Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz,eds,The Strained Alliance: U.S.–European Relations from Nixon to Carter

Reviewed by: Suzanne Doyle, University of East Anglia, UK

The ‘long 1970s’, stretching from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, have attracted considerable attention from scholars in recent years; this interest is unsurprising. Facing a changing and uncertain time, Western policy makers had to adjust to the shifting of relative power. This was created in part by the onset of Soviet-American strategic parity, the relative decline of America’s economic power in comparison with Europe and Japan, and instability in the Middle East. Consequently, the ‘long 1970s’ are now recognized as years of profound structural transformation for the international system. Furthermore, the decade also saw the weakening, or even disappearance, of some of the most important pillars on which US–European relations had rested since the beginning of the Cold War. The popularity of the US and its leaders had declined significantly throughout Western Europe, Europe’s willingness to follow US foreign policy had appeared to wane, and the Bretton Woods system collapsed. These developments challenged and, in many ways, transformed US–European relations. Through the authors’ utilization of a wide array of recently declassified materials from the United States and Europe, The Strained Alliance deals carefully with these and other issues, bringing us fresh insights into the changing dynamics of transatlantic relations during this time.

The volume is divided into four parts. The first focuses on the problematic relationship between German Ostpolitik and US détente. The second part focuses on whether US–European relations widened in the early 1970s, through chapters analysing the re-launch of the movement towards European integration, the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, and the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. The third part discusses the major transatlantic crisis that arose from Kissinger’s misconceived ‘Year of Europe’ initiative, and the difficulties of maintaining transatlantic harmony during the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The final part analyses the second half of the 1970s and provides detailed insights into Schmidt and Carter, as well as the NATO dual track decision. This final section is perhaps the most significant in the book. The insights it offers on the tense relationship between the Carter administration and the Schmidt government, over strategic as well as financial issues, makes an important and innovative contribution to the expanding literature on this era.

The volume’s analysis is not only well documented and effective, being largely based on extensive recently released archival material, it also provides a conclusive argument on the dynamics prevailing within the Atlantic alliance. Almost all of the essays touch on, at least in part, the inherent contradictions of US-European relations during this time. On one side, US leaders wished Europe to contribute more to the common Atlantic cause, through both defence contributions and increased consumption to sustain the global capitalist economy. However, they simultaneously distrusted many of Europe’s attempts to assert diplomatic autonomy, such as Brandt’s Ostpolitik. On the other side, Western Europe pursued greater autonomy and displayed increased restiveness with US military dominance, whilst at the same time fearing any possible moving of US focus away from Europe. Overall, the volume reveals the contradictions that underpinned the relationship between the United States and its European allies during this time. More significantly it contravenes conventional wisdom, demonstrating that European integration evolved less as a consequence of US support than as a result of American’s relative decline and growing US–European discord.

The understanding that this volume provides is buoyed by its approach. The volume goes beyond the classical bilateral approach and takes into account interactions on multilateral levels, such as the European Community, the Helsinki process and the G-7 summit. The book does not, however, provide an even coverage of US–European relations. The space devoted to the start of the decade is significantly greater than that allocated to the middle and end. The volume is also far too German-centric in its definition of what constituted US–European relations during the Cold War. The German question was obviously at the centre of the transatlantic relationship, and the changes in West German foreign policy during the 1970s drastically altered that relationship. Consequently, the volume centres too much on this at the cost of overlooking important developments in the ever-problematic rapport between the US and France, and the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Britain. Furthermore, the role of smaller countries and Southern Europe receives scant attention. Accordingly, the volume only serves to enhance understanding of US relations with the ‘big three’. Whilst this imbalance largely reflects the current state of scholarship, this does not make it less problematic in a book that purports to analyse US–European relations.

Notwithstanding this shortcoming, The Strained Alliance is an important addition to the historiography on transatlantic relations. The volume demonstrates the complexity and importance of Atlantic relations during the Cold War, and whets the appetitive for further detailed research. It should be considered essential reading for scholars of transatlantic relations for many years to come.