Commons,Land Ownership and Governance amongst the Marams of Manipur

Introduction

In most Asian and African societies which experienced European colonialism, land and forest governance is marked by pluralism with a corresponding dualism between customary law and modern statutory law (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Woodhouse, 2006). Among the tribal communities of North-East India, this plurality historically evolved by recognising diverse socio-cultural realities through autonomous provisions or a territorialised regime of governmental exception (Haokip, 2022; Hausing, 2022; Wouters, 2020). Land and forest have often been imbued with collective identity and often perceived as community or common resources with different patterns of commoning. Non-commoditised relations, subsistence-based resource use and autonomous provisions for self-governance have historically fostered the prevalence of commons. Moreover, the Sixth Schedule in states such as Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura, and the Hill Areas Committee along with Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in Manipur, guaranteed special rights for self-governance. Although these provisions are territorial devices to manage ethnic conflicts, aspirations and relations, they have always been subject to contestations, conflicts and negotiation due to competing authority and power dynamics (Haokip, 2022; Hausing, 2022; Karlsson, 2011). As and when the state interfered with these provisions by attempting to impose uniform land and forest legislations, tribes opposed such efforts in order to protect their primordial rights.

In Manipur, the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereafter MLR & LR Act), has been implemented in the valley inhabited by the dominant Meitei community, whereas the tribes in the hills remain under customary law (Haokip, 2021; Kamei, 2018; Singh, 2025; Sitlhou, 2015). Therefore, private property is eminent in the valley, and diverse common property systems that are culturally embedded exist among the hill tribes. Within the Naga tribes there are individual, clan or headman property, while among the Kukis, ownership belongs to the chief with villagers’ usufructuary rights (Devi, 2006: 2; Ray, 1991: 170). However, there have been multiple attempts to extend the MLR & LR Act to the hill areas, the latest being the Seventh Amendment Bill, 2015—which was directed to introduce private and state property systems. Another controversial legislation was the Manipur Hill Areas (Acquisition of the Chiefs’ Rights) Act, 1967. The Act was aimed at abolishing chieftainship, compensating the chiefs and implementing the MLR & LR Act 1960, thereby acting as a means to authorise the state government to acquire rights, title and land in the hill areas (Bhatia, 2010; Chaube, 1999; Shimray, 2009: 92). These Acts sought to redefine indigenous customs and weaken traditional authority over land and forest. Thus the acts were opposed by the tribes and subsequently not enforced. This complex and dynamic issue necessitates a village-level analysis to unravel how tribes associate with their resources in terms of ownership, benefit-sharing and governance mechanisms.

Accordingly, this article examines the typologies of landed property, including forest; classification of resource systems; access rights; external provisioning; and governance mechanisms thereof amongst the Marams of Manipur. The Marams are one of the Naga tribes. They refer to themselves as ‘Maranamei, i.e. people of the Marams’ (Tiba, 2013: 9, 30). This etymology is linked to an important village called Maram Khullen (Sen, 1992: 55), which is regarded as the custodian of their socio-cultural practices. Their territory disperses across the Senapati district of Manipur. The article is premised on fieldwork undertaken in two of the prominent villages of the community, Maram Khullen and Willong Khullen. The villages were selected since they are considered the oldest settlements and still display relevance of the customary tenure system, traditional institutions of governance, and high dependence on land and forest resources. The predominant means of livelihood is agriculture and allied activities, reflecting a typical rural livelihood that heavily relies on land and forest. Moreover, they are relatively isolated, with no public transport facility, and depend on Senapati and Maram town for education, healthcare and trade. The field work was conducted in two phases: July to August 2019 and August to September 2022. Interview questions were semi-structured and open-ended, oriented towards investigating the respondents’ practices, perspectives and experiences. Respondents included important stakeholders such as the village council members, men, women and youth. Interviews were recorded using a recorder; thereafter, they were transcribed and coded into themes for objective analysis. Simultaneously, field observations facilitated the acquisition of knowledge on the ground and verification of the information provided by respondents. Secondary literature has also been relied upon to substantiate the argument as and when necessary. The article demonstrates that the notion of property among the Marams is not a binary of private versus commons, that the governance mechanism is polycentric and kin-nested, that commons function as social insurance for livelihood sustenance and security, and that the existence of a collective governance mechanism over commons limits accumulation of landed property by elites.

Customary Tenure and Land Ownership

Tribal societies are known for customary values marked by mutual coexistence and concern. These facilitate the sharing of resources beyond barriers of ownership, especially with those in need, leading to social cohesion within the village community and beyond. Tribal property relations under customary tenure are structured by customary conventions, traditional institutions and collective rights, with authority vested in traditional leadership (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2018; Marchang, 2017; Shimray, 2006; Wily, 2007). Such practices exist in ‘discrete villages with explicit geographical area and include a complex of properties owned by individuals, families, clans and villages where the acquisition, use and transfer are governed by customary norms’ (Wily, 2007: 45). These norms are tied to village communities (Piang, 2015) and often indicate ‘a common heritage, which though not equally distributed, makes an argument for communal or communitarian rather than individual management’ (Lund, 2000). In other words, there is a significant element of access claims and utility rights beyond ownership to those without property rights (Sikor & Lund, 2009), guaranteed by community affiliation irrespective of class, gender or age. This facilitates livelihood sustenance and security, particularly to the poor and landless (Woodhouse, 2006: 1706). Ownership of land, therefore, has to be understood not as much in absolute terms but as in terms of a correlation with the extent of external provisioning to non-members based on local conditions. This enables benefit sharing amidst unequal ownership through negotiation or tacit agreement premised on village or ethnic affiliation or geographical proximity. Both the primary right of ownership and the secondary right of access claims are important.

Among the Marams, each village encompasses a territorial entity possessing sufficient forest wealth and land which is owned individually and communally (Athickal, 1992: 64). The ownership system and governance mechanism remain within their ancestral domain, entrenched in age-old customary practices and seen alongside traditional authority systems. The founder of a village, called sagung or chief, is considered the first owner. Since usually two or more clans or sub-clans jointly establish a village, a certain portion is delegated for ownership premised on the clan or sub-clan. Tiba described that:

Within the circuit of the nam-lam-rei (village land) all cultivable and potentially cultivable land was subject to rights, which were vested either in individuals or in sodung (clan). According to tradition these holdings were first claimed and delimited by the earliest settlers on the village sites. (2013: 111–12)

Individual ownership over land and forest within tribal communities originates from their historical experience without state or market interventions. Land abundance and scanty population in the past facilitated claims of individual property through investment of labour required for clearing, burning, cultivation and terracing. These are a consequence of and not a prerequisite to ownership as well as inheritance in customary land systems. Customary law recognised the heritable and transferable right of an individual who cultivated lands not cultivated before (Ngajokpa, 2004: 47). Subsequently, hereditary individually owned property with exclusive rights over its transfer, use, access or delegation of privileges developed. However, in contrast to statutory private property, this is characterised by customs-based inheritance ‘through paternal descendants’ (Devi, 2006: 23) and transfer restrictions or prohibition of sale to outsiders. In the case of the absence of a male member, the next male kin inherits property.

The saleability or transferability of landed property is also contingent on customary values and belief systems. In other words, individual liberty over property is defined by custom. As such, individually owned property is categorised into non-saleable land and saleable land. The former is further categorised into sarakakat, thought to be given by God, and saralaha, inherited since the beginning of settlement. Being perceived as inherited blessings from God or their ancestors, such lands are considered pure and original, and selling them is believed to cause misfortunes or bad luck. However, due to increasing financial need in contemporary times, such lands are beginning to be considered saleable assets. In a situation of acute financial stress, land—being the only asset—is often subjected to a mortgage, which may be relinquished subsequently in cases of default. In a sense, traditional forms of individual ownership have made modern land transactions possible. Nonetheless, such land transactions are still restricted within the village community through preferences or affiliations to close-kin or villagers. Moreover, as far as possible, only land which has been acquired previously is considered for sale and not inherited non-saleable land.

Categories of Commons

Commons scholarship offers a vantage to understand and analyse property relations based on de facto customary practices that are governed by institutions resembling neither the state nor the market. It shows that communities have successfully governed shared resources used by multiple individuals to sustainably meet their needs based on local conditions (Anderson, 2011; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Such resources are governed by a certain institution that structures the context of excludability and subtractability (Ostrom, 1990: 30; Ostrom et al., 1994: 6). In the Indian context, even if the state exercises de jure control, the de facto management and use belong to the village communities (Jodha, 1995: 3278; 1990: A65). Commons resources vary across different climatic zones, and the magnitude of utilisation or dependence also varies subsequently (Chopra & Dasgupta, 2002: 31; Menon & Vadivelu, 2006: 113). While they significantly contribute towards livelihood, employment, income generation, particularly among the rural poor (Jodha, 1990; Menon & Vadivelu, 2006), the changes induced by forest legislations, land reforms, privatisation, population pressure and commercialisation have resulted in deprivation and dispossession (Beck & Ghosh, 2000; Jodha, 1989; Kumar, 2013; Kurian, 1988). This indicates that the lack of legal protection and schemes for improvement continues to endanger the commons.

In both the villages under consideration, mostly permanent agricultural lands are under individual, private ownership, with few families owning forest areas that are used for small-scale farming or ‘as a source of fuel-wood or timber’ (Maram & Khan, 1998). Availability of individual cultivable land leaves the commons as a secondary resource to be harvested according to needs. However, the privilege of access to cultivable lands within the commons is guaranteed to those without individual land. Therefore, commons serve as a primary resource for those without private agricultural land, even as they serve as a secondary resource for all. Devi identified two types of land ownership systems: first, individual property; and second, village property considered as common property (2006: 24). Maram and Khan in their study mentioned three categories of forest, which include the private, the clan and the community (1998: 179–81). However, a comprehensive classification vis-à-vis governance mechanisms in each typology is lacking. Evidence from the field suggests that there are two types of ownership: individual and commons. Commons are further classified into pfitat (sub-clan), sudung (clan) and village commons, respectively. This implies that kin–clan relations structure the ownership classification along with a decentralised institutional arrangement for its governance.

Pfitat commons refer to the land and forest area collectively owned by the sub-clan. It originates from two main sources: instituted either by the progenitor of the sub-clan or through collective purchase. The head of the sub-clan, along with each family head, shoulders the responsibility of governance. Regulations regarding the management, use, access and extraction of resources are thus framed by the sub-clan collective. The knowledge of pfitat commons vis-à-vis governance mechanisms is transmitted to younger generations during sub-clan meetings and occasional site visits. This enables the continual existence of pfitat commons and limits extensive privatisation of land. Further, the utility of pfitat commons centres on ensuring the welfare of its members as livelihood or supplementary resources. An elder from Willong Khullen opined:

Pfitat commons are governed by the sub-clan collective under the leadership of the sub-clan head. Its utility depends on collective decision. At present, part of it is used for small scale vegetable farming such as pumpkin, beans, cucumber, maize, cabbage, mustard leaves etc. Any member family may cultivate depending on needs and without tenure restrictions. The forest area serves as an important source of NTFPs and fuel wood. While NTFPs are collected based on seasonal availability, fuel-wood is obtained from two methods. One is the unrestricted access to dry woods and the other is through collective, where they identify a specific area, invest collective labour, and then distribute among themselves.

Cultivable land within pfitat commons serves as a source of support and resilience for families with limited cultivable land or without cultivable land. Access to non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and dry woods is unrestricted, but there is a restriction on the random felling of trees in the forest area unless a collective decision favours such access. For any specific restriction, the head convenes a joint meeting, collectively deliberates and thereafter enforces the restriction based on consensus.

The existence of clan or sudung commons among the Marams underscores the importance of genealogical blood relations in constituting land and forest property relations in the community. Clan-based demarcation also exists in the settlement area, dotted with hangsii or dormitories. Similar to pfitat commons, clan ownership originates as a gift from the progenitor of the clan or its members, or is acquired by the clan collectively:

The sudung land may have been first claimed by an ancestor since the founding of the village, or inherited from its members dying without descendants, or originates from the individual holdings which may have been so long that they became merged with the sudung holding system. It was never sold, as it was believed that to do this would cause the sudung to die out. (Tiba, 2013: 112–13)

Sudung commons are utilised primarily for livelihood needs, providing provisions for farming, fuel wood, NTFPs, grazing ground, timber for house construction and are also considered as reserves. Depending on the topography, farmlands are located on the lower slope, while other resources are obtained from the forest areas unsuitable for cultivation. Their importance may be understood in the following terms:

The clan land has got specific significance as the clan always extends a helping hand to the needy and provides a portion of its land if one of its members requires it for his/her survival. In exceptional circumstances, the clan also gives land to immigrants on the condition that he agrees to be one of them. (Ngajokpa, 2004: 47)

Access to cultivable land is prioritised for the landless, especially widows and the poor. Although tenure is restricted, it is renewable depending on needs and collective consensus. Collection of firewood, NTFPs, hunting and fishing are accessible by all without restrictions. New members are granted timber rights for house construction. A clan having excess cultivable land may grant temporary cultivation rights to another clan member with limited cultivable land. Such provisions are circumscribed with a reasonable amount of tax in cash or kind and with fixed tenure.

Sudung commons also serve as territorial spaces for the formation of new villages. For example, Maram Khullen was divided into three government gazette villages: Mathak Sagei, Makha Sagei and Khullakpa Sagei. Phuba describes that his present village was formed by converting their clan commons into a new gazette village through a collective decision involving the clan members and the village council of the parent village, that is, Maram Khullen. In doing so, the new village became empowered to have an independent village administration under the leadership of the clan head, even as they remained bound by custom to the Maram Khullen chief on socio-cultural matters. Although sudung commons hold importance for clans, some clans do not have these commons at present. An elder from the Kapsiilamai clan in Willong Khullen noted that they have no clan commons, whereas the other two clans, Kangkuinamei and Hangnamei-Haomei, have their own, clarifying further that each sub-clan within their clan has their own pfitat commons.

The remaining land and forest areas fall within the category of village commons. In both the villages, land and forest in the vicinity of the settlement fall under individual ownership as well as sudung and pfitat commons: village commons were found to be at the extreme limits of the village’s territory. This part of the village territory, that is ‘communally owned is neither heritable nor transferable and cannot be sold to other villagers or tribe’ (Ngajokpa, 2004: 46). The availability of other cultivable land often renders the village commons as reserve land which may be useful in times of need or scarcity. Nonetheless, village commons may be utilised for gathering NTFPs and as hunting sites. In Maram Khullen, the village commons are jointly owned and governed by all villages that originated from it. They formed the Northern Maram Peoples Organisation around the year 1971/2 as the governing body, and each constituent village deputised two representatives to be board members. However, the village commons of a few of these villages are exclusively governed by that particular village itself.

Resource Systems and Access Provisions

Ostrom stressed that ‘well-tailored appropriation and provisioning rules help to account for the perseverance of common property resources’ (1990: 92). Customary conventions outline the appropriation and provisioning rules with respect to internal and external resource use. External provisioning exists in two strands depending on their affiliation: One is shared privileges within the village community, and the other is among neighbouring villages. Both are conditioned by the type of goods to be harvested. For instance, hunting, fishing and foraging rights are shared among neighbouring villages unless speculations of permanent encroachment occur. This is linked to communal tenure ‘understood as a system of many different bundles of rights that are enforceable, and includes access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation’ (Anderson, 2011: 3–4). The possibility of multiple rights within a specific resource system offers the opportunity of external provisioning. For instance, after an agricultural harvest, individual fields can serve as grazing grounds for others. Thus, a piece of land can have primary, secondary and tertiary users. There is leniency in the context of resources associated with livelihood; however, restrictions may be enforced otherwise. Furthermore, the existence of external provisioning produces secondary rights. These refer to the privileges of temporary access without holding primary property rights, associated with ‘the ability to benefit from things’ (Sikor & Lund, 2009) through harvesting of resources without involving transfer of ownership. Few activities may require customary tribute, such as payment of the hind leg for success in hunting. In case the hunt/catch occurs in clan commons, the head is brought to the hangsii, where it is cooked, distributed to the member families, and the skull is fixed on the wall of the hangsii. External provisioning benefits the underprivileged to secure their livelihood and serves as an important means of resource distribution.

Therefore, understanding property relations among tribal communities requires analysis of the prevailing resource systems so as to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the nature of resource utilisation vis-à-vis benefit-sharing mechanisms. Resource systems in the villages under study are adaptive and shaped by bio-physical conditions as well as livelihood needs and strategies. There are possibilities of transcending ownership boundaries through temporary access provisions and utility rights, both of which are contingent upon affiliation with the village community. This facilitates extension of resource provisions to the poor and landless. While individually owned land serves mainly agricultural purposes, commons provide complementary sources of sustenance for the community by opening multiple livelihood avenues that are constitutively utilised for productive gains (Kadekodi et al., 1989: A192). Utilisation of commons is guided by a shared indigenous perspective based on subsistence and labour supply rather than profit-oriented extractivism.

The Marams’ main occupation is agriculture supplemented by cattle rearing, collection of NTFPs, hunting and fishing, suggesting a typical rural resource system based on ‘existential dependence’ or adaptive strategy (Xaxa, 2008: 102). Therefore, their resource systems comprise cultivation areas or farmland and the forest as a source for grazing, NTFPs, fuel wood, seed sowing or plant nurseries, reserved forest and sacred forest. The cultivation area constitutes the main land use category and is a permanent resource system subjected to continuous cultivation. It is located primarily within individually owned private property but may also be found in a few of the commons. The landless are given priority in access to cultivable land located on the commons. In a few areas of the commons, there are community farmlands established through community development projects implemented by government and non-government agencies. In such cases, the local institution, after due deliberation, identifies the viable site while also determining strategies for labour input and benefit sharing. At present, in Willong Khullen, there is a collective lemon and banana farm supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The responsibility for management and maintenance is entrusted to the village council. However, there is a lack of a systematic follow-up mechanism and a high sapling mortality rate. This highlights one of the critical limitations of many government and non-government schemes and programmes. In Maram Khullen, few areas of the common farmland were occasionally used as nurseries for preparing crop saplings. After the seeds mature, they are uprooted and planted in their respective fields.

Apart from agriculture, the forest provides access to grazing, NTFPs, fuel wood, hunting and fishing. Access to such resources depends on seasonal availability and is temporal in nature, without any restrictions unless a collective decision favours imposition of certain restrictions. It may be shared among adjoining villages in times of peace, while restrictions may be imposed otherwise. In both villages, few households engage in domesticating animals, such as buffalo, goat, cow and poultry, as livelihood supplements. They are fed on the grazing grounds located in the commons during the crop season and on agricultural waste in the post-harvest winter season to avoid crop destruction. Social forestry is also practised in Maram Khullen, where areas of forest are reserved for specific purposes such as fuel wood, timber for house construction or to act as vegetable gardens for new families or divorcees without individual land. Fuel wood for the hangsii is obtained from this reserve as well. Trade of timber, stone and sand is undertaken on the basis of collective decision-making.

Sacred forests may also be evidenced in this region, in areas of forests where sacrality is ‘attributed to individual trees, ponds or mountain peaks, or animal species’ (Gadgil & Guha, 1992: 16). Sacred forests are regarded as the abode of spirits where destruction is believed to cause misfortune, thereby ensuring the forests are kept intact in ‘their primeval state’ (Gadgil, 2002: 55). Regulations in this respect originate from the tribal community’s belief systems rather than statutory law. In Willong village, there is a sacred hill called Apouugijang located on the border with Sangkumei village. It is believed to be inhabited by spirit(s): Felling of trees, cultivation or anti-social behaviour is strictly prohibited and is considered to bring bad luck to the offender. Human restrictions favour the natural breeding of plants and animals. Although hunting is not absolutely restricted, the catch/hunt depends on the permission of the dwelling spirit. In case the hunters perceive noise, they immediately leave the site, as it is assumed to signal a bad day for hunting. For any human intervention, a certain ritual has to be performed where the chief pronounces, and the priest observes the sequence through dreams, after which the priest decides either to enter or not. There are also restrictions on the use of certain areas due to the belief that these are occupied by spirits. For instance, in Maram Khullen, an area called sadjiirarat (forbidden land) in the low-lying area is prohibited for cultivation by all except the Pseinamei clan. In Willong, there are few areas where cultivation was prohibited in the past due to misfortune encountered while cultivating them. However, conversion to Christianity changed these belief systems, and subsequently, few areas began to be cultivated again.

Polycentric Commons Governance

The authority of traditional leaders in tribal societies is legitimised by customs. As such, governance of resources is based on traditional institutions and customary conventions. Ownership systems, access rights and resource utilisation, along with institutional processes such as rules, norms, decision-making, rule enforcement and conflict resolution, are entrenched in customary practices and traditional authority systems. Among the Marams, property relations are governed by the traditional institution called the village council that functions through customary conventions. Traditionally, the village council comprises the head, called the chief or the sagung, clan head or sudung sagung and other elected or nominated members depending on needs (Tiba, 2013: 101). The sagung is the de facto and de jure head of the village, and his office is hereditary through patrimonial descent (Athickal, 1992: 61). Like the village, each clan and sub-clan has their own sagung, who is the head in their respective domain while also collectively assisting the village sagung in the larger village administration (Athickal, 1992: 57). In this way, Tiba argues, ‘the village administration among the Marams is democratic with gerontocracy form of government led by elders’ (2013: 100). Democratic practices are reflected in consensus-based decision-making and polycentric institutional arrangement based on kin–clan decentralisation.

Such polycentricism and decentralisation are in coherence with the ownership categories where independent clan and sub-clan units are nested in the larger village council. Shared customs and cultures form the bedrock of ownership categories and corresponding governance units. The clan and sub-clan act as autonomous administrative units to govern their respective commons under the leadership of their own sagung. A sub-clan comprises several households, and a clan comprises several sub-clans. Representation in governance units is based on family or kinship units, which is correspondingly proportional to the ladder of the society. For instance, in the governance of the pfitat commons, each family is represented, while in the sudung commons, representation is based on the sub-clan. The governance of the sudung commons is independent from the larger village administration, unless there are external disputes. The clan head, called sudung sagung, who is the senior male member of the elder generation of the sudung, exercises the highest authority (Athickal, 1992: 57; Tiba, 2013). However, his authority is not exclusive, as every aspect of governance is based on collective decision-making. The sudung sagong is assisted by the gaonburas¸ who were introduced during the British era. At present, the gaonburas’ role is essential in governance within and outside the clan as they assist the clan head and are its representatives to the larger village council. Spontaneity, reciprocity and mutual concern, especially on issues of collective importance, mark the essence of clan governance.

Therefore, the territorial limits, tradable and non-tradable resources and the scope of access rights and penalty for illegal activities are collectively defined. Essentially, there are two categories of regulations. The first relates to livelihood activities such as cultivation, collection of NTFPs and fishing and hunting, which are based on customs and attached with a great deal of leniency. The second emerged due to the commodification of forest resources and involves detailed identification of the resource to be traded, its quantity, informal contract and collective utilisation of revenue or benefits to be generated. Rather than one highly centralised authority, ‘a polycentric public-enterprise system emerged, to achieve a very sophisticated management system’ (Ostrom, 1990: 133). The working of the polycentric network implies recognition of the legitimacy of higher authority and vice versa. Although each entity is an independent governing unit, they are all nested within the larger village council, the highest administrative body. The village council interferes only in issues of collective concern to the village or inter-clan disputes. For any land-related dispute, the aim is to seek compromise and reconciliation rather than outright penalties (Tiba, 2013: 105).

Village commons are governed by the village council, which comprises the head called sagung, members deputised from the clans (clan heads and gaonburas) and other elected or selected members. The council holds responsibility for the maintenance and protection of its boundary and enforcement of rules with respect to use or conservation. However, all rules and regulations are framed by the village collectively. Knowledge regarding the territory and its governance mechanisms is orally transmitted during public meetings and site visits, especially to male members. This reflects a kin-based polycentric practice that is embedded in the socio-cultural and customary practices.

Contact with the state, colonial and post-colonial, brought changes in the village administration. The colonial regime introduced the concept of a headman, which was loosely termed gaonbura (Tiba, 2013: 109). After independence, the state government introduced the Village Authorities in Hill Areas Act, 1956, which stipulates the constitution of Village Authorities in every village. As a consequence, two domains of administration emerged, the village council and Village Development Board (VDB): the latter comprises elected or selected members with specific office tenure, headed by the chairman (Tiba, 2013: 109). This new authority system introduced an elected or selected form of leadership legitimised by democratic mandate, replacing the hereditary leadership based on kinship legitimised by customs. However, through adaptation, they become essential in the village administration. For instance, the gaonburas’ role has become essential in clan and village administration. Moreover, the VDB is delegated the responsibility of dealing with the state’s development programmes. In the process, they become important means of representation and delegation of responsibilities, even as the authority for governance of land and forest remains vested with traditional leaders.

Conclusion

This article discusses empirical data from two villages to show that common property systems prevail among the tribal communities of Manipur through either collective ownership or access rights. Continuity is possible because ‘the British administration did not interfere with the customary land system and the Indian constitution continues to safeguard the same’ (Ngajokpa, 2004: 46) through autonomous provisions for self-governance. Focusing on the Marams, the article highlights that property relations and governance mechanisms are structured by kin–clan relations. As such, ownership is categorised into individual and commons, where the commons are further classified into pfitat, sudung and village commons. Simultaneously, the governance mechanism reflects kin–clan-based polycentric and decentralised institutional arrangements. This collectiveness, deeply rooted in socio-cultural practices, favours the endurance of customary property relations to date. Moreover, new authority systems introduced by the state (colonial and post-colonial), such as the gaonbura and chairmanship system, were also adapted as means of representation and delegation of responsibilities and do not affect the traditional land and forest ownership or governance system.

Access rights are often framed so as to extend the benefits of resources depending on needs within the village community and beyond, regardless of ownership. Such rights are exercised over resource systems which include agricultural land, grazing grounds, social forestry, sacred forests and others shaped by the bio-physical conditions and livelihood strategies. This facilitates livelihood sustenance and security despite unequal ownership distribution. This permeability of ownership rights marks the distinctiveness of tribal property relations from the statutory system or eminent private property regime. While the ownership categories guarantee primary and permanent rights, the multiple resource systems provide provisions for secondary rights and temporary access claims. Different forms of properties are therefore constitutively utilised for livelihood benefits. On the one hand, individually owned land serves mainly agricultural purposes, while on the other, the commons serve as supplementary resources or a stock of resources that can be harvested when needed. Hence, ownership may be understood more in terms of responsibility for collective provisioning rather than its exclusive character. This idea, attached to property, substantially facilitates livelihood sustenance and security, especially to the landless and the underprivileged. However, even though land and forest commons prevail among the tribal communities under study, these remain unrecognised by the state and are under continuous pressure to get consolidated under the pre-defined statutory property categories. These opposing notions of property often result in contestations and conflict between the formal and informal domains. In other words, the future of commons within tribal communities is at stake. While the statutory domain often views such tribal practices as synonymous with tenure insecurity, evidence from the field suggests that these offer opportunities for livelihood sustenance and security even to those without property rights. Moreover, resource utilisation based on needs without over-exploitation fosters sustainability as compared to the highly individualised and profit-oriented paradigm of mainstream economic development.