Indo-Bangladesh borderland issues in Meghalaya

Introduction

In South Asia, borderlands are among the most important issues and spaces in the wider context of studies on international relations. They remain heavily contested, fragile and permeable, representing often an aftermath of haphazard colonial demarcations that still haunt the sub-continent, even turning into what has been called ‘killer border’ in the Indo-Bangladesh context (Ranjan, 2018: 89). Securing a nation’s boundaries regarding entry and exit of foreign nationals and protecting the nation’s citizens from any dangers posed by cross-border movements is an evident concern of any sovereign state, also on the borders between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India on the other side of South Asia. As such, it is natural for states to seek to control their porous boundaries. At least this is what public policies and official statements suggest.

Local realities, however, as this article confirms through close observation of the borderlands between the Indian state of Meghalaya and several districts of northern Bangladesh in the Rangpur, Mymensingh and Sylhet Divisions, are quite different. This article is, therefore, also adding to the literature on post-colonialism and debates of colonial legacies in South Asia, by highlighting the continuing liminality of borderlands and the porosity of national borders, arbitrarily drawn at some point in history. This issue is completely ‘alive’ not only between India and Bangladesh, but also for example at the Torkham border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is well-known to be a smugglers’ paradise, with unchecked cross-border movements not only for trade, but giving rise to serious concerns about security and terrorism. While the Meghalaya–Bangladesh borderlands have been relatively low-key in such wider respects, theoretical and practical dilemmas of border management arise for the concerned states and local people (Jamwal, 2004; Ranjan, 2018; van Schendel, 2005). At ground level, various factors make local people move back and forth across these borders, often without formal controls. Such constant low-key movement needs to be seen as part of local survival mechanisms in scenarios of liminality and neglect of peripheral borderland territories and their people by state agencies (Jamwal, 2004: 31). In the long run, this may cause considerable harm, including increased security risks, not only to these local communities, but also the respective nation states. It may even, as recent dramatic press reports (Kharmujai, 2020) suggest, invigorate local politics of development, belonging and citizenship.

Given that the Indo-Bangladesh border of Meghalaya is so evidently permeable, this article discusses various legal and illegal activities involved in cross-border movements, which continue to occur and raise various concerns (Ranjan, 2018). The main purpose is to provide close insights of village level micro-scenarios to illustrate local borderland predicaments. Formal interviews and a questionnaire-based methodology were unsuitable for this kind of study, which covers various illegal activities, so that many respondents would not wish to be identified. The author, himself a local resident of Meghalaya, therefore used unstructured ad hoc purposive interviews with numerous unidentified respondents as well as participant observation over several months between July 2017 and February 2018, to depict the partly precarious realities of people’s cross-border activities as part of their daily life in a neglected borderland region of India.

The article first provides a brief conceptual background about notions of border, boundaries and borderlands, and briefly locates the study in its historical and spatial context. The fluid (in)formal manifestations of people’s cross-border movements in the borderland of Meghalaya then form the main body of this article in several sections. These accounts of navigating various types of border-crossing lead to a concluding analysis that does not call for closing the borders with walls or fencing, but stresses the need for continued cross-border relationships among these local people. Yet, it also warns about the long-term, potentially dangerous implications of wider demographic and political changes in this region, particularly if uncontrolled migration across manifestly porous borders grows to non-sustainable extents.

Boundaries and Borderlands

Historically, the epoch between the two World Wars was central in the establishment of terminologies regarding national boundaries, with a number of keywords appearing in political and geographical language (Paasi, 1996). These words created proclivities for fixed meanings of concepts like boundary, border, frontier and borderland. General understanding of the term ‘border’ refers to inter-state or international borders that demarcate sovereign entities in the world’s state-centric system (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Prescott, 1987; Vaughan-Williams, 2012). The term ‘borderland’ includes adjacent areas, a transition zone within which the boundary lies (Baud & van Schendel, 1997; Prescott, 1987). Borderlands remain spaces of securitisation, violence, uncertainty and fluidity (O’Dowd, 2010). Sometimes, borders are dotted with gunmen and lined with barbed wire, seen at many border sections between India and Pakistan (Lakshmi, 2020), but also between India and Bangladesh (Datta, 2018). As structural entities, borders can generate different effects in diverse circumstances. They can facilitate crossing as well as enclose and divide (Piliavsky, 2013: 41). Borders are also an emotional space, often dividing families, and they may become sites of ethnic conflict (Ranjan, 2018: 28). A boundary, on the other hand, signifies a more neutral, instrumental line of physical contact between sovereign states, which offers prospects for co-operation (Perkmann & Sum, 2002), but it may also generate disputes and larger conflicts.

Frontier denotes a somewhat different spatial category and refers to a zone, either a political division between states, or between settled and uninhabited parts of a country, famously theorised for the USA (Turner, 1996 [1920]). The notion of ‘frontier’ has been understood as more outward-oriented than ‘border’, signifying a zone of contact rather than a line of separation (Taylor, 1993). In the modern world system of states, traditional zones of contact, earlier perceived as frontiers, notably also in the Pashtun borderlands, are everywhere replaced by boundaries (Friedmann, 1996).

Borderland studies have recently become a mushrooming inter-disciplinary activity that recognises borderlands as laboratories of socio-cultural and political change. Many scholars emphasise efficient recognition of borders and borderlands as critical zones at the margins of state control (Gellner, 2013; Harris, 2013; Jones, 2012; Kalir & Sur, 2013). Borderlands are also emotional spaces, connected by people to memory and identity (Ranjan, 2018: 28–35). They are often socio-spatially discrete zones (Piliavsky, 2013: 24), fundamentally different entities, peripheral to the respective nation. Often this geographical isolation in time and space has resulted in border residents being and feeling marginalised, reflecting historically unequal and contested distributions of power in a particular economy and society (Turner & Ashworth, 1996).

India’s Borderlands

India’s numerous borderlands have recently emerged more prominently in the literature and are discussed as areas within which the new literature on borders is being challenged, tested and theorised (Aggarwal, 2004; Aggarwal & Bhan, 2009; Gellner, 2013; Jones, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Shewly, 2013). Within this literature, a notable emerging focus on national security (Jones, 2009a, 2012) provides multiple indications that border management poses also huge practical dilemmas (Jamwal, 2004; Ranjan, 2018) and impacts on local people.

This article focuses on the borders between Meghalaya and Bangladesh. India’s states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram together share about 4,096 km of borders with Bangladesh (Jamwal, 2004: 5). Under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, this boundary line was drawn in much haste as the date for India’s partition on 14–15 August 1947 was approaching (Chakravarty, 2015a, 2015b; Jamwal, 2004: 5–6; Ranjan, 2018: 44–52). Natural barriers were often ignored, and instead the boundary was drawn on the basis of old district maps (Das, 2010: 2). Hence, the international border passes right through villages, dividing communities and settlements (Jamwal, 2004: 8). In numerous cases, it even put people’s home in one country and their agricultural land in the other, making the border unnatural and completely arbitrary, without recognition of micro-level local needs.

The entire stretch of the Indo-Bangladesh border consists mainly of rugged territory, with numerous rivers, hilly and marshy areas making it difficult for India to build the sturdy fencing it anticipated, while Bangladesh opposes this fencing (Ranjan, 2018: 118). Critical studies (Hussain, 2013) have argued that it has been largely impossible for India to control the silent crossing of persons along the boundary line, which has occurred for decades (Ranjan, 2018: 89). The Border Security Force (BSF), the watchdog of the Indian government, is not completely efficient, nor vigilant enough in guarding the boundary line. It has instead urged border residents to be watchful to prevent illegal intrusion from Bangladesh (Shillong Today, 2020). Figure 1 depicts the local scenario.

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Figure 1.

Source: Map drawn by the author.

The tribal hill state of Meghalaya covers an area of only about 22,430 km². According to the 2011 Census (Government of Meghalaya, 2014: 2–5), its population has been estimated at 2,966,887, among whom 2,555,861 are tribal and 411,026 are non-tribals, with a population density of 132/km². The tribal people, as ancient inhabitants of this region, are mainly Khasis and Garos, whereas non-tribals include Bengalis, Nepalis, Assamese and some others.

Figure 1 shows that Meghalaya is bounded in the south by Bangladesh’s divisions of Mymensingh and Sylhet and in the west by Rangpur division. According to the 2011 census (Bangladesh, 2011), Mymensingh has a total population of 11,370,000 with a density of 1,100/km², Sylhet has a total population of 9,910,219 with a density of 810/km², whereas Rangpur has a population of 15,787,758 with a density of 980/km². This comparison establishes immediately that the relatively sparsely peopled hill state of Meghalaya shares its boundary of 443 km with three heavily populated plain divisions of Bangladesh. In this area, ever since the partition of August 1947, after a referendum in Sylhet (Ranjan, 2018: 50), the deprivations of the local tribal people have continued to be ignored. The border, mainly running through hilly jungle areas and riverine territory, is much longer than the roughly 263 km of Assam’s border with Bangladesh. Since much infiltration has been identified in Assam (Goswami, 2006), there is considerably more writing on the responses in that state (Ranjan, 2018: 92–9).

Prior to the partition in 1947, many tribal people in the Meghalaya borderlands owned agricultural land in the plain areas which are now Bangladesh. Besides, some common marketplaces (haats) existed where people from present-day Meghalaya and neighbouring divisions of Bangladesh bartered their products. Tribals would bring forest produce to these markets, including spices, whereas Bengalis brought fish and vegetables. Back then, some tribal people went to the plains to plough their fields, and many Bengalis used the hills for recreation. Through the 1947 partition, the local areas of Meghalaya suddenly became a borderland. Literally overnight, many tribals lost their agricultural lands in the plains and the Bengalis could no longer visit the hills. Many existing connections between the tribes of Meghalaya and the Bengalis of East Pakistan/Bangladesh were simply cut and Meghalaya’s borderland became even more isolated. The new boundary seriously affected commercial centres and local markets, disrupting business activities that locals had established. To avoid hardship, thousands of tribal people migrated to the upper zones of Meghalaya, adjacent to Assam. Since it was difficult for the majority to abandon their native areas, they are still living in the borderland, mostly pursuing their old occupations.

There are 10 border blocks of Meghalaya sharing the boundary line with Bangladesh (see Figure 1). Of these, Khliehriat with an area of 2115 km² is the largest, while Amlarem is the smallest (Government of Meghalaya, 2014). The population density in these 10 border blocks shows wide variations. It is much higher in Zikzak and Pynursla in the West Garo Hills and East Khasi Hills, respectively, compared to the state average of 132/km² (Government of Meghalaya, 2014: 2–5). Rongara is the least densely populated border block with a density of 30 persons per km²; overall the borderland remains sparsely peopled.

Barriers Dominating the Borderlands of Meghalaya

Borderland residents of Meghalaya are mostly earning their livelihood working at the steep slopes in the forests. They engage in traditional agricultural occupations, producing fruits, including oranges, lemons, sohkwit (a sour fruit bigger than lemons), lychees, jackfruit, papaya and pineapple. Wild pepper, betel leaf and nuts, bay leaf and broomsticks are cultivated in the area, which also produces high-quality honey, much in demand in the market. Rearing of local poultry and piggery are prominent village activities.

Though the borderland is rich in forest products, its infrastructure is extremely underdeveloped. Many villages, such as Huroi, Hingaria, Lailong, Lejriroad, Lyngkhat, Nongjri and Gasuapara, are accessible only by kutcha roads, mud lanes with deep pits and potholes filled with water, rendering such roads non-motorable, especially during the rainy season (Kharmujai, 2020). This situation is worst for roads leading to the last hamlets before the border. Even the national highway from Jowai to Ratacherra (NH-44) is in a pathetic condition. Borderland residents have to carry their agricultural produce on their backs to reach the market, making it difficult to transport goods to the nearby towns of Khliehriat, Pynursla, Sohra, Mawkyrwat, Williamnagar and cities such as Shillong and Tura. Many borderland villages and hamlets have no road at all, and the area also lacks healthcare infrastructures. In some villages, Community Health Centres (CHC) and Primary Health Centres exist, but no qualified physicians. For instance, the large border village of Ryngku in Mawsynram block has a CHC, but lack of medical staff has been creating serious problems, as reported in The Shillong Times of 17 January 2018. Access to health facilities in many border blocks poses huge challenges, especially when a doctor is present just once or twice a week and there is an emergency. Such situations force Meghalaya’s border residents to trek to Bangladesh for medical emergencies (Sunavala, 2017).

The situation is similarly dire in education. A common problem in many primary schools is teacher shortage. Moreover, students are at the mercy of the ‘master’, as teachers are called, who may delegate the teaching to others, as reported by a border village teacher on 17 December 2017. Border areas also lack reliable power supplies and telecommunications connectivity remains extremely poor, as private service providers are not interested in the borderlands because of low profitability and difficult terrain. Jamwal (2004: 20–1) mentions many government programmes to integrate the border areas since the 1980s, but the Government of Meghalaya has not taken up any significant development schemes to assist borderland residents. As a result, borderland areas continue to have low levels of attainment in health indicators, education, transport, telecommunication and economic development.

Border Haats as an Economic Asset of the Borderland

A decisive step was taken by the governments of India and Bangladesh to revive border markets (haats) after many decades, marked by signing of a Memorandum of Understanding at New Delhi on 23 October 2010. In Meghalaya, a border haat was officially opened in Kalaichar in 2011 in the presence of the Union Commerce Minister of India, Anand Sharma, and his Bangladeshi counterpart, Muhammad Faruk Khan, as well as the Chief Minister of Meghalaya (Talukdar, 2011). Officers of India’s BSF and the Border Guards of Bangladesh (BGB) were present at this inauguration. Another official border haat started from 2012 at Balat in Meghalaya, close to Dalora in Bangladesh (Mukherjee, 2016). Borderland inhabitants can now buy and sell a range of specified goods, including local agricultural/horticultural products, spices, minor forest produce (excluding timber), fresh and dry fish, dairy and poultry products. Cottage industry items, wooden furniture, handloom and handicraft items are also permitted and people may use Bangladeshi Takas or Indian Rupees. The Memorandum of Understanding suggests that purchase per person is limited to the equivalent of 100 dollars (Nath, 2018: 16; Business Standard, 2015).

This revival of border haats is welcome, but the locals remain unhappy. Tribals from Meghalaya are eager to purchase hilsa fish from the haats, but the Bangladeshi government barred its export since 2012, so as not to deprive its own citizens of this Bengali delicacy (Chakraborty, 2016). Bangladeshis want to buy beef, but its sale is prohibited in the haats. The inaccessibility of such desired items generates disappointment. Restrictions of sales also frustrate locals who expected significant financial gains from these border haats.

Meghalaya’s Unfenced Border: A Smuggler’s Paradise

These commercially unsatisfactory formal border markets encourage people to think beyond nations and their restrictive regulations. Officially, border haats are the only places where citizens of both countries can trade and meet each other, but the actual borderland market is much more diverse. The border has over 100 ‘unfenced areas’ of streams, rivers, drains and culverts, apart from an unfenced portion of 90 km and many other unofficial old border haats along the 443 km of the border (The Northeast Today, 2017). These ‘unfenced areas’ are places where citizens of both sides can easily mingle (Majaw, 2014). In Huroi and neighbouring villages, Bangladeshis often enter India to buy basic items from village shops (dukan shnong), where they will speak freely to locals whom they know well, but will avoid talking to unknown persons, as related by a villager from Huroi on 21 July 2017. Similarly, at the border town of Dawki, the boundary is completely unfenced. The author witnessed unruly movements of tourists along this unfenced border, which is a beauty spot, on 27 December 2017. A BSF jawan, identifiable by the name tag on his uniform, sought to control the crowd with a whistle. He reprimanded a group of young Bangladeshis taking pictures with a selfie stick near the water of Umngot River within India’s territory. The author asked this BSF officer how he could differentiate whether people are Indian or Bangladeshi. The polite answer was ‘from their faces’ (shakal se). About 90 per cent of people here are Bengalis, either from Silchar in India or from Sylhet in Bangladesh, they have similar features and mostly speak Sylheti. Clearly, anyone can enter the territory of the other state even in broad daylight, and detection of infiltrators is difficult, confirmed also by Jamwal (2004: 24).

By contrast, barbed wire fencing exists along the border of Shella Bholaganj block, where haat Shella is the area’s largest market place. Here, Bangladeshis are not seen as buyers or sellers at this market, yet by itself, ‘fencing is not a barrier’ (Jamwal, 2004: 25). Apparently, Bangladeshis can build ‘rapport’ with local villagers, guiding them through culverts, as disclosed to the author on 25 January 2018. That very day, a Bangladeshi with two plastic bags full of fish was caught by the BSF at the border of Dalia village, while he was waiting for his accomplice to complete their business.

From Dalia to Kalatek, over about 4 km, hundreds of culverts and two unfenced open spaces are found. Similar conditions in many border areas in Meghalaya reflect that trust and intimate relations between citizens of both countries still exist. These ‘unfenced areas’ allow locals to continue cross-border networks and partnerships. Day-to-day activities, communication and interaction between them take place, with free flow of goods and people. These are also safe passages for illegal trading. A local business woman from a border village told the author at Haat Dawki on 27 December 2017 that especially ‘in autumn and early winter, Indian tomatoes (sohbaingon) are in high demand from Bangladesh’. Items like kerosene, salt, Mother India biris and ganja are transferred from India to Bangladesh. Another local trader told the author on 21 October 2017 that Indian soaps, shampoo and certain medicines like the cough syrup Phensedyl, which is banned in India, are in high demand across the border, confirmed by occasional press reports of such goods being seized, as seen in The Sentinel of 18 November 2017. Indian liquor, especially Officer’s Choice whisky, is another prominent commodity.

As noted earlier, besides these consumer items, cattle smuggling is a lucrative business (Ranjan, 2018: 109; The Telegraph, 2017). While beef export from India is officially forbidden, transport of cattle to Meghalaya itself remains possible, as beef is a delicious food item for most of Meghalaya’s hill people. Cattle transports are arranged by rail and trucks from distant states like Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to West Bengal and onwards to Assam, from where transports go to Meghalaya by road to certain border villages at night. Cattle are herded through many plantation areas and cross the border to reach fixed spots in Bangladesh. Plantation owners receive ₹100 for each animal allowed to pass through. To secure safe passage through up to 10 plantation areas, ₹1,000 may be required per animal. But, for the parties involved in this cattle business, that is a meagre amount. Each animal is worth about ₹15,000 for traders in Assam. On reaching Bangladesh, the value rises to ₹60,000, depending on the animal’s size, as the author learnt in two different villages. Jamwal (2004: 14) reports different strategies to smuggle about 1.7 million animals into Bangladesh per year. The final payment may not be cashless. Sometimes, the author was told, a truckload of cattle is exchanged for three gold biscuits, approximately 36 tolas of gold.

Haat Thymmai is not an official border market. Here, Bangladeshis communicate in Bengali and the local Khasi language and Takas were used in transactions. Nearby is a wine store, used by citizens of both countries, but liquor that costs an Indian ₹80 will be sold to a Bangladeshi for ₹150, as the author found on 16 January 2018. The BGB obtain drinks from this wine store, too, sending fellow Bangladeshis to buy this, as BGB staff are obviously prohibited from crossing into India. Visiting this haat, the author met a ninth standard Indian student of a secondary school. Still relatively short, he looked simple but was an expert in cattle smuggling. Munching kwai (betel nut and betel leaf), he talked about his frequent visits to Bisnakandi, a border township of Sylhet district. With two young friends, he confirmed how easy it is to trick the border guards. As locals, familiar with the terrain, using different routes through the thick jungles made it easy for these boys to avoid detection. When the boss (kingpin) calls them, using a Banglalink SIM, this means dealers are waiting in Bisnakandi. Bringing cattle to Bangladesh has given them good incomes. On the eve of Id-ul-Zuha, the demand rises, as another villager confirmed on 19 July 2017. To deceive the BSF, smugglers adopt several tactics, including a well-oiled counter-intelligence network, with linesmen telling them where the BSF are located. Secondly, transporters ensure the cattle cross the border quietly and efficiently. Finally, agents take the cattle to certain pre-arranged destinations in Bangladesh. Such smuggling networks along the border are strong and sometimes the BSF are attacked and distracted with stones and other devices (The Telegraph, 2017). The BGB’s Additional Director General, Md Zahid Hasan, according to The Shillong Times of 16 July 2017, asked India to curb cattle smuggling, but such rhetoric hides a massive business. More than 8,000 animals were seized from the borderland of Meghalaya from 2011 to 2016 (The Telegraph, 2017). Ranjan (2018: 108–9) also highlights this issue and cites reports that this cattle trade is worth US$ 500 million annually. Reflecting intensified controls, in 2019 the BSF in Meghalaya seized 10,239 heads of cattle worth ₹16.86 crores (Business Standard, 2020).

At Nongjri, a cluster of villages, there is an unofficial border haat with about 50 small shops in tin sheds. The village headman (matabor) explained on 11 January 2018 that this haat is located 30m from the Mazargoan and Boromsitipur villages, and less than 100m from the villages of Dayali, Chairag and Batrai in Bangladesh. This old haat, which continued to operate unofficially even after partition in 1947, is open from 10:00 AM to 3:00 PM. Nongjri has a secondary school and three BSF camps for its protection. But, Nongjri and its haat are connected only by a kaccha road, while Bangladeshis can easily reach this market to trade and interact with inhabitants of Nongjri and surrounding areas. On 11 January 2018, the author asked three BSF jawans about this international boundary. They explained politely that above 70 per cent of the haat goers are men from Bangladesh. Four Bangladeshi women were seen washing plates in an Indian tea shop. Bengali was a common language and Bangladeshi currency was extensively used. Even Indians have more Takas than Rupees.

The use of Takas for daily transactions, very common for borderland villagers, is not restricted to haats. In fact, during the demonetisation of ₹500 and ₹1,000 notes in late 2016, when Meghalaya’s people, too, were facing serious scarcity of currency notes, the borderland villagers were not bothered, as the author learnt on 19 January 2018. Notably, the Meghalaya Border Areas Development Minister tried to claim that Takas are not used in Meghalaya’s borderland (India Today, 2017) and repeated this in the Business Standard of the same day. The difference of official claims and unofficial reality is stark.

Clearly, inhabitants of this remote borderland of Meghalaya have to cope with multiple situations of deficiency. In most parts of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills districts, Indian SIM cards have poor signals and landline connections are unavailable. Poor quality Indian SIM signals forced locals to use Bangladesh SIM cards, such as Grameenphone, Robi Axiata Limited (Robi) and Banglalink, the latter much better than others, as the author learnt on 16 January 2018. In Nongjri, one Banglalink SIM costs ₹150–200, but in haat Thymmai the price is ₹400–500. SIM cards and top-up cards of these companies are available in local shops for borderland residents. Grameenphone and Robi SIM are much cheaper, but their services are unreliable, especially in jungle areas. Though they do not really want to use Banglalink SIM cards, as making calls to Indian SIM cards is costly, locals have no choice, as a former village leader at haat Nongjri confirmed on 11 January 2018. Donkupar Roy, the former Opposition Leader of Meghalaya, said in the State Assembly: ‘I also got one Bangladesh SIM card, but refused to use it because I know it is illegal. However, the people in the border area are compelled to use Bangladesh SIM cards for communication’ (Lyngdoh, 2020). Roy, who represents Shella constituency, also said that during his visit to a border area he noticed a BSF jawan using a Bangladesh SIM card. People know that such cards are illegal, but use them because Indian mobiles have no reliable network. The availability and functioning of Bangladesh SIM cards in the borderlands allows intruders, including cattle smugglers and gold dealers, to conduct their business freely across the two countries. This is indeed a security issue, and also constitutes a loss to Indian cellphone companies, while Bangladeshi providers reap the profits.

Getting in and out of Meghalaya’s Borderland

The movement of people between the borderlands of India and Bangladesh did not end with partition in 1947 (Ranjan, 2018: 89). In areas where the border was fenced, intruders might damage the barbed wire. There may not be high-volume movement like in Assam, but the unfenced gaps allow Bangladeshis to cross the border into Meghalaya. Baghmara, Ghasuapara, Mahendraganj, Borsora, Shella, Nongjri, Haat Thymmai, Dawki and other borderland villages are regular entry and exit points. High demand for cheap labour in coal-mining areas and construction work is said to be chiefly responsible for this influx to Meghalaya and many children have been trafficked to work as cheap labourers in coal mines (Majaw, 2014: 132–3; Majaw, 2016: 45; Nayak, 2015). Long-term contact means that Meghalaya tribals do not consider Bangladeshis as strangers, and some tribal women are happy to enter marriages. A restaurateur of Haat Nongjri said her youngest cousin sister eloped with a stranger from Bangladesh, whom she met at the haat. A woman from Nongshken, who is unwilling to leave her natal village, expects her partner from Bangladesh to visit her. Such marriages do not occur only in borderland villages, but have spread to the main towns of Meghalaya, where there are many children of mixed nationalities. As reported by several interlocutors, in some instances the husband left the wife and children after a few years of togetherness.

Some people from Meghalaya support Bangladeshis entering India, as they assist them in smuggling activities. Through such engagements, citizens of the two countries build trust and understanding, and also gain courage to silently cross the border to participate in each other’s festivals. During Id-ul-Zuha, many natives of Meghalaya visit Bangladesh, crossing the border without passports. Bangladeshis are welcomed to enter Meghalaya during the traditional Phur Nongjri festival. According to several interlocutors, they also come to witness the famous tribal dance (Shad Suk Mynsiem) of the Umniuh-Tmar border village, where gambling entertains many visitors during this festival. On such occasions, the BGB and BSF fail to prevent infiltrations, as natives of both countries are traditionally welcomed at each other’s festivals. At a football field near haat Thymmai on 16 January 2018, a BGB jawan invited the author to visit Bisnakandi in Sylhet district. Asked whether it is possible to enter Bangladesh without valid documents, the response was that ‘just to visit Bisnakandi, there is no problem’. People from Meghalaya entering Bangladesh during Id-ul-Zuha are excited to visit a foreign country, while entering India allows Bangladeshis to experience the pleasant weather of the hill areas, to explore job opportunities, and even to search for new shelters and wives.

Such border crossings sometimes have horrific consequences. Two informants told the author on 27 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 that the throats of gold smugglers from Umniuh-Tmar village were cut and they were robbed by their workers from Bangladesh. Some people never returned home from attending Id-ul-Zuha. A woman from Nongjri told the author on 3 July 2017 that Bangladeshis cut a Nongjri man into pieces. A wealthy family in the border village of Suktia was killed by their Bangladeshi workers, as reported by a young man on 3 December 2017, and the killers also looted the property.

Despite three BSF camps, the people of Nongjri feel unsafe and have arranged their own armed security guards. The former village headman of Nongjri said on 11 January 2018 that Bangladeshis have now become violent. A man going alone to the local haat is no longer safe, though the lane leading to the market is only about 150m long, going through plantation areas. As the border is entirely unfenced, this facilitates sudden violent attacks from beyond the boundary line, so that walking alone through this lane means putting one’s life in danger. The criminals are more aggressive against women. Returning from the haat, women walking through this lane should be in groups, as the criminals will push a victim swiftly into Bangladeshi territory, which is merely 10m away on the left side of the footpath. Once dragged into Bangladesh’s territory, ‘you cannot do anything at all’ (phim lah leh eiei shuh) said the former village head. In the haat, the citizens of both countries depend on each other’s business, but beyond this, now nobody can be trusted, and the three BSF camps are insufficient to protect the land and people of Nongjri. For those from beyond the border, crossing this lane to the haat means a chance to pluck betel nuts from the trees. The strong desire to steal betel nuts makes Bangladeshis fearless even of the fully armed security guards of this village community, who are now policing the plantation area. Sometimes, the former village leader said, the bullets of these village guards kill those who cross the boundary line.

Prevailing Scenario on Either Side of the Borderland

While Bangladesh has been growing at a strong pace (Ranjan, 2018: 138), it remains one of the world’s poorest and most densely populated countries in the world (BMEF, 2009). With a population of 165 million in 2019, it is the world’s most densely populated rural country, with a density of 1,104 people per km² (Karim, 2020). While at least one-third of the population still lives below the poverty line, many suffer extreme poverty. Quite apart from the fallouts of the current COVID pandemic, the ambitious plans for a Golden Bengal (Sonar Bangla) have not materialised earlier (Jamwal, 2004: 13), partly due to disasters related to climate change. These include more severe floods than earlier, cyclones, riverbank erosions and landslides (Government of Bangladesh, 2009; Hossain et al., 2020: 1; Islam et al., 2015), while the risks of drought were examined by Shahid and Behrawan (2008). High population density and hazardous ecological conditions subject millions of rural Bangladeshis to destruction of their farms and livelihoods, forcing many to move (Government of Bangladesh, 2009; Kabir et al., 2018). People living in the divisions of Bangladesh bordering on the hills of Meghalaya are facing similar problems, whether in Rangpur (The Independent, 2019), Bogura (Bilu, 2020) or in and around Sylhet (Chowdhury, 2020; Islam, 2017; Islam & Islam, 2017).

A combination of inefficient and corrupt border security agencies, unfenced gaps and numerous culverts and other loopholes in the border protection system seems to encourage Bangladeshi victims of natural disasters to establish contacts with borderland inhabitants in Meghalaya and other Indian states. While India as a whole has more than 3 million Bangladeshi migrants (Khadria, 2009: 52), much focus has been on Assam (Hazarika, 1993). Census figures for 2001 in Meghalaya indicated only 7,410 male and 4,950 female immigrants born outside India (Khadria, 2009: 50). But recently, Meghalaya has also become known for illegal infiltrations from Bangladesh. About 100 have been detected and deported during the past decade, including a high-ranking politician of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Salahuddin Ahmed, who in May 2015 was arrested in Shillong after having illegally crossed into India (The Times of India, 2015). Table 1 show the number of Bangladeshi nationals detected and deported from Meghalaya to Bangladesh from 2012 to 2016, based on a report from the Anti-Infiltration Directorate, Government of Meghalaya.

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Table 1.

Numbers of Doubtful Citizens Detected by the Police

Year	Detected	Deported
2012	268	264
2013	169	168
2014	74	71
2015	71	67
2016	115	99
Total	697	669

Source: The Shillong Times (2017).

Less prominent people who remain undetected are not afraid to stay, because for them it is often a question of survival. In some border villages, it is easier for newcomers to hide their identity among numerous Bengali speakers who migrated earlier from Rangpur, Sylhet and Mymensingh divisions. Brokers (dalal) are willing to help Bangladeshis hide their national identity in Meghalaya’s borderland, of course for some rewards. The Dalal will provide them work and takes a cut of their earnings, often readily accepted to secure survival. This becomes the start of a new beginning for borderland migrants. Prolonged stay in the area encourages them in due course to include their names in electoral rolls, as happens all over India. Jamwal (2004: 16) cites estimates of about 600,000 Bangladeshis in Delhi. This formalisation process was observed in 2016 by the author, a native of Meghalaya, when middle-aged non-tribals from Bangladesh living in Bholaganj, a cluster of villages including Shella, Majai and Kalatek, were trying to enrol themselves as voters at Sohra Civil Sub-Division office.

The slowly resultant demographic change is now visible in many areas of the Garo Hills. In March 2012, the plain belt of Garo Hills through the Social Welfare Association (SWA), under the leadership of Sofiur Rahman as General Secretary, demanded the creation of a separate Plain Belt District, called by some observers a Bengali Muslim Kingdom, covering the entire plain belt from Tikrikilla of North Garo Hills to Mahendraganj in the South West Garo Hills districts (Meghalaya Times, 2012). This is an area where Bengali speakers have become the local majority. According to Dr Azad Zaman, a Congress legislator from this area, this plain belt presently has 250,000 people, 100 mosques and 35 temples (The Shillong Times, 2020).

The South West Garo Hills district is bordering Rangpur division of Bangladesh, whereas the North Garo Hills district is bordering on Assam’s Dhubri district, a gateway of infiltration from Rangpur division to Assam (Goswami, 2006: 2). This demand for a separate Plain Belt District alarmed the Garos, a community who have suddenly become a minority. The SWA demand was rejected by the government of Meghalaya. Had the government agreed to a Plain Belt District for the Bengali Muslims, communal bloodshed would have occurred. Equally concerning, recent reports now indicate that five neglected border villages with about 5,000 inhabitants are demanding to be allowed to secede to Bangladesh (Kharmujai, 2020). This reflects the demographic changes outlined above, but may also constitute part of an intensifying bargaining technique to achieve better government support for infrastructure improvements in the Meghalaya borderlands.

Conclusions

The borderlands of Meghalaya are an area of low development, poor transportation and weak communication networks, definitely isolated in terms of accessibility to the state’s main towns for borderland villagers, while Bangladesh is just across the border and offers certain attractions. The state government has lacked commitment to address infrastructural problems. To escape being marginalised, the border inhabitants need others from beyond the border, especially regarding trade and mobile phone connections. This article showed how many unfenced sections of the border and numerous culverts in the jungles facilitate engagement in clandestine crossborder activities. Hence, the silent flow of goods, cattle and illicit trade in the area has become rampant. Border agencies have remained ineffective to control smuggling and cross-border movement, while a strong network of agencies and middlemen intensifies such interactions. The government of Meghalaya has not shown sufficient interest in formulating policies for local development and concern regarding the free entry of Bangladeshis to its territory. Recently, socio–political organisations of Meghalaya have served quit notices on all Bangladeshi labourers in the coal mine areas, considering that they are coming to Meghalaya via Assam. These groups have repeatedly demanded that the influx of other Indians to this predominantly tribal state be stopped, fearing submergence by non-tribal outsiders (Hazarika, 2019).

But they have not said anything about cattle smuggling and other clandestine activities, including multiple intrusions across the borderland. Border-crossing is now becoming a matter of increasing concern for the security of borderland inhabitants. The porosity of the border has spoilt the environment to such an extent that border inhabitants are now facing dangers arising from trans-border crimes. In this borderland, India risks losing its sovereignty, as local inhabitants do not see the BSF as a reliable protection force. This could be the main reason why some village communities in the border region now have their own security guards.

To border inhabitants of Meghalaya, this arbitrarily drawn international boundary is not a real frontier. It is a space of ambiguity, a laboratory of socio–economic and socio–cultural change, now presenting novel challenges for local tribal people, who risk becoming a minority in their own land. The border hardly plays a role as a bulwark or a limiting point, as money and other tangible products are still flowing across this boundary, which remains a space or gateway that is open to all. Since many locals seem to integrate well with their neighbours from Bangladesh, this has decreased the significance of the boundary line and affected India’s sovereignty, as people from both sides defy this national boundary. The fluid nature of this boundary line itself is one among many pull factors for cross-border activities, together with economic and environmental reasons.

However, as the demographic changes are rather one-sided, and more Bangladeshis come to Meghalaya, new challenges have arisen. The borderland people of Meghalaya will need to ponder about their protection and their loyalty, because they are in such close contact with Bangladeshis, on whom they depend for trade, Takas and telecommunication. It appears that a silent storm from Bangladesh is quietly engulfing this borderland of Meghalaya, raising new questions of security and identity for the borderland inhabitants. The suggested solution cannot be increased polyphonic rhetoric about nationalism, building walls and more fences or a total closing of the borders. What is needed are locality-sensitive monitoring of cross-border movements and strengthened local development processes in Meghalaya’s borderlands. However, that, in turn, may create new attractions for more migrants from Bangladesh.