The role of Christian churches in curbing disinformation in contemporary Nigeria's representative democracy

Abstract

This article argues for a role for Christian churches in the quest for curbing disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy and attempts to sketch a portrait of such a role and the attendant challenges. This is against the backdrop of the huge impact of disinformation on contemporary Nigeria's politics and democratic values.

Keywords

Disinformation Christian churches curbing Nigeria representative democracy

Introduction

There have been, in recent times, many studies on disinformation in Nigerian politics and its effects on the country's representative democracy (Abang and Okon, 2018; Aririguzoh, 2019; Balogun, 2025; Hassan, 2023; Igohosa, 2021; Obi, 2024). Hence, calls have been made to curb it. However, none of these scholars and policy makers who have suggested various ways of curbing it, has considered the role that Christian Churches in Nigeria could play thereof. This, in itself, is surprising, at least for two reasons. One, the salient role that religion, especially, Christianity in its diverse forms, just like Islam, ordinarily plays in the life of Nigerians, even in politics (Akinkuotu, 2025; Obadare, 2018). This is in spite of the secularity of the Nigerian state as enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Onapajo, 2016:113).¹ Two, the fact that nobody, even the church, as Pope Francis (2018:1–2) notes, is and can feel exempted from the duty of countering disinformation. This article, therefore, attempts to fill the aforesaid gap. It argues for a role for Christian churches in the quest for curbing disinformation in Nigeria's democracy and attempts to draw a portrait of such a role. It is divided into five parts. Part one opens with the introduction. Part two deals with conceptual considerations. Part three looks at the current state of disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy, the factors that brought it about, and its effects on democratic values and processes in Nigeria. Part four considers the nature of the proposed role for Christian churches in Nigeria, and the challenges and the constraints they could face thereof. Part five closes with a conclusion.

Conceptual considerations

Disinformation

A subset of problematic information (Parnell, 2024: 189), disinformation is the willful creation, distortion and consequent dissemination of false/misleading information to achieve intended political or economic purposes. Here, facts that should have ordinarily reached information consumers in their raw and pure form are tampered with so as to make present an altered picture of things. Purveyors of disinformation, be they politicians, states, corporate organizations, ideological groups, social media influencers, political parties, journalists, etc., always hope to manipulate public opinions by presenting their opponents in a bad light and making them unworthy of the people's trust. They usually prey on the vulnerability of the people, their partisan potentiality, and propensity for sharing information for sundry reasons (Berger, 2018: 7). This way, disinformation gets traction by repetition and amplification thus indirectly confirming the infamous words of Goebbels (Cited in Chou, 2014: viii) that “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”

Granted, Arendt has noted how deliberate falsehood and outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends have been with us since the beginning of recorded time (Arendt, 1972: 4). Pope Francis (2018: 2) even dates it back, precisely in the form of fake news, to the lies of the snake in the Garden of Eden which, he said, “began the tragic history of human sin.” However, the advent of digital information technology has taken disinformation to an unprecedented level (Ireton and Posetti, 2018: 15). This is due to at least four reasons: a) the democratization of news production that the internet has made possible b) the lack of effective quality control for what passes thereof as news c) the ease and sheer velocity with which social media platforms spread disinformation d) the reality of social media's recommendation and personalization algorithms that make it easier for people to see information that target their established interests and reinforce their existing worldviews(Bernecker et al., 2021: 2). Basically, disinformation could, among others, be by way of: a) Fabrication in which case there is the creation of false information/content from the scratch. b) Context-Isolation, which involves taking genuine information and putting it out of context. c) Manipulation, which involves taking genuine information and tweaking/distorting it in the same context (Pal and Banerjee, 2019: 5–6). In some instances, this manipulation is carried out by way of “deepfakes” using generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, which also make it easier for the people to be deceived (Hendrickson, 2024).

Between disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and fake news

There are some terms that disinformation is often semantically associated with, even if they are not the same. The first one is “misinformation.” Granted, in misinformation there is the spread of false/misleading information as it is the case in disinformation; in the former rather than in the latter, however, spreaders of the misleading information do not know that the information they are disseminating is false (Pal and Banerjee, 2019: 5–6). Here, there is no malicious intent to deceive, mislead, manipulate, or to cause harm (Berger, 2018:7). The spreading or sharing is done inadvertently. But in the case of disinformation, the spreaders of the misleading information/falsehood actually know what they are doing, having, as it were, the intention to deceive, mislead, manipulate, or to cause harm (Fletcher, 2021: 49). It is simply a deliberate action. Thus, it is the intent to mislead that separates disinformation from misinformation. The second one is “malinformation” in which authentic information about somebody or an organization that should have remained private is deliberately shared and made public not for the interest of the public but with the clear intention of harming the particular person or organization (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2018: 46). Here, there is, among others, an invasion of privacy and the weaponization of information. An example could be seen in the leaking of someone's email(s) or releasing of compromising materials like sex tapes (Kranefeld, 2023: 62).

Then, there is the reality of “fake news” which, as a term, is a contested one (Higdon, 2020:3). As in the case of disinformation, fake news has also something to do with the spread of false information with the intention to mislead. However, in addition to this, fake news has the peculiar character of impersonating the form of mainstream news so as to confer on itself some level of legitimacy. Hence, Zimdars and McLeod (Cited in Silverman and Smith, 2024) define it as “purposefully crafted, sensational, emotionally charged, misleading, or totally fabricated information that mimics the form of mainstream news.” Extending this definition a bit, Lazer and colleagues (2018: 1094) underline the fact that this mimicry of the news media content/mainstream news pertains only to the form and not to the organizational process or intent. Thus, fake news could be said to be a type of disinformation that is not only decked out in the borrowed robes of mainstream news (Dao, 2024), but also made catchy so that it could go viral (Grazulis and Rogers, 2019: 140; Higdon, 2020:5; Pope Francis, 2018: 1). A website created to mimic a mainstream news site but lacks contact information and uses stock photos for staff rather than photos of real people, is an example of fake news (Silverman and Smith, 2024). This is said not oblivious of the peculiar understanding and abuse of the term “fake news” in current media ecosystem. Herein, it connotes any information that one dislikes or finds unfavorable or inconvenient and thus easily dismissed, even when such information, as reported by the mainstream news media, is accurate (Grazulis and Rogers, 2019: 141). In other words, it could be regarded as inconvenient truth that one disagrees with, and thus comfortably dismisses. This understanding has recently been popularized by President Donald Trump whom Bennett and Livingston (2021: 3) thus describe as the “outliar-in-chief.”

In this paper, therefore, given the aforesaid “confusion” that surrounds the use of the term “fake news”, and coupled with the fact that it is only but a category or subset of the umbrella term “disinformation”, it will not be deemed synonymous with disinformation. Also, because the term “misinformation”, as hinted at above, is bereft of the intent to deceive, mislead or manipulate others - things that disinformation ontologically takes pride in - it will not be used in the work as a synonym of disinformation. Equally, for the fact that malinformation deals solely with the intention to harm rather than to mislead or deceive, all of which, however, are the stock-in-trade of disinformation, it will not, as well, be used in this article as the synonym of the latter.

Representative democracy

Given its varied definitions, the term “democracy” is generally a contested one (Hadland, 2015: 23). As a system of government, however, it is one in which the people are heavily involved in running their affairs. Hence, in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, it is defined - in what has become almost legendary – as “government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Cited in Behrouzi, 2005: 16). Granted, the idea of democracy could be found in various degrees in many ancient tribes around the world (Beetham and Boyle, 2009: 14). Its provenance, however, is most often traced to the ancient Greek city-state, Athens, around the 5^th century B.C, with its modern usage closely associated with the eighteenth century revolutionary upheavals in the West (Huntington, 1991:5–6). That said, representative democracy (otherwise indirect democracy) is a form of democracy in which the people instead of getting all directly involved in law, policy and decision-making (as is the case in direct democracy) (Hardyman, 2017:4), choose some people as representatives to do so on their behalf. The choosing of these representatives is often through elections which ought to be periodic, free and fair, and in which all the eligible citizens participate (Hardyman, 2017:5). While those representatives that stood well for the wishes of the people are kept at another cycle of election, those who do not are voted out. This way, even as the people of a country do not vote on every decision made, the final authority in the state belongs to the people (Hardyman, 2017: 5). Unlike direct democracy which is usually best suited for small, simple societies and communities (Hardyman, 2017: 4), many modern societies and countries of the world today (Nigeria inclusive) practise some sort of representative democracy. This is because of their complexity, population, and oftentimes the number of groups that make them up, as well as the number of issues that are often handled. And apart from the aforesaid periodic, free and fair elections in which all eligible citizens ought to participate, representative democracy is often characterized by the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government (Organization of American States, 2001: 3).

The state of disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy today

Although Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960 (Amaefule 2020a: 15), disinformation in its democracy is as old as politics in the country (Roberts and Karekwaivanane, 2024: 4). It was there when word of mouth and the traditional media platforms like newspaper, television, and radio held sway as tools of disinformation. However, one of the factors that has exacerbated it in recent times is the reality of digital information and communication technologies, especially, the social media platforms (Vosoughi et al., 2018). As at the time of writing, Nigeria has over 107 million internet users, with 38.7 million of them being users of the various social media platforms like Facebook, X(formerly Twitter), WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat, You-tube, and Tik Tok (Kemp, 2025). While still making use of the traditional media platforms as far as politics is concerned, Nigerians, especially, the youths the largest segment of Nigeria's population (Amaefule, 2020c), utilize these social media platforms even more (Lorenz, 2022: 104; Ndlela and Mano, 2020: 3–4). It is, therefore, not surprising that these same social media platforms have also become today the major culprit in the dissemination of political disinformation, alongside and more than the traditional news media platforms (Tsfati et al., 2020: 160–161). Little wonder, Nigeria remains one of the countries in Africa that reports most concern about disinformation (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). And to make matters even worse, there is also the reality of AI-generated contents and deepfakes, which, unlike the situation in the past, featured most extensively before, during and after the 2023 general elections in Nigeria. This is with particular reference to the presidential election involving Bola Tinubu of All Progressives Congress (APC), Atiku Abubakar of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Peter Obi of the Labour Party (LP) (Flanagan, 2023; Okpi, 2023; Shibayan, 2023). Some believe that this deployment of AI-generated contents and deepfakes in the disinformation campaign in the said 2023 presidential elections in Nigeria could be one of the firsts in the whole of Africa (Okolo, 2024). Other elections in the country during that time and beyond, up to the time of writing today, did not and have not fared any better. They have also been invaded by the locust of AI-generated contents and deep flakes (Akewushola, 2024; “Imo PDP”, 2023).

That said, apart from the issues of social media and the AI-generated contents and deepfakes, the preponderance of disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy today could be attributed to the following factors:

Misuse of religion

Nigeria is a very religious country. Many Nigerians are Muslims and Christians, with only a few being practitioners of African Traditional religions. One thing about Nigerians, and indeed, many Africans, is that they trust their religious leaders more than they trust their political leaders (Mbaegbu, 2024: 1–2). These religious leaders have and are seen to have influence and power. Such power, according to Falola (1998:104), comes from the “traditional religious sources – the power to preach, teach, dogmatize, and lead congregations. They depend on perceptions of moral uprightness and justness, opposing themselves to the corruption of those in political power. They also rely on their charisma, their ability to arouse, inspire, and stimulate a crowd.” Obadare (2006:666–667) even suggests that in recent times and in some cases, their power has also come by way of their massive material wealth, especially, those in the neo-Pentecostal churches. However, the fact of the matter is that some of them often abuse this trust. Not only do some engage, willingly or unwillingly, in the spread of political disinformation, they also do encourage some of their flocks, willingly or unwillingly, to do the same (See “Nigerians Condemn”, 2025).

Illiteracy

It is true that any one, whether educated or not, can fall prey to fake news. All things being equal, however, the more educated one is, the lesser the probability for such a one to fall prey to political disinformation and thus to spread it thereof (Pop and Ene, 2019). At least, such a one may want to verify the news received and not swallow such in toto. While improvement has been made from what used to be, unfortunately, Nigeria currently boasts of one of the highest number of out of school children in the world. In fact, over 10.5 million of the children in the country are said to be out of school (UNICEF, 2022). This definitely has a lot to say about the disinformation ecosystem in the country.

Nature of politics in Nigeria

In Plato's Republic (Jowett, 1892, III, 72), Socrates allows for the telling of lies by politicians and leaders of the state for the common good. There are not few individuals here in Nigeria, as elsewhere in the world, who actually believe, like him, that it is in the DNA of politicians to tell lies and thus may come to exercise a bit of tolerance towards their lies. Not too long ago, for instance, a certain minister of information in the country was so much used to lying and seemingly tolerated and liked his own lies that fears were raised as to whether he was suffering from a psychiatric disorder called “pseudologia fantastica” or “mythomania” (Kperogi 2017a). In fact, he a kind of converted his ministry, the ministry of information, into that of disinformation, given his penchant for lying! But some did not see anything wrong in what he was doing; for them, he was just doing his job! Thus, where such an attitude as his exists in abundance and is accepted as normal, then, there is bound to be a preponderance and ease of disinformation. Related to this is yet another peculiar nature of Nigerian politics. Politics in the country is a do-or-die affair. Thus, many politicians are ready to do and say any and everything to win elections. And winning such elections means having not only an almost unchecked access to state funds, but also becoming instant millionaires, and even billionaires, and then bettering the lot of their families, friends, aides, co-ethnics and even generations unborn (Amaefule 2016: 37; Sisk 2008: 9).

Discriminatory prosecution of spreaders of disinformation

In 2022, the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) issued a document called Code of Practice for Interactive Computer Service Platforms/Internet Intermediaries. Among others, it was aimed at ensuring the best practices for making Nigeria's digital environment safer and establishes strategies for combating internet harms like misinformation and deception, and penalties stipulated for offenders (National Information Technology Development Agency, 2022, https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Code-of-Practice.pdf). Also, Section 97 of the 2022 Electoral Act (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2022, A395) forbids campaigns based on religious, tribal, or sectional reasons, stipulating, as it were, penalties for offenders. However, offenders of such Codes, Acts and other related laws often appear to be treated differently based on their social status and political affiliations. For instance, during and immediately after elections, many political actors, their minnows and myrmidons, especially, those of the ruling party, often post misleading information on their social media platforms with the intention to harm the reputation of candidates on the other side and groups related to them (Abba 2023). Such are never as prosecuted as are many from the opposition (Oluwasanjo 2023). Such discrimination, and, indeed, lack of accountability and commitment to bring to book those found to be behind the dissemination of disinformation in the past, have also seen many get involved in it themselves.

Unemployment

A good number of Nigerians, especially, the youths, are unemployed (Amaefule, 2022a). Sometimes, some of them are paid pittances by politicians and those in government to engage in the dissemination of disinformation about their opponents and critics of the government. For instance, Kperogi (2017b) points to the existence of a certain hate and propaganda factory during the administration of former Nigeria's president, Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023), - the Buhari Media Center (BMC), whose mandate was not only “to smear, demonize, and troll government critics with thousands of fake, foul social media handles”, but also to “flood the comment sections of news websites with false handles and calculatedly duplicitous information.” Made of 40 members, each of them was paid N250, 000 every month. Also paid sometimes to disseminate the same disinformation prior, during and after elections in Nigeria are influencers and celebrities with huge followership on social media platforms (Nwonwu et al., 2023).

Less public trust in government, its persons and agencies

In an address in 2018 to the United Nations General Assembly, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, had noted how the world suffers “from a bad case of ‘Trust Deficit Disorder’” United Nations (2018). Indeed, Nigerians are among the many the world over who are suffering from such trust deficit disorder. Yes, a good number of Nigerians today do not so much trust their governments at all levels. In fact, a survey conducted in 2023 found out that apart from the police and the judiciary, no other public institution is as greatly distrusted by the Nigerian public as the president and the federal government, with 36% and 35% respectively stating that they greatly distrust them (Hoffman, 2025). The state government and the local government area did not fare any much better. The trust deficit also extends to many government agencies. Many people would rather run easily with any other news media with information than with any public ones. They often consider the latter as just mouthpieces and megaphones of government's own disinformation and propaganda. The issue is also compounded by the fact that, on many occasions, political officials and their appointees have engaged in the spread of unverified information as well as in the undermining of legitimate news in an effort to whitewash their administration or their policies (Freedom House, 2024). Hence, Onwubiko (2022) believes that in Nigeria, “the greatest purveyor of fake news is the government at both the centre and at sub-national levels.” Kperogi (2017b), on his own part, notes how what has been practised in Nigeria in recent times is a certain “propagandocracy”, that is, a “government conducted by intentionally false and manipulative information.”

Ethnocentrism and high polarization of the country

Disinformation usually breeds and spreads faster wherever polarization is high, as groups try to gain the upper hand over others (Osmundsen et al., 2021). Nigeria, as currently constituted, is highly polarized. Such polarization comes by way of religion, region, party politics, ethnic group, etc. With particular reference to polarization by way of ethnic groups, Nigeria, in the face of scarce resources and contested power (Volf, 1996: 77–78), and a plurality of ethnic groups, is today held sway by intense tribalism and ethnic chauvinism (Amaefule, 2020b). All of these, however, are helped by the reality of confirmation bias which makes it easier for people, no matter their educational level and religious and political orientation, to accept as accurate, even when otherwise, any information that confirms their existing beliefs, stereotypes and myths about some individuals or group of individuals (Zhou and Shen, 2021: 503). They easily spread such information, and believe that the rather much accurate information has been manipulated and thus its authoritative sources should be discredited (National Endowment for Democracy, 2018).

Foreign interference

Apart from the aforementioned internal factors and more, external actors also play a role in the spread of disinformation in Nigeria's democracy. A recent investigation by Dubawa, for instance, revealed a coordinated network of X (formerly Twitter) accounts, active since 2022, pushing pro-Russian propaganda and anti-democratic narratives in Nigeria, while praising, as it were, authoritarian governance (Taddy, 2025). Similarly, the example of Cambridge Analytica and Team Jorge shows the extent that some forces, firms and individuals in the West could go in undermining democracy in Nigeria through the spread of the same disinformation (Leloup and Reynaud, 2023). Often carried out for personal, pecuniary and ideological reasons, this is usually not without the connivance of some local actors. All these align with Huntington's observation of how democratization in a country may be influenced, perhaps decisively, by the actions of individuals, governments and institutions external to that country (1991: 85–86).

Effects of disinformation on contemporary representative democracy in Nigeria

Pope Francis (2018: 2) could not have been any more right when he observed that, “Even a seemingly slight distortion of the truth can have dangerous effects.” For one, democracy, as it is obvious, functions better when and where people are well informed about issues and realities of governance and even about parties and candidates standing in for elections and referenda. But when and where there is an intention to “touch” the information concerning these, the people often do not make informed choices. Hence, they end up electing bad rather than good leaders and lagging behind in holding such public officials accountable (Bernecker et al., 2021: 1). Achebe (1983:1) has noted how it is bad leadership, rather than mere physical attributes or disadvantages that has been the bane of Nigeria. So, disinformation has had the effect of keeping Nigeria almost in a perpetual state of electing bad leaders. Again, due to disinformation, some good politicians have lost the courage to come out and contest elections, so as not to have their reputations sullied. Hence, the loss of individuals that would have brought the expected transformation to the Nigerian polity.

More so, as elsewhere, disinformation has led to loss of credibility in democratic institutions in the country (Cigankova et al., 2025: 271). The worst hit is Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the body responsible for conducting elections in the country, as well as the Judiciary, both of which currently have the lowest ratings among Nigerians (Madueke and Enyiazu, 2025). Disinformation has impinged on people's perception of the integrity of elections conducted and arbitrated by these institutions. Even, because of their poor handling of elections and related issues, some citizens, especially, the youths, have had to call for military intervention as had been the case in recent times in some other West African countries (Arthur, 2025). Also, disinformation in Nigeria's democracy has often led to violence (Smidt, 2020: 199). Generally, there are three main types of electoral violence: pre-election, election day, and post-election. However, the latter is the most rampant and violent in African democracies (Koko, 2013: 65; Mehler, 2007: 217), Nigeria inclusive. For instance, over 800 persons were reportedly killed by supporters of Muhammad Buhari, the main opposition candidate in Nigeria's 2011 presidential election. These supporters believed that he had been rigged out by the then incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Again, disinformation commonly leads to a certain confusion and informational paralysis (Bennett and Livingston, 2021:3). Bombarding people with disinformation most times puts them in a situation where they do not know what to believe any more. This is akin to what the World Health Organization (WHO) calls an “infodemic”, an epidemic of information (Pan American Health Organization, 2020). This was clearly evident during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. Up to now, many Nigerians cannot tell the chaff from the wheat in terms of the many stories they heard and read, for instance, about the then three major presidential candidates, Bola Tinubu of All Progressives Congress (APC), Atiku Abubakar of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Peter Obi of the Labour Party (LP).

Finally, Nigeria's representative democracy has been shown in recent times to have gone into recession (Lotona, 2024; Olutokun, 2017). Even, the V-Dem Institute, in its 2025 democracy report, talks of how Nigeria's democracy has become a “grey zone electoral democracy” which can easily fall behind the bar for democracy (2025:13). While many reasons have been given by scholars and policy makers for this situation of things (Lotona, 2024; Olutokun, 2017), no less significant also is the role that disinformation plays thereof. In fact, disinformation poses a huge threat to Nigeria's nascent democracy and its sustenance. Little wonder, former Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, says something about the purveyors of disinformation in Nigerian political landscape that is worth repeating, here: “We must discourage this issue of hate speech and propaganda that are going on because before this time, we were always afraid of the gun as a threat to democracy. But the biggest threat to democracy now that we know is the issue of propaganda, fake news and hate speech. Anybody that is an advocate or vanguard of this is a threat to democracy just like the gun” (Cited in “Fake News”, 2025).

Is there anything that the christian churches in nigeria can do in view of the foregoing?

The Christian churches in Nigeria include, among others, the mainline churches (Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist and Lutheran, churches); classical Pentecostal churches (Assemblies of God, Christ Apostolic Church, Apostolic Faith Mission, Foursquare Gospel Church); neo-Pentecostal churches (Redeemed Christian Church of God, Deeper Life Bible Church, Living Faith Church Worldwide (Winners Chapel), Christ Embassy, etc.); evangelical churches (Evangelical Church Winning All, formerly Evangelical Church of West Africa, etc.); and the African-instituted churches (Celestial Church of Christ, Cherubim and Seraphim Church, Church of the Lord (Aladura). Granted, these denominations have vastly different structures, resources, theological orientations, and political relationships, differences that fundamentally can and actually affect their capacity and willingness to even engage in counter-disinformation work. At the same time, however, there are many things they have in common that may warrant their being considered together as one body, the Body of Christ in Nigeria, and thus capable of addressing together any problem, in this case, the crisis of disinformation in the country's political space. For one, all these churches see the Bible as an inspired Word of God, even if this is often interpreted differently (Olorode 2023, 142), Two, they are united, as article two of the Constitution of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) (2004, 2) makes clear, in their “worship of one God in the Trinity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit”. Three, they all belong to the same Christian Association of Nigeria, which is the umbrella body of all Christians in Nigeria. Four, in many places in the country today, especially, the Northern part of the country, members of these churches have been and are all being targeted by Islamist fundamentalists like Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Muslim Fulani herdsmen, among others, without their being separated along the lines of their denominations and persuasions. They are simply attacked because they are Christians, followers of Christ, and their places of worship, without discrimination, are being and have equally been targeted (Amaefule 2022b). Thus, the reason to consider them together here, and not just individually as it is often the case.

That said, over the years, in different ways and capacities, these churches have played significant role in the emergence and sustenance of democracy in the country (Huntington 1991, 85). And while it is true that countering disinformation in the country's democracy is something that concerns all (Brandt et al., 2022; Pope Francis 2018, 1–2), involvement of these Churches in it, however (something which also forms part and parcel of their mission), is their way of continuing a job which they started in the past in favour of democracy. Among the many ways they could go about this, mention must be made of:

Personal commitment not to contribute to the spread of disinformation

Among those who spread disinformation in the wider Nigerian society, some of them, undeniably, are Christians and members of the Christian Churches. The Churches should help wean such members off this. As hinted at above, in Nigeria, people generally trust religious leaders, in this case, priests and pastors, and place high premium on words that come out of their mouths. Priests and pastors should, therefore, try not to be purveyors of disinformation themselves. They cannot be part of the disinformation problem, and still expect to be taken seriously whenever ideas about solving the issue of disinformation in the country's political landscape are mooted. Yes, it is true, for instance, that during the Covid-19 pandemic, some of them, unfortunately, fell short of this (Chime 2021; Egbunike 2020). The good thing, however, is that it was also some of their counterparts, priests and pastors, that were in the forefront of correcting them (Augoye 2020). Thus, priests and pastors should always be a step ahead in verifying information before they pass them across. While this should be a daily reality, it is even more expected, before, during and after elections, when, of course, emotions are high. This way, they will help to keep most of their flock and, by that very fact, many others, “sane” and in check. One of the ways they can do this is by asking two or three of their colleagues they know should know better when they are in doubts concerning a particular piece of information. Priests and pastors know themselves better than others.

Pope Francis (2018, 1) notes how disinformation often thrives on the absence of healthy confrontation with other sources of information that could effectively challenge prejudices and generate constructive dialogue. In this sense, they can also cross-check the information with traditional news media. The latter, due to their nature and organization, do not, all things being equal, easily fall prey to disinformation as the social media platforms, for example, do. This is said not oblivious of the fact that many people in Nigeria today do not so much trust some of these traditional news media, as well. They often see them as being easily compromised by the government and its agencies. Again, in Nigeria, today, there are some organizations that can help to fact-check information/news. Some of these include FactCheckHub, Nigerian Fact-checkers Coalition (NFC), Dubawa, the latter which is Nigeria's first indigenous independent verification and fact-checking project/organization (https://dubawa.org/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid), etc. Granted, there have been doubts in some quarters as to how accurate, neutral, objective and non-partisan these professional checkers and fact-checking organizations could be (Marietta et al., 2015)), checking and comparing, however, what two or more of them say about a particular piece of information or news could always be of a tremendous help (Markowitz et al., 2023). Similarly, even if the same moving beyond their religious platforms to engage in political fact-checking may sometimes raise questions about their credibility, neutrality, capacity and even as to whether or not they are further politicizing religious institutions, the commitment of these priests and pastors, however, to truth, justice and the common good will always remain important.

Use of the pulpit in a non-partisan way

The pulpit is for preaching the word of God. However, while doing this, socio-political issues that concern the men and women who are being preached to should not always be forgotten (Coriden, 2004: 112). The priests and pastors of the Christian Churches in Nigeria can use their pulpit, of course, in a non-partisan way, to help set the records straight as regards any piece of information. Yes, when they find any information or news to be false, they should not dilly-dally in letting the people know even right there from their pulpit. This does not amount to any abuse of the pulpit. This way, they will help a lot in curbing the spread of the said disinformation and the eventual “disaster” that it could cause.

Best ethical practices at church-owned media houses and platforms

Many of the churches in Nigeria have their newspapers, journals and newsletters. Some others even run radio and TV stations. For instance, the Catholic Church in Nigeria owns the Lumen Christi Television based in Lagos and the Catholic Television of Nigeria (CTV) based in Abuja, which are all satellite television stations (https://ctvnigeria.org/about/). Also, many of her various dioceses in the country own their TV and radio stations. The Anglican Church in Nigeria owns the Advent Cable Network Nigeria (ACNN TV), a satellite television station, based in Abuja (https://acnntv.com/). Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) owns the Dove Television, a satellite television station, located at Mowe, Ogun State (https://dovevision.org/). The Christ Embassy, founded by Chris Oyakhilome, owns the LoveWorld television station based not only in Nigeria, but in many other parts of the world. There are many other churches with their own television and radio stations. Efforts should, therefore, be made so that only verified news and information come out thereof. But then, it should be acknowledged that the aforesaid church-owned media infrastructures are often limited in their reach as they are most of the time only watched or listened to by their members. And even many of these members who watch the channels do not often go beyond religious programmes. But the situation is a kind of mitigated by the fact that if each church-owned media house is able to correctly inform its members who watch or listen to it of the true situation of things in the country at a particular point in time, then, a good number of Christians would have been reached at the end of the day. And as salt and light of the world (Matt. 5:13–16), these Christians would eventually influence positively the generality of Nigerians.

Calling christian politicians to order

As noted above, many politicians, among others, are behind the spread of disinformation in the country's political space. They often use such to gain advantage over their opponents. Unlike the situation in the past when a good number of Christians considered politics as a dirty game that they should have nothing to do with, a good number of politicians in the country today are Christians (Amaefule, 2019: 183–184). The Churches in their leaders should keep reminding these politicians that politics should not be a do-or-die affair. Rather, it is and ought to be a vocation and a means to their sanctification. Therefore, they need not get themselves involved in the spread of disinformation in order to make it. They should be courageous enough to resist joining the bandwagon of those who do so. As Jonathan (Cited in “Fake News”, 2025) rightly noted, they, and other politicians in the country, should be made to understand that there must be a country and state before they could talk about having a president, a governor, or any other. And if, by way of disinformation and its dissemination they destroy the country, there will be nobody left for them to govern.

Church's ongoing involvement in education

From the beginning, the Christian Churches in Nigeria have used schools as a means of evangelization (Amaefule, 2023: 85). In this way, the Churches played a significant part in forming those who were involved in nationalistic struggle in the colonial times and then in leadership positions early in post-colonial times. And even today, the churches have not relented in doing this. While there have been accusations that some of the Church-owned schools have often gone beyond the reach of the ordinary people (Essien, 2024: 204. See also Omolade, 2009), these churches should endeavour to look into such. By their involvement in the school apostolate today, the Christian churches in Nigeria help in training a good number of the citizens who are capable of verifying the news they consume and thus resist all the more the temptation to accept and then spread the misleading/false information or news. Hence, they help them hone their critical thinking and discernment capabilities. Even, the churches in Nigeria can go a step further by introducing into these schools particular programmes or even courses – especially, where they do not yet exist - that could, among others, help to teach pupils and students how to identify disinformation and thus, restrain from spreading such.

Media/digital literacy

A recent research reveals that over 48% of Africans do not recognize deepfakes when they see such (Ndebele, 2023). Granted, the research was limited to five African countries, viz., Mauritius, Egypt, Botswana, South Africa, and Kenya, the percentage of Nigerians who do not know much about deepfakes may still be as high. The different Christian churches in Nigeria, individually or, as a group, should organize seminars and workshops every now and then to help the Christians know how to detect not only deepfakes but also the different species of disinformation, and detecting them, be in a better position not to spread them. They should as well help Christians and others, especially, those of them that make use of the social media platforms, to be at home with the ethics of such platforms. Those working with existing fact-checking organizations, as well as individual Christians who are media personnel, including priests and pastors already playing public roles in the sustenance of democracy in the country, could be called to help out in such seminars and workshops. Also, as pointed out above, some influencers are often paid to spread disinformation. This is often without the knowledge of the thousands and millions that follow them on social media platforms. Hence, the necessity of digital/media literacy programmes. While such programmes should be directed to all the members of these churches, the greater part should be directed to the young people. As explained above, they form the majority users of social media platforms from which disinformation and even misinformation are spread the most.

Prophetic ministry

It has been noted that in Nigeria, the government and her agencies are sometimes involved in the spread of disinformation. Hence, the leadership of the Churches in Nigeria should exercise their prophetic ministry by calling out the government or any of her agencies wherever and whenever they notice such. They should be ready to use their own media houses and platforms to counteract such and let the people know the true situations of things. They should as well let the government know when they are engaged in acts that may make the people distrust them. This is particularly the case when there are indications that government agencies like INEC and the Judiciary are making it easier for people to run with disinformation. On some occasions, in order to check what it considers as “fake news” or news that may undermine “national security”, the government has often rolled out some measures. Cho (2025: 1091) notes how in more liberal regimes these measures have aimed at protecting “healthy public discourse through fact-checking and legal regulations”, but in illiberal or authoritarian regimes, the aim has been to “seek to reify their control over the public sphere, limiting rather than enabling political discussion”. The seven-month ban of X (then called Twitter) by former Nigeria's president, Muhammadu Buhari, in 2021, for instance, falls under the second of Cho's two options (Akinwotu, 2022). The churches, on such occasions, should not keep silence, but should keep voicing out their objection since such, among others, undermines human rights and fundamental freedom (Grzadkowska, 2021). Such calling out should not be limited to only the government, but also to politicians, mainstream journalists, owners of social media platforms and any others that may engage in the spread of disinformation.

Public awareness campaigns

During the early days of HIV/AIDS pandemic in many African countries, the Churches in Africa and especially in Nigeria, embarked on serious awareness campaigns which, together with government efforts, helped to make people much more aware of the disease, its prevention, how to care for those affected and other realities about it (Daniel, 2012. See also Waimiri, 2003). The same happened during the Ebola virus disease epidemic (Featherstone, 2015) and even more recently, the Covid-19 pandemic. Disinformation remains a great threat to both public health and democracy. Therefore, Churches in Nigeria should not be found wanting in this case, as well. Together with other relevant stakeholders, they should embark on elaborate awareness campaign in the thousands of its parishes and stations to help the people understand more about disinformation and what they should do. The November 27^th of every year is observed as the Worldwide Disinformation Awareness Day (November 27th Proclaimed, 2021). Christian Churches in Nigeria should also join in observing the day in their parishes, stations, schools, hospitals and clinics.

Prayer

In 1993, during the military dictatorship of Sani Abacha, and in the midst of the political uncertainty that followed the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election, the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria (Catholic Bishops' Conference of Nigeria in Schineller, 2002, 292), for instance, came up with the “Prayer for Nigeria in Distress”, which is said even today in all Catholic families, parishes and chaplaincies in Nigeria. Five years later, in 1998, the same Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria came up with another prayer, “Prayer against Bribery and Corruption in Nigeria” (Amaefule, 2022a:200), which is also said daily in most Catholic families, parishes and chaplaincies in Nigeria. Given the current crisis of disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy, coming up with yet another prayer, this time, “Prayer against Disinformation in Nigeria's Democracy”, may not be out of order. Other churches in the country could do likewise. In fact, Christian churches in Nigeria should pray against the crisis of disinformation in the way and manner they deem fit, and according to their particular traditions. All this is hinged on the overall belief in the power and efficacy of prayer and in the wonders that it could do even in the face of a situation like this (Amaefule, 2022a: 201).

Challenges and constraints

To effectively confront disinformation in the nation's politics and democracy and in the way and manner listed above and even more, there is need for the Christian churches in Nigeria to overcome the near-extreme denominationalism often found in their midst (Amaefule 2022b). This is given the way, for instance, the mainline churches were established in the country in the past, and the way the neo-Pentecostal churches come up in the country today. Rather than what divides them, the churches should focus more on things, as listed above, that unite them and what they hope to overcome together in this case – the crisis of disinformation. Similarly, there is need for them to overcome ethnocentrism which, unfortunately, is found today not only in the nation's politics but, even so, in the churches, as well (Amaefule 2019, 185). They should always be reminded that the water of Christian baptism overrides the blood of kinship and extreme ethnicism (Healey and Sybertz 1996, 149). Again, there is need to overcome the selfishness that may make a particular church or its members to focus more on what they stand to gain from a particular politician who is a member of their church or who comes from their own ethnic group as the case may be rather than on the prophetic ministry that they should render given a particular situation at hand. More so, combatting disinformation in the nation's representative democracy may also require funds which may not always be there. Hence, the need for the churches to make sacrifices to this effect. Also, as said above, the churches and especially their priests and pastors should endeavour to avoid anything that could present them as purveyors of disinformation. It damages their credibility.

Equally, it has been noted that the Churches in Nigeria should always call out state and non-state actors engaged in the dissemination of disinformation. Such a mission, however, is always fraught with risks and dangers to life. This is much so not only because it involves the setting of people free from the grips of falsehood (Arendt 2006, 229), but also the propensity for abuse of power and fear of being held accountable by many state actors in Nigeria. Similarly, a joint prophetic ministry called for in this case for the churches in Nigeria will always be faced with both the pessimism of the naysayers and the fears of those who believe that such a coming together will lead to the swallowing up of their particular churches or denominations. Without glossing over such sentiments and concerns, there is still need for them to believe that God who always knows how to write even on crooked lines will not withhold His Spirit from en-wisdomizing and empowering all those involved so that the flame of the project would be kept ever aglow.

Conclusion

The article made a case for Christian churches in the quest for curbing disinformation in Nigeria's representative democracy. The paper located the role, among others, in the churches’ personal commitment not to contribute to the spread of disinformation before, during and after elections; in their making use of their pulpits to correct disinformation when and wherever it is found; observing best practices and ethics at their own media platforms; always cautioning Christian politicians against engaging in disinformation to gain electoral advantage over their opponents; Ongoing involvement in education; efficiently carrying out their prophetic ministry that would see them call out the government, politicians, mainstream journalists, and any others that may engage in disinformation, and then through their fervent prayer. The paper acknowledged the challenges that denominationalism, ethnocentrism, selfishness and the often misuse of government powers, as well as the constraints of funds and goodwill could pose to the aforesaid concerted efforts of the Christian churches in Nigeria.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Adolphus Ekedimma Amaefule

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biography

Adolphus Ekedimma Amaefule holds a Licentiate in Theology from the Università Pontificia Salesiana (Pontifical Salesian University), Rome, and a PhD in the same discipline from the Pontificia Facolta Teologica dell'Italia Meridionale (Pontifical Theological Faculty of Southern Italy), Naples. At present, he is an Associate Professor in the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria. His email address is eke2006@yahoo.com, and ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9520-4740

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