Transnational Islamic Movements

Introduction

Networks are one of the key factors of change in a society. They are pervasive and they could be found almost anywhere. It is perhaps little wonder that the study of networks has been on the rise. One can even talk about the ‘network takeover’. ¹ Networks are an important area of research in such diverse subjects as mathematics, computer science, neurology, epidemiology and sociology. What is intriguing is that insights from the study of networks may be transferable, that is, they may be applied to research in other disciplines as well. Watts, one of the theoreticians behind the small world phenomenon and six degrees study, argues that ‘many of the ideas and metrics of the ‘new’ science of networks have either been borrowed from, or else rediscovered independently of, a distinguished lineage of work in mathematics, economics, and sociology’. ²

Watts also notes on the growing trend of cross-pollination among social science scholars and ‘interdisciplinary synthesis of new analytical techniques’ in the study of networks. ³ This paper is an attempt to move beyond a religious analysis only and to approach Islamism and Islamic movements also through a framework of networks. First the networks are defined and some of their properties are outlined, then they are discussed in relation to hierarchies. Networks value is considered in general sense and specifically in relationship to Islamic networks. Special attention is given to such aspects as strong and weak ties, and bonding and bridging social capital of a network.

Networks, their Structure and Properties

Manuel Castells, one of the proponents of the grand theory on networks, gives a succinct definition of a network as ‘a set of interconnected nodes’. ⁴ In a system or a set, nodes or actors are connection points that may be represented by individuals, communities, groups, organizations or states. Links between the nodes may be personal or professional, e.g. ties between different individuals, or they may be expressed through cooperation and joint projects between different organizations. Nodes and ties (actors and links) constitute the basic elements of the network analysis, one of the popular methods in modern-day science. Networks have been a part of the social fabric along with hierarchies and markets. ⁵ However, there is a fundamental difference between then and now. Castells argues that though networks between social entities have always existed (for instance networks within institutions, such as Oxbridge graduates’ ‘Old boy club’, Opus Dei), the advances in communication technology have made it possible to talk about the ‘the rise of the network society’, where ‘power of flows’ and ‘space of flows’ play a strategic role. ⁶ Castells’ ideas are influential and became a major reference point in the study of networks.

Networks have been differentiated from hierarchies and chaos because of their unique properties. In the words of Barabási networks have ‘an underlying architecture guided by universal principles’. ⁷ Those properties seem to be hidden, but they may emerge as scholars experiment with networks or apply social network analysis and statistical analysis. For instance, a well-known social network experiment by Stanley Milgram suggests that everything is interconnected and within ‘six degrees of separation’ from each other (this property is also known as ‘the small world effect’). Some complex networks (e.g. social networks, the Internet, biological networks) have revealed another property – they are connected not evenly or randomly, but instead they seem to have an uneven distribution of connectedness. These networks have hubs of connectivity, that is, they are essentially scale-free. ⁸ The scale-free networks attracted particular attention, especially in works by Barabási and his colleagues, due to their properties of resiliency and robustness, ⁹ as well as preferential attachment also known as the ‘Matthew effect’ (that is, ‘rich get richer’). ¹⁰ In a scale-free network it is usually the early nodes that tend to have a higher chance to become hubs, and the reason for it is this preferential attachment process. Barabási argues that preferential attachment is behind the growth of a network; the corollary of it is that a growing network is likely to be scale-free. ¹¹

Relevant to this paper is also an assumption of a ‘community structure’ in a complex network – e.g. highly inter-connected groups are linked through weaker connections to other highly-interconnected groups. Granovetter, somewhat counterintuitively, highlights the importance of these weak connections in his theory of ‘strength of weak ties’. Another area of research, particularly in anthropology, sociology and epidemiology, is homophily or assortative mixing, that is, ‘Similarity breeds connection’. ¹² Indeed, similarity facilitates attraction and interaction in a social network, whether it is among people of similar ethnic background, age, occupation or religion. It is a well-known phenomenon in social networks attested to by such sayings as ‘Birds of a feather flock together’ or ‘A fisherman always sees another fisherman from afar’ (a Russian proverb). It is also supported by anthropological studies in homogamy (that is, homophily in marriages). ¹³

Islamic Networks

In Islamic studies the idea of networks was perhaps first applied to the phenomenon of al-Qaeda. Indeed, its structure can be better described as a network rather than a hierarchy. Burke even describes al-Qaeda as ‘a network of networks’. ¹⁴ Among others, Sageman and Atran have been giving particular attention to the network structure and the role of relationships in al-Qaeda. In fact, al-Qaeda has become a common reference point as its layout has inspired other Islamic groups to emulate its structure. Turbiville describes al-Qaeda not only as the most innovative entity but also as perhaps a prototype for other groups. ¹⁵ More specifically, Hahn, in his Russia’s Islamic Threat, traces al-Qaeda’s influence on the Chechen jihadists that also operate as a ‘scale-free network’ and have been expanding their operation beyond North Caucasus. ¹⁶

There are other examples of transnational Islamic groups that seem to have some kind of network structure, e.g. Ḥizb ut-Taḥrīr, Muslim Brotherhood, Fethullah Gülen movement, and others. One can argue that the phenomenon of al-Qaeda and some other Islamic networks could be linked to the globalization processes and the transforming role of technology, especially the Internet. Moghadam suggests this in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘The emergence of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network in the late 1990s would seem to suggest that globalization facilitates the formation of loosely organized, deterritorialized transnational groups’. ¹⁷ Indeed, there seems to be an intimate and direct link between globalization and the rise and development of Islamic transnational networks.

Globalization, a worldwide shift to the neoliberal economy, can be characterized by a flow of goods, money and people as well as a flow of ideas. New communication technology, such as global TV and especially the Internet, has facilitated this flow of ideas and information. It has also led to the emergence of the cyber-world. Thomas Friedman, the author of The World Is Flat, in his latest musings suggests that a merger of globalization and IT revolution made the world no longer simply connected but hyper-connected. ¹⁸ For Castells, this development of new media provides a change in the power locus – it is no longer located in an institutional hierarchical structure, but in a decentralized mediated network space. Indeed, new communication technologies have been facilitating the process of the decline of traditional/formal forms of authority and the emergence of new, often self-taught leaders. In his study of popular Islam Echchaibi examines the phenomenon of ‘celebrity religious figures’ (such as Amr Khaled in Egypt and Baba Ali in California). He analyses a shift in the location of authority in the Muslim world and describes it as a ‘delocalisation of authority in Islam’. ¹⁹

Transnational Islamic networks seem to be a product of the complex convergence of local and global factors, they operate in the real and cyber-world, they cast a vision for a new global reality and they seek to facilitate change. It may be helpful to see how network properties and network values may help to explain the way some Islamic groups operate.

Networks and Hierarchies

Networks are often contrasted with hierarchies, where the entity is organized vertically (that is, centralized), influence flows top-down, information is monopolized and bureaucracy is an integral part. Networks have been operating differently, and in the age of globalization they seem to have been gaining a number of advantages. One of them is a ‘speed’ advantage, that is, networks facilitate information sharing and processing. Bunker and Begert describe it as follows: ‘Networked structures possess increased information flows due to the vast number of information channels (cross-linkages) that exist between the various cells/nodes’. ²⁰ Information is shared, not amassed; it is processed, filtered and fused faster and in more creative ways thus allowing a network to benefit from this knowledge and to adapt faster. Another advantage is their ability to generate the so called ‘phantom’ presence by employing a ‘swarming’ – ‘a tactic where dispersed forces converge or ‘swarm’ to concentrate, focus, or mass their resources or effort to conduct and attack or campaign’. ²¹ By swiftly and strategically moving their resources and people they may project more power and activity than they actually have.

It is interesting that some advantages of a decentralized structure over a hierarchy is characterized by asymmetry. Even a small underground network with little resources may present an asymmetric threat to a state-actor. Holton even argues that the main challenge today comes from the ‘global networks that are highly mobile, clandestine and decentralized’. ²² Indeed, some networks are not always traceable and they may prefer to be less visible or even secretive (e.g. the so called ‘Dark networks’ or networks involved in drug smuggling, trafficking or terrorism). They may either conceal their links, or quickly adjust under threat and go underground all together. This asymmetry is perhaps achieved through a greater degree of flexibility of a network system that allows adaptation to circumstances and reliability of the system. As a result a network system is more robust and durable; it may be reconstructed and readjusted. An example of such adaptability is al-Qaeda, which Bunker and Begert describes as follows: ‘Al Qaeda as an organization knows how to learn and adapt itself to new environments and it exists both in traditional humanspace and within cyberspace’. ²³

A real-life decentralized network is often hub-based and self-regulating, essentially a scale-free network of highly connected nodes (hubs). Al-Qaeda in the language of network analysis is a scale-free network, that is, a network with various associated nodes and clusters connected to a hub or hubs. A scale-free structure facilitates flexibility and adaptability, as well as rapid healing and restructuring. One of Alebert’s and Barabási’s observations on the scale-free networks is that they are robust to accidental failures but their weakest point is a possibility of fatal simultaneous attack on its hub(s). ²⁴ In relation to an Islamic network, Sageman similarly highlights such vulnerability to a coordinated attack(s). He notes that the al-Qaeda network is sufficiently robust to a targeted attack to a significant number of its isolated nodes; however he argues that it may disintegrate if 5–15% of the hubs are taken down. ²⁵

Though attacking the hubs is the best way to destabilize a scale-free network, it is not always easy to identify the hubs as connections and the centrality of the actors may remain hidden. Members of a secretive network such as al-Qaeda share a strong ideological commitment, however they may have little knowledge of their organizational structure and information exchange may be on ‘as needed basis only’. ²⁶ Al-Qaeda’s decentralized structure actually facilitates secrecy and security of the group and makes it more difficult for penetration. In their work on mapping social networks, Carley and Tsvetovat suggest that: ‘To remain covert, the Al Qaeda has structured itself as a leaderless design characterized by its organic structure, horizontal coordination, and distributed decision making’. ²⁷ The challenge for such a covert organization is how to remain secret and yet ensure communication exchange, execution of operations and ultimately the success of its mission.

In order to spot hidden connections between the nodes and estimate their centrality in a network or a secretive organization, analysts have been using special algorithms and software for analyzing social networking. Software used for Social Network Analysis (SNA) seems to follow a basic principle: by feeding the data and then scanning multiple data sources at once, an analyst may discover some important unseen connections. An article in Independent aptly described it as ‘Terrorist Facebook’. ²⁸ However, employing SNA in security and the military also caused some ethical problems and controversies. By helping to ‘connect the dots’ SNA augmented the ‘mosaic philosophy’ (also known as the ‘mosaic theory’) of intelligence gathering (extracting seemingly unrelated pieces of information from detainees, including innocent ones). ²⁹ Furthermore, there is a danger that scarcity of data on a given network and its anecdotal nature may at times lead to incomplete and potentially misleading analysis of a network.

Dealing with static networks also distorts the picture, as in reality networks are dynamic and the links, actors and centrality of actors are subject to change. Therefore, another important aspect is thinking about a network from a dynamic perspective. Carley is a proponent of Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) that ‘considers the role of the agent in terms of processes and not just position’. ³⁰ Carley argues that by utilizing the Dynamic Network Analysis and identifying not only social but also knowledge networks, task networks and resource networks, one comes with a more realistic representation of a network, including the changes occurring among actors/nodes and links between them. By approaching a network as a dynamic entity, Carley and her colleagues seem to provide better insights into networks, including such covert network as al-Qaeda. The dynamism of such networks is expressed in changes over time. It includes a combination of what can be called a fluid leadership structure important for vision and large-scale strategy (a vision that is also spread through manuals and the Internet), change among leaders (e.g. due to a fatal attack) and activism of local, almost self-sufficient cells.

Operating in cells or groups may imply that a network has no ‘hierarchical divisions with clear chains of commands’. ³¹ It gives cells or groups a degree of flexibility to run its projects and operations as they see it. Penetrating or suppressing such a network is also a much harder task than suppressing a hierarchical system, as cells may be isolated and may know little about each other. Hahn describes this challenge presented by a Chechen fighters’ network: ‘It prevents penetration by the secret services or the arrest of operatives from exposing other cells or entire jamaats, nodes, and hubs’. ³² Indeed, networks are more difficult to target or engage with. In his book on networks and netwars Arquilla and Ronfeldt observe that: ‘Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks. It takes networks to fight networks. Whoever masters the network from first and best will gain major advantages’. ³³ In a similar vein it has been suggested that building moderate Muslim networks may help to contest the radical interpretation of Islam and even facilitate the growth of the civil society in Muslim countries. ³⁴ In other words, one may need to engage a network with another network, or target a network by another network.

Groups within networks may be differentiated according to their function or geographical location, or perhaps due to a combination of both. The produced diversity within a network has a number of advantages as it allows specialization and division of labor. If needed, it helps the organization to mobilize internally in time of crisis or any other difficulties. It also facilitates further expansion through setting up fronts and associate organizations, if the Islamic movement is able to do so. In his research on Salafīs and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Wiktorowicz contrasts the Muslim Brotherhood which has enjoyed relative freedom in Jordan and operates through a wide variety of grassroot organizations (such as hospitals, educational centres, research associations and other formally set up institutions) with the Salafī group which has to rely exclusively on informal networks due to the tight surveillance and control by government. As a result, Salafīs have had a much smaller pool of recruits, as mobilization could only take place in a small group setting and home gatherings. ³⁵

Multiplicity and diversity of groups may also facilitate competition among groups and a strive for excellence. It seems to create a favorable environment for entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, problem-solving and learning by trial and error when launching new initiatives or adapting the more successful ones. For instance, in order to build a support base, Islamic activists from Muslim Brotherhood or the Fethullah Gülen movement may use such diverse set-ups as mosques, charities, hospitals, educational establishments, media outlets, small businesses, student associations, women’s groups, sport outreaches and conferences. Such a holistic approach may also have a helpful element of redundancy, that is, the system will still be working even if one of its components or members fails or is prevented from working (e.g. due to government pressure). ³⁶ Yet another advantage of multiplicity of groups or even setting up front organizations is that associate organizations may facilitate legitimacy by reinforcing each other’s position. It also helps to penetrate various niches and facilitate the expansion of a network, for instance through its professional association, women’s fellowship or student outreach. A diverse and complex network helps to bring resources together, at times through its weak link connection.

Network properties help to understand mobilization and recruitment in an Islamic movement, that is, how they facilitate expanding and building new networks, coordinating activities and disseminating the message. For instance, scale-free networks are likely to grow as they keep adding new nodes to its hubs (that is, preferential attachment). Decentralized structure, and specifically scale-free structure, helps a system or an organization to be more robust and resilient, adjust and swiftly respond to the change of circumstances, and if needed, even become less visible or go underground. Targeting covert networks is particularly difficult as identifying hubs and links may present a challenge. Networks facilitate a flow of information and disseminating the message, both in real space and in cyber-space. Their functional differentiation also plays an important role in a network integration and survival. Interestingly, it is not always the nodes but the links between the nodes that may explain those network properties. One may even say that networks are not so much about human resources (represented in the skills, knowledge and motivation) but about ways of interaction between these resources. This interaction and social relationship have vested value described as social capital.

Networks Value

In the words of Portes: ‘To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage’. ³⁷ Coleman, Granovetter and Putnam were among the first to look at the aspect of social capital, e.g. socio-economic value of networks. The notion of social capital remains poorly conceptualized and it is open to overlapping interpretations. The sources of social capital may be family, community, civil society as well as ethnicity, religion, education and gender. Putnam distinguishes the notion of bonding social capital (exclusive, close ties between family and friends) and bridging social capital (inclusive, distant ties between co-workers and acquaintances). ³⁸ In turn, Granovetter uses the concept of strong and weak ties, and highlights the bridging aspect, that is, weak ties.

The following discussion focuses first on the bonding characteristic of a network, that is, dense pre-existing networks that facilitate mobilization and may play an important role in radicalization of a group. One of the most prominent proponents of network theory among social scientists is Donatella della Porta. Her research, especially on a tendency among Italian extremists to join the cause as a ‘cliques of friends’, ³⁹ influenced Sageman’s research, and in turn Atran’s and Vertigan’s research on the role of networks in mobilization and radicalization in certain Islamic groups. Atran and Sageman in particular were hoping to debunk a commonly held notion of al-Qaeda’s recruitment, and to show a bottom-up recruitment process through the pre-existing networks rather than top-down recruitment. By tracing and analyzing the network connections they were also attempting to overrun a popularized concept of the ‘lone wolf’ theory of terrorism. Their findings seem to suggest that indeed most people join jihād through friendship (about 80%) and kinship (about 20%). ⁴⁰ For instance, Sageman traced biographies of about 172 terrorists and found that almost two thirds ‘joined’ jihād along with their friend(s) (‘bunch of guys’), or they already had a friend who was a jihādī. ⁴¹ Sageman refers to this network foundation for recruitment by a police term BOG ⁴² or ‘bunch of guys’ theory, while Atran calls a ‘band of friends’. ⁴³

In 2005, Atran and Sageman used social network analysis to test their concept of leaderless resistance. They believed that jihādī groups are moving from a hierarchical organizational model towards a leaderless resistance model (a model initially popularized by the anti-government activist Louis Beam). With the help of UCINet (software for analyzing social network data) ⁴⁴ they processed information from a merged database on the jihādīs from Southeast Asia and al-Qaeda associates. The resulted graph indeed seems to indicate that small groups engage in resistance without central coordination, while leaders may provide the inspiration for groups and its associations. Atran and Sageman also picked up on the growing role of the Internet in propagating al-Qaeda’s ideas. For instance, Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) seems to take on the role that used to be played by Bin Laden.

They also did further research on the Madrid bombers, retracing their daily lives, family and friendship connections, the school they went to and the cafe where they liked to hang out. In a Western/diaspora context Sageman refers to the observed dynamic as the ‘halal’ theory of terrorism. He describes it as creating a sub-culture and developing a collective identity over a meal and discussion at a local halal restaurant. ⁴⁵ Furthermore, in his earlier work, Sageman notes that the bonds that these, mostly young, people make are of critical importance for understanding terrorism. He suggests that: ‘Despite the popular accounts of the 9/11 perpetrators in the press, in-group love rather than out-group hate seems a better explanation of their behavior’. ⁴⁶ According to Sageman, these social bonds and in-group love even surpass the ideological appeal: ‘social bonds play a more important role in the emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology’. ⁴⁷

His research is echoed by some other scholars. For instance, Hegghammer observes a similar dynamic among young people in Saudi Arabia: ‘Group dynamics such as peer pressure and intra-group affection seem to have been crucial in the process of radicalization.’ ⁴⁸ Schweitzer also focuses on the dissemination of al-Qaeda’s ideas through the pre-existing bonds which have been formed during the war in Afghanistan or at training camps after the war. ⁴⁹ He and Shay even refer to this bond as being ‘the Afghan “Alumni”’, a volunteer who previously participated in the Afghan war or came after it. ⁵⁰ In an ironic way a good illustration of similar peer and friendship dynamics is a British comedy Four Lions (2010) that humorously depicts terrorists-to-be and their bonding every day live experiences. Perhaps the most quoted attempt to map the pre-existing bonds that led to an atrocity is a Krebs’ graph of links and relations between the suicide bombers of 9/11. By mapping the pre-existing bonds, Krebs shows how mobilization and radicalization may be driven by social and friendship ties. ⁵¹

Another kind of social capital is bridging – or reaching out to new resources through the so-called weak links such as co-workers and acquaintances. Networks bring in resources, and Granovetter was the first to promote a theory conventionally called ‘the strength of weak ties’ (SWT). ⁵² In his study of job-hunting he came up with a network theory of access to information known as the ‘Strength of weak ties’. ⁵³ Initially he elaborated his theory in the context of interpersonal relationships in the labour market, highlighting the importance of weak ties (acquaintances as opposed to friends, that is, strong ties). Firstly, weak ties facilitate a greater spread of information: ‘whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance … when passed through weak ties rather than strong’. ⁵⁴ Secondly, weak ties tend to provide a linkage (however weak) between different groups, some of which perhaps would not even be connected if it were not for the weak links. They extend the network and bring more diversity to the relationships: ‘Weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups’. ⁵⁵ Thirdly, weak ties act as bridges to the broader pool of knowledge and resources, for instance in the case of job-hunting, weak ties are becoming ‘an important resource in making possible mobility opportunity’. ⁵⁶ Granovetter then applies his theory from micro to macro level and highlights a paradox. Strong ties facilitate trust in the leader and enhance the cohesiveness of the community, but they also contribute to fragmentation. In turn weak ties are ‘indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to their integration into communities’. ⁵⁷

The ‘the strength of weak ties’ may be observed in the network of Islamic organization which Vidino describes as ‘New Western Brothers’, that is, Islamic groups in the West inspired by Hassan al-Banna and with strong elements of Muslim Brotherhood. ⁵⁸ These groups, under the umbrella of the FIOE (Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe), recognize the importance of their strong ties but they also strategically build an extensive network of weak ties. Their links are not limited to the Muslim community, but expand to the wider religious and non-religious community in Europe connecting their regional organizations with educational establishments, governmental and non-governmental organizations, sport and art organizations, as well as with various NGOs and youth organizations. Similarly, in his appraisal of the Muslim Brotherhood Bayat ascribed the success of the movement to its ‘associational character – their commitment to social mobilization within civil society through organizing cells, alternative mosques, schools, youth associations, women’s organizations, clinics, work cooperatives, as well as athletics and paramilitary groups’. ⁵⁹

Strong ties are important, but development and integration of an Islamic organization also depend on an extensive and growing network of its weak ties. Building on both strong and weak ties seems to be the most efficient strategy. For instance, while studying the effectiveness of the social capital of a group, Oh comes to the conclusion that not only closure (‘strong ties’) is important, but also bridging (‘weak ties’). In fact, the presence of only one type of tie may decrease the effectiveness of a group: ‘Having too much of one source of group social capital (strong closure within a group, for example) can negatively affect the group’s effectiveness’. ⁶⁰ It seems that Islamic organizations with a long-term agenda may try to capitalize on both their strong and weak ties in order to function at a far greater distance (in geographical, social, cultural and economic terms). An example of such is a movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen, whose activists have been establishing cultural, educational and civic institutions first in Turkey and Central Asia, and then increasingly in other parts of the world. Ugur explains that the movement has managed to employ its social capital, and as a result: ‘A critical contribution of the movement is the empowerment of the civil society vis-à-vis the state’. ⁶¹

If evaluated from a business perspective rather than an engagement on a wider scale, bridge-building and cooperation with different bodies make an Islamic organization more competitive than some other Islamic organizations which may prefer to stay within ethnic or religious boundaries. McEvily argues that firms with a wider network of weak ties obtain more competitive capabilities: ‘We propose that a firm’s exposure via its network to more diverse sources of information is commensurate with a richer set of opportunities’. ⁶² Such cooperation not only helps to gain new prospects and access to a greater pool of resources and information, it also help to ‘legitimize’ the organization. Della Porta and Diani highlight that among other benefits alliances ‘serve also to guarantee and to reinforce the legitimacy of movement organizations’. ⁶³

Association with ‘higher’ levels of authority and potential and actual collaboration with other bodies, including government organizations, academic institutions, consultancies, media outlets, businesses and third sector (charities) seems to be the most expedient way for an Islamic organization to gain recognition and eventually credibility.

Some Implications

Network framework has been uncovered and studied in a number of disciplines from neurology to computer science. The findings are exciting, also because of their interdisciplinary nature. Networks (whether WWW, brain or transportation grid) seem to be regulated by some universal organizing principles; they have properties, structure and certain value. Understanding networks helps to understand the bigger system and the way it operates. However, identifying networks may be a challenge. In fact some networks prefer to be secret or covert. This makes it more difficult to analyze their properties and to predict their behaviour, as well as to engage with these networks. Because of network properties (e.g. its flexibility, resilience to attacks, dynamism, at times clandestine nature) some scholars suggest that it may take another network to engage or target a given network.

This paper echoes the main message of Barabási’s book Linked – ‘think networks’. ⁶⁴ By approaching Islamic activism as a network one avails himself or herself of a number of analytical tools for identifying, studying and understanding Islamic networks. Social Islamic networks can be traced in a local Muslim community, in the activism of a mosque or an Islamic centre in the neighbourhood, at a local Islamic bookshop or a halal restaurant, on the Internet, or in an Islamic programme on Satellite TV. A local Islamic group may be a part of a bigger network with shared ideology and coordinated activities. They may exhibit scale-free and/or small-world properties. They may be resilient to penetration or exploit the strength of weak ties and build alliances (also through the Internet). It may take an interdisciplinary approach, including a network-based approach, for understanding such complex multifaceted phenomena as transnational Islamic networks.