Abstract
Current antidepressants are crude compared with the ideal and patents on most have expired. There are therefore strong clinical and commercial pressures for new drugs to replace them. The prospects for this are, however, now markedly reduced as several major pharmaceutical companies have abandoned work in this area whilst many others have sharply decreased their research investment. These changes and the lack of progress over such a long period are indicative of a catastrophic systems failure which, it is argued, has been caused in large part by a logical flaw at the animal modelling stage. This tautology has served to lock the current antidepressant drug discovery process into an iterative loop capable only of producing further variations of that which has gone before. Drugs produced by this approach have proved to be only poorly effective in the context of the clinically depressed population as a whole. Hence, the inevitable failure of the current antidepressant drug discovery process has left little behind that can be salvaged. Therefore, it is suggested that this be urgently reformulated on more rational grounds using more appropriate species in new animal models based upon a thorough understanding of the behavioural expressions of depression in the clinic.
Introduction
Depression is a widespread disorder that accounts for approximately 12% of the total burden of non-fatal global disease (Üstün et al., 2004). In the developed world around 25% of people can expect to experience this at some point in their lives (Blazer, 2000; WHO, 2002). Females are up to three times more vulnerable than males (Burt and Stein, 2002). First line treatments for depression are mostly drugs based (Hollon et al., 2002), with antidepressants being the third most commonly prescribed medication in the United States (Mojtabai and Olfson, 2011).
Whilst their use is on an upward trajectory throughout the developed world (Lin et al., 2011) the utility of these drugs is nonetheless restricted because not all patients respond to them (e.g. Bielski and Friedel, 1976; Brown et al., 1994; Fava and Davidson, 1996; Moncrieff, 2007). Indeed, these response rates may be as low as 40–50% (e.g. Trivedi et al., 2006), even after several years of treatment (e.g. Colman et al., 2011). This is not greatly higher than the response rate to placebo (Walsh et al., 2002). A further cause for concern are meta-analyses including negative findings submitted to the FDA but not published in the scientific literature that show that even these low figures are exaggerated by publication bias (Piggot et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2008).
There are reviews indicating that small numbers of severely (but not mild or moderately) depressed patients respond to these drugs (e.g. Fournier et al., 2010) but these must be viewed in the light of this publication bias. There is also a marked tendency for the strength of reported drug effects to be related to the age of the publication (Papakostas and Fava, 2009), which has been suggested to reflect the larger amount spent on advertising whilst these drugs were still in patent (Lacasse and Leo, 2005; Leo and Lacasse, 2008).
In addition to concerns about the large number of patients who cannot be treated using these drugs, currently available antidepressants are crude compared with the ideal and have several very serious shortcomings. Relapse rates are high (e.g. Geddes et al., 2003), there is a dangerous ‘therapeutic lag’ of several weeks (e.g. Skolnick, 1999) that leaves even those who do eventually respond feeling temporarily even more depressed (Jick et al., 2004; Möller and Volz, 1996) and side effects remain an issue even though these are reduced in second generation antidepressants compared with first (e.g. Dording et al., 2002).
In consequence official policies no longer recognise drugs-based antidepressant therapies as the panaceas they once did (e.g. Hughes and Cohen, 2009; Middleton et al., 2005; NICE, 2004) and significant numbers of depressives reject these treatments in favour of ‘self-medication’, with alcohol and/or other non-prescription drugs (e.g. Garland et al., 2012; Hendrie et al., 1998).
There are therefore strong clinical and ethical pressures towards the development of a new generation of antidepressants and the commercial rewards for doing so are potentially enormous. It is deeply paradoxical then that so many of the major players in the pharmaceutical industry have declared that they are no longer going to vigorously pursue this goal (Miller, 2010). The aim of the present paper is to explore the reasons why this hiatus has occurred and ways in which this knowledge can be used to help inform efforts to get the antidepressant drug discovery process moving forward once again.
Dissecting the process
Animal models
The drug discovery process seeks to produce drugs that are both efficacious and safe (Paul et al., 2010). Whilst clinical trials are often given a higher profile (e.g. Lipsky and Sharp, 2001) this fails to take into account the pivotal role animal models play in the process leading up to this phase. That is, preclinical models provide information that helps determine whether drugs should move into Phase 1 clinical trials (Herrling, 2005; Verkman, 2004) and, where appropriate, fulfil the regulatory obligation for efficacy to be shown before they are allowed to do so (e.g. Woodcock and Woosley, 2008). That said, the utility of animal models of depression is often not immediately obvious to non-specialists because they tend not to be based on a direct mapping of homologous responses between species (as would be the case with, say, hypertension), their end points often bear no resemblance to the disorder they are seeking to model (see below) and the level of translation between these models and clinical efficacy is low (Harmer et al., 2011).
In this context, animal models of depression should ideally be based on a common aetiology in both animals and man. They are not and so ‘pharmacological validity’ has been used as the defining characteristic instead. That is, all potential new drugs are measured against existing compounds in models that have been developed solely on the basis of their sensitivity to these standards (e.g. Kudryavtseva et al., 1991; Porsolt et al., 1977; Song and Leonard, 2005; Steru et al., 1985; Willner, 1997). These models have in consequence remained mechanistic and are now frequently referred to as ‘assays’ in recognition of their lack of any obvious relationship with clinical depression (e.g. Krishnan and Nestler, 2008).
There are a plethora of such models (for reviews see McArthur and Borsini, 2006; Willner, 1984, 1997) and one of the main reasons for this is that it is impossible to reject particular tests once they have satisfied the ‘sensitivity to known antidepressants’ criterion. This point also extends to those more recent genetically based models (e.g. Cryan and Holmes, 2005; Cryan and Mombereau, 2004). Hence, use of these assays has in recent times become a matter of preference and taste rather than utility, since they have all been developed on essentially the same definitional lines.
Commonly used models of depression include tail suspension (Cryan et al., 2005; Steru et al., 1985), forced swim (Porsolt et al., 1977), mouse killing (e.g. Song and Leonard, 2005), chronic social defeat (e.g. Keeney and Hogg, 1999; Kudryavtseva et al., 1991) and chronic mild stress (e.g. Monleon et al., 1995; Willner et al.,1987).
Logical flaw
Attempting to identify new compounds as potential antidepressants by testing them in animal models of depression that have been defined as such solely on the basis of their sensitivity to existing antidepressants is logically flawed, a tautology (of the form A=B therefore B=A). Thus the argument ‘it is an antidepressant because it has effects in animal models of depression that are animal models of depression because they are sensitive to the actions of antidepressants’ is in context no different in form from the statement ‘God exists because the Bible says he does and the Bible is the infallible word of God’.
This basic error was built into the current antidepressant drug discovery process from its inception (e.g. Chessin et al., 1956; Loomer et al., 1957) and the problems inherent with this approach have become compounded at each stage. Hence the current situation, where first generation antidepressants put on the market before FDA regulations required efficacy to be shown (Goodrich, 1963) were used as templates for a second generation of drugs that we now know to be only poorly effective in the context of the clinically depressed population as a whole (Colman, 2011; Piggot et al., 2010; Trivedi et al., 2006).
This situation has become further confounded in more recent times by the propensity to blur the conceptual differences between ‘stress’ and ‘depression’ and to erroneously use these terms more or less interchangeably (Dias et al., 2009). Further, many of the models currently in use are open to alternative explanations for effects seen in them. For example the end-points used to indicate antidepressant action in the forced swim test could also be the product of effects on learning and memory (e.g. West, 1990). Effects on sucrose consumption in the chronic mild stress model can be accounted for by the food deprivation component of this procedure alone (Forbes et al., 1996) and chronic social stress models where animals are exposed to attack from an aggressive conspecific (e.g. Keeney and Hogg, 1999) could equally be measuring factors that influence the activation of the endorphin system (e.g. Rodgers and Hendrie, 1983; Siegfried et al., 1987) and/or the well documented analgesic actions of the antidepressants themselves (e.g. Micó et al., 2006; Wattiez et al., 2011)
In consequence, the vast majority of researchers in this area operate on the de facto working definition of depression as ‘that which responds to existing antidepressants’ (e.g. Cryan et al., 2002; Cryan and Holmes, 2005; Deussing, 2006; Kelly et al., 1997; Krishnan and Nestler, 2008; Samuels et al., 2011; Song and Leonard, 2005; Willner, 1984; Wong and Licinio, 2004) in any species, including yeast (e.g. Chen et al., 2012) and regardless of the mechanisms underlying these effects or the end-points employed.
False assumptions
If the first flawed premise of the current antidepressant drug discovery process is that existing drugs are suitable templates on which to base the development of new treatments, the second is that rats and mice are suitable species on which to (almost exclusively) base the animal models these drugs are tested in (e.g. Cryan and Holmes, 2005; Krishnan and Nestler, 2008; Porsolt et al., 2001).
Were the antidepressant drug discovery process to have been developed along rational lines, rats and mice would have been selected because of special characteristics that make them particularly suitable for use in these models. They do not, however, have such characteristics (Dias et al., 2009; Hendrie and Pickles, 2009) and there are indeed strong arguments against their continued use in this context (Hendrie et al., 2011; Hendrie and Pickles, 2009). Further, little consideration has been given to species differences between rats and mice except for perhaps, occasionally, their size. Hence there are rat (Detke et al., 1995) and mouse (Porsolt et al., 1977) forced swim tests; rat (Rygula et al., 2005) and mouse (Keeney and Hogg, 1999) social defeat models; rat (Willner et al., 1987) and mouse (Yalcin et al., 2005) chronic unpredictable mild stress models and rat (Chermat et al., 1986), mouse (Steru et al., 1985) and gerbil (Varty et al., 2003) tail suspension tests, etc.
There are nonetheless important differences between rats and mice and their significance cannot be ignored. Laboratory rats are derived from Rattus norvegicus. These are colonial animals that live together relatively peaceably under laboratory conditions (e.g. Barnett, 1963; Rodgers and Hendrie, 1982), within which significant levels of full-blooded aggression are seen under only the most unusual of conditions (e.g. Rodgers et al., 1983). Laboratory mice (Mus musculus) are by contrast strongly territorial and show high levels of intra-male aggression whenever they are group housed. Cages of male mice (the sex that is most frequently used) are in consequence a mixture of dominant and subordinate animals that vary greatly in terms of behaviour, physiology and immune functioning (Berry, 1970; Brain, 1971; Hendrie et al., 1996) and this is, at least, a major source of variance in all studies using this species.
Rats and mice are, it seems, used extensively in the field of depression research because there has been no serious consideration that things should be otherwise (e.g. Borsini, 2012; Hendrie et al., 2011; Nestler and Hyman, 2010) and the lumping together of findings made using rats, mice and/or other species as ‘rodent models’ (e.g. Castagné et al., 2011; Duman, 2010; El Yacoubi and Vaugeois, 2007; Krishnan and Nestler, 2011; McArthur and Borsini, 2006; Nestler and Hyman, 2010) ignores the potential importance of these species differences. This is also a very high risk strategy that assumes depression to be a general mammalian feature that can be modelled in any animal of this class.
Systems failure
The ease with which ‘me-same’ compounds could be produced in the 1960s, ’70s and to a certain extent the ’80s (e.g. Domino, 1999; Geddes et al., 2000) once gave this flawed antidepressant drug discovery process an aura of rationality. However, serendipity remained at its base, the illusion could not be maintained indefinitely and the paucity of this approach has now been fully exposed. The glacial rate of progress over the past 60 years has provided improvements in tolerability but not efficacy (Hindmarch, 2001). The most frequently prescribed antidepressants are now more than 20 years old and out of patent (Ciprani et al., 2009). There is little in the pipeline to replace them and only poor prospects of there being progress in the near future now that many of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies have to a greater or lesser degree reduced their investment in this area (Blier, 2010). There has been what can only be described as a catastrophic systems failure and this has left little behind that can be salvaged.
Taking stock
With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that even a cursory consideration of the species used in these models would have raised serious questions about the models themselves. Asking ‘what species?’ inevitably raises the question ‘why?’ and any rational answer to that demands a level of understanding about depression itself that we do not currently possess. The emphasis would thus have been on developing that understanding of depression rather than continuing down the line of making high levels of investment in drug-led approaches that have not proved successful. The result of this omission has been an antidepressant drug discovery process that is tautologically locked into an iterative loop capable only of producing further variants of that which has gone before. This error has become critical now the proportion of the clinical population that cannot be treated with these drugs has become clear. There can be no more potent demonstration of the moribund state of the current antidepressant drug discovery process than the growing clinical interest in the Class C street drug ketamine (e.g. Berman et al., 2000; Morgan and Curran, 2012).
Moving forward
The need to develop a greater understanding of clinical depression and to apply that knowledge to the development of new animal models for use in a reformulated drug discovery process highlights one further difficulty that needs to be addressed before that process can begin: that of resolving the different approaches taken by psychiatrists and pre-clinicians so that findings from each can be integrated. The prevalent approach in the clinic has been nosological, with an emphasis on interview and questionnaires that themselves concentrate heavily on mood state (such as those originally developed by Hamilton (1960) and Beck and colleagues (1961)). These methods are clearly not available to those that work with animals. Hence, although there is no widespread tradition of behavioural assessment in psychiatry (e.g. van Praag et al., 1987; van Praag, 2010) a full characterisation of the behavioural expression of depression in the clinic is nonetheless required.
Importance of the ethological approach
Ethological analysis was first applied to laboratory animals in the 1960s (e.g. Grant and MacKintosh, 1963) and has gained use particularly in the fields of anxiety (e.g. Cole and Rodgers, 1993; Holmes et al., 2000, Smolinsky et al., 2009) and depression (e.g. Hendrie and Starkey, 1998; Pickles et al., 2012).
The most important aspects of the ethological approach are Tinbergen’s four principal questions (Tinbergen, 1963). These questions relate to form (what does it look like?), function (what does it do?), ontogeny (how does it change over a lifetime?) and phylogeny (what does it look like and do in other species?) and can be applied to all levels from molecular to societal to give insights that are not obtainable by any other means.
In the context of depression this approach has recently led to an analysis that suggests that this is an adaptation mediated via events in the third ventricle (Hendrie and Pickles, 2010). This has been concluded because the behavioural cluster associated with depression (e.g. hunched posture, avoidance of eye contact, reduced competition for food/sex and sleep disruption) is defensive in nature. This cluster in turn serves to reduce an individual’s attack provoking stimuli and so allows them to remain within social groups that have become hostile to their presence. Depression is most commonly seen in adults and the nature of the adaptation indicates that it would only have developed in those species with a similar social need to our own. The third ventricle is implicated because the hypothalamus lies at one end, the pineal at the other and major pathways from the amygdala and hippocampus pass through it (Hendrie and Pickles, 2009, 2010).
The opportunity to test this hypothesis experimentally has not presented itself as yet and so it may not be supported. Nonetheless, its proposal serves to illustrate the potential significance of the guiding principles of ethology in this context and the value of the pioneering work that has already been done on the behavioural characterisation of human psychiatric illness (e.g. Dixon, 1986; Dixon et al., 1989; Troisi et al., 1990; Troisi, 1999).
Reformulating the process
The failure of the current antidepressant drug discovery process has been contingent upon a number of avoidable factors and it is imperative that these mistakes are not repeated. It is beyond the scope of this paper and the position of those authoring it to suggest in detail how the antidepressant drug discovery process should be reformulated but there are a few general principles that clearly need to be adhered to:
Ethology must be at the heart of this new process, to provide the required ethological description of clinical depression in all its various stages and to enable homologies between animals and man to be identified as they emerge.
New animal models need to be developed on the basis of this knowledge and designed to allow full integration of data generated in animals and man.
These new models must also be constructed on the basis of a full understanding of the natural histories of the species to be used in them. Since it is postulated that depression is a species-specific adaptation developed in response to particular social circumstance this adaptation will only be seen in those species with similar social needs to our own (Hendrie and Pickles, 2009, 2010). The social organisations of rats and mice do not predict that they are amongst the group of species to have developed this adaptation (Hendrie and Pickles, 2009). Mongolian gerbils (Meriones unguiculatus) are, however, a strong candidate in this context (e.g. Pickles et al., 2012) and other species will no doubt be found once they are looked for.
Lastly, the purpose of the drug discovery process is to produce drugs that are both efficacious and safe and the process needs to be shaped to meet those goals, not the other way round. Hence, if rats and mice are not suitable for use in this context then concerns about using different species in new animal models must be set to one side. The continued use of current animal models of depression cannot be justified only on the grounds that they fit in with other aspects of the drug discovery process and the process must evolve to accommodate that.
Conclusions
The ‘annus horribilis’ suffered by European neuroscience in 2010 as the result of GSK, AstraZeneca, Pfizer, Merck and Sanofi all announcing significant reductions in their research efforts into traditional drug discovery for the treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders has been well documented (Nutt and Goodwin, 2011). The catastrophic failure of the antidepressant drug discovery process has undoubtedly been a contributing factor and there are hence pressing clinical, ethical and commercial reasons why this process must be quickly built anew.
Footnotes
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
