Abstract
Reviewed by: Frederick C. Schneid, High Point University, USA
Munro Price’s book is a concise and insightful exploration of the fateful months of 1814 and the end of the Napoleonic Empire. Price argues that Napoleon’s belief – which he often stated to his coterie – that only military victory could galvanize France and save his empire, was false. The author contends that even if Napoleon truly believed what he said, the clear evidence from his prefects, secret police and administration found otherwise. The population of France would have rallied to the Emperor if he had ended the war and accepted a negotiated peace. To this end, Price makes an effective and convincing case. This interpretation is not a new argument in the conventional sense. Historians have discussed Napoleon’s foolhardiness in not accepting peace overtures, and few believed that in conceding, Napoleon would have undermined his legitimacy among the French population. Yet the specialists have not followed up this debate with serious methodical, historical research. For his part, however, Price is determined to pursue an answer to this question through archival research. The result is compelling, and should encourage further study.
The work opens with an examination of the state of Napoleon’s empire in December 1812, and the author follows this with an exploration of the Malet affair. In these two chapters Price appears to set the stage for the traditional argument. After the disaster in Russia and receiving news of the failed coup, Napoleon rushed home to secure his regime and rebuild the army. Yet Price does not take the well-trodden route, and instead argues that Napoleon ‘drew the wrong conclusion’ (32). The Emperor believed the threat to his rule came from republicans, whereas Price contends that the true peril to the regime came from the Bourbons. In assessing the extent of his power after 1812, Price states, ‘For Napoleon, the litmus test of loyalty was willingness to fight for him …’ (33). The relative ease with which he rebuilt his army through conscription indicated to the Emperor that he retained the support of France. To this end, Napoleon’s notion that the stability of the regime rested with military victory was false. Indeed, Price asserts that Napoleon’s association of military victory with political stability was an essential part of Napoleon’s mentalité. This outlook both informed and clouded his decisions when Metternich approached him, and resulted in his eventual refusal to seek anything other than total victory (51).
Price nevertheless contends that Napoleon’s determination to achieve victory swayed his thinking at the end of his successful spring 1813 campaign. Despite defeating the Russo-Prussian armies at Lutzen and Bautzen, he entertained Metternich’s new proposals. While Price maps the exchanges between Napoleon and the Austrian foreign minister in some detail, he admits that ‘the reasons for Napoleon’s sudden capitulation are not clear …’ (88). Certainly, Napoleon’s willingness to explore peace by means of Austrian mediation appears to undermine Price’s thesis. Price uses his interpretation cleverly to reflect upon the sense of relief among the French public and that of the imperial retinue in anticipation of the Congress of Prague. Price contends that reports from French prefects indicated that peace would secure the imperium. The news of the summer armistice reinforced this feeling as found in French public opinion. Moreover, Price convincingly argues that both Generals Caulaincourt and Savary had a similar hope for peace. All of this was dashed, however, when the armistice ended and conflict resumed. Price states that it was at this moment that ‘the erosion of Napoleon’s domestic support had begun’ (110). Thus, the road to the alienation of the French and the army began at the conclusion of the armistice, and not with defeat on the battlefield in October 1813.
Once Napoleon failed to end the war through a successful peace settlement, Price examines the events that occurred during the disastrous fall campaign. The army was defeated, Germany was lost, France was invaded and Napoleon’s support gradually disappeared. The chapters of this work follow progressively from campaign narrative to domestic discontent. The invasion of France breathed new life into Napoleon’s illusion that the French people would rally as they had in 1792 (205). Price declares that Napoleon’s hope for popular resistance centred on the population of Paris. Yet Parisians, as gauged by the activity on the Bourse, did not seem confident in the outcome. The crafting of this narrative lets the reader relive the enormous shock of the fall of Paris. If Napoleon believed Parisians would offer the greatest resistance to invasion, the city’s capture by betrayal undermined his entire view. Everything came crashing down.
By pursuing the story in this manner, Price effectively brings the reader to the last dramatic act of 1814 – the confrontation with the Marshals at Fontainebleau, which resulted in Napoleon’s abdication. The author begins the book describing Napoleon’s farewell to his guard before departing for exile. One can compare that romanticized account of the event to the situation leading to the farewell. As Price has finely crafted his history, it makes even more sense, and reinforces his central thesis. Napoleon could never conceive that peace, rather than war, could secure his empire.
Price’s style is smooth and his prose flows quite well. His arguments are easy to follow. Still, it is his sources that are crucial to his compelling interpretation. Price’s research at the secondary and printed primary level is solid. He relies upon standard works for the campaign narratives that are written in German, French and English. His archival research appears most clearly in those chapters dedicated to domestic perceptions of the war. Price has consulted material effectively in the Archives nationales as well as diplomatic archives in France, Austria and the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the key sources used to support Price’s thesis come from prefectural and police reports. While he uses sufficient evidence to introduce and substantiate his argument, still there is a need for more before one can fully accept this interesting interpretation. Rather than constituting a definitive account, Napoleon and the End of Glory introduces a revisionist perspective on the decline and fall of the Napoleonic regime that begs for further research. Price has achieved a clear and well-argued account of 1813–14, but his book should be considered the first new work on the subject and it should be followed by future comprehensive research into the prefectural archives. Price’s interpretation is intriguing, but leaves the critical historian wanting to see more.