Hartmut Rosa,Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World

After the publication of his habilitation thesis, Social Acceleration (Rosa, 2013), Hartmut Rosa, a German sociologist, became internationally prominent for his original theory on the sociology of time. Although Rosa’s analysis of social acceleration is detailed, the questions regarding what problems it brings to social life and how to improve social life have not been answered. As a disciple of Axel Honneth, a representative of the third generation of Critical Theory, Rosa turned to Critical Theory after completing his acceleration theory. He attempted to answer the questions left by Social Acceleration by proposing a new version of Critical Theory. His research findings are presented in the book Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World (hereafter, Resonance).

The book was published in German in 2016, and its English translation was published in 2019. The title of the book summarizes well the purpose of the work, which is to present a theory of resonance grounded in the analysis of the sociology of world relations. Rosa suggests that resonance theory should provide a new criterion for the diagnosis of the times for Critical Theory (pp. 157–158, 453). Therefore, Rosa addresses four questions: Why does Critical Theory need a new criterion for the diagnosis of the times? What is resonance? How does it serve as a criterion for Critical Theory? If the diagnosis of the times is based on the concept of resonance, what are the symptoms of modern society? Discussion of these four questions constitutes the introduction and the four major parts of Resonance.

The first question is answered in the introduction. Rosa states that his motivation for proposing resonance theory originates from the central question of contemporary Critical Theory: How can people live a good life (p. 2)? Honneth (2000) also raised such a question; however, he did not explicitly answer it. Since the works of Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Theory scholarship has addressed this question with an attitude of ethical abstinence rather than answering it directly (Jaeggi, 2018), because the answer to questions such as whether a life is ‘good’ is often considered as subjective. In (political) philosophy or sociology, determining what is good is often based on the maximization or equitable distribution of material resources, but this ‘resource fetishism’ perspective does not examine the human nature and is therefore unconvincing to Rosa (p. 7). Rosa believes that although any definition of a good life contains some subjectivity, in any good life, the subject necessarily shares an appropriate relationship with the world. The appropriateness of the relationship between the subject and the world varies societally and can be confirmed only through sociological research. Rosa emphasizes that he does not regard this relationship as transcendental, as phenomenology does, but defines his analytical approach as ‘a sociology of world relations’ (p. 37). Despite the social variability regarding the appropriateness of world relations, we can still deduce the common features of appropriate relationships with the world if we understand human nature. In addition, the nature of such appropriate world relations can be used within Critical Theory to determine whether a good life is possible. Rosa’s proposition is that the common feature of appropriate world relations is resonance (p. 30).

Having made this proposition, Rosa must, of course, define resonance and, namely, the nature of human beings and features of appropriate world relations. The proposition and these definitions are the content of Part One. In Part One, Rosa analyzes humans’ being-in-the-world on the basis of Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. A ‘human’ is principally a physical presence in the world; thus, Rosa takes the body as the starting point for his analysis. Rosa emphasizes that a human’s body is never isolated. We are initially formed as an embryo in our mother’s womb and are connected to her. Even after birth, we remain connected to the world. Our first act after birth is to take air into our lungs and let it out, and we continue to do so until the end of our lives. Our skin feels temperature, and our pores contract. Our eardrums vibrate in contact with the air. Whether we breathe, hear, touch, or even eat, drink, walk, or sleep, all of our senses and our entire life are made possible by our entwined interrelationship with the world. In addition to the body, emotion is the same. Rosa considers fear and desire as two basic emotional forms of world relations, and emotion is never merely a product of the subject’s heart. We can feel fear because of the eerie atmosphere of surroundings; then, our skin gets goosebumps to express our feelings. We can be awed by the beauty of a sunset and then unable to restrain the release of our feelings through tears.

The air, temperature, sounds, and sunsets do not belong to us, and they are not under our control. However, they compose our perceptions and emotions, and they compose us. This is not to say that we are identical to the world. The subject and the world are distinct. However, this distinction is the reason that we can provoke our own responses by listening to the world, and we can create our own answers to the world. Listening and answering constitute our subjectivity. This relationship between the subject and the world through mutual listening and answering is what Rosa calls resonance (p. 174). Resonant world relations are the conditions for the formation of the subject.

Rosa also emphasizes two key points about resonance. First, resonance is not a state but a relationship (p. 167). Resonance involves the subject being in a relationship that enables listening to and answering the world. However, constant resonance with the world is unnecessary. Second, resonance is not an echo, and it is not a chorus. Resonance is different voices listening and responding to each other; thus, difference is a precondition for resonance (p. 182). The opposite of resonance, which is a relationship that endangers the subject’s existence in the world, is alienation. Alienation occurs when the world is silent and does not speak to us anymore. Therefore, despite remaining in the world, we are indifferent to it. Rosa refers to Rahel Jaeggi, another disciple of Honneth, who defined such a silent and alienated relationship with the world as a ‘relation of relationlessness’ (p. 184; cf. Jaeggi, 2014).

Throughout the argument in Part One, Rosa indicates that we can ascertain whether we can live a good life by examining whether we are in a resonant or alienated relationship with the world. Rosa states that ‘Critical Theory should be a critique of relations of resonance’ (p. 37). However, this statement is too broad for a specific diagnosis of the times. Therefore, in the second and third parts of the book, Rosa purports an analytical framework for critiquing the relations of resonance.

Rosa does not attempt to divide the world into subjective, objective, and social dimensions, as his predecessor Jürgen Habermas did (p. 37). Rosa defines resonance as a healthy relationship in which both parties can listen to and respond. Therefore, he does not attempt to propose a typology of resonance based on a good/bad or any other possible criteria (p. 170). In Parts Two and Three, however, Rosa distinguishes three types of what he calls ‘axes of resonance’ according to the different spheres in which resonance is generated. The first type comprises ‘horizontal axes of resonance’, or the resonance in human relationships, such as that of a happy family or the political system of democracy, which today is considered to resonate more strongly with people. ‘Vertical axes of resonance’ is the second type and comprises transcendent categories, such as those involving God, the universe, and eternity. Such axes refer to being inexplicably moved by a feeling of greatness beyond this earth, similar to the feeling of praying in a church or viewing the endless starry sky late at night. The third axis type is ‘diagonal axes of resonance’, which involves the various objects in our environment. The diagonal axes involve not only objects but also the situations in which we make objects speak. For example, the physical and chemical experiments in a classroom that allow us to understand the workings of the material world and the excitement of competing in ball sports are also included in the diagonal axes of resonance. These various axes of resonance, developed by contemporary human society, enrich the resonance of our world relations and enable us to live a good life.

These axes of resonance do not guarantee that their domains necessarily lead to resonant world relations. Resonance can be disrupted and turn to alienation for various reasons. Whether their spheres are resonant or alienated can be determined only through empirical research. In this regard, a crucial contribution of Rosa’s resonance theory is that it enables Critical Theory to transcend the abstract level of social philosophy and produce topics worthy of empirical studies in sociology.

However, Rosa does not leave the task of diagnosing the times entirely to empirical research. In Part Four of Resonance, he attempts to grasp contemporary social development trends theoretically and offers a preliminary critique of relations of resonance. Here, Rosa references his findings from Social Acceleration and proposes that ‘a society is modern when it can only stabilize itself dynamically’ (p. 405). This dynamic stabilization is driven by the spirit of ‘expanding humanity’s share of the world’ (in German: Weltreichweitenvergrößerung) (p. 310). Rosa means that modern society has developed the idea that the only goal worth pursuing is to maximize the access to resources by controlling the world as completely as possible. Such a goal has led to a cycle of asking for ‘more’ and ‘better’ in all fields of society. Acceleration is a phenomenon generated by this idea. When our modern world is over-controlled by the idea of expanding humanity’s share of the world, a listening and answering relationship, and therefore resonance, between us and the world cannot exist. The ecological crisis that results from the overexploitation of nature, the depression that results from the excessive pursuit of economic growth, and even the deaths that result from overwork are examples of alienation. Of course, Rosa is not appealing to us to abandon competition. Rather, he is reminding us that we must not regard growth as the only goal of social development and life; we must value the voice of the world and rebuild resonant world relations. For in this way, we can hear our own voice and find our own meaning of life.

Although Resonance is a sequel to Social Acceleration, resonance theory does not directly correspond to acceleration theory, but further examines the underlying causes and problems behind the phenomenon of social acceleration and thus presents a more thorough critique. In this regard, the first sentence of this book, ‘If acceleration is the problem, then resonance may well be the solution’ (p. 1), is misleading. Regardless, the book is original and rich in content. Rosa’s critique of relations of resonance, Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason, Habermas’ critique of the colonization of the lifeworld, and Honneth’s critique of recognition can clearly be traced to the same origin. However, Rosa extends the scope of Critical Theory to not only the reasonable subject but the whole world, including animals and objects. Concurrently, resonance theory does not prematurely abandon the distinction between the subject and the world, as new materialism does, but rather retains the responsibility of the subject to face the world (cf. Rosa and et al, 2021). Resonance brings new life to Critical Theory and is the representative work of the fourth generation of Critical Theory scholarship.

This book is too rich and broad to explain comprehensively. Thus, the reader may have doubts when reading it. Rosa is aware of this. The conclusion of the book provides not the usual comprehensive summary and preview of the next study but a rare question-and-answer section that Rosa employs to refute possible doubts. Although most of the answers are convincing, some of Rosa’s responses are not satisfactory. One of the most obvious questions is whether resonance is always good. We can imagine that resonance exists between the leader of a totalitarian system and his supporters, but this resonance is clearly dangerous. Rosa argues that such a situation cannot be considered as resonant because only one opinion is present; therefore, this scenario can only be called an alienating echo (pp. 446–447). However, what then are the criteria for defining world relations as resonant or alienated? Does any criterion allow us to confirm the resonance between the subject and the world, or are we limited to the unilateral imagination of the subject or the researcher? Can we use any criterion to categorize resonance itself? In this respect, although Rosa insists on not proposing a typology of resonance, perhaps such a proposal is ultimately necessary for resonance theory. Nevertheless, Rosa’s scholarship still thrives today, with valuable works still being published (e.g. Rosa, 2020). We can look forward to witnessing him produce even more exciting new developments for Critical Theory.