Writing a constitution without parties? The programmatic weakness of party-voter linkages in the Chilean political change

Abstract

In 2020 Chile began a constitution-making process that will culminate in writing a new constitution through a 155-member constitutional convention. The Chilean party system is often described as one of the most institutionalised in Latin America, so the election results of the convention’s members were even more surprising. Of the 155 people elected, only 50 (32.2%) are party members, 41 (26.4%) are independents adopted as candidates by a party, 48 (30.9%) are independents outside a party, and 17 (10.9%) are representatives of indigenous peoples, all of them independents. Compared to proximate legislative elections, the number of independent candidates (ICs) and winners was substantially higher. We suggest that this increase was not only due to a political climate of growing distrust of parties but also to an electoral law that allowed ICs to form electoral apparentments with one another, thus combining their votes and increasing their chances of success, especially in low-income municipalities of the capital.

Keywords

Chile constitution electoral systems independent candidates political parties

Introduction

On 15 November 2019, Chilean political parties met to provide an institutional solution to one of the biggest social crises the country has ever faced: the social outbreak of 18-O.¹ In this instance, representatives of ruling and opposition parties met to draw a proposal to review the current institutional framework and propose a constituent process that would lay the foundations for a ‘new Chile’. Among the details of this process were the rules of a new ad hoc electoral system that would operate in an unprecedented way for the election of the representatives of the constitutional convention. One of these rules caused particular interest among electoral experts and the public: the lists of independents. The argument behind the opening to independents was to democratise the spaces of political representation for the citizens. In other words, Chile’s institutionalised party system opened the door for independent candidates (ICs) to compete on equal terms with party candidates. The result of this experiment -unprecedented in the world- was successful, as the representation of independents went from only 1 out of 155 (0.6%) in the congress elected in 2017 to 48 out of 138 (34.8%) in the new convention, relegating the traditional Chilean parties from the constitutional discussion.

In this research note, we analyse how Chile, one of the countries with the most institutionalised party systems in the region (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005), was able to increase so steeply the number of independent non-party representatives from one election to the next. We argue that while this electoral process illustrates the weakening of the traditional party system, it had one exceptional characteristic: the electoral rules specifically implemented for these elections. Congress passed a law allowing ICs to compete on lists within the framework of a proportional representation electoral system in which between three and eight candidates for the convention were chosen in 28 districts. In other words, the law allowed the votes of ICs to be added to those of other candidates adhering to a common apparentment. In contrast, for the election of members of Congress, each IC competing with outside parties or party coalitions had to do so as an individual candidacy. This had a significant effect on the final composition of the constitutional convention. The traditional political parties saw their representation drop significantly, while the ICs scored surprising victories. Whereas in the most recent election of deputies in 2021, independents outside party coalitions obtained only one of the 155 seats, in the election of the convention, they won 48, more than 30% of the representation. Additionally, the law included seats reserved for indigenous peoples, for which candidates had to be individuals without explicit and formal political party support. In total, 17 seats were reserved for native peoples (11% of the total).

What effect did these electoral rules have on the political result? What socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors explained the remarkable surge of independents? Was there any territorial pattern in the independents’ success if urban areas were compared to rural ones? To what extent was the percentage of votes for independents related to the historical electoral strength of the traditional left, centre, or right parties? We answer these questions with a statistical analysis of the election results at the municipal and candidate levels. Chile is made up of 345 municipalities, which are the smallest electoral unit for which socioeconomic and sociodemographic data are available. We complement this analysis with individual information on the 1278 candidates who competed for 138 seats in the 28 electoral districts, excluding the 95 candidates from indigenous peoples (all of whom were independents) because they were chosen using a different (majority) electoral system. Finally, to identify differences in the 2021 convention election, we compared its results with those of the 2017 and 2021 congressional elections since they are the most similar in composition.

The article is divided into five sections. First, we discuss the literature that studies the access and performance of ICs, and then we focus on the evidence of the elections of other constitutional assemblies. Second, we present our methodology. Third, we explain the law implemented to facilitate apparentments or lists consisting of independents. Fourth, we show our results based on statistical data analysis. Finally, we discuss the findings and present our main conclusions.

Theory

ICs are unaffiliated with any political party and compete outside them. They are to be distinguished from ‘party independents’ or ‘coalition independents’ who, while not party members, compete as part of a list and add their support to that of other candidates. Thus, ICs compete alone in competition with entire lists of candidates, which increases the electoral odds against them. In addition, ICs face more significant difficulties in accessing funds, forming campaign teams and often competing against apparentments with powerful party labels (Abramowitz, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Brancati, 2008; Carey and Shugart, 1995). Finally, apart from other entry barriers, electoral legislation prevents ICs from forming their apparentments (Brancati, 2008; Hocker, 1980; Pross, 2013). The reason is simply that politics is considered a collective game: if a candidate wants to compete as an IC, he must be prepared to pay as an individual the cost of not coordinating collectively with other candidates (Brancati, 2008; Lagunes and Arellanes, 2016; Vidal, 2019).

The study of ICs has focused on their ability to produce a kind of democratic oxygenation of party systems (Aguirre et al., 2017; Dinarto and Ng, 2021; Huizar, 2018; Vizcarra, 2019), on the factors that explain or facilitate their success (Angenendt, 2015; Ehin and Solvak, 2012; Monro, 2019; Rizopoulos, 2005), and on the regulatory frameworks that may facilitate their emergence and consolidation in practice (Makulilo, 2011; Rosales and Arreguín, 2013; Santiago and Larrosa, 2018; Sarabia, 2015). However, it is not common to find examples or case studies in which a key election, such as that of a constitutional assembly, coexists simultaneously with two factors the literature identified as explanatory of independent success. That is (1) a weakening of traditional parties and (2) favourable legislation for ICs that the parties themselves have promoted. In this article, we take the three approaches suggested by the theory to understand the particular case of Chile better.

The literature highlights three factors that favour or hinder the success of ICs: first, the legal requirements; second, the characteristics of the electoral system; and third, the socioeconomic and sociodemographic context in which independents compete. Regarding legal requirements, institutional barriers are typically established for ICs, as reflected in the number of signatures or sponsorships required for them to register. Naturally, the higher the entry barriers for ICs, the fewer the ICs in competition and, consequently, the lower their number in representative bodies (Brancati, 2008; Gilas and Medina, 2014; Huizar, 2018; Santucci, 2022; Vidal, 2019). In other words, while party candidates only need the support of their coalition to run in an election, those candidates who want to run as independents need much work to gather support to get their name on the ballot.

On the impact of electoral systems, one might think that proportional representation systems would facilitate competition by independents in that they offer more competitive seats within an electoral district than a majority system. However, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. In the first place, in majority systems, ICs are more likely to succeed since majority systems imply more personalised elections, mainly where party systems are weak (Brancati, 2008; Oliveros, 2016; Zittel, 2015). Second, single-member districts tend to be territorially smaller than districts in proportional representation systems, which allows ICs to compete on a more level playing field in terms of campaign spending (Brancati, 2008; Cox, 1997; Samuels, 2001; Ureta, 2018).² Third, in majority systems, competition is between individual candidates. In contrast, in proportional representation systems, ICs face candidates organised into apparentments with a combined vote tally, which diminishes the former’s chances of winning (Žúborová et al., 2014).

Some studies report that ICs’ electoral performance could be affected by the sociodemographic characteristics of the territorial unit in which they compete. The literature suggests that independents are successful in vulnerable environments with high poverty levels (Durston, 1999; Larreguy et al., 2016; Vommaro and Quirós, 2011). In these contexts of vulnerability, citizens’ demands are mainly material,³ so party discourses and programmatic linkages have less impact, and crises of representation tend to be more widespread. In urban and disadvantaged environments (i.e. high levels of poverty), there is a high level of disaffection with parties, so the traditional party system has been considerably weakened (Morales et al., 2018; Siavelis, 2016). In other words, parties’ credibility as mediating agencies is significantly reduced (Desposato, 2007; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Szwarcberg, 2009).

A second sociodemographic variable is the level of rurality of the territorial unit. Unlike in densely populated urban areas, in highly rural settings, politicians can directly address the demands of their voters (Belmar & Morales, 2020, 2022; Durston, 2005; Moya & Paillama, 2017, 2022). Of course, those with party machines are in a better position to respond to the demands and solve the problems of citizens (Auyero, 2001; Durston, 2005). In these environments, traditional parties are still strong (Morales et al., 2018), hindering the electoral success of aspirants. The critical role also explains people’s closeness to the municipal government it plays for these communities. Traditional parties -and their machine- create an almost impenetrable bastion for new candidates, especially independents. While aspirants who are party members can draw on their party’s machine to match the benefits offered by these caudillos, aspirants who are ICs will find the election an uphill struggle.

Finally, campaign spending is also one of the determinants of independent candidatures’ viability, performance and success. Several studies demonstrate this relationship in the Chilean case (Gamboa and Morales, 2021; González-Bustamante, 2013; Morales and Piñeiro, 2010; Piscopo et al., 2022). Increases in electoral spending would allow for higher levels of knowledge and positive evaluation of candidates among voters, which would facilitate the garnering of votes. This is why spending studies tend to find that money has a differentiated effect according to the quality of the candidate, with challenger candidates benefitting the most (Jacobson, 1978, 1990). Incumbents have the advantages of incumbency (Ferejohn, 1977) and have reached the top of the knowledge ladder, so they do not benefit from this propaganda.

What hypotheses can we outline considering this theoretical review of the independent candidatures?

H1. The electoral performance of ICs depends on the institutions regulating each election. ICs perform better in institutional contexts facilitating lists or apparentments between independents.

Our first hypothesis corresponds to the effect that the rules of the electoral system have on the results of the election of convention members in 2021. We argue that the change in electoral legislation facilitated the electoral performance of CIs. The rule on lists of independents debuted in 2021. This rule did not apply to the 2017 and 2021 deputy elections. Therefore, our test mechanism is the significant increase in independent candidacies and the amount of votes obtained in 2021 compared to the 2017 and 2021 deputy elections. As we reviewed in theory, ICs suffer from several difficulties and must overcome high barriers to entry to run and compete in elections compared to a partisan or party-supported candidate, but the presence of an ad hoc legislature could change the picture.

H1A. The electoral success of ICs depends on the institutions regulating each election. ICs are more successful in institutional contexts facilitating lists or apparentments between independents.

Along the same lines as our first hypothesis, we want to test if the condition of standing for an election as an independent affects winning or losing an election. Our intuition is simple. The electoral system – used for the convention – could improve the performance of independents in terms of volume and percentage of votes (H1), but candidates still fail to win the seat. We believe that the robust effects of the law are best evaluated if they lead to the victory of these candidates.

H2. The higher the levels of poverty, the better the electoral performance of independents, especially in low-income municipalities of the capital, Santiago (Metropolitan Region), where electoral turnout is lower and the traditional party system weaker.

Our second hypothesis relates to the sociodemographic characteristics of the electoral unit they are running. We argue that ICs should perform better in areas with higher poverty levels. This is explained by the fact that in these localities, the traditional party system has lost its capacity to mediate interests and solve problems. Instead, personalistic leaders who deliver personalised solutions to the population’s most pressing needs are more valued than the programmatically linked offer that party candidates and their coalitions can provide.

H3. The higher the levels of rurality, the worse the electoral performance of independents since historical leaders or caudillos typically predominate in these territories, hindering the entry of actors new to the electoral contest.

Our third hypothesis, like the second, concerns the sociodemographic characteristics of the territory. We postulate that rurality is a strong barrier to entry for ICs. As mentioned in the theoretical section, this happens mainly for two reasons. The first is the strength of the traditional party system, which has developed a relationship of closeness and familiarity that politicians maintain with their voters in these areas. The second is that clientelistic links develop to a greater extent in these areas, so voters’ welfare depends on the continuity of their politicians, developing a mutualistic relationship.

H4. As campaign spending increases, the probability of being elected increases. This effect is more pronounced in the case of ICs.

Our fourth and final hypothesis concerns election spending by candidates during their campaigns. Studies on the influence of money in politics tend to identify campaign spending as the main predictor of success, both in terms of votes collected and in terms of winning the election. Party candidates have greater access to campaign resources than ICs. The main argument is that spending increases the political knowledge of the candidate and their ideas among voters, so that that money would yield more for those less well-known candidates: ICs.

Having reviewed the literature on the viability of independent candidacies, we are interested in reviewing the evidence on other constituent processes. Is it common for ICs to be elected in constitutional conventions or constituent assemblies? Table 1 summarises the results of constitutional elections held over the last three decades. Of the 544 seats on Ethiopia’s Constituent Assembly elected in 1994, independents won 34, or 6.3% (Nohlen et al., 1999). Of the 134 members elected to Venezuela’s National Constituent Assembly in 1999, only three, or 2.2%, were independents (Combellas, 2003). In the elections held in East Timor in 2001 for the formation of a Constituent Assembly, the election was divided between the national level and the district level. While at the national level, there were 75 seats up for election, at the district level, there were another 13 (one representative was elected per district). In the national-level results, no single IC was elected, while at the district level, only one gained a seat (Silva-Carneiro, 2001). In the Bolivian election of members of the Constituent Assembly held in 2006. 255 seats were contested, of which 230 went to political parties and the rest (9.8%) to ICs (Gamboa, 2009). In the Tunisian elections for the National Constituent Assembly held in 2011, of the 217 contested seats, 185 were held by the country’s main parties (85.2%) and 32 (14.8%) by ICs (Amara and El Lahga, 2014).

Table 1.

Constitution-writing processes carried out from 1990 to the present date.

Country	Election year	Seats	IC seats	% IC	Source
Colombia	1990	70	2	2.86	Hoehn (2014)
Paraguay	1991	198	19	9.60	Hoehn (2014)
Peru	1992	80	9	11.25	Hoehn (2014)
Cambodia	1993	120	1	0.83	Nohlen et al. (2001)
Ethiopia	1994	544	34	6.25	Nohlen et al. (1999)
South Africa	1994	400	0	0.00	Lyon (1994)
Ecuador	1997	70	4	5.71	CAPEL (1997)
Venezuela	1999	134	3	2.24	Combellas (2003)
East Timor	2001	88	1	1.14	Silva-Carneiro (2001)
Iraq	2005	275	12	4.36	Inat (2005)
Bolivia	2006	255	25	9.80	Gamboa (2009)
Ecuador	2007	130	0	0.00	Paz and Cepeda (2007)
Nepal	2008	601	0	0.00	The Carter Center (2008)
Tunisia	2011	217	32	14.75	Amara and El Lahga (2014)
Nepal	2013	240	0	0.00	The Carter Center (2013)
Chile	2021	138	48	34.78	Servel (2021)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the sources mentioned.

IC: independent candidate.

It was pointed out in the introduction that the objective of this article was to provide greater clarity about the high representation of independent politicians in Chile’s constitutional convention. A brief review of the literature on constitution-drafting processes and the presence of ICs in them seems to confirm our suspicion that the preponderance of independents in the Chilean constitutional process is not only striking when compared to the trend of recent Chilean elections but also when considered in the light of comparative experience.

Data and method

As already mentioned, this study answers the following research questions: What factors explained the surprising success of independents in the 2021 elections to the constitutional convention? What institutional rules regulated the election of convention members, and to what extent did these rules facilitate the success of independents? What geographic areas of the country, considered in terms of poverty and rurality, were more likely to support ICs? What was the typical profile of successful ICs by sex, age and campaign spending?

To answer these questions, we elaborated 6 datasets from the elections of deputies 2017, convention 2021 and deputies 2021. The first three identified the most relevant political, socioeconomic and sociodemographic variables for each of the 345 municipalities in the country. The political variables naturally included the percentage of votes obtained by independents and the percentage of votes that the ‘Approve’ option obtained in the constitutional referendum of October 2020, which is the most immediate electoral precedent (except for 2017). The socioeconomic variables consist mainly of the poverty rates for each municipality. The sociodemographic variables refer to the percentage of rurality of each municipality and the geographical zone to which it belongs (i.e. if it is from the Metropolitan Region in which the capital of the country is located or if located in other regions).

The second set of three databases refers to the candidates competing. In the case of the 2021 convention, 1278 candidates were running for 138 seats (in the 28 districts). We excluded candidates from indigenous peoples (95 in total, all independents) since they competed under different rules, so much so that a majority electoral system was used in their case. In the 2017 deputy election, there were 960 candidates and 1256 in the 2021 deputy election. For each candidate, we identify their gender, age, profession (i.e. formal education or recognition in their area of work), political party, percentage of votes, electoral success (elected or not elected) and campaign spending, among other variables. Following Acevedo and Navia (2015), we calculated campaign spending as a percentage of the electoral spending limit for each district. Thus, if a district’s campaign spending limit was US$10,000 and the candidate spent US$1000, the candidate’s spending percentage is 10%. This measure allows a valid comparison since there are large districts with a campaign spending limit close to US$500,000 and other smaller ones in which the limit is US$130,000. Thus, while two candidates may record the same expenditure, its impact differs depending on whether it occurs in a large district or a smaller one.

Results

In March 2020, the Chilean Congress approved an unprecedented law that allowed electoral apparentments between ICs. The law, which was applied exclusively in the case of the 2021 Conventional Elections (Law 21,216 of 24 March 2020), stipulated in its 29th provision, ‘Two or more independent candidates may constitute an electoral list. This list will be valid exclusively in the electoral district in which the independent candidates declare their candidacies’. This law changed the structure of electoral competition for these elections. Historically in Chile, independents who competed outside party alliances did so as individuals and could not form a list with other candidates. The effect of this alteration of the rules was immediate: lists of independents began to be registered in all the country’s districts. Usually, these lists did not respond to a national programme or platform but were inspired by different political catchwords. For example, lists with an ecological orientation, others with an interest in defining water as a good for public use and others with a regional inspiration.

Table 2 compares the number and percentage of independent candidacies for Chilean congressional elections between 2017 and 2021. As mentioned in our Hypothesis 1 and facilitated by the enactment of the ad hoc law, the constitutional convention election has the highest number and proportion of ICs. Of the 1278 candidates, 528 (41.3%) presented as independents, a figure never approached in any election organised in the Chilean Congress under the rules of a proportional representation electoral system. As for the independents’ success, the results are overwhelming. There were 138 seats in competition, as out of the 155 representatives elected as members of the convention, 17 seats were reserved for representatives of indigenous peoples. Of these remaining 138 seats, which were elected in multi-member constituencies using the D’hondt formula, 48 (almost 35%) were held by independents. Finally, independent candidacies in ‘independent lists’ were more successful than ‘individual’ independent candidacies. While the success rate of in-pact independents was 10.38%, the success rate of out-of-pact independents was 3.70%. That is, out of 453 independent pact candidates, 47 were elected, and out of 27 ICs outside the pact, only one was elected (1). The independent lists swept the 2021 convention elections.

Table 2.

‘Party’ and independent candidates by election (2021).

	Candidates				Elected
Election	(a) Independents	(b) ‘Party’	(a + b) Total	(a/(a + b) × 100% of independents	(c) Independents	(d) ‘Party’	(c + d) Total	(c/(c + d) × 100% of independents
Deputies 2017	11	949	960	1.15	1	154	155	0.65
Senators 2017	4	128	132	3.03	0	23	23	0
Convention 2021	528	750	1278	41.31	48	90	138	34.78
Deputies 2021	8	1248	1256	0.64	1	154	155	0.65
Senators 2021	2	171	173	1.16	2	25	27	7.41

Source: Compiled with data from www.servel.cl.

What factors explain the independents’ success? We have noted the benefits of the new electoral rules that allowed alliances between independents. However, other conditions were present that we would detail, the first of which is a political variable. In October 2020, Chileans voted in a constitutional referendum to decide whether to ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ the drafting of a new constitution. The ‘Approve’ choice won about 78% of the votes in the referendum, which followed a violent social outbreak. How does the Approve vote relate to the percentage of votes collected by the ICs? This discussion is by no means a minor one. Chile is experiencing a phase of party-system deterioration (Luna, 2008; Luna and Rosenblatt, 2012; Siavelis, 2016). If in the 1990s, close to 80% identified with a party in opinion polls, by 2021, only about 20% did so (Morales, 2020). In addition, recent electoral results show a significant reversal for the traditional parties, and poor results gradually opened the door to ICs. The ‘Approve’ choice was far from the exclusive domain of political parties; social movements and organisations were also protagonists (Garretón et al., 2021; Heiss, 2021; Shqueitzer, 2021).

Figure 1 shows the correlation between the percentage of ‘Approve’ votes and the percentage of votes for ICs by the municipality. We separate the analysis into two territorial groups: the Metropolitan Region and the rest of the country. This segmentation has a methodological justification. The Metropolitan Region has close to 40% of the electoral register, it is predominantly an urban territory with high levels of inequality, and the traditional political parties have shown greater electoral resilience there than they have in the rest of the country (Morales et al., 2018). For both territorial groups, there is a direct correlation between the percentage of votes for ‘Approve’ and for ICs, although the correlation is stronger in the Metropolitan Region (0.66). This finding suggests a better understanding of the collapse of the traditional political party system in these elections.

To strengthen the evidence regarding the factors explaining the increase in the number of independents elected in the 2021 convention election, we decided to disaggregate the analysis into two steps. First, we test a series of multiple linear regression models to examine electoral performance according to the area and sociodemographic variables where the independents were elected. Second, we run a series of logit models to test the electoral success of ICs. That is, to test whether they could win the election. In order to compare the effect of the law, we considered the elections of Deputies in 2017, Convention 2021, and Deputies 2021. Taking into consideration the independent variables indicated above, we built some multivariate linear regression models whose structure is as follows

\begin{array}{l} V O T E S H A R E_{i} = B_{1} A P P R O V E_{i} + B_{2} P O V E R T Y_{i} + B_{3} R U R A L I T Y_{i} + M R \\ + B_{f} M R * B_{3} P O V E R T Y_{i} + B_{4} M A G N I T U D E_{i} + \sum_{j = 1}^{N} δ_{j i} + e i \end{array}

where i is each municipality, VOTESHARE is the percentage of votes for ICs; RURALITY is the percentage of rural population; POVERTY is the percentage of poor people; MR is a dummy variable that has the value of ‘1’ when the municipality is from the Metropolitan Region and ‘0’ when it belongs to the rest of the country. The model includes an interaction term between MR and POVERTY to distinguish the effect on the electoral performance of independents according to geographic area. We also add the district’s MAGNITUDE, ranging from 1 to 8. Finally is the set of municipality dummies, with N = 345. The baseline estimation assumes that the error term ei is clustered by the municipality, which allows the statistical models to be specified as an Ecological Regression (Gelman et al., 2001). We built four models with different combinations of independent variables. Of course, we include the closest congressional elections (2017 and 2021) to test for differential returns to implementing the law. Table 3 shows these results.

Table 3.

Multivariate linear regression models.

	Deputies 2017				Convention 2021				Deputies 2021
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 3c	Model 4c
APPROVE					0.534***	0.559***	0.490***	0.485***	−0.280*	−0.182	−0.182	0.0212
					(−0.0488)	(−0.048)	(−0.0558)	(0.0564)	(−0.15)	(−0.146)	(−0.144)	(0.132)
POVERTY	0.311***	0.222**	0.225*	0.190	0.340***	0.181**	0.0472	0.0493	−0.869***	−1.020***	−1.138***	−0.650***
	(−0.102)	(−0.109)	(−0.131)	(0.170)	(−0.106)	(−0.11)	(−0.123)	(0.123)	(−0.216)	(−0.211)	(−0.219)	(0.214)
RURALITY	−0.0678*	−0.0816**	−0.0823**	−0.0588	−0.0958***	−0.111***	−0.0969***	−0.0946***	0.0502	0.00788	0.0199	−0.0258
	(−0.0381)	(−0.038)	(−0.041)	(0.0429)	(−0.0323)	(−0.0317)	(−0.032)	(0.0323)	(−0.0523)	(−0.0517)	(−0.0514)	(0.0458)
MR		−2.762**	−2.671	−3.692		−4.614***	−8.935***	−9.153***		−6.615***	−12.78***	17.72**
		(−1.277)	(−2.368)	(2.548)		(−1.093)	(−2.109)	(2.148)		(−2.156)	(−4.056)	(6.965)
MR*POVERTY			−0.0111	0.0521			0.760**	0.788**			1.152*	0.759
			(−0.245)	(0.314)			(−0.318)	(0.322)			(−0.646)	(0.570)
MAGNITUDE				0.262				0.186				−7.449***
				(0.441)				(0.337)				(1.465)
Constant	1.821*	4.280***	4.244**	3.457	−2.926	−1.495	5.021	4.303	37.61***	34.39***	35.38***	47.07***
	(−1.051)	(−1.536)	(−1.733)	(2.750)	(−3.96)	(−3.881)	(−4.721)	(4.902)	(−12.92)	(−12.35)	(−12.2)	(10.90)
Observations	110	110	110	110	345	345	345	345	86	86	86	86
R²	0.081	0.12	0.12	0.115	0.294	0.329	0.34	0.341	0.185	0.27	0.298	0.471

Source: Compiled with data from www.servel.cl.

MR: Metropolitan Region.

The dependent variable is the independent candidates’ percentage of the vote. Standard errors in parentheses.

***

p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

The results are in line with expectations. First, independents gained more votes in municipalities where the ‘Approve’ option was more successful. The robustness of this effect is particularly interesting, as it disappears completely for the 2021 deputy elections held only 6 months later. Second, according to Models 1 and 2, the increase in the percentage of poor people in a municipality is accompanied by a higher percentage of votes obtained by independents, with even greater intensity in the case of the Metropolitan Region (MR × POVERTY), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In convention 2021, the electoral strength of independents was greater in the lower-income districts of the capital. Third, independents accumulated more votes in urban municipalities than rural ones, where the political leaderships of traditional parties build strong bastions, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Finally, Magnitude does not affect the 2021 convention elections but does affect the 2021 deputy elections, where independents perform worse in larger districts.

In line with our Hypothesis 1, we note significant changes in the performance of independents between the three elections, especially between the 2021 convention and the 2021 deputy elections, as there is only a 6-month difference. What happened in those 6 months? What do the variations in these performances from one election to the next tell us? We argue – in addition to the return of the electoral law applied in 2017 – that this decline in support for independents is primarily due to the poor legislative performance of the candidates elected at the 2021 convention. Independents were protagonists of the process not only because of their large presence (30.9% of seats) but also because they were at the centre of a series of scandals for failing to perform their duties (Aravena, 2021; Dote and Marull, 2022; García, 2022). On the same day of the inauguration, a group of convention members prevented the national anthem from being sung. Then, just days after the body’s inauguration, it was discovered that one of the main leaders of the ‘People’s List’, Rodrigo Rojas Vade, had misled his voters by claiming to be suffering from cancer, even though there was no medical record of this. These independents also failed to form caucuses or groups to reach agreements, let alone follow clear lines or criteria when voting for or against proposed policies. All these mistakes undermined the credibility and seriousness of the work of the independents.

Due to the scenario described above, it is probably in the municipalities where they were most supportive of the changes (i.e. the largest vote for Approve) that confidence in voting for independents suffered the most. We believe that our models show precisely how the political climate has been normalising, reflected in the fact that Approve is no longer significant. In the case of poverty, it becomes negative, indicating that the independent figure was more punished precisely in the most vulnerable areas. We argue that this is because the ‘social outbreak’ mainly called for a social agenda that would improve the welfare of Chileans, a problem that the convention failed to discuss in detail and even less succeeded in resolving. Hence, it is probable that the most deprived people are the most disappointed with the convention and their members and thus voted to punish the independents. In fact, the convention was accused of privileging an identity agenda over a social agenda. This mistake has been identified as the main reason for the defeat in the exit plebiscite (Cavallo, 2022; Mascareño, 2022; Moreno, 2022).

To test for differential effects between the capital and the rest of the country, we constructed a graph of predicted values. Figure 2 shows independents’ expected electoral performance for MR municipalities compared to the rest of the country, based on variations in poverty levels. This calculation of the predicted values is based on Model 4b. Indeed, independents’ electoral performance was by no means uniform. As mentioned, the traditional party system has been weakened in the most vulnerable territories, which has been particularly intense in the MR (Morales, 2021). In line with the literature, the ICs were most successful in the low-income municipalities of the capital, the most emblematic case being that of the ‘People’s List’, which obtained 9 of the 41 seats (22%) allocated to the seven districts of the MR. We maintain that both the local electioneering work of their candidates and the effects of the anger expressed in the ‘social outbreak’ of October 2019 were strong predictors of independents’ electoral success, facilitated as it was by the law permitting apparentment lists of independents.

The second level of analysis concerns the success of the ICs. While we have already reviewed that the law facilitated their appearance on the ballot and improved their performance in terms of vote share, we are also interested in how the variables associated with the candidate benefitted their victory. As mentioned in our Hypothesis 1A, we also decided to test the probability of success for independents. The ad hoc law allowed ICs to run and obtain better returns. However, did this translate into them winning the seats they competed for? We now show the results of a series of logit models in which the dependent variable has zero value when the candidate is a ‘loser’ and 1 when the candidate is a ‘winner’. The independent variables are INDEPENDENTS (0 = Party member/1 = Independent), GENDER (0 = Female/1 = Male), AGE, BALLOT POSITION (Place on the ballot), OCCUPATION (0 = Non-professional/1 = Professional), and SPENDING CAMPAIGN (Percentage of spending). We add two interaction terms: INDEPENDENTS × AGE and INDEPENDENTS × SPENDING CAMPAIGN. As in the previous model series, we did this exercise for the elections of convention 2021, deputies 2017, and deputies 2021.

We construct four regression models in which the independent variables are added successively. The results of this exercise can be seen in Table 4. In the first model, which only includes the INDEPENDENT and controls, the results are not significant. However, as this is an incomplete model, great care must be taken in concluding it. In Models 2 and 3, more variables are included: campaign spending and ballot position are statistically significant and with the expected directions. That is to say, campaign spending promotes victory, and lower positions depress it. Model 4, however, is the most complete, as it includes OCCUPATION and the interaction terms mentioned above. Here, controlling for other variables, it is observed that INDEPENDENT has a positive coefficient. Next, it is observed that independents make their campaign spending more efficient – they increase their chances of success – compared to party members (INDEPENDENTS × CAMPAIGN SPENDING). Finally, independents under the age of 40 are more likely to be elected than party members of the same age range. The opposite is true for older party members, especially in the small group of those over 75.

Table 4.

Logit regression models.

	Deputies 2017				Convention 2021				Deputies 2021
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 3c	Model 4c
INDEPENDENTS	−0.886	−0.269	−0.420	−35.07	−0.307	0.0209	−0.0906	1.721**	0.00848	−0.205	−0.692	−84.59
	(−1.058)	(−1.128)	(1.132)	(7016)	(−0.189)	(−0.211)	(0.215)	(0.776)	(−1.078)	(−1.106)	(1.112)	(3227)
GENDER	0.993***	0.811***	0.798***	0.807***	0.0572	−0.118	0.198	0.151	0.420**	0.227	0.247	0.240
	(−0.21)	(−0.257)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(−0.182)	(−0.195)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(−0.18)	(−0.199)	(0.201)	(0.201)
AGE	0.0193***	0.00545	0.00457	0.00374	0.00595	−0.00111	0.000255	0.0125	0.0165**	0.0106	0.0114	0.0106
	(−0.00726)	(−0.00942)	(0.00947)	(0.00950)	(−0.0069)	(−0.0075)	(0.00777)	(0.00933)	(−0.00723)	(−0.00821)	(0.00836)	(0.00842)
SPENDING CAMP. (%)		0.118***	0.117***	0.115***		0.0669***	0.0668***	0.0631***		0.106***	0.103***	0.101***
		(−0.00925)	(0.00928)	(0.00940)		(−0.0106)	(0.0109)	(0.0113)		(−0.00946)	(0.00964)	(0.00983)
BALLOT POSITION			−0.0651	−0.0655			−0.374***	−0.362***			−0.227***	−0.230***
			(0.0549)	(0.0548)			(0.0601)	(0.0602)			(0.0514)	(0.0515)
OCCUPATION				0.160				0.394				0.212
				(0.300)				(0.389)				(0.270)
INDEPENDENTS*AGE				0.179				−0.0445**				1.047
				(179.7)				(0.0181)				(57.15)
INDEPENDENTS*SC				1.610				0.0562*				1.795
				(224.4)				(0.0510)				(102.8)
Constant	−3.214***	−4.141***	−3.856***	−3.922***	−2.285***	−2.170***	−1.175***	−2.083***	−2.957***	−3.474***	−2.752***	−2.857***
	(−0.372)	(−0.482)	(0.535)	(0.587)	(−0.332)	(−0.364)	(0.399)	(0.595)	(−0.353)	(−0.403)	(0.430)	(0.476)
Observations	959	959	959	959	1278	1079	1079	1079	1256	1256	1256	1256
Pseudo-R:	0.0456	0.346	0.347	0.351	0.00421	0.0589	0.116	0.126	0.0127	0.182	0.205	0.210
Log-Likelihood:	−404.9	−277.6	−276.9	−275.2	−435.6	−382.8	−359.4	−355.5	−463.3	−383.8	−372.9	−370.7
χ²	38.7	293.2	294.6	298	3.681	47.88	94.70	102.5	11.96	171	192.8	197.2
Prob Wald:	2.01E−08	0	0	0	0.298	9.99E−10	0	0	0.00751	0	0	0

Source: Compiled with data from www.servel.cl.

The dependent variable is Loser (0) and Winner (1). Standard errors in parentheses.

***

p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

The comparison between the three elections shows that the candidate’s independent status positively affects their probability of success only in the case of the 2021 convention election, which favours our Hypothesis 1A. That is, the ad hoc law not only benefitted the percentage of votes they obtained (as we saw in the series of models in Table 3), but also made it easier for them to win. This effect is completely lost for the election of deputies in 2021, which, let us remember, only took place 6 months later. Gender also seems to play a crucial role, as, by 2017, the triumph was more likely for men. This is also due to ad hoc legislation, which, as with the independents, included gender parity in the lists submitted for the 2021 convention election. The position on the ballot paper had no effect in 2017, but did have an effect in 2021. Since it operates as an informational shortcut, in elections such as convention 2021 with low levels of information about the positions and candidates, people would tend to select those at the top of the list. In the case of Diputados 2021, this effect could be due to information overload, as it took place in the middle of 12 other ballots to be filled out by citizens. Finally, and as expected, campaign spending has a robust effect for all elections but is much lower in the case of the constituent convention election.⁴

To show more precisely the differences between independents, we have constructed Figures 3 and 4 to show the expected values of the dependent variable (0 = Loser/1 = Winner) based on the interaction terms indicated above. Both graphs were built on the values of Model 4b. The probability of being elected increases faster for independents. This is in line with the literature on campaign spending, as spending returns more on these candidates. As mentioned, age is a key variable due to the characteristics of the social outburst. Secondary school students led the movement, and a climate of generational renewal of politics was established. In this context, young ICs likely have a better chance of success than young partisan candidates, especially those who emerged from these movements. As we see in Figure 4, the probability of success for ICs is significantly higher in the case of younger candidates. In contrast, the effect on party members remains stable with age. We argue that this is precisely due to the refoundational spirit of the 2021 convention election, as this effect does not exist for the 2017 and 2021 deputy elections. We suggest that this could be explained by the fact that many of the young ICs came from the movements associated with the social outbreak.

Discussion

Our findings have been as follows in testing the hypotheses presented in this article. First, the institutional design adopted for the election of members of the constitutional convention favoured the success of ICs since it allowed the formation of apparentments or lists of ICs, thus improving their chances of success. Second, those independents were more successful in the poorest municipalities, especially in the capital, Santiago. Third, their great electoral weakness proved to be in rural municipalities. At the individual level, two findings were significant. First, campaign spending was not strongly correlated with the percentage of votes. Independents were more efficient than party members in using resources, transforming them more effectively into votes. Second, of those candidates under 40 years of age, independents were more likely to be successful than party members, while the opposite was the case with older candidates.

Why do these results matter for theory? The crisis of representation has become almost a constant theme in Latin American politics, with few exceptions. For a long time, at least since the 1990s, Chile experienced low levels of volatility and a party identification that rapidly deteriorated. Little by little, the traditional parties were losing strength, with the appearance of alternative parties, especially on the left. Complaints of corruption and irregular financing of politics, added to a string of private sector abuses of consumers, were part of the demands that crystallised in the so-called ‘social outbreak’ of October 2019. To find a way out of that crisis, the political elite decided to clear the route for a process of constitutional change. In October 2020, Chileans agreed by almost 80% to change the constitution. Following this result, Congress designed the rules to choose members of the constitutional convention. Extraordinarily, but understandably given the hostile environment for the reproduction of party labels, Congress created rules that laid even barer the crisis of representation. Approving the law allowing apparentments between ICs weakened a party system that had sustained Chile’s fragile democracy since the early 1990s.

We have emphasised the powerful effect of this institutional design on political outcomes. Nevertheless, we also highlighted the social factors influencing the independents’ success. Important among these was the concentration of their electoral efforts, particularly those of the so-called People’s List, in the low-income municipalities of the capital. However, we also noted the difficulty these independent lists had in reaching rural municipalities, where a certain predominance of traditional parties is still observable. Finally, we highlighted the successful campaign of several independent lists that notched up important victories without having a large share of resources. We know that their campaigns were mounted mainly through social networks. The context of COVID-19 prevented the parties from mobilising their ‘electoral foot-soldiers’ in their traditional ‘face-to-face’ campaigning methods, leaving them unprotected communicationally due to their slow ability to adapt to the new virtual campaign spaces.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was funded by FONDECYT 1220004 and Millennium Nucleus Center for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile NCS2021_063.

ORCID iD

Fabián Belmar

Mauricio Morales

Notes

Author biographies

Fabián Belmar is a PhD candidate in Political Processes and Institutions, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile, holds a BA in Political Science and Public Administration and is Coordinator of the Centre for Political Analysis, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Juridical Sciences, Universidad de Talca, Campus Santiago, Chile.

Mauricio Morales, PhD in Political Science, is a Full Professor, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Juridical Sciences, Universidad de Talca, Campus Santiago, Chile, and Millennium Nucleus Center for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile (MEPOP, NCS2021_063). His work has published by Democratization, Political Studies Review, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Ethnopolitics, Journal of Women, Politics and Policy, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, and Contemporary Social Science.

Benjamín Villarroel is a student of Political Science and Public Administration, Universidad de Talca, Campus Santiago, Chile. His research interests include electoral behaviour and public policies (in particular, public health and pension policies).

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