Abstract
Editors Kjell Tӧrnblom and Ali Kazemi should be lavishly commended for developing and offering what most scholars would likely view as one of the most definitive and complete handbooks on the nature of social resource theory. In the third chapter of the volume, the editors state: Social resource theory (SRT) addresses a core focus of psychology and social psychology, namely the study of human relationships (at interpersonal, intergroup, societal, as well as cultural levels). Like theories of social exchange, which provide the major foundations of SRT, it is a theory about processes involving the initiation, maintenance, and termination of different kinds of social relationships. SRT addresses several issues: the cognitive organization of interpersonal resources, the cognitive mechanisms that underlie resource exchange, their development in childhood, cross-cultural differences, and the pathology of exchange. (p. 33)
It is also of note that the editors suggest that despite being ‘widely recognized by scholars working in different disciplines, we tend to think that [this theory] has not been as influential as it arguably should have been’ (p. 10).
Much of this book reflects and builds upon the classic work on social exchange as developed by the late Uriel G Foa and his wife Edna B Foa (and includes an abridged chapter from these authors as well). Critical to their theory is the concept of resources (including their interpreted meaning), which the Foas defined as ‘anything that can be transmitted from one person to another’ (p. 16). The Foas initially conceptualized six chief ‘resources exchanged in interpersonal encounters’ (p. 16): love, status, information, money, goods, and service. Though the study of these six resource types remains profoundly important, many of the chapter contributors have argued for an extension of these aforementioned classes; further related suggestions included that resources can sometimes be somewhat of a fuzzy concept and can also reflect one’s values. Several chapter authors adeptly detailed how resources can have objective, subjective, concrete, symbolic, and evolutionary or biogenetic qualities. Those with an interest in stress and coping will likely appreciate the chapter by Doane, Schumm, and Hobfoll where much consideration is given to the latter author’s well-known conservation of resources (COR) theory; a critical aspect of this theory is that individuals invest resources to guard against loss given that we are particularly sensitive to the effects of loss. This chapter also raises the critical point that select personal or situational factors may (or may not) promote the development of resources such as whether one is part of a supportive, loving family or has personal skills that allow for psychological growth.
The book itself features a total of 28 chapters (and a terse foreword) from leading psychologists and other social scientists in the field. In addition to brief (though detailed) introductory and concluding sections, the volume predominantly contains four sections largely devoted to theoretical considerations of social resource theory and select empirical and applied or cross-cultural considerations and investigations (with some emphasis on social justice themes). A strength of this volume is that most of the chapters feature analysis and commentary on how the respective contributors viewed or extended the Foas’ contributions. However, given some of the common reiterations of the nature of this central theory contained in most of the chapters, it may have been particularly dynamic if the volume could have somehow presented or organized these divergent views in a more succinct yet creative fashion.
Like many prominent models of human social behavior, social resource theory is often predicated on basic social expectancies governed by seemingly routine social (and even moral) norms. This view is nicely summarized by Hatfield and Rapson with a common presumption that: ‘[P]eople . . . possess an innate sense of fairness. People assume that they should reward benefactors, reciprocate favors, and punish cheaters. . . . Yet there are cultural differences in people’s sense of justice, the value of . . . social resources . . . [and] on how fairness is defined’ (p. 442). This concluding chapter, in particular, offers several thoughtful examinations of the applications of social exchange theory. Perhaps some of the most provocative questions of this chapter (and perhaps even of the volume) revolve around the question of why ‘good people’ sometimes behave cruelly and unjustly. Hatfield and Rapson aptly note that acts of violence and war should make us question whether humans even care about social justice; likewise, individuals may be inclined to prefer their in-groups rather than their out-groups, particularly when making evaluations of justice. Hatfield and Rapson further suggest that scholars should increasingly be concerned with understanding how ‘good people [can] view injustice with a shrug and . . . flagrantly violate norms of honor and decency’ (p. 446). Although this remains a wise and important suggestion, this point does not adequately address those whose social norm is to show a virtual repudiation of social decency or justice (particularly in the pursuit of resources). Consider two fairly well-known examples of this philosophy: (1) the racist and nationalist Nazi policy of Lebensraum, which argued for the conquest of foreign lands and supposed undesirable others in order to benefit the German people prior to and during the Second World War; and (2) contemporary ideologies forwarded by terrorist groups – most notably, ISIS – that espouse the importance of imposing their policies by any means (including destructive or brutally lethal ones). Social resource theory ably explains common social interactions, such as if I show kindness to you, we might strike up a friendship, or if you complete a satisfactory project, then I may pay you for your efforts. However, this volume does not provide as much guidance on how to make sense of behavior where one’s conceptualization of social justice – as in the aforementioned examples – is inherently destructive.
If the editors were to entertain a second edition, in addition to some of the aforesaid suggestions, it may be of some benefit if greater focus was given to applied aspects of social resource theory with particular emphasis on processes governed by cultural, individual difference, and online-based factors. In any event, not only is this volume a critical resource for those with interests in social psychology and related fields, but it should also help achieve the stated aim of increasing the influence of social resource theory within the field.