Revisiting the Golden Arches in China

Abstract

This article reports an analysis of the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s during three historical periods: 1978-1991, 1992-2000, and 2001-2012. It finds that the Chinese discourse had gradually diversified in its content and agents involved. It argues that the evolving meaning of McDonald’s in China was a product of, and closely reflected, China’s pluralizing political and economic structure. The Chinese case illustrates that, to acquire a balanced and nuanced understanding of brand meaning, scholars should not only examine agency but also structure so as to avoid the pitfalls of either blind pessimism or naïve optimism.

Keywords

China McDonald’s agency structure brand meaning discourse analysis macromarketing

In reporting his field research on McDonald’s in Beijing in 1994, Yan (1997; 2006) observed that the American fast food restaurant was perceived by his informants as “a high-fashion restaurant” offering “haute cuisine” to “more civilized people” (p. 52-53). He predicted that, after twenty years, McDonald’s American associations would become but dim memories for older residents: “a new generation of Beijing consumers may treat the Big Mac, fries, and shakes simply as local products (p. 76).”

Twenty years later since Yan’s study, McDonald’s is still popular in China, operating more than 1,400 stores (Burkitt 2012a). However, his prediction has not fully materialized. In fact, McDonald’s American origin remains a salient and often negative component of its brand image there, making it a ready target of attacks by Chinese nationalism (Gao 2012). The phrase “junk food (laji shipin)” is frequently used by the Chinese to describe McDonald’s and other Western fast food brands. In his update to the 2nd edition of the widely cited book, Golden Arches East, Watson (2006) laments that McDonald’s has become a victim of obesity politics and worldwide anti-glo-balization movements.

This article reports an analysis of the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s between 1978 and 2012. It argues that the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s gradually diversified in the last three decades in both its content and agents. Rather than simply being a victim of worldwide anti-globalization movements, the evolving meaning of McDonald’s in China reflected the complex, changing nature of China’s political and economic structure, which underwent varied degrees of liberalization and pluralization over the years.

As a ubiquitous global brand, McDonald’s has attracted the attention of scholars interested in the topic of globalization. Focusing on the imperative of capitalist structure, some scholars see the McDonaldization of the world a serious threat to humanity and cultural diversity and express strong pessimism (Redner 2004; Ritzer 2004). Emphasizing the power of agency, other scholars present an optimistic picture when they interpret the varied meanings of McDonald’s in local markets as testimonies to how local forces resist the homogenizing effect of globalization (Parker 1998; Watson 2006). Foster (2008) identifies the problems with these two contrasting tendencies: sentimental pessimism denies all agency to local peoples, while simple optimism obscures the complex ways in which heterogeneity can be recruited within a homogenizing project as well as the inequalities among different agents bound together by a product (p. 8). To overcome these problematic tendencies, scholars must adopt a panoramic perspective and consider the role of both agency and structure in brand meaning construction.

Agency and structure constitute the two critical components of consumption (Baudrillard 1998). Consumption in its essence is a process of sign manipulation, identity construction, and magic making. It is also deeply embedded in broader social, political, and economic contexts, so that the meaning of a brand or consumption practice is never fixed but contested by different agents and evolves over time (McCracken 2005). This perspective locates the social construction of consumption practices by agency within the confines of existing structures, so that the complexity of brand meaning can be adequately investigated.

Over the years, researchers have gradually expanded the list of agents participating in the construction of brand meaning. Traditionally, marketers are believed to control the meaning of their brands (Marchand 1998). Some cultural studies scholars challenge this view by celebrating the creative agency of the consumer (Parker 1998; Watson 2006). Recent research treats the consumer as an active agent that interacts and negotiates with other agents (e.g., Peñaloza and Barnhart 2011). A more dialectic view sees the consumer as both constituting and being constituted by cultural signs and by the larger political-economic context (Murray 2002). A macromarketing perspective further implicates the government, the media, non-governmental organizations, and transnational forces as potent agents (Foster 2008; Yang 2009). These various agents consciously pursue their own agendas through their interaction, contestation, and negotiation with each other, so that the meaning of consumption practices becomes discursive and fluid.

Discourse analysis offers a powerful tool to understand the interaction of agency and structure in shaping brand meaning. Hirschman, Scott, and Wells (1998) define “discourse” as the entire process in time and over time where product meanings move back and forth among speakers (marketing professionals, scholars, public officials) and cultural sites such as media products, government documents, and retail stores. Discourse analysis aims to map out how meaning is negotiated to maintain identities and power relations in society by identifying the key ideologies underlying discourses (Jorgensen and Philips 2002).

A historical approach is closely associated with discourse analysis and thus an essential element of research on brand meaning. A brand’s meaning is unstable and constantly unraveling because agency and structure evolve and power relations shift (Alfino, Caputo, and Wynyard 1998). Thus, brand meaning is best understood in terms of prior, accumulated meanings as well as historically sedimented values (Foster 2008, p.13). In addition, only through examinations of changes in societal systems can we obtain a better understanding of the relationship between agency and structure (Dixon 1984). For these reasons, the rest of the paper will analyze the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s between 1978 and 2012 to examine how the meaning of the brand evolved over time in China as a result of the country’s changing political-economic landscape.

Methodology

This project relied on a mix of secondary and primary sources for its data collection. For historical research, secondary sources are the literature about the period—including books and articles—written at a later date, while primary sources are evidence produced during the historical period under investigation (Witkowski and Jones 2006). The secondary sources for this project consisted of English books and articles on Chinese politics, economy, and social development since 1978. The primary sources included relevant policy documents and statistics issued by the Chinese government and its affiliated organizations; articles on fast food and McDonald’s published in major Chinese national newspapers, magazines, and academic journals; promotional materials, documents, and website information from McDonald’s in China; online postings, blogs, and discussion threads on McDonald’s and fast food retrieved from major Chinese Internet portals and social media sites; and English articles on McDonald’s in China. Chinese articles published in major Chinese national newspapers, magazines, and academic journals were retrieved from two extensive Chinese databases, the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI) and Duxiu (读秀), by using search words such as “Maidanglao (麦当劳)”— the Chinese brand name of McDonald’s, “yang kuaican (foreign fast food),” “kuaican (fast food),” and “laji shipin (junk food).” Since the Internet has become a major forum for public discourse in China in the last decade (Shirk 2011), the online data were used to supplement the offline data to capture the dynamic and democratic nature of public discourse in the Internet age.

Periodization is an integral part of historical research and offers several advantages than simple chronology, including providing a better structure and making comparisons between periods possible (Hollander et al. 2005). A common technique of periodization is to rely on important turning points in the material under review (Hollander et al. 2005). China’s development since 1978 contains some major milestone events and thus lends itself well to this method of periodization. More specifically, the year of 1978 witnessed China emerging out of the devastating Cultural Revolution and embarking on market-oriented economic reforms. The Chinese economy between 1978 and 1991 experienced significant growth, but central planning still dominated the system (Naughton 1995). The year of 1992 marked another major turning point in China’s history because the Communist regime gave its full endorsement to the development of “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics,” which accelerated the fundamental transformation of the Chinese economy into a market system (Naughton 2006). China officially joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, signaling its formal integration into the global trade system and the start of a hyper competitive era for the Chinese domestic market. Given these major events, China’s development since 1978 can be roughly divided into three periods: 1978-1991, 1992-2000, and 2001-2012. These three periods also mesh very well with the trajectory of McDonald’s expansion in China.

The data analysis involved three essential tasks: first, the secondary data were analyzed to outline the political-economic context of each period; second, the primary data were examined and interpreted to locate the key ideas of the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s for each period; and lastly, the findings from the primary data were related back to the political-economic context to identify plausible links between the larger context and the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s.

The next three sections will report the findings, each section devoted to one period and structured into two parts: the political-economic context and the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s. The latter part is further organized by the key agents involved.

The Period of 1978-1991

The Political-Economic Context

China started market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, and experienced political and economic rollbacks after the Tian’anmen Massacre in 1989. Central planning and price control continued to characterize the Chinese economy at the time (Naughton 1995; Sicular 1995). In between, periods of liberalization were interspersed with periods of ideological campaigns against Western bourgeois influences (Kluver 1996). In spite of the ups and downs, the period was marked by a steady ideological shift from an emphasis on class equality to the mantra of “being rich is glorious” and from frugality to consumption (Sullivan 1988). Stimulated by the new economic measures, per capita incomes increased by 200% for rural residents and nearly 100% for urban residents from 1978 to 1990 ( China Statistical Yearbook 1996). Retail businesses mushroomed, and consumer consumption rose sharply (Chai 1992). Rapid growth was accompanied by social problems such as skyrocketing inflation, widened income gaps, and epidemic corruption (Naughton 1995), which led to the massive student demonstration in 1989.

The period also witnessed some degree of political liberalization. The Chinese government gave nods to borrowing the West’s advanced science and technology while rejecting its capitalist values and lifestyles (Schram 1984). However, Chinese intellectuals took advantage of their new status and freedom, widely surveyed Western liberalistic and individualistic ideas and theories, and came to the consensus that, lagging far behind the West, China should pursue the Western model of development (Zhang 2008).

Their rising incomes noted, Chinese people still lived materially austere lives during this period (see Table 1), and rationing of food items persisted (Wang and Kinsey 1994). In fact, few people ate out at the time, and, when they did eat out, their only options were small-scale facilities that offered limited varieties, poor services, and long waiting lines (Han 1985; Yan 1985). A catering service in China in 1978 served a population of 8227 on average and collected 46,800 yuan in annual revenue, while in 1990 each served a population of 756 with an annual revenue of 27,800 yuan ( China Statistical Yearbook 1993). According to a restaurant in Shanghai that employed 47 workers, its customers spent on average about 0.15 yuan on breakfast or dinner and 0.25 yuan on lunch (Shuguang Restaurant 1982).

Table 1.

* Indices of China’s Development, 1978-2010.

Year	1978	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Average Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban Residents (yuan**)	343	478	739	1510	4283	6280	10490	19109
Average Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Rural Residents (yuan**)	134	191	398	686	1578	2253	3255	5919
Number of Color TV per 100 Households (set): Urban	N/A	N/A	17.2	59	89.8	116.6	134.8	137.4
Number of TV per 100 Households (set): Rural***	N/A	0.4	11.7	40	64	49	84	112
Number of Computer per 100 Households (set): Urban	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.7	41.5	71.16
Number of Computer per 100 Households (set): Rural	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5	2.1	10.4
Total Number of Books Published	14987	21621	45603	80224	101381	143376	222473	328387
Total Number of Magazines Published	930	2191	4705	5751	7583	8725	9468	9884
Total Number of Newspapers Published	186	188	1445	1444	2089	2007	1931	1939

* Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook (1995, 1996, 2001, 2011).

** One US dollar equaled to 1.71 yuan in 1980, 2.94 in 1985, 4.88 in 1990, 8.35 in 1995, 8.28 in 2000, 8.19 in 2005, and 6.77 in 2010 (China Statistical Yearbook 1996, 2011).

*** The numbers for 2000, 2005, and 2010 are for color TV only.

In comparison, the Chinese’ recreational and media consumption saw rapid growth during the period. Though few families had a TV set in 1978, the majority of urban households owned a color TV and 40% of rural households owned a black/white TV by 1990 (see Table 1). The total numbers of books, magazines, and newspapers published in the country also multiplied many times ( China Statistical Yearbook 2011). Though the state owned and tightly controlled the publishing and media industries, it granted considerable freedom to the introduction of the West’s advanced science and technology (Sullivan 1988). Foreign media content was also allowed to enter the Chinese market through cooperative relationships with the local media (Seligman 1984). Advertising returned to China in the late 1970s and started to showcase foreign brands, many of which were not yet available on the Chinese market (Stross 1990). After years of isolation, most Chinese had no idea about what life really was like in the capitalist West or what kind of comforts and luxuries Western consumers enjoyed. This sudden avalanche of ideas and images from the West offered them a glimpse of a prosperous and modern world beyond their immediate reach, which formed a sharp contrast to their own materially deprived life.

It is in this context that Western fast food brands started to enter China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. KFC pioneered the trend when it opened its first Chinese store in Beijing in 1987—a three-story building of 11,800 square feet on the edge of Tian’anmen Square—and charged 12 yuan for a hamburger and eight yuan for a piece of fried chicken. On opening day, it reportedly sold out its 2200 buckets of fried chicken and made 83,000 yuan (Ding 2008). Given its arch competitor’s success in China, McDonald’s scrambled to enter the market. However, as the political and economic climate became less accommodating immediately after 1989, McDonald’s settled on a low-key entrance in 1990 by setting up its first restaurant in Shenzhen ( Seattle Times 1990), a special economic zone in southern China and a city more prosperous and liberal than the rest of the country (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

McDonald’s first restaurant in China opened in Shenzhen on October 8, 1990.

The Discourse on McDonald’s in 1978-1991 China.

Marketers

American brands made active efforts to influence the Chinese perception of American fast food through public relations. For example, the chairman of KFC’s Beijing operation, Xia (1988) suggested in a piece written for International Economic Cooperation (Guoji Jingji Hezuo) that KFC was doing well in Beijing because of its tasty food, fair pricing, good service, and clean, disposable tableware, and because of its scientific management that spelled out clear monetary rewards and penalties based on employee performance. He emphasized that, rather than letting employees eat them, KFC threw away fried chickens that were one and half hours old to guarantee customers the tastiest products (Xia 1988). While such public relations pieces by KFC directly promoted the KFC brand, they nevertheless lent a halo effect to other American fast food brands, including McDonald’s. Featuring its traditional striped shirts and matching caps, McDonald’s recruitment ads for its Shenzhen store read: “More than 200 youths in Shenzhen are going to put on this uniform, a symbol of a prosperous future. As an aggressive person, what are you waiting for?” The ads reportedly attracted 6000 applicants—some with college degrees—vying for 240 part-time positions ( Seattle Times 1990).

The Government

Owned and tightly controlled by the government, the Chinese national mass media did not carry extensive coverage of American fast food brands during this period. The People’s Daily, the organ of the Chinese Communist Party, did run a piece to celebrate KFC’s presence in Beijing, noting that the sales of the Beijing store ranked top among KFC’s 7400 restaurants worldwide, garnered admiration from many foreign friends of China, testified to the benefits of the government’s opening-up policies, and proved that the living standards of the Chinese people had improved (Ji 1988).

Chinese Intellectuals

Small in their total number, college-educated Chinese were designated by the government during the reform era as a special social group labeled “intellectuals (zhishi fenzi),” and many were fast-tracked to leadership positions (Hsu 2007). Elite intellectuals—college professors, scientists, researchers, scholars, editors, and managers of trade organizations—who enjoyed privileged access to information and Chinese media outlets, especially trade and academic publications, emerged as opinion leaders in the society, and exercised considerable influence on government policies (Zhao 2008).

The few Chinese articles on McDonald’s during this period appeared in trade and academic publications. Some introduced the brand to the Chinese reader even before McDonald’s officially entered China. For example, Yang (1983) told the reader that McDonald’s was popular in America because its food was fresh and nutritious, its service fast and friendly, its stores clean and elegant, and its prices fair and low. Wang (1986) recounted how the company achieved international success by relying on strict and precise management methods to produce standardized and consistent products. Summarizing McDonald’s secrets of success as innovation, quality, service, cleanness, and value, Yan (1987) mentioned that its employees often spent two to four years at its Hamburger University to go through extensive training.

It appears that Chinese intellectuals and managers in the 1980s readily embraced the concept of fast food as an important marker of a country’s modernization. Hence, quite some articles either discussed how industrialized countries developed their fast food industries or explored how China should develop its own fast food industry. Suggesting that Chinese traditional foods were compatible with the fast food style of services, Yan (1985) reported on how the city of Shanghai, as part of its efforts to expand its service industries, experimented with different formats to develop fast food outlets. Citing how the fast food industry developed at a shocking speed in the U.S., Han (1985) argued that developing China’s fast food industry should be an urgent national task, while also contending that China had a long history of fast foods.

Interestingly, in the same year that KFC entered China, the term “junk food” also appeared in the Chinese discourse. Writing in Contemporary Workers, Li (1987) explained why high-calorie, low-nutrition foods such as soda, ice cream, and French fries were considered unhealthy junk food, and why brown rice and whole grains were good for people. Given the grain-dominated Chinese diet at the time, the article’s message was akin to preaching the importance of dieting to a perennially starved person. For this reason, the concept of junk food was not picked up again until the mid-1990s.

The Period of 1992-2000

The Political-Economic Context

In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China’s economic reorientation, gave his full endorsement to broader and bolder economic reforms (Naughton 1995). Between 1992 and 2000, China implemented a spectrum of economic reforms, more comprehensive and intensive than those in the 1980s, to establish a market-based economy (Naughton 2006). T o enter the WTO, it also gradually harmonized its legal system with international standards, especially in the economic sphere (Tanner 1999). Because of the new reforms, market competition substantially intensified, and Chinese consumers enjoyed much higher incomes (see Table 1) and easy access to a wide range of products and services. According to Li (1998), 700 kinds of vegetables were available on the market in Shanghai and 110 skin care brands in Beijing in the late 1990s.

However, the rapid marketization of the Chinese economy came with heavy social costs, including corruption, massive unemployment, income inequality, rising crime rates, uncontrolled urbanization, environmental deterioration, and social dissatisfaction (Lewis and Xue 2003). The liberalization of the housing, higher education, and healthcare industries created a strong sense of insecurity among Chinese families and substantially affected their overall living standards (Tang 2001). A direct result of the reforms was a reconfiguration of class and social strata: intellectuals, officials, entrepreneurs, and many employees in the private sector comprised the beneficiaries and were vocal in defending their own class interests while the voice of the losers was often muted by the system (Tang 2001; Zhang 2008).

Politically, conservatism continued to surge for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese regime remobilized propaganda campaigns to defend its legitimacy (Lieberthal 2003). Second, as the Chinese learned more about Western countries, they quickly became disillusioned and reacted against the pro-Western, anti-traditional tide of the 1980s (Goldman 1999; Zhang 2008). A series of major events, including China’s failed bid to host 2000 Olympic Games, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and China’s scheduled accession to the WTO in 2001, all induced a feeling of ambiguity toward the West and a surge of popular nationalism (Gries 2004).

During this period, the state further loosened its control of the cultural realm, and Chinese society was gradually pluralizing (Lynch 1999; Waldron 1998). Notably, there was a revival of neo-Confucianism inspired by the success of China’s East Asian neighbors (Goldman 1999). The Chinese media also underwent drastic commercialization (Zhao 1998). By 2000, China boasted of more than 90 million cable subscribers, 30 million regular users of the Internet, and a quarter of a million websites (“New Media” 2001). Western magazines, including Business Week, Fortune, Forbes, Elle, and Cosmopolitan, launched their Chinese editions (Crellin 1998). These new developments indicated the disintegration of a unified—real or imagined—national political, intellectual, and cultural discourse (Zhang 2008).

The Chinese catering industry experienced fast growth during this period. By 2000, there were 3,508 catering companies each with annual revenue of 2 million yuan or more, including 253 foreign invested companies and 378 funded by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan ( China Statistical Yearbook 2001). In 1996, there were 400,000 fast food outlets in the country with combined revenue of about 40 billion yuan. The total number of such outlets grew to more than 800,000 with total revenue of 75 billion yuan by 1999 (China State Domestic Trade Bureau 2000). McDonald’s participated in the boom. In 1992 it opened its first Beijing store—which was also the largest McDonald’s in the world at the time—on the southern edge of the Wangfujing Shopping District, not very far from the Tian’anmen Square (Pi 1992). It operated 27 stores in China in 1995 (Wall Street Journal 1995), more than 100 in 1996 ( Wall Street Journal 1996), and 257 in 2000 ( People’s Daily 2000).

The Discourse on McDonald’s in 1992-2000 China.

Marketers

During its early expansion in China, McDonald’s promoted itself as a symbol of modernity, youth, and fun (Yan 1997; 2006). It distributed a short booklet to the Chinese media outlining its history and its business philosophy of “quality, service, cleanliness, and value,” and print advertisements emphasized that its products were healthy food, based on nutritious ingredients and scientific cooking methods (Yan 1997; 2006). It also maintained good relations with government organs to get free publicity (Wu 1995; Zhou 1992). As market competition intensified, the American brand started to advertise on television. During this period, TV commercials linked the brand to celebrations of endearing social relationships through soft-sell advertising. For example, its first TV commercial in the country included a series of warm, feel-good vignettes of Chinese families and groups interacting around its products, the tagline urging people to share good time and good food (McDonald’s China 1996; see Figure 2). By introducing Western rituals such as children’s birthday parties, dating in public places, and formal marriage proposals in its commercials, McDonald’s further established itself as an aspirational brand for modern, Westernized young folks.

Figure 2.

Scenes from McDonald’s “Good Time” commercial in China, 1996, with the tagline: “Good Time, Good Food, Shared” (Source: youtube.com 2011).

During this period, some local fast food brands took turns challenging foreign brands through lower-priced Chinese dishes, yet most fizzled after a short period of spectacular success (China State Domestic Trade Bureau 2000; Ding 2008). The boom-and-bust stories of these local brands further helped solidify McDonald’s indomitable image.

The Government

The Chinese government actively participated in the discourse on McDonald’s during this period on two apparently coordinated fronts. First, its party organs such as the People’s Daily carried enthusiastic coverage of McDonald’s. For example, reporting on McDonald’s grand opening in Beijing in 1992, The People’s Daily sang high praise of the restaurant and suggested that McDonald’s was a symbol of China’s economic opening-up and exchange: “Beijing welcomes McDonald’s because today’s Beijing is more open and more pragmatic” (Pi 1992). McDonald’s community services and philanthropic activities were also extolled so that Chinese companies could learn from it (Wu 1995; Zhou 1992). Exploring why McDonald’s attracted a lot of repeat customers, articles in the same party organ alleged that the fast food brand’s kitchen functioned like a factory that relied on science and technology to achieve product standardization and quality consistency (Ling 1995; Li 1999). Without any reservation, Pi (1996) praised McDonald’s for capturing the hearts of Chinese children through promotions. The price war between McDonald’s and KFC was reported as benefiting the Chinese consumer, and the presence of these foreign brands was seen as a boost to the Chinese economy because most of their raw materials were sourced in China (Yi 1999).

On the second front, the government diligently promoted the growth of the domestic fast food industry. Starting from 1995, it organized an annual national conference to discuss issues related to the industry (China State Domestic Trade Bureau 2000). It issued Guidelines on Developing the Chinese Fast Food Industryin 1997, decreeing that the industry should combine the rich tradition of Chinese food culture with the managerial and technological experience of foreign companies to modernize itself and become competitive in the international market (China Ministry of Domestic Trade 1997). The guidelines set specific goals for the industry, directing officials at different levels to facilitate the development of Chinese-style fast food facilities through administrative interventions.

Chinese Intellectuals

Compared to the monolithic tone in The People’s Daily’s coverage of McDonald’s, Chinese intellectuals began to embrace diverging viewpoints in their discussion of the brand, and the trend became more obvious during the second half of the period. It is true that McDonald’s continued to be praised for its scientific management and standardized, efficient operation (Ding 1998). However, the discussion frequently went beyond admiration of the American brand to identify the gaps between Chinese local brands and their foreign competitors and highlight the challenges that the local industry had to overcome. For example, Xie (1997) believed that Chinese fast food brands lagged behind in their business philosophy, product quality, human resources management, franchise expansion, and marketing but held advantages in tasty and nutritious menus, and modernization and standardization would be the key to their future growth. Xuesong Li (1999) used words such as “infantile,” “immature,” “backward,” “low-standard,” and “crude” to describe the local industry. He (1999) vividly recounted her experience as a consumer of foreign and local restaurants to illustrate the gaps between the two. Bucking the trend, an article in Enterprise Economics (1999) noted McDonald’s declining sales worldwide and traced the cause to the fact that its management was conservative, its menu boring, its expansion hasty, its price wars with competitors costly, its advertising terrible, and its public relations ill managed.

Optimism emerged when Chinese scholars resorted to a cultural logic. Some argued that Chinese fast food should dig into the long history of Chinese food culture for inspiration and borrow foreign technologies and management skills to come up with winning recipes (Liang 1994; Shen 1998). Zhang (2000) identified three advantages of Chinese fast food: affordable price, home turf, and local taste. Disagreeing with the popular view that Chinese fast food should embrace standardization, Su (2000) suggested that Chinese fast food should pursue a different business model: as a culture, Chinese food defies standardization and should be appreciated for its colorfulness and never-ending varieties.

Health harms associated with foreign fast food attracted more attention during this period, though the level of criticism remained low. Wang (1994) reported on social discriminations obese women suffered in the U.S., linking low socio-economic status to junk food consumption and obesity. Z. Zhang (1998) warned that KFC and McDonald’s were bad for children, especially those who were overweight. M. Zhang (1998) claimed that people in the West already frowned upon junk foods such as fried chicken, pizza, and hamburger, and that the modern animal farming industry used a lot of hormones to grow animals—for this reason, Westerners preferred “green foods.” Rising concerns in the West about advertising of junk food bombarding children were also reported ( Advertising Panorama 1998).

Criticism was also launched from other angles. For example, Huang (1995) and Shi (2000) commented that fast food in China—especially Western fast food—targeted high-income consumers, who were the minority, while ordinary Chinese had to be very careful with their daily spending and therefore could not afford it.

Finally, some Chinese intellectuals began to report on McDonald’s controversies around the world and how other countries resisted the brand. For example, in an article entitled “the Whole World is Challenging Western Fast Food,” Shi (1997) surveyed Indonesia, India, Fiji, France, and Great Britain where McDonald’s met local resistance because of cultural, health, and environmental reasons.

Most of the writings by Chinese intellectuals on McDonald’s were published in academic journals or business trade publications with limited reach. However, articles on the harms of foreign fast food by health and nutrition experts appeared in popular national consumer magazines such as Food & Health (Shipin yu Jiankang), Health & Beauty (Jian yu Mei), Women’s Friend (Funü zhi You), Family Parenting (Jiating Yu’er), and Health Guide (Jiankang Xiangdao), which were read by a young and well-educated urban population—the same market targeted by McDonald’s.

Chinese Consumers

During this period, a small group of Chinese consumers in major cities participated in the discourse on McDonald’s through their consumption practices. According to Yan’s (1997; 2006) field research in Beijing in 1994, some well-to-do Chinese—especially yuppies and young couples—visited McDonald’s not because they liked its food but because they wanted to satisfy their curiosity about American culture and their need to feel connected to the West. As these consumers spent a large amount of money on such an experience—it cost a family of three one sixth of its monthly income to eat a meal there—they inevitably used phrases such as “high-fashion,” “more civilized,” “haute cuisine,” “high food,” and “romantic” to describe the restaurant, and eating there became a marker of social status and pride (Yan 1997; 2006).

However, another study by Eckhardt and Houston (2002) revealed that this romanticized image of McDonald’s was drastically eroded among Chinese consumers a few years later. Their interviewees in Shanghai considered the fast food place not fancy or expensive enough for celebrations of major life events, and one could lose face if hosting parties there because of its standardized and simple menu. The restaurant continued to be associated with modernity and youth because of its clean, bright environment and the novelty of its menu—it was so different from traditional Chinese food that only the young were willing to try it or eat it regularly (Eckhardt and Houston 2002).

The Period of 2001-2012

The Political-Economic Context

China officially joined the WTO in 2001. Since then, its economic development had been marked by some impressive milestones: it became the world’s largest automobile market in 2009, the largest personal computer market, and the second largest economy in 2010 (Fletcher 2011; Monahan 2011). Such rapid growth substantially expanded the rank of the Chinese middle class, i.e. households with an annual income ranging between $15,000 to $30,000. This group was predicted to reach 76 million by 2015 (Burkitt 2012c). Affluence also created a consumerist culture where status consciousness and decadence walked hand in hand (Gerth 2010).

Paradoxically, economic success did not guarantee satisfaction or happiness. Instead, social tensions escalated because of worsening corruption, environmental pollution, income gaps, labor exploitation, inflation, and land seizures by the government and developers. According to one report, China witnessed 180,000 protests, riots, and other mass incidents in 2010 (Orlik 2011). To alleviate social instability, the Chinese government adopted policies to improve the lives of the disadvantaged (Wen 2012). Questioning the country’s single-minded focus on GDP growth at the expense of broader social developments, the Chinese started to advocate a more inclusive, fair, and humanistic model of growth that emphasizes the needs of ordinary people (Jiang 2012).

Material affluence also brought the Chinese widespread obesity and chronic diseases such as hypertension, stroke, and diabetes (Burkitt 2012b). China had the largest diabetic population in the world, with 92.4 million adults suffering from the disease (International Diabetes Federation 2011). The obesity epidemic seriously challenged China’s underinvested health care system (Wang, Xu, and Xu 2007), which spent 80% of its budget covering chronic diseases (Burkitt 2012b).

Affluence did not bring peace of mind either. It is true that, when dining out, Chinese people had numerous options in terms of price, style, and taste, yet the public’s confidence in food safety was at a historical low, thanks to never-ending news about contaminated foods (Veeck, Yu, and Burns 2010). Treating it as a social stability issue, the Chinese government passed the Food Safety Law in 2009 (China People’s National Congress 2009). However, the legislation did little to boost the public’s confidence, as almost 70 percent of the respondents in a 2010 national survey expressed serious concerns about food safety (Shan 2011).

On the other hand, the Chinese were enjoying more freedom than ever before to claim and defend their rights because of loosened government control. Notably, consumer activism was on the rise, which “allowed disgruntled Chinese to voice a much wider variety of social complaints as aggrieved ‘consumers’ than they can as aggrieved ‘citizens’” (Gerth 2010, p. 149). However, nationalism became suspect as a motive, since foreign brands were frequently targeted by consumer activists (Gao 2012). China also witnessed a budding environmental movement. The country had between 4,000-5,000 environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by 2011, including international NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Greenpeace (Ford 2012). Greenpeace opened offices in mainland China in 2002 and was exercising considerable influence on the country’s environmental policies through co-operations with the state (Greenpeace 2007).

The rapid development of the Chinese media facilitated consumer and environmental activism. China was expected to become the world’s second largest media market in 2012 with a worth of $34 billion (Clark 2011). The Internet experienced the most extraordinary growth in the country, and China had the largest population of Internet users in the world, 564 million strong by the end of 2012 (China Internet Network Information Center 2013). More importantly, unaffiliated with the government, Chinese Internet portals had evolved into major content aggregators, enjoying the flexibility of amassing content via as many sources as possible (Wu 2006). American documentaries on fast food such as Supersize Me (Spurlock 2004) and Fast Food Nation (Schlosser 2002) were readily available on Chinese video websites. Compared to print media with their elitist leanings, the Internet provided ordinary Chinese an effective platform to learn about fast-breaking events inside and outside China, to discuss issues, and to voice their opinions, even though they have to carefully circumvent the many taboos dictated by the government (Shirk 2011; Zhao 2008).

China’s catering industry grew at a double-digit annual rate during this period, with anticipated revenue of $381.2 billion in 2011 (IBISWorld 2011). By 2010, there were 21,595 catering companies each with annual revenue of 2 million yuan or more, including 589 foreign invested companies and 611 funded by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan ( China Statistical Yearbook 2011). The industry also experienced rapid development in terms of globalization, standardization, supply chain management, and quality control (Deloitte 2011). Competition between Chinese and foreign fast food brands intensified, with Chinese chain restaurants owning more than 70% of the market and foreign brands localizing their menus to attract customers (Deloitte 2011). McDonald’s operated more than 560 stores in China in 2003 (Dolven 2003), more than 700 in 2005 ( Wall Street Journal 2005), and about 1,400 by February 2012, which gave it 2% of the market share (Burkitt 2012a).

The Discourse on McDonald’s in 2001-2012 China

Marketers

This period witnessed some new developments in McDonald’s marketing communication. First, in response to intense market competition, the company began to emphasize its low prices, long service hours, and quality ingredients, offering frequent sales promotions to attract customers: a promotional coupon priced a combo meal of a McChicken, a medium-sized coke, and a medium-sized bag of fries at 15 yuan in 2012, or about $2.40 (McDonald’s China 2012). Second, combining the power of social media and nostalgic marketing, it tried to cement brand loyalty among the generations who had grown up with the brand. For example, in commemorating McDonald’s 20th anniversary in China on a social media site, it asked its fans to post pictures of the McDonald’s toys they had collected and vote on their favorite ones; in a similar program, it asked its customers to enter an essay competition on their first experience with McDonald’s (McDonald’s 2010). The social media page registered 17, 877 likes by the end of 2012.

Last and more importantly, the company had to spend considerable resources to minimize damage caused by frequent negative publicity about the brand in the press. It published the nutrition and calorie information of its menu and employed public relations to advocate the idea that “the question is not about what one eats but about how one burns the calorie intake” (McDonald’s China 2012). To emphasize its Chinese connections, it released Report on McDonald’s Contribution in China (1990-2010) (McDonald’s China 2010). T o dispel the perception that its chickens grew on hormones, it launched a communication campaign in 2011, promising that its “chickens are from 100% natural growth” (McDonald’s China 2012). After the press accused that its burgers were made of “pink slime” (Hu 2012), it launched a new national TV campaign to promote its beef burgers, which, promised by the campaign, were made of 100% pure beef, therefore a perfect fit for Chinese males who were 100% manly men (McDonald’s China 2012; see Figure 3). On the other hand, despite rising health concerns among the Chinese, the company introduced very few healthy options to its Chinese menu (McDonald’s China 2012).

Figure 3.

McDonald’s “Manly-Man Beef” commercial in Shanghai, 2012.

In contrast, having borrowed from foreign brands the ideas of cleanliness and fast, friendly service, some domestic brands were trying to beat foreign competition by positioning themselves as the healthy choices. For example, the largest Chinese domestic fast food chain, True Kungfu (2011), marketed itself as being healthier than foreign fast food because all its dishes were steamed rather than fried. Old Uncle (2012), another domestic competitor, interpreted healthy fast food as of “low calorie, no public harms, and balanced nutrition” and promoted its products as of green and natural ingredients and with no frying. To address public concerns about food safety, Old Uncle regularly invited its customers to visit its organic farms, which supplied its vegetables (Old Uncle 2012). Some restaurants, both Chinese and foreign, included the phrase “slow food” in their marketing to position themselves as elegant, high-class alternatives to fast foods.

The Government

The Chinese government continued to play an active role in guiding and regulating the Chinese catering industry during this period. It issued Standards on Catering Business Management in 2007, which, as a cover-all regulation, detailed numerous rules that a catering business must follow, including principles such as the store should be clean and elegantly decorated and the service should be friendly and respectful (China Ministry of Commerce 2007). In 2008 it published a five-year plan for the industry, outlining steps to encourage “green” catering, healthy eating, the development of medium- and low- priced outlets, the global expansion of Chinese restaurants, and the recognition of “Chinese cuisine” as a cultural heritage (China Ministry of Commerce 2008). To educate the Chinese about healthy eating, the government commissioned the Chinese Nutrition Society (2007) to develop Diet Guidelines for Chinese Residents. Against such a background, the People’s Daily began to carry articles condemning the harms of foreign fast food—one article specifically emphasized that McDonald’s was consumed by the poor and shunned by the rich in the West (Liu and Kang 2007). On the other hand, the Chinese government did very little to restrain fast food marketing to children. The only recorded effort was launched by a lone delegate of the National People’s Congress, Zhang Jiao, who submitted a legislative proposal three years in a row to restrict foreign fast food marketing but failed to get much attention (Ji 2006).

The Chinese Mass Media

The rapid proliferation and fragmentation of the Chinese media created an intensely competitive media market and a strong demand for interesting content to fill up the ever-expanding media space. Given the state’s tightened censorship of many sensitive topics (Zhao 2008), sensational food safety news became a politically safe and commercially effective staple for the Chinese media, and stories about food safety problems of foreign brands held an additional appeal because of popular nationalism.

Indeed, both Chinese online and offline media outlets during this period were filled with stories about the harms of foreign fast food. To a great extent, the media became key conveyors of developments in the anti-fast food movement in the West. For example, a documentary by China Central TV (CCTV) included several minutes’ recap of Supersize Me with many original images and statistics from the film (CCTV 2010). Similarly, a report that McNuggets in the U.S. contained dimethylpolysiloxane, an anti-foaming agent used in Silly Putty, was picked up by CCTV Online (2010). The Western press story that McDonald’s Happy Meal did not decay after a whole year because of too many preservatives got its share of media attention in China as well (qq.com 2010). Some Chinese media coverage may have been directly inspired by what had happened abroad. For example, immediately after the British regulator in 2005 published a list of food manufacturers whose products contained Sudan 1, a banned carcinogenic dye (Food Standards Agency of UK 2005), Chinese journalists started their hunt for violators in China, and their investigation implicated KFC and McDonald’s (Wang 2005). The Chinese media frequently initiated their own investigations of McDonald’s. Recently, on a program that celebrated China’s Consumer Rights Day, CCTV exposed how employees of a McDonald’s store in Beijing sold chicken wings 90 minutes after they were cooked while the company’s policies set a 30-minute limit (Zhang 2012).

The negative media coverage on McDonald’s went beyond health and food safety issues. Notably, it was criticized for violating local minimum wage laws in China (Lan, Liang, and Xin 2007) and for possible tax evasions (Zhao, Xue, and Hei 2007). The Chinese media sometimes took on a nationalistic tone in their coverage of McDonald’s. For example, an editorial in a popular magazine on the harms of foreign fast food warned: “Children are the future of our motherland and the hope of the Chinese nation. Their health directly determines whether the Chinese nation will be strong or not in the future and whether our country will be competitive or not in its overall strength” ( Family Medicine 2005, p. 47).

Chinese Intellectuals

During this period, some Chinese scholars continued to investigate why McDonald’s had been successful in China. While some articles still lauded McDonald’s advantages in standardization, quality control, fair pricing, and franchise management (Chi and Gao 2007; Ma 2005), others focused on branding and identified McDonald’s strengths in terms of its positioning strategy—it represented a modern, leisure culture that appealed to the young (Cao 2010; Wen 2003). Reflecting upon the gaps between foreign and Chinese fast food brands, Chinese scholars posited that McDonald’s was more customer-focused (Huang 2011; Su 2002). However, even in acknowledging the positives of McDonald’s, some authors conceded that Chinese people did not really enjoy the taste of foreign fast food (Cao 2010; Wen 2003). Therefore, to compete against Western fast food, Chinese brands should develop tasty, healthy, and green menus targeting different segments of the population (Li 2006; Liao and Xu 2004; Sun and Wu 2007). It was also noted that developing a unique corporate culture and individualizing services would be the key to market success in a society where customer needs were becoming increasingly individualistic (Xu 2003).

The health effects of foreign fast food became a major concern among scholars and columnists, and the phrase “junk food” was frequently associated with McDonald’s (Ma 2006; Zhao 2006). Some even suggested that foreign fast food could be addictive because of its effects on human brain (Gui 2009; Xu 2006) and could lead to hormone imbalances and infertility (Cheng 2007). The health effects of foreign fast food on children were often highlighted (Chen et al. 2003). Some academic researchers investigated the link between foreign fast food and obesity through empirical studies. Ma et al. (2004) surveyed children in four Chinese cities and found that frequent consumption of Western fast food was a significant contributor to obesity among children. Ni and Zheng (2011) concluded that Western fast foods such as McDonald’s and KFC contributed to China’s rising obesity rates. Against the trend, some scholars argued that there was no bad food, only bad eating (Ge 2006). Some authors also observed the gap between China and the West in denouncing fast food and blamed the phenomenon on the Chinese’ blind worship of the West (Tan 2004; Zhang 2006). Tan (2006) concluded that, like tobacco companies, McDonald’s was on the losing side of a historical trend that favored healthy foods.

NGOs

During this period, NGOs not only actively participated in the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s, but also helped expand it to include some new dimensions. For example, Greenpeace in China agitated against genetically modified (GM) foods and animal feed production that destroyed rainforests (Greenpeace 2007). There is also evidence that activists from the organization participated and guided online discussions on related issues: a popular Chinese website, the review section of the documentary, Food Inc. (Kenner 2009), hosted very informed debates on the issues raised by the movie as well as links to Greenpeace’s Chinese website (doubai.com 2012). The Slow Food Movement also left its mark in China (Peng 2004), and some Chinese began to embrace the idea of slowly enjoying good foods to counterbalance the fast pace of modern life (Shu 2009).

Chinese Consumers

Because of easy access to the Internet, ordinary Chinese actively participated in the discourse on McDonald’s through social media sites, online forums, and personal blogs. At some online consumer review sites, customers of McDonald’s posted ratings of individual franchises in different cities and shared their opinions of various items offered by the fast food brand (dianping.com 2012). When expressing their preference for McDonald’s, these consumers often compared it to KFC. There were also frequent online postings by disgruntled consumers who told their personal stories about the store’s poor services, deceptive marketing, or products containing hair, glass, flies, or nails.

Some Chinese took advantage of venues offered by the Internet and condemned McDonald’s for reaping huge profits in China while destroying the health of the Chinese. One post even linked McDonald’s and KFC to the invasion of China by Western powers at the turn of the 20th century and argued that, instead of military invasion, foreign companies were launching economic invasion of China (sohu.com 2010). Some even used what they saw during their trips to the U.S. to advocate against foreign fast food because it was a food for the poor (ifeng.com 2008). Follow-up comments on an online posting entitled “Look: America is so rich, women [there] so fat” (tiexue.net 2010) pointed out that in America it was the poor who over-ate and became obese, in direct contrast to North Korea or China, and that the U.S. would sooner or later be destroyed by obesity because advanced science and economy could not compensate for the overall decline of citizens’ physical fitness.

Online discussions by the Chinese easily became heated, with strong emotions exhibited by both the critic and defender of McDonald’s. In attacking the view that foreign fast foods were junk and the Chinese should eat Chinese food, many commentators replied that Chinese food products might be far less safe to eat (qq.com 2010). Yet, both sides shared the same degree of anxiety about food safety and equally vocal in their condemnation of a money worshiping society and a corrupt, impotent government (qq.com 2010; tianya.cn 2010).

Chinese consumers did not refrain from spreading rumors and jokes about McDonald’s. One rumor had it that chickens raised for foreign fast food were not allowed to move around and became fully grown in a few days because of being fed hormones, so that many chickens ended up having four legs or three wings (sohu.com 2010). As a joke about McDonald’s that went viral online, a poster asked whether he could take his girlfriend to the American restaurant for braised pork—a popular traditional Chinese dish—and white rice; many consumers chimed in and bantered that McDonald’s sold all kinds of delicious Chinese traditional dishes at very low prices. Skepticism toward technology, globalization, meat-based diet, and the Western model of modernization also surfaced from the online discussions. One post claimed that high-tech hormones invented by Americans were now destroying the entire human race (tianya.cn 2008). Monsanto and its GM seeds were criticized for first harming Indian farmers and now poisoning Chinese people (Yanyu 2010). On hearing McDonald’s response that it followed Chinese standards in China and used only 100% pure beef rather than “pink slime,” some Chinese expressed their doubts that a company famous for its global standardized operation would adopt different standards in different countries, or that Chinese standards were superior to American standards, which legalize the use of “pink slime” (Hu 2012).

It appears that a considerable percentage of Chinese consumers were aware of health issues associated with foreign fast food. Even those who liked and frequented McDonald’s often used the word “garbage” to describe its products, and many were plagued by guilt and anxiety. Young women and children were attracted to McDonald’s because of its free toys. Working professionals went there when pressed for time. Some parents promised their children visits to McDonald’s as rewards for good behaviors, while others tried hard to resist their children’s pleading to visit Uncle Ronald. A few parents and bloggers advocated the need to regulate food advertising to children (Chang 2004; Liu 2006).

Discussion

This historical review demonstrates that the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s in the last three decades experienced gradual but remarkable pluralization on two major fronts (see Table 2). First, the meaning of McDonald’s evolved significantly over the years. When the brand first entered China, the country was a poor socialist economy struggling to meet the basic needs of its people and obviously had little demand for hamburgers that cost 12 yuan each. However, China was at a historical moment of reorientation and re-imagination. In this context, the Golden Arches were initially embraced by the Chinese as a beacon of both national and personal aspirations for material wealth. For a number of years, McDonald’s was consumed by Chinese elites as a monolithic sign of Western prosperity, modernity, science, and technology. Later on, as the Chinese became more affluent and moved on to new signs of status and prosperity, the brand image of McDonald’s suffered steady erosion. Most recently, as the Chinese increasingly connected themselves with the West, they also acquired the gaze and vocabulary of the global discourse on McDonald’s. As a result, McDonald’s became associated with a wide range of controversial issues, including obesity, food safety, labor rights, animal rights, GM foods, and the fate of small farms. In redefining the meaning of McDonald’s, the Chinese were also debating what constituted a good, happy life and what equitable and sustainable economic development should be about. Such debates in turn introduced more humanistic and pluralistic ideas into the discourse on McDonald’s.

Table 2.

Summary: the Chinese Discourse on McDonald’s and Its Political-Economic Context, 1978-2012.

Period	1978-1991			1992-2000
Political Context	Liberalization in the field of science & technology; The Western model of development appealing to intellectuals; More exposure to foreign media content; Entrenchment of political conservatism at the end of the period;			Intensifying social problems and erosion of social safety nets; New class configurations with beneficiaries of economic reforms emerging at the top; China’s bad experience in international affairs; Surging nationalism and political conservatism; The state’s retreat from the cultural realm; Media commercialization and pluralization;
Economic Context	Economic reorientation; Policy shift from austerity to consumption; Low incomes and food rationing; Underdeveloped local catering industry;			Comprehensive economic reforms to establish a market economy; Rising incomes, market competition, and consumer choices; A fast-growing catering industry and rapid expansion of foreign fast foods in China;
Agents	Marketers	Government	Intellectuals	Marketers	Government	Intellectuals	Consumers
Meaning of McDonald’s	Sign of prosperity, science & technology	Sign of good policies & rising living standards	Sign of scientific management & modernity	Modernity, youth, & fun; healthy food;	Product of good policy; good for China; a model of standardized, scientific management	A management model for local brands to copy; junk food to be resisted	Early: a marker of social status & pride; Later: a cheap, modern place for the young
Period	2001-2012
Political Context	Escalating social problems and tensions; questioning of the Western model of growth; Widening access of the Internet; intense media competition; Budding influence of local and global NGOs; Rise of consumerism and environmentalism; popular nationalism; food safety scares;
Economic Context	WTO membership and fast economic growth; an expanding middle class; Intense competition in the catering industry;
	Marketers
Agents	McDonald’s	Local	Government	Mass Media	Intellectuals	NGOs	Consumers
Meaning of McDonald’s	Cheap, convenient, nutritious food;	Opposite of green and healthy food;	Opposite to Chinese cuisine; harmful food for the poor;	Unsafe food full of harmful chemicals; violator of laws;	Standardization; good branding; a modern, leisure culture; not as tasty as Chinese food; junk food;	Bad for the environment; Undesirable part of a modern lifestyle;	Nice toys; convenient, safe and good food; unhealthy food for the poor; symbol of imperialism & what’s wrong with science & modernity; sign of a money worshipping culture & a corrupt government; to be resisted.

Agents who participated in the discourse also experienced considerable diversification. Between 1978 and 1991, the Chinese government was the primary agent and initiator of the discourse. The American brand happily rode the tide through its self-promotion, and Chinese intellectuals with information about the West and some English skills functioned as collaborators of the government. Most ordinary Chinese at the time did not participate either as consumers or as citizens. The same can be said about the period between 1992 and 2000, where the overall power relations among the various agents did not change much, even though Chinese intellectuals—less obliged to follow the party line—started to embrace more diverse and critical viewpoints. In contrast, the period between 2001 and 2012 witnessed an expanding rank of agents that participated in the discourse as well as new alignments of power relations among them. Notably still an active contributor through policy-making, the Chinese government frequently assumed a defensive position for its perceived reluctance to regulate foreign fast food. On their part, Chinese intellectuals, while lending their support to government policies and domestic brands, also exerted strong pressure on the government and McDonald’s to reform. Thanks to the revolutionary power of the Internet, the Chinese mass media and ordinary Chinese emerged as major forces that reshaped the discourse. Local brands and NGOs also pitched in according to their own agendas. In this context, McDonald’s became one of many voices in defining the meaning of its own brand in China.

The evolution of the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s closely reflected, and was a direct product of, the increasingly pluralistic nature of Chinese society. On the economic front, China had progressed from an economy of central planning and material shortage to a relatively free market economy of intense competition, which provided consumers with endless options when it came to catering services. On the political front, loosened government control, the commercialization of the Chinese media, the spread of the Internet, and the pluralization of Chinese society all helped create a quasi public space during the last period where ordinary Chinese could participate in defining the meaning of McDonald’s. Moreover, as the country became more open to the outside world, political forces underpinning the global anti-McDonald’s movement also entered China and exerted their influence on the local discourse.

At this writing, China remains an authoritarian state where the government exercises enormous power in both the economic and political arenas. The regime had played a major role in the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s in the past, and it is reasonable to expect that it will continue to exercise its influences, especially given prevalent food safety concerns and obesity worries. It is equally important to remember that the regime allows ordinary Chinese more freedom as consumers than as citizens (Gerth 2010). In other words, discourses on consumption issues can easily become politicized and serve as venues for political discourses. Finally, as class stratification continues to escalate in China (Zhao 2008), class consciousness, which was already manifested in the recent discourse on McDonald’s, is likely to assume a more prominent role in the future development of the discourse. With all these factors considered, the meaning of McDonald’s in China is still far from being settled.

Conclusion

In tracing the development of the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s over three decades, this article contributes to macromarketing literature on four fronts. First, it reconfirms the historical nature of brand meaning. Echoing the Chinese story, the meaning of McDonald’s has experienced historical changes—from a magical sign of modernity to a target of social criticism—in different societies, including the U.S. (Kincheloe 2002), Japan, and Hong Kong (Watson 2006). It appears that economic development has the effect of shifting the target market of McDonald’s downward from the affluent to the middle-class and poor, depriving the brand of its aspirational component. Without a historical perspective, it would be difficult to capture this dynamic nature of brand meaning.

Second, this study highlights the socially constructed nature of brand meaning. As some scholars point out, the meaning of brands is not solely controlled by corporations, but subject to contestations among an array of agents with their own vested interests and ever-shifting alignments (Miller 1998; Foster 2008). As the Chinese case reveals, pluralization in agents inevitably leads to pluralization in a brand’s meaning. On the other hand, social discourses aim to construct social consensus (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). Thus, the key ideas underlying the Chinese discourse on McDonald’s had shifted from the idea of “modernity, science, and technology” in the 1980s to the idea of “green and healthy” during the period of 2001-2012. Such a shift reflects the changing preoccupation of Chinese society over the years.

Third, McDonald’s experience in China also demonstrates that the agents of brand meaning do not operate in a vacuum but are restrained by the larger political-economic structure. This is especially true in the case of Chinese consumers. History suggests that other agents heavily mediated their relationship with McDonald’s, thus keeping them the subject of the system (Murray 2002). Yet, with the help of the Internet, they have assumed an active role in negotiating the meaning of McDonald’s and in turn put pressure on the system. This balanced and nuanced understanding of consumer agency can help us avoid blind pessimism resulted from a fixation on the structural imperative (e.g., Ritzer 2004) or naïve optimism deprived from an idolization of creative agency (e.g., Watson 2006).

Fourth, the findings of this article testify to the dialectic relationship between globalization and anti-globalization movements. Globalization, in promoting homogenizing trends of economic development, technological proliferation, and consumerism, also contains built-in mechanisms to spawn simultaneous resistance. The Chinese experience suggests that afflu-ence, pluralism, and participation in globalization accelerate the engine of resistance and thus may be the best remedy for the negative effects of globalization.

It is likely that McDonald’s will continue to enjoy nice profits in the Chinese market due to the country’s large population and the brand’s aggressive marketing efforts. However, the days when the Golden Arches enjoyed uncontested praises and admirations are long gone. Rather, as Chinese society increasingly embraces pluralism, the brand’s meaning will continue to be burdened with fragmentation and controversies. Indeed, it has become what Miller (1998) calls a meta-symbol in China—as well as in the rest of the world—which finds itself in a dangerous zone where local people can ascribe to it anything they would like.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This project was made possible by a summer research fellowship from Rider University in 2012. The author thanks the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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