Abstract
Through an analysis of archival documents and the published writings of experts, this paper explores the relationships between the emerging field of sexology, the state, and the Catholic Church in post-1956 Poland, as these relationships play an important role in the history of sexuality under state socialism. In the period in question, experts in sexuality, mainly medical doctors, focused on how to improve sexual relations within marriage. They developed a notion known as the ‘culture of sexuality’ based on progressive values such as equality, rationality, and psychological health. Experts drew a connection between an improvement in people’s marital sex lives and the health and welfare of both society and the nation. The Party-State supported these developments and also used them to their advantage in their political struggle with the Catholic Church. However, the experts’ proposal to restrict access to abortion (in 1961) was met with decisive resistance on the part of the Party-State.
Between 1955 and 1956, abortion was a topic of much discussion in Poland, the result of which was the passing of a liberal law that made it legal. After about five years of silence during the Stalinist period, the issue of sexuality had reappeared as a subject of public debate. Experts from various disciplines, albeit mainly medical doctors, approached these issues mostly focusing on the Society for Conscious Motherhood (Towarzystwo Świadomego Macierzyństwa, SCM) which was established in 1957 and was supported by the Party-State.
This article aims to explore the development of expertise on sexuality in a political context. Sexuality constituted an important element in the modernizing project of state socialism. East-Central European countries witnessed crucial and progressive changes, and to some extent, the study of sexuality could benefit from the ideological and political context of state socialism, as recent research has shown. 1 Although Polish sexologists in the 1960s also published on other issues, their main concern was the sexual relationship between heterosexual married couples. They assumed that marriage formed an obvious goal for every citizen, and in their daily practice they dealt with patients who were married or were thinking about a future spousal relationship. In fact, marriage was nearly a universal experience for Polish people at that time. 2 For the experts, marriage and family played an important role in socialist society. Indeed, ideas about sex, contraception, marriage, and family – as propagated by the experts – should be read within their political context, namely, the modernization strategies of state socialism in the period in question, and the state’s social and economic concerns, as well as its ideological struggles with the Catholic Church. Accordingly, this article looks at the post-1956 relationships between the emerging field of sexology, the state, and the Church as important aspects in the history of sexuality under state socialism. I address the following questions: How did the experts conceptualize marital sex – what was proper and what was mature sex? How did their conclusions influence policy? What was the relationship between this type of expertise and the state?
We already enjoy some significant scholarly literature on sexuality under state socialism. 3 The current research on sexuality in post-war Poland has focused on abortion, contraception, 4 the development of expertise (mainly in the 1970s and 80s), and sex education in the twentieth century. 5 This literature also discusses the time frame of important changes and developments. As Josie McLellan and Agnieszka Kościańska have shown, the last two decades of state socialism in Germany and Poland, respectively, formed a period of considerable openness towards sexuality, as well as witnessing significant changes in behaviour and the development of progressive views on sex on the part of the experts. 6 Kateřina Lišková, in the case of Czechoslovakia, argues that ‘liberalizing changes in understanding sexuality were already occurring in the 1950s’. 7 Liberalizing attitudes and policies were, however, reversed in the following decades. As the Czechoslovak case shows, manuals on how to have a healthy sex life changed views on gender equality between the 1950s and the 1970s, and in the latter decade, the manuals insisted on the necessity of a gender hierarchy for a successful marriage. 8 Developments in the ‘science of sex’ both shaped and were shaped by the changing political context. These examples clearly show the need for a careful and nuanced analysis of the ruptures and evolutions of different aspects of sexualities under state socialism: expertise, medical practice, and the state’s views, as well as the citizens’ behaviours. Kościańska and Renkin argue that ‘the role of science as discourse and practice is critical to understanding fully Central and Eastern European histories of sexuality and their legacies’. 9 What needs to be further explored is how expertise in sexuality in those countries influenced progressive policies, and what motivated the Party-State when shaping policies towards sexuality. Additionally, in the Polish case, the question of the role of Catholicism and Catholic hierarchy needs to be investigated. This article addresses these problems.
Agnieszka Kościańska has pointed to the originality of the ‘Polish school of sexology’ developed in the 1970s and 80s, which established the practices of interdisciplinarity, an integrated approach towards the patient, popularization, and a constant dialogue with the readers/patients. This specific approach used by Polish sexologists was already visible in the 1960s when the ‘father’ of this school – Kazimierz Imieliński – started his career. Kościańska has also shown how Polish expertise on sex in the 1970s and 1980s shaped and strengthened gender stereotypes and gender order, even at the cost of undermining the principles of the communist gender-equality project. 10
This article shows that in the period 1956–1970, Polish experts in sexology developed a notion known as the ‘culture of sexuality’ 11 which was based on progressive values (i.e. equality, rationality, psychological health). Ideas and activities carried out by those experts fitted easily within the modernization strategies of the state. Experts focused on improving people’s sex lives within their marriages but related these improvements to society and the nation’s health and welfare. Therefore, the Party-State supported these developments and also used them as a tool in their political struggle with the Catholic Church. On the other hand, experts searched for methods that would decrease the number of abortions, which situated them surprisingly close to the Church’s views (although the arguments in opposition to abortion were different in both cases), whereas the Party-State would not accept any restriction on the right to free abortion. In this paper, I show examples of the complexity of relations between progressive expertise, the state, and the Church. This research also reveals that the period 1956–1970 can be considered as a significant step towards more progressive views on sexuality, particularly after the period of Stalinism when issues surrounding sexuality were silenced. 12
The analysis ends in 1970 for several reasons. Although not in every aspect, 1970 marked an important change. The SCM’s advocacy of the ‘culture of sexuality’, and the state’s leading policies on sexuality, did not change dramatically after 1970. Nevertheless, the turn of the decade marked an important change. By the end of the 1960s, the SCM had begun to reformulate its targets, going beyond family planning and sexuality. The word ‘marriage’ was substituted by ‘family’ and ‘married life’ was substituted with ‘family life’. The decline in birth rates during that time began to worry the Party-State, as was commented in a note on the SCM’s national meeting: ‘the problem of abortion needs careful observation, in the light of demographic issues. If the birth rate continues to decline, appropriate measures should be taken’. 13 The political climate around family and women’s roles also changed from the 1960s to the 1970s. 14 Social policies aimed at providing more benefits for working mothers. In 1968, a year of unpaid maternity leave was introduced, and four years later, paid maternity leave was extended from 12 to 18 weeks. As Agnieszka Kościańska argues, mainstream Polish sexology in the 1970s and 1980s began to stress gender differences and the importance of traditional gender roles for shaping a happy marital sexual relationship. 15
The period from 1956 to 1970 was also peculiar in terms of the relations between the state and the Church: after a short period of more conciliatory policies towards the Church during de-Stalinization, the Party-State resumed its anti-Church measures in order to both limit the Church’s organizational expansion and weaken its ideological influence on society. Yet, after 1970 another shift took place as the Party-State opted for less antagonistic policies towards the Church. 16 As historians of state-Church relations under communism have pointed out, while in the 1960s the bishops’ protests against ‘demoralizing’ films and publications were ignored by the state, in the 1970s the government and the Church had a shared interest in fighting what were seen as Western influences and more liberal approaches to sexuality (pornography, nudity in art, etc.). 17 In the 1980s, as the Church’s influence grew stronger, it managed to influence policies on sexuality; in 1986, the Church hierarchy effectively pressured the state to withdraw the newly introduced progressive textbook for sex education in schools. 18 Research on the role of the Catholic Church in shaping post-war policies in the realm of sexuality shows that it changed according to the period and the broader context of state-Church relations.
This article draws on a variety of sources. First, I explore the books and articles written by experts and published as scientific literature. I further look into their popular writings, which is where they explained their ideas and arguments to the broader public. Important for this study have been the copies of the journal Family Issues (Problemy Rodziny) published by the SCM from 1961 to 2001. The second crucial source was that of archival documents from the communist party, parliament, and the Ministry of Health.
The first section covers the developments of expertise in sexology in post-1956 Poland – both in terms of public debate and institutionalization. The second section traces the ideas behind the culture of sexuality and how it was spread by the experts in their professional and popular writings, demonstrating their understanding of happy and healthy marital sex in the context of modernization, gender equality, and social welfare. The third section addresses the role of the state and the interplay between expertise, the state, and the Church.
The Development of Polish Expertise on Sex after 1956: Abortion, Conscious Motherhood, and Sexology
In the short post-World-War-Two period, Poland engaged in discussions about abortion and venereal disease, and even some pre-war books on sexuality were re-published. Yet, with the onset of Stalinism in 1948, all dialogue related to issues of sexuality ceased abruptly. 19 Between 1949 and 1955 there was a complete silence on sexuality. In late 1955, issues of sexuality re-emerged, but in the context of the political and cultural thaw. Journalists and intellectuals started to discuss ‘the crisis of family’ and the ‘degeneration of private life’, associating these issues with certain Stalinist policies. Indeed, prostitution, abortion, and the crisis of marriage were seen as elements of the moral panic of early de-Stalinization. Public discourse in the mid-1950s even associated the moral crisis with women’s emancipation. 20 As Malgorzata Fidelis argues, public discourse focused on the control of female sexuality. 21
Shortly after the liberalization of the abortion laws in the USSR in 1955, Poland witnessed an open debate on the issue. Press articles and radio broadcasts highlighted the problem that there were thousands of illegal abortions – some of which resulted in the deaths of young women – and the question of whether the law should be changed. 22 Gynaecologists presented diverse opinions on the issue. Jan Lesiński, professor and future activist of the SCM, was convinced that legal abortions would not reduce the birth rate and that a professional abortion would exercise no negative effect on a woman’s health. During a discussion in the Parliamentary Commission of Health in December 1955, the minister claimed that doctors who had been asked by the Ministry of Health for their opinion argued that abortion could be harmful but that women should not be punished for terminating their pregnancy; rather, methods of contraception should be provided and made widely available. 23 A law of April 1956 made abortion legal for women who were ‘in [a] difficult situation’. 24 Discussions in the press often related new ‘reproductive morality’ to progress and modernity. 25 The law aimed at fighting illegal abortions, and it contributed to the further medicalization of women’s reproductive health. 26 At first, access to abortion was limited by demanding and time-consuming stipulations, but in late 1959 it became fully available, although doctors were obliged to provide information about family planning and to prescribe contraceptives. 27 Liberalization (with the 1959 directive of the ministry) was related to the anti-natalist discourses and policies of the party. In 1958, the first secretary of the communist Party declared that a high birth rate ‘limits the accumulation of goods needed for building socialism because it makes it necessary to increase the number of available jobs and delays technical progress’ and that the birth rate should be slowed down. 28
The abortion debate was only the beginning. Experts who took part in it – and who usually advocated liberalization – soon spread the ideas of ‘conscious motherhood’, that is, preventing unwanted pregnancies with family planning. Conscious motherhood as an idea and as the agenda of socially concerned Polish leftist groups has its roots in the interwar period, 29 but in the late 1950s, a group of intellectuals, journalists, and doctors (gynaecologists) decided to renew this notion and established the Society of Conscious Motherhood. Its first meeting was organized by the League of Women and the editors of the daily Życie Warszawy (Life in Warsaw). 30 The communist party welcomed the group and the SCM was officially established in late 1957; it was controlled by and directly benefited from the financial support of the Ministry of Health. Among the members of the temporary executive board sat 10 doctors, including Jan Lesiński, Professor Marcin Kacprzak, doctor and expert in social medicine who became the head of the Society until 1970, 31 and the future author of the famous The Art of Love, Michalina Wisłocka, who was a gynaecologist. One of the high officials in the Ministry of Health became the general secretary of the society.
At first, the SCM declared rather modest goals – to spread the ideas of conscious motherhood, i.e. contraception methods and a general awareness of the need for birth control. In the early years, it focused on counselling and publishing popular brochures on contraception and marriage. 32 Soon, the SCM even started a company that produced contraceptives. From the very beginning, the society maintained fruitful contacts with the international network of family planning. 33 Although the doctors who engaged in the activities of the SCM supported the decriminalization of abortion in 1956, they considered abortion as harmful. Doctors saw decriminalization, above all, as a means to combat illegal abortion, which often resulted in death or severe health problems, and they were far from recognizing it as an advisable method of birth control. Moreover, they were worried by the statistical data on legal abortion which revealed that many women had numerous abortions and were unwilling (as the experts judged) to become ‘conscious mothers’.
Soon, the SCM’s agenda started to include expertise in sexology. An ambitious mission of shaping a new ‘morality’ also embraced issues such as sexual relations. The SCM supported some of the first research initiatives in sexology, such as the survey carried out by the social psychologist Hanna Malewska on women’s sex lives in the late 1950s. In 1960, the first National Conference on Mental Hygiene in Marriage took place. It was an interdisciplinary project that gathered experts in psychology, sociology, law, and psychiatry and was organized by the Polish Association of Mental Hygiene and the SCM. It was an interesting attempt at an interdisciplinary discussion on marriage and family with a strong emphasis on sexuality. 34 Thus, the ambitious project of developing Polish sexology emerged – funding an institute of research in sexology and establishing a society of sexologists. This did not actually happen, but, as a result of the conference, the sexological division of the SCM was established under the direction of Bolesław Popielski and Tadeusz Bilikiewicz – the latter was a psychiatrist who ran a clinic on sexual neuroses in Gdańsk, where Kazimierz Imieliński started his career as a psychiatrist and eventually became the first Polish doctor to hold a degree in sexology. The division operated throughout the 1960s but never led to a separate society of sexology. Bilikiewicz and Imieliński were the main authors of expert literature on sexuality in the 1960s. Bilikiewicz published his The Clinic of Sexual Neuroses (Klinika nerwic płciowych) in 1959, but he had already finished the manuscript in October 1956 – a symbolic date for de-Stalinization in Poland. Imieliński was the author of a popular book on sexuality Sex Life: Psycho-hygiene (Życie seksualne: psychohigiena) that saw four editions between the years 1965 and 1973, all with high print runs (it was also translated into Czech and Russian). 35 The sexologist division of the SCM published three issues of The Problems of Sexology (Problemy seksuologii) in the years 1964–1968. Polish sexology after 1956 developed, therefore, between the fields of psychiatry, mental hygiene, psychology, pedagogy, and gynaecology.
The aims of the SCM evolved. The first national meeting of the organization took place in 1960. In his speech, the Minister of Health pointed to the ‘positive effects of the [abortion] law’ but stressed also ‘the sad fact that the number of abortions is still very high’. He indicated the most important goals of the SCM: ‘the struggle for the raising of the culture of sexuality, and the struggle against abortion’. 36 At that time, the society had assembled 50,000 members. The emphasis on family planning and sexuality was somewhat less visible at the second national meeting held in 1965, when it was decided that the society should broaden its scope of interests towards family issues ‘in order to support a strong and cohesive family dynamic’. 37 This new approach manifested itself in the creation of The Centre for Research on the Contemporary Family (Ośrodek Badań nad Współczesną Rodziną) in 1965. Among the declared objectives of the society, however, the so-called culture of sexuality as well as the importance of family planning remained.
The SCM reached a broad public. Its ideas and advice on marriage became visible, mainly through a large number of popular publications and a strong presence in the media (both press and radio). Its staff also released several educational films. 38 One of the brochures on contraception, published in the early 1960s and distributed free of charge, had a print run of one million (Poland’s population at the time stood at 29.6 million). 39 By 1967, the Warsaw-based counselling centre had treated 100,000 patients. 40 Although, as studies have revealed, Polish women still lacked key knowledge of contraception, 41 the SCM was renowned for its reach.
Shaping the ‘Culture of Sexuality’ in Marital Relationships
The most general objective of the SCM and the experts who wrote about sexuality between 1956 and 1970 was to build and spread the ‘culture of sexuality’ in Poland. They argued that many of social problems, including venereal disease, the high abortion rate, marital conflicts, and sexual neuroses were rooted in the lack of a culture of sexuality. Propagators of the culture of sexuality approached sexuality in a broad context in terms of the well-being of both the individual and society. Indeed, they recognized it as a crucial element in the life of an individual which also exercised an effect on many other aspects of life (such as work). Educating society towards an understanding of this ‘culture’ and putting it into practice would raise the quality of life, making sex more enjoyable and marriage longer lasting. What ideas stood behind the culture of sexuality? How should a happy sex life develop?
Experts engaged primarily in explaining the importance of conscious motherhood. The discourse around family planning embraced both social and economic arguments. Experts argued that Poland would become more prosperous if it reduced its high birth rates. But if birth rates remained high, the socialist state would face difficulties in providing both education and employment for the emerging generations. Another issue the doctors frequently pointed to was the negative impact of uncontrolled fertility. Marcin Kacprzak, head of the SCM, argued that bearing too many children is unhealthy for both mothers and their children, who are born weaker when the mother gives birth too often. 42 As Agata Ignaciuk argues, most of the authors of the popular books and pamphlets on contraception stressed that its main advantages were the health and prosperity of the family. 43
Family planning and contraception were also regarded as a means to achieve an enjoyable relationship. Family planning, Wisłocka argued in 1959, contributes to a ‘harmonious life’. 44 It allowed a separation of ‘procreation from sex’. Couples, especially the woman, could more readily enjoy sex if they did not have to fear becoming pregnant. When Kazimierz Imieliński analysed 146 cases of sexual neurosis that were treated in the Gdańsk clinic, he found that fear of conception stood among the five most important causes in the development of neuroses. 45 Fear of pregnancy could lead to female frigidity, 46 disgust towards the partner, conflict, and even the disintegration of the marriage. 47
Experts advised the use of contraception, while condemning other means of birth control such as abortion, coitus interruptus (still the most popular way of avoiding conception among Polish couples even in the early 1970s), 48 and sexual abstinence. All three methods were presented as unhealthy and harmful for the body and the psyche. Abortion could result in infertility, coitus interruptus could lead to sexual neurosis or the lack of female orgasm, and sexual abstinence could cause neurosis in either a man or a woman. Michalina Wisłocka, in a book about contraception written for doctors, threatened that ‘propagating abstinence means neglecting physiology, and can lead to the breaking up of the marriage’. 49 Among the 146 cases of sexual neurosis analysed by Imieliński in 1961, 104 were caused by abstinence; ‘abstinence’, he concluded, ‘triggers deviant behaviors’. 50 Further, coitus interruptus was believed to provoke gynaecological diseases. 51
The use of contraception as advised by the experts was a sign of responsibility, progress, and rationality. Experts saw it as liberalizing, especially for women. Wisłocka wrote in 1959: ‘For the first time in the history of love, two aspects of human sexual activity, the procreative and the emotional, can be consciously separated. What this new freedom, based on a free choice, brings to us, we are only beginning to understand’. 52
In the experts’ eyes, the reason for many problems related to sexuality – unsatisfying sex and sexual neurosis – was the lack of knowledge and the general backwardness of society. ‘The struggle against ignorance [ciemnota – meaning ‘darkness’] is the first and most effective means of prevention’, argued Bilikiewicz. 53 ‘Backwardness’ captured problems such as the traditional silence with regard to sexuality, the lack of any knowledge transfer, falsehoods and prejudices, religious beliefs that made some people avoid sexual pleasure (especially women), and men’s rough sexual behaviour. Experts associated backwardness with archaic and not clearly defined traditions: ‘by promoting reluctance towards her sexuality during childhood, a girl can become frigid as an adult’, and ‘this is a remnant of an ascetic, medieval upbringing’. 54
Furthermore, Imieliński listed some of the most ‘terrifying’ examples of false knowledge. In his abovementioned book Sex Life published in the mid-1960s, for example, he pointed to some persisting beliefs: that masturbation leads to the ‘drying of the spinal cord’; that only some sexual positions are acceptable, others are deviant; and that there is a limit to the number of times one can have sexual intercourse in one’s lifetime. 55 Since the early 1960s experts argued strongly that masturbation is not harmful – if it is not ‘extensive’, being rather a natural (although ‘immature’) sexual expression of young people. What they judged as harmful was the fear of its negative effects, which could lead to sexual neurosis. They also stressed that certain sexual practices are not ‘immoral’. Imieliński felt he should explain to his readers that stimulating the clitoris or touching the male genitals (by the woman) was ‘not a perversion’. 56 Since the late 1950s, nearly all the experts advocated the introduction of sex education in schools, as well as a broader form of sex education for the population as a whole.
Every study conducted by the experts confirmed that Poles lacked nearly any knowledge on issues of sex. Indeed, a number of men who were engaged to be married, and who were interviewed by Imieliński and his colleague in their 1961 study, were unaware of the most basic facts about sex. Among 59 men who were engaged to be married and had already had sex with their fiancées, 24 stated that they did not know whether their partners had orgasms. Out of all 83 interviewed men, 11 were not aware that women should also enjoy sex. 57 It was estimated that only 20 per cent of men had proper knowledge of sexual intercourse (provided by books and colleagues). 58 Furthermore, Hanna Malewska’s research showed the correlation between the lack of information on sex and subsequent problems within one’s sex life; 20 per cent of her interviewees had proper knowledge about sex, pregnancy, and birth, and consequently were the most satisfied with their sex lives. 59 In her study, she argued that the quality of one’s sex life is very much conditioned by their one’s sexual experiences; if these experiences are negative or even traumatic (which is highly possible when knowledge has not been provided), negative associations are established.
One of the reasons for an unhappy sex life, experts argued, was religiosity and a religious upbringing. Malewska suggested that the Catholic Church neglected to address sexual issues that did not aim at procreation. Many women she interviewed suffered from a conflict between the ‘norms imposed by a specific version of Catholicism’ and their own sexual needs. In her book The Cultural and Social Determinants of a Sexual Life (Kulturowe i psychospołeczne determinanty życia seksualnego) published in 1967, Malewska emphasized the importance of culture in shaping one’s experiences and norms with regard to sex. She did not blame religiosity directly, but rather pointed to the fact that patients who declared themselves as being religious were generally opposed to teaching children and teenagers about sex. Religious patients tended to exhibit fear and were incapable of expressing themselves regarding sexual matters. The absence of both fear and feelings of guilt contributed to more satisfying sexual relations. Other experts blamed the Catholic Church for people’s sexual dissatisfaction more directly. Psychiatrist Stefan Leder, in his paper about the patients of the Warsaw sexology counselling centre, argued that ignorance, false ideas about ‘anything that relates to sexuality’, and a lack of ‘culture’ was precisely related to the ‘dominance of the catholic worldview’. 60
The experts seemed to suggest that backwardness meant Polish people suffered rather unhappy sex lives. Hanna Malewska, who conducted in-depth research on married women’s sex lives in the years 1959–1963 (1100 patients in 10 clinics across Poland), observed that one third of her interviewees were dissatisfied with her sex life. 61 Imieliński concluded that due to insufficient knowledge, ‘the percentage of marriages that maintain a normal sex life does not exceed 15–20 per cent’. 62 The need for shaping a ‘culture of sexuality’ was, therefore, an urgent social necessity.
Throughout the whole period from 1956 to 1970, experts in sexuality were concerned about the disorders in the sex lives of both men and women. It seems, however, that they concentrated more on women’s sexuality from the very beginning (i.e. the late 1950s). Bilikiewicz contradicted the opinion, which he believed was widespread, that men are more likely to develop sexual neuroses; in fact, he showed that many women suffer from the lack of orgasm. 63 One of the first articles published by Imieliński (in 1960) focused on sleep orgasms, erotic dreams, and masturbation among women (the survey included 500 young women). 64 Imieliński discovered that there was no connection between masturbation and sleep orgasms, the latter being a physiological phenomenon. In 1963, the SCM published a textbook for doctors focused precisely on female sexuality, in which two authors explained how it differed from male sexuality, as well as describing the most common disorders (vaginismus, dyspareunia, frigidity); indeed, frigidity could be caused by ‘an opinion that female sexual pleasure is indecent’. 65
Women were most frequently the victims of the underdeveloped culture of sexuality. Women suffered from frigidity mainly because their husbands were not culturally-minded enough. Male egoism was mentioned in nearly every popular book on marriage. Bilikiewicz in his book on sexual neurosis argued that dyspareunia is caused by the lack of sexual stimulation during intercourse. 66 According to Michalina Wisłocka, most women who attended the Sexology Counselling Centre (run by the SCM), suffered from frigidity. In most of these cases, the treatment was to provide counselling, psychotherapy, and contraception. 67 Wisłocka also talked to husbands whose wives had complained of intercourse lasting only two to three minutes. 68 Experts advised women on how to seduce their husbands, and they advised men on how they should talk to their wives. 69 Imieliński warned about the extremely negative consequences of the lack of female orgasm: these women were susceptible to neurotic reactions such as excessive crying, poor sleep, depression, being quarrelsome, as well as somatic dysfunctions. Anorgasmia could also have a negative influence on men, because it could offend their ‘masculine ambition’. 70
Experts emphasized equality between spouses as the fundamental principle for a good sexual relationship and a lasting marriage. They defined this equality as both spouses having the right to sexual pleasure and they put the responsibility for assuring satisfaction on both the husband and the wife. Decidedly, they rejected the double standards associated with sexuality (e.g. it was acceptable for men to have pre-marital sex, but not women), and they further argued that such double standards were incompatible with equality, and led to ‘promiscuity, prostitution, alcoholism, and venereal disease’. 71 In his popular book, Imieliński argued: ‘We are witnessing a moral revolution, which leads to sexual egalitarianism and to women’s equality in every sense’. 72
Nevertheless, experts distinguished equality (perceived as the equal right to pleasure) from sameness. They insisted that there are differences between male and female sexualities, especially in the development of sexuality throughout one’s lifetime, and the dynamics of desire during sexual intercourse. Moreover, women were said to be more concerned with feelings, while men wanted to dominate or be in charge of their sex lives. Imieliński argued that the female body was less sexually active. In the woman’s case, sexuality was related to ‘higher emotions’, therefore, even an ordinary quarrel with her husband could prevent her from reaching orgasm if intercourse were to take place soon after the argument. Bilikiewicz suggested that a woman needs to be wooed, whereas a man ‘is more like an animal’. 73 Assumptions about gender difference sometimes led the experts to argue about the natural inequality in sexuality. In a popular book for men, Jadwiga Beaupré, a doctor and activist of the SCM, claimed that ‘the true man’ should be responsible, especially for the couple’s sex life, whereas ‘the woman should remain subordinated’. 74 Sometimes the experts’ writings were contradictory and confusing; in the above-mentioned textbook on female sexuality, the authors argued that the man usually initiates the sexual act, but ‘there should be equality in the choice of moment for it’. 75
Interestingly, a pedagogue, Mikołaj Kozakiewicz, doubted the very basis for this kind of difference. He argued that the qualities usually associated with women or men as constitutive to their gender were only ‘allegedly psychological’, rather they are socially constructed (shaped by the existing division of labour in a given society). 76 Kozakiewicz was convinced – building his argument on Marxism – that gender divisions were only part of ‘superstructures’ that reflected socio-economic structures, and thus were adjustable. 77 In 1965, Imieliński was also sceptical of these gender differences: he thought the opinion that women were more ‘passive’ could actually be ‘a product of cultural factors’. 78
How did the experts, based on the knowledge acquired through sexology, describe proper, marital sex? For Imieliński, the ‘ideal sexual act’ begins in the morning when the husband creates a positive atmosphere, expresses signs of love, and helps his wife with household duties. In the evening, intercourse should begin with foreplay (mutual stimulation). The stimulation of the woman’s erogenous zones should continue during penetration. 79 ‘One of the principles of the culture of sexuality is the eagerness to assure the partner’s satisfaction, in which knowledge about the biological and psychological characteristics of the woman and the man can help’. 80 Experts in sexuality did not provide extensive technical advice (that appeared later, for example, in The Art of Love by Wisłocka (1978)); 81 popular literature focused rather on common attitudes and norms, explaining how to deal with problems, while providing basic knowledge on anatomy and the reproductive system. The technical aspects of sex were considered secondary in shaping the culture of sexual relations. For experts, proper and mature marital sex – except in particular situations – always included foreplay and penetration, and preferably simultaneous orgasms.
The idea of ‘culture’ was understood as the opposite of ‘nature’ or ‘natural’. During the first general meeting of the SCM in 1960, Marcin Kacprzak in his speech argued that ‘a cultural human being does not want to and should not reduce their sex life to a purely biological issue’, and that sexual instincts should be consciously shaped. 82 In this context, experts were especially referring to men who should overcome their naturally more intense sex drive and their egoism. Indeed, modern ‘cultural’ sex must also then, be aesthetic. Masturbation, although considered natural and morally indifferent, was often regarded as immature and unaesthetic. Bilikiewicz perceived it as a consequence of cultural constraints – young people being unable to marry early. Thus, marriage should put an end to masturbation.
Marital sex, as regarded by the experts, could realize all the principles of the culture of sexual relations. It was the realm of a mature, rational, responsible, ethical and aesthetic sex life. Modern marriage, based on love (understood as an emotional attachment, free from economic constraints), could put into practice the idea of women’s equality, as a woman’s right to pleasure was recognized. Through sexuality, marriage could ensure individual happiness and social stability. Experts seemed to believe that knowledge and sex education would enlighten men and women enough to put these ideals in practice. Thanks to knowledge couples would no longer suffer from disorders such as frigidity, or harm themselves through unhealthy sexual practices (such as coitus interruptus) or abortion, and their marriages would not end in divorce.
The culture of sexuality then should be read as a modernizing project, aimed at rejecting traditional norms which came to be perceived as backward and erroneous. At the same time, it was a project that aimed to preserve and strengthen the traditional institution of marriage and family. However, it was a new model of marriage based on love and partnership, and a new model of family. The culture of sexuality was believed to be beneficial to society not least of all because it prevented divorce. In the Preface to work on sexuality published by the sexology division of the SCM in 1968, Bilikiewicz wrote that neglecting problems of sexuality leads to the most severe ‘social disasters’: prostitution, venereal diseases, the decline of morality, etc. 83 Therefore, broader social issues depended heavily on sexuality.
But there was something more, namely the nation. Bilikiewicz continued his reflection saying that all these social disasters weaken the ‘biological strength of our nation and can negatively affect even its defence’. Indeed, ‘the happiness of the whole nation’ lies in the hands of the experts. In 1965, during the second general meeting of the society, the president of the SCM stated: ‘We see the good of our nation in a monogamous family, which is stable and lasting, culturally aware and happy’. 84 During official meetings, experts established a connection between the ideas of a cultural sex life and the well-being of the nation, rhetoric that suited the state in its ideological struggles. Those struggles and the experts’ role in the politics of sexuality are detailed in the following section.
The ‘Culture of Sexuality’ – a Modernizing Struggle between the State and the Church
What was the Party-State’s attitude towards the development of expertise in sexology? Did it listen to the experts or make use of their ideas? In this section, I will analyse the relations between the Party-State and the experts and highlight some of the attendant ambiguities amongst them. To understand the state’s view of sexuality and its role in the ‘building of socialism’, we must include in the analysis the third actor, namely, the Catholic Church. The Church campaigned against abortion throughout the whole post-war period and especially from 1956. The ruling party was determined to support the access to abortion guaranteed by the 1956 law. It seems that through such support, the communist party strengthened a new vision of a modern socialist society based on experts’ views on sexuality, but also realized the principle of political struggle with the Catholic Church. That is why, when the experts proposed limiting access to free abortion, the Central Committee opposed them.
After the thaw in 1956 the Church’s position grew stronger; the Primate of Poland Stefan Wyszyński, after a three-year internment,
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was released and became a symbol of the resistance to Stalinism. While still imprisoned, Cardinal Wyszyński called on the Catholics of Poland to begin a ten-year preparation for the 1000-year anniversary of the Christianization of the country. In August 1956, the so-called vow to Our Lady of Jasna Góra (a sanctuary in Częstochowa) made by 500,000 pilgrims declared: We promise, with our eyes turned to the Bethlehem manger, that as of now we will all be guardians of emerging life. We will struggle to defend every child and every cradle as bravely as our fathers fought for the freedom of the nation, paying with their blood. … We will consider the gift of life as the greatest blessing of the Father of Life, and as the most valued treasure of the nation.
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The Church not only attacked new laws and institutions; it established its own. In 1958, the Temporary Commission of Moral Revival Action gathered together activists and doctors who opposed liberalization. In the 1960s, the Church also developed pre-marital courses which taught Catholic sexual morality. 88 Catholic activists ran counselling centres that promoted calendar-based contraception, and those experts who supported the Church explained their views on sexuality in the Catholic press and popular books. One of them was Włodzimierz Fijałkowski, a well-known gynaecologist who presented his anti-abortion attitudes in the Catholic press throughout the subsequent three decades (1960s–1980s), advised the Pastoral Care of Families Commission in the mid-1960s, and (allegedly) in 1974 lost his position at the Medical Academy in Łódź because he refused to perform abortions. 89 In 1958, Fijałkowski blamed experts for promoting pre-marital sexual activity but remaining silent on its consequences (pregnancy, venereal diseases, prostitution). Fijałkowski opposed these so-called ‘double standards’ and advocated women’s equality (‘men are not more in need’ of sex) and sexual freedom, but not without taking responsibility for one’s actions (in this case, he meant abortion). He refused to agree with the mainstream sexologists that sexual abstinence is harmful; he believed that individuals should sublimate their sex drives, ‘this is what culture implies’. 90 In an article about marital sex, he argued that ‘abstinence helps to develop love’, and sometimes is simply necessary (when the wife is exhausted). 91 In a popular book, Fijałkowski strongly supports pre-marital abstinence, fails to mention contraception altogether, and calls masturbation ‘unhealthy’. 92 His book was published by the official medical publishing house. As we can see, there were some ideas that experts in the culture of sexuality shared with those of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the rejection of the double standard, a focus on female satisfaction, and negative attitudes towards abortion as a form of birth control helped unite these antagonistic groups. Nevertheless, Catholic morality (and the experts who were influenced by it) could not accept masturbation, pre-marital sex, contraception, or abortion under any circumstances.
How did the Party-State and the experts react to the Catholic campaigns? The Central Committee’s decision to let the experts and journalists establish the SCM was influenced by this context. In October 1957, the social division of the Central Committee agreed to establish the SCM, arguing for the necessity of promoting family planning. The new law on abortion met with serious opposition, as the Church joined with doctors to fight against it; these doctors refused to perform abortions and were encouraged ‘to create, among believers, an atmosphere of condemnation for the use of any kind of contraception’. Doctors who supported the law on abortion or organized counselling were persecuted and threatened; even the national gynaecological specialist was against liberalization of the law and mobilized other doctors to side with him.
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Other sources confirm that, indeed, there was certainly resistance against the new law ‘for ideological reasons’.
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In this situation the Ministry of Health proposed to establish a front to support the progressive doctors, an organization [namely the SCM] which would also engage the whole society and fight against the ‘ideological front’ of the Catholic Church created during a meeting in the sanctuary of Częstochowa.
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Soon after the establishment of the SCM, experts engaged in public debates about abortion and sexuality. For example, in Służba Zdrowia (Health Service, the official journal of the Ministry of Health), the gynaecologist Tadeusz Kielanowski, one of the supporters of legal abortion, responded to an anonymous article published in Tygodnik Powszechny (The Catholic Weekly), arguing that ‘a foetus is not a human’. 97 The Church, in turn, campaigned against abortion, contraception, and the SCM itself. In early 1958, the office of the bishop of Poznań issued a memo which called for the discontinuation of the sale of contraceptives and an outright boycott of the law; sexual intercourse with the use of contraception was termed ‘the wife’s collaboration in her husband’s masturbation practices’. ‘It is a stand against progress’, 98 argued one journalist, while Kielanowski argued that birth control is a rational choice, otherwise there would be too many children to feed. 99 The Church perceived family planning as an attack on the family as an institution and on the nation as a whole; 100 this was the very rhetoric employed as their argument against abortion and contraception. In the words of Wyszyński, everyone who promotes abortion is ‘killing their Nation’. 101 In 1970, the Polish episcopate issued a memorandum to the government on abortion’s ‘biological and moral threats to the nation’, arguing in favour of limiting the right to abortion and banning the advertising of contraception. 102
While most experts stayed away from such heated discussions, the SCM reacted to accusations and tried to explain its views. In the opening speech on the first scientific meeting dedicated to sexuality (1960), the president of the SCM, Marcin Kacprzak said: ‘counter to the accusations, the SCM does not aim to limit birth rates, or harm the family. Our aim is to strengthen the family by making it happy’. 103 He admitted that birth rates had declined, but that, he said, was not caused by the activities of the SCM. 104
Abortion and the realignment of attitudes towards it show how complex the relations were between experts, the state, and the Church. Experts who in 1955/1956 advocated free choice and the liberalization of the law, soon started to change their tone and they began to present abortion as harmful and ‘unmodern’. Although they did not opt for re-criminalization, they were disappointed by the effects of liberalization: the high abortion rates and the difficulties in spreading progressive ideas of birth control through contraception. In 1958, the Ministry of Health discussed the consequences of the 1956 law and concluded that the press position in the matter of abortion ‘was too liberal’, and that what should be promoted instead was contraception. 105 Doctors were also accused of being against contraception, since ‘even female doctors have two or more abortions per year’. 106 It is not entirely clear who came up with the idea, but as a conclusion from the first national meeting of the SCM in 1960 there was a proposal ‘to discuss the introduction of fees for abortion’. 107 A couple of months later, the Ministry of Health discussed abortion and conscious motherhood at a meeting: ultimately, it stressed the need to ‘prevent clerical influence’, to publish more on the benefits of contraception and to train doctors and nurses on how to give proper instruction, because, they argued, contraception ‘has a huge socio-political importance’. 108 As previously mentioned, they proposed introducing fees for abortion, arguing that society had misunderstood the intention behind the law: that is, to reduce the number of illegal abortions, not to use it as a form of birth control. There were many people, especially among workers, who preferred abortion to contraception because it was free and they were not concerned about the negative consequences of terminating a pregnancy. Fees, then, would make abortion more expensive than contraception, thus strengthening the message that the goal is to prevent unwanted pregnancies, not to terminate them. 109
However, fees were ultimately not introduced. The Central Committee decidedly opposed the idea and the arguments presented by the Ministry. The Social Commission argued that if contraception were more available, people would use it, but that they would not understand the introduction of fees. In fact, abortion had just become fully accessible with the Ministry’s 1959 decree that made the procedure readily available. Another argument against charging abortion fees was that it would serve the Church’s anti-abortion campaign. This decision clearly shows the party’s political motivations as access to abortion was an important part of the struggle with the Church, and, indeed, any step backward could be read as a sign of weakness. Spreading ideas of conscious motherhood and the culture of sexuality proved to be secondary in this regard. The idea of charging fees, although it might seem of little importance in terms of effectiveness, reflected the experts’ growing concern regarding their (at least partial) defeat in their modernizing social mission focused on promoting contraception. 110 The party shared the same general implications of that mission, but was more determined to support full access to abortion because of its political goals. The struggle against the Church in the realm of sexuality also manifested itself in 1962 when the Central Committee decided to close down a Catholic counselling centre called Ognisko which had been established in 1957. The Committee’s reasoning was that Ognisko promoted the Church’s anti-abortion campaign. 111
The SCM sometimes found it difficult to realize its goal of making contraception the norm. Surprisingly, its demands to provide better access to contraceptives were not necessarily heard by the Party-State. The SCM constantly informed the Ministry of Health (and through it, the Central Committee) about the problems with different forms of contraception, for example, saying that such difficulties rendered the doctors and activists’ efforts in spreading the ideas of family planning fruitless. 112 In 1961, when the Ministry discussed the consequences of the 1956 law, experts, represented by doctor Jan Lesiński, complained that there was only one effective contraceptive method (globule Z, a chemical contraceptive produced in Poland), that the production of pessaries was failing because of noble steel shortages, and that, in general, all available contraceptives were too expensive. 113 In 1965, the Supreme Audit Office suggested reducing the production of contraceptives by the SCM’s firm, Securitas. 114 In the 1960s, the Party-State seemed more concerned with defending access to abortion than improving access to effective forms of contraception, and as such was at odds with the culture of sexuality promoted by the SCM. 115
The state was also reluctant to introduce sex education in schools, something the SCM’s experts had been arguing for since the early 1960s. Ideas about the culture of sexuality reached schoolchildren only in 1973, when sex education was finally introduced as a separate subject in many schools. As late as 1986 it became obligatory in all schools.
Another struggle between the Communist Party and the Church revolved around conflicting ideas of national strength. In the 1960s, the Party-State in a search for political legitimacy turned to nationalist rhetoric. 116 Sexuality also helped to shape the vision of the nation’s strength. As experts pointed out at official meetings, the idea behind the culture of sexuality was to improve the nation’s health and economic and moral well-being, which would be achieved by happy marital relationships and family planning. Certainly, the experts did not introduce the category of ‘nation’ into the discourse, but their arguments and ideas helped support the nationalist rhetoric of the state. The Church also had its vision of national strength that resided in population growth. ‘This is about the very existence of the nation’, as one of the bishops put it, in typical clergy rhetoric. 117 In this sense, it was contrary to the culture of sexuality that aimed at shaping not necessarily a fertile family, but happy, healthy (lasting) marriages and families. The ideological and political struggle between the communist government and the Catholic Church juxtaposed socialist modernization with Catholic traditionalism, and both tried to shape the future of the nation.
When, in 1967, the Administration Division of the Central Committee evaluated the activity of the SCM, it seemed satisfied with the society’s achievements. The SCM ‘contributed to a decrease in the number of abortions [which had declined by about 19% since the peak year of 1962], as well as the overall birth rate’, despite having been ‘attacked by the clergy’. The Administration Division proposed that 32 activists be awarded state decorations. 118 The decrease in births in comparison with the early 1950s proved that the state cared for families. Furthermore, the decrease in the number of abortions each year showed that society’s attitudes had evolved and that they placed their trust in the experts. As I have demonstrated in this section, however, the relations between experts and the Party-State in the 1960s were ambiguous, since the latter did not always support the experts’ views.
Conclusion
As Agnieszka Kościańska writes, ‘sexology can be understood as constitutive of the socialist power discourse and contributing to socialist biopolitics’. 119 The case study presented in this article shows the complex relations between the socialist state and the experts on sexuality. The project of modernizing sexuality through broad sex education, family planning, and creating a ‘culture of sexuality’ was welcomed and supported by the Party-State. Sexology in the period between 1956 and 1970 both shaped and reflected ideas of modernization, which were understood as an improvement based on scientific knowledge, rationality, and equality, as well as a rejection of ‘backwardness’ and Catholic morality. Sexologists and the Party-State on one side, and the Church on the other, propagated competing visions of sexuality, family, and the nation. According to the state, the welfare of the nation was to be achieved through healthy families and birth control, and the experts provided arguments to support this claim; whereas for the Church, national strength resided in population growth.
An analysis of the interactions between sexologists and the socialist state in Poland between 1956 and 1970, however, reveals a complex story in which the communist party did not always support the experts and those experts’ views on abortion were sometimes closer to the views of the Catholic Church (despite their different reasoning). The communist party stood determined to support free access to abortion, whereas its determination in supporting contraception proved far less visible. Decisions were made in accordance with the party’s ideological principles and its political struggle with the Catholic Church. Such principles made the establishment of the SCM in 1957 possible and resulted in the Central Committee’s 1961 rejection of charging fees for abortion.
It is interesting to note the experts’ focus on women’s pleasure and gender equality. Although they stressed the biological differences between men and women, they did not extol women’s traditional roles. Moreover, they cast doubt on these differences, by calling them ‘social’ or ‘cultural’. The emergence of sexology after 1956 and its early developments contributed to a slow, but considerable acceptance of sexuality in the public sphere. The modernizing project at which sexologists aimed can be seen as both progressive and liberalizing in the light of current social norms and the earlier silence on matters of sexuality.
This case study of the developments in Polish sexology and the agenda of the SCM between 1956 and 1970 can further nuance our understanding of sexuality under state socialism. It shows that both expertise and the state attempted to achieve a modernizing project in which sexuality played a very important role; in this respect, the Polish case mirrors some developments present in neighbouring socialist countries. These efforts were liberalizing, especially where women’s sexuality was concerned, although we should name those developments as an evolution rather than a revolution. 120 What is characteristic and unique for the Polish case, however, is the role of the Catholic Church, as a force that opposed the modernizing projects of state socialism. In the period studied (in contrast to the later decades), the anti-Catholic ideological struggle influenced the modernizing efforts of the Party-State.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This paper has benefited from comments by Kateřina Lišková and Gabor Szegedy, as well as the attendees at the European Social Sciences History Conference in Belfast (2018).
