A Consumer Vulnerability Perspective on State-Sponsored Propaganda

Abstract

As technology and interconnectivity increase globally, the opportunity to wage irregular warfare (competition) has become low-cost-low-risk, simple to wage, challenging to detect, and more difficult to deter and defend. Propaganda is the most common method of covert or overt influence operations used by state actors today and often employs the same technologies, channels, and market communication techniques that firms use in more benign pursuits. We propose a framework based on Consumer Vulnerability Theory to explain the effects of state-sponsored propaganda on citizens’ propensity to become vulnerable consumers by manipulating beliefs about the availability and control of government-provided resources. Vulnerability leads citizens to employ coping strategies that help achieve the propagandist’s goals. This perspective may inform policy and public education campaigns to deter and attenuate the harmful effects of state-sponsored propaganda on citizens. Research on moderators and mediators that reduce influence now become more salient.

Keywords

consumer vulnerability propaganda irregular warfare fake news transnational competition public policy

At the dawn of the Age of Artificial Intelligence in January 2024, global leaders convening in Davos, Switzerland for the World Economic Forum (WEF) voted the top global risk in the next two years to be “misinformation and disinformation” (World Economic Forum, 2024). The sudden concern about misinformation and disinformation among business, NGO, and government leaders attending the WEF results from the realization that bad actors could flood global information systems with false narratives—particularly during election years. (Three billion persons in the world will cast votes in 2024 and 2025 in countries such as the United States, India, and the United Kingdom.) Ominously, civil unrest resulting from electorates agitated by misinformation and disinformation could trigger government responses in the form of government censorship, controls on the free flow of information, and propaganda targeted at a country's citizens.

Democracies and totalitarian governments around the world continue to seek status and advantage on the world's stage. Armed conflict is often an effective method for one country to impose its will on another. However, the costs of armed conflict can be high in terms of “blood and treasure” for the invaded country but can also be extremely costly for the aggressor. For example, a US intelligence report declassified in December 2023 estimated that Russia's dead and wounded in the Ukraine invasion have totaled 315,000 (Landay 2023). This is on top of hundreds of billions of financial expenditures (Jenkins 2023; Staten 2022). Compared with the low-cost alternative using propaganda in asymmetrical warfare using the internet, this cost differential highlights the more favorable potential for deploying state-sponsored propaganda to achieve advantage over rivals.

What should be most concerning for our profession is that the knowledge and tools developed for marketing beneficial products or services can be coopted and directly applied to benefit malevolent actors with few adjustments. For example, the Russia-hosted Winter Olympics in 2014 held closing ceremonies February 23rd winning applause from countries around the world. The Sochi Winter Olympics served as a branding boost for Russia in its public relations effort among the world's countries. However, four days later, unmarked Russian forces purporting to be “armed pro-Russian individuals” invaded Crimea (Simpson 2014). At the time, Russia asserted that the “little green men” in Crimea were not Russian soldiers using a barrage of misinformation and disinformation.

Russia's smooth takeover of Crimea set the stage for its difficult and painful invasion of the rest of Ukraine eight years later in February 2022 (BBC 2023). However, Russia's Sputnik and Russia Today “media outlets” under the control of the Russian Federation served as sources of state-sponsored propaganda in the years before the invasion of Ukraine commenced. After the invasion, the Council of the European Union forbade the operation of these two Russia propaganda outlets in the EU with the following statement:

Sputnik and Russia Today (“media outlets”) are under permanent direct or indirect control of the authorities of the Russian Federation and are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the military aggression against Ukraine and for the destabilization of its neighboring countries…. Systematic information manipulation and disinformation by the Kremlin is applied as an operational tool in its assault on Ukraine. It is also a significant and direct threat to the Union's public order and security. Today, we are taking an important step against Putin's manipulation operation and turning off the tap for Russian state-controlled media in the EU. (Council of Europe 2022, p. 1)

Until the EU imposed these sanctions in response to the Russian war in Ukraine, these Russian outlets (and others) had been allowed to operate unfettered and uncensored disinformation and propaganda campaigns from inside the European Union against EU citizens. Numerous other examples exist in other Western Democracies, including the United States. This example is either an interesting commentary on how the West perceives the threat propaganda poses or its juxtaposition to censorship—the threat is significant. Still, it is allowed to occur in the absence of armed conflict.

One definition of consumer vulnerability is “a state of powerlessness arising from an imbalance in marketplace interactions or the consumption of marketing messages and products. It occurs when control is not in an individual's hands…” (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005). According to this definition, citizens of a target nation can be vulnerable based on marketing messages (propaganda) formulated to instill a feeling of powerlessness in the consumption of one or more government-provided resources they use. Similarly, from the numerous definitions of propaganda, we select “ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause” (Merriam-Webster 2023a) to represent it for this discussion.

The purpose of this research is to propose a framework to explain the effects of state-sponsored propaganda on citizens’ propensity to become vulnerable consumers by manipulating the citizen's beliefs of limited resource control and limited resource scarcity. This induced consumer vulnerability leads citizens to employ coping strategies predicted by consumer vulnerability theory, which can achieve the propagandist’s goals. Knowledge of this process can then inform policy decisions to minimize the impact of propaganda.

Consumer vulnerability theory suggests that limited access and control of government-provided resources lead to vulnerability and specified coping strategies. This perspective can provide policymakers and citizens insights into the process and suggest possible mitigation strategies. With these challenges in mind, we employ the consumer vulnerability framework proposed by (Hill and Sharma 2020) to understand better how state-run propaganda campaigns use market segmentation, messages and determine channels to influence individuals in democratic countries. As consumers (citizens) experience consumer vulnerability, they employ one of the five coping strategies identified by the framework. Policymakers can use this information to predict citizen reactions and target segments to better educate consumers, nudge consumers toward more productive coping strategies, and better regulate communication channels.

Six parts comprise this article, as follows: (1) a discussion of state conflict today, (2) an explanation of consumer vulnerability and how citizens of democracies may fit the framework; (3) a definition of propaganda and its delivery and modern-day use targeting vulnerable market segments using propaganda, (4) manipulating coping strategies of vulnerable consumers and potential pathways for education and regulation to mitigate these harmful effects; (5) an exploration of the current state of conflict-short-of-war in terms of the players and their publicly stated strategies and intentions through the lens of consumer vulnerability, and (6) implications for marketers and policymakers.

We Aren’t At War … Are We?

Most Western democracies are not at war (with the notable exception of the Israel-Hamas war declared in 2023). That does not mean attacks are not occurring. The US Constitution grants Congress the sole power to declare war and has done so 11 times in history. The last declaration was World War II. Congress and the President also have the power to authorize military force with specific limitations and have done so numerous times (USSenate.gov 2023). Other democracies have similar processes where the power to declare war resides with the president, prime minister, and government assemblies. For this research, countries are at war when the Geneva Conventions apply. “(Geneva) conventions apply to all cases of armed conflict between one or more signatory nations and one or more other nations,” even when war is not officially declared (Jurkowski and Blokhina 2019).

The critical portion of the definition is armed conflict. This definition is significant to this discussion, which focuses on individual countries as the unit of analysis. While some aspects of the proposed framework may apply or be adaptable to internal propaganda on a country's citizens, it is not the focus. More specifically, the unit of analysis is large countries with similar populations and economic and military power. Interactions between authoritarian or totalitarian regimes and Western democratic nations provide the context for the study.

As discussed in the introduction, the cost of war is significant, with each side doing its best to make it too costly for the other. Most countries prefer to respond proportionately to an attack while attempting to de-escalate diplomatically. These realities relegate states to conflict-short-of-war activities that are calculated not to trigger an armed conflict or war.

Simmering hostilities remain. The disagreements between countries developed over time and will take some time to resolve. The philosophical argument between democratic and socialistic states existed before World War II. While it may have reached an inflection point at the end of the US–USSR Cold War, disagreements persist between large communist countries (Russia and China) and Western democracies.

In addition to the Russian Federation being in a proxy war with NATO in Ukraine, it also actively works against NATO by detaining high-visibility citizens of the United States and other countries and is complacent, unwilling, or unable to hinder Russian-based hacker groups from attacking the United States and its allies (Jamieson 2019). China often uses technology to gain an advantage over the West through corporate espionage and, most recently and visibly, TikTok. The United States asserts that TikTok's parent company maintains close ties to the Chinese government, providing access to US citizens and managing content (Fung 2023).

When democratic states declare war, additional powers are granted to the government to engage the industrial complex, utilize the military and clandestine resources, and act decisively. When not at war, they refrain from using these powers and actions. Additionally, democracies tend to hold free speech in high regard. Authoritarian or totalitarian states do not have the same restraints. Because of this, authoritarian regimes can engage in higher-order non-combat (conflict-short-of-war) overt and covert attacks against democracies and expect less than proportional retaliation, if any.

These expectations frame the current boundary conditions for interactions between competing nation-states: (1) nations must avoid armed conflict because it is too costly for either side; (2) democracies and authoritarian peer states have historical fundamental disagreements that persist; (3) authoritarian states are not restrained from utilizing attacks up to but not including armed conflict where democracies are restrained; (4) authoritarian countries already have systems in place to control the flow of information, while the West avoids censorship; (5) countries seek to establish advantages over one another, and (6) authoritarian states can expect less than proportional retaliation if anything.

Whether using game theory, utility theory, or heuristics, one can surmise that the authoritarian regimes will attack with the most provocative conflict-short-of-war operations to further their goals and future advantage. Additionally, they can expect very little in response from democracies, but already have established anti-information defenses should retaliation occur.

Propaganda is one significant tactic used against democracies and is the primary focus of this discussion. Deceptive use of propaganda can render citizens of democracies vulnerable consumers.

Consumer Vulnerability

In broad terms, consumer vulnerability theory considers the relative disadvantages among subpopulations and varied marketer manipulations that affect consumer decision-making. Some of its earliest incarnations focus on the Southern United States and the adverse effects of racism in the US South's marketplace (Sexton 1971). Early definitions of consumer vulnerability focused on who experiences it rather than what it is. On the surface, it may be difficult to imagine how Sexton's Research and propaganda targeting citizens of democracies intersect. However, there is a compelling argument to be made that these citizens meet the definition's attributes.

Most consumer vulnerability research in Marketing can trace its roots to the seminal work of Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg, and its associated definition:

Consumer vulnerability is a state of powerlessness that arises from an imbalance in marketplace interactions or from the consumption of marketing messages and products. It occurs when control is not in an individual's hands, creating a dependence on external factors (e.g., marketers) to create fairness in the marketplace. The actual vulnerability arises from the interaction of individual states, individual characteristics, and external conditions within a context where consumption goals may be hindered, and the experience affects personal and social perceptions of self. (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005, p. 134)

Since then, Hill and Sharma (2020) have identified at least 30 nuanced definitions of the term, which influenced their definition as published in the Journal of Consumer Psychology:

Consumer Vulnerability is a state in which consumers are subject to harm because their access to and control over resources is restricted in ways that significantly inhibit their ability to function in the marketplace. (Hill and Sharma 2020, p. 554)

We parse these two leading definitions to evaluate and determine whether propaganda use can increase consumer vulnerability for citizens of targeted countries (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Comparison of Baker, Gentry, and Rittenberg and Hill and Sharma Definitions of Consumer Vulnerability.

	Consumer vulnerability definitions by
	Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg (2005)	Hill and Sharma (2020)
State	A state of powerlessness	A state of being
Antecedents of Consumer Vulnerability	(1) An imbalance of marketplace interactions or marketing messages and products(2) The interaction of individual states, characteristics, and external conditions	Created by limited access to, and/or lack of control, over resources
Cause	Consumption goals are hindered	Inhibition of consumers’ ability to function
Effects	Personal experiences and perceptions of self are affected	Consumer is subject to harm

Unit of Analysis and Segments

Both definitions agree that the unit of analysis is the individual. Also, it is possible to identify market segments to group these individuals based on similar traits and attributes. These traits are not necessarily physically observable, per se, but can be potential signals or indicators of antecedents. For example, elderly consumers are not vulnerable due to their advanced age. However, their age may signal a higher propensity to have an attribute that makes them more susceptible to influence (Berg 2015). We should avoid stereotypes, as in this case, some elderly may be subject to consumer vulnerability due to cognitive decline, physical limitations, and other issues, while others may not have these conditions and not exhibit vulnerability (Hill and Sharma 2020). The ethics of using market segmentation to target disadvantaged consumers with harmful products is discussed by (Rittenburg and Parthasarathy 1997). It is exactly the methodology that state propagandists use today.

Perception or Reality?

Baker, Gentry, and Rittenberg, and Hill and Sharma agree that consumer vulnerability is a consumer's state at a particular time. However, Baker, Gentry, and Rittenberg classify it as a state of powerlessness. A state is “the combination of circumstances or attributes belonging at a particular time to a person or thing”; it is not a permanent attribute, and therefore, the state of an individual is transient (Oxford English Dictionary 2023). Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg leave the definition of powerlessness to the vernacular, suggesting that being powerless may be perceived or actual. In any event, both definitions agree that individuals may move in and out of a state of consumer vulnerability.

The definition's wording leads to the critical question: is it necessary and sufficient for powerlessness or a lack of control of resources to exist in reality, or is an individual's belief that they are powerless adequate? Some discuss powerlessness as an aversive state relative to feeling neutral or powerful (Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003), while others reference powerless in terms of less actual access to or control of physical (material wealth) and social rewards (Fiske and Berdahl 2007; Rucker and Galinsky 2008).

One can easily envision a situation where the mere perception of a lack of control could negatively affect the consumer's choices. Suppose an individual is of a class that is discriminated against in society. In that case, they may be prone to adjust their purchasing behavior in favor of a business known not to discriminate or forgo the product entirely. For instance, an individual who has experienced discrimination in their life in the past may have the perception of powerlessness and a lack of control in this context and be less likely to apply to an institution of higher learning (Gallup 2023). The alternative would require the individual to apply to the program, enroll, and then experience rejection and powerlessness to be considered vulnerable, whether or not the intent of the business is to discriminate.

Interestingly, in this higher education example, students indicated they were less likely to apply because of their prior experiences and beliefs. For those who applied and were accepted, 14% of black respondents reported feeling discriminated against at least occasionally. Here, both belief and reality cause consumer vulnerability.

The aphorism “Perception is Reality” may capture the sentiment of the situation, but it cannot be true since reality is “The quality or state of being real; something that is neither derivative nor dependent but exists necessarily” (Merriam-Webster 2023b). However, others argue that beliefs can create reality. If an individual has a prior belief of what will occur in a given situation, they may alter their behavior, producing a “self-fulfilling” prophesy (Snyder 1984). Similarly, postmodern view of hyperreality suggest that humans “construct their own realities” (Berthon and Pitt 2018; Venkatesh 1999).

Also, according to Norms Theory, individuals may have assembled a set of normal exemplars of similar situations and make decisions about probable outcomes based on that set (Kahneman and Miller 1986). These norms may also reference an individual's beliefs to make decisions that create the same limited resource and powerlessness end-state. We do not suggest that the individual's beliefs create discrimination or that their restricted consumption is somehow their fault. However, if consumers believe they will be discriminated against, they may alter their actions, resulting in reduced consumption, as if they had attempted to acquire but were denied service.

This higher education example provides anecdotal evidence that consumers’ beliefs can negatively affect their consumption patterns, regardless of reality. Because of this, consumer vulnerability may exist when either actual or perceived limited control of resources or powerlessness occurs. In this way, whether an individual experiences or believes the restrictions exist, they meet the Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg, and Hill and Sharma definitions’ requirements for consumer vulnerability. So, suppose propaganda can create a belief in the citizens’ minds that they are powerless or cannot control some resources provided by the government or society. In that case, citizens may be classified as vulnerable consumers.

Antecedents of Consumer Vulnerability

Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg identify two general cases where consumer vulnerability may be more likely: (1) when market distortions or misleading marketing messages exist or (2) when an individual consumer's state and characteristics interact with external conditions to reduce control by the consumer. These two categories may be an attempt to unify the two primary pathways of consumer vulnerability research at the time. In the first condition, consumer vulnerability is attributable to the receipt of marketing messages or marketplace interactions. The second condition in the Hill and Sharma definition indicates an interaction between the consumer's attributes and external market forces that can cause consumer vulnerability.

In terms of (1), it can refer to consumers who may be influenced by marketing manipulations or scams, particularly those of disadvantaged populations or consumers with a higher propensity to be affected by these messages. For example, individuals in this category may be inexperienced, with less education, a diminished ability to comprehend, or in a (emotional) state, such as those grieving or hoping for a miracle. These persuasion tactics are discussed in the context of target marketing specifically in (Smith and Cooper-Martin 1997) and are particularly applicable to citizens as vulnerable consumers.

Of note, the Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg definition in (1) explicitly identifies the ability of marketing messages to create consumer vulnerability. While the Hill and Sharma definition does provide for this direct classification, it does not exclude it. Therefore, propaganda communicated to citizens through marketing messages can create a belief of powerlessness and limited control of resources, increasing the probability of citizens having consumer vulnerability.

Regarding the Hill and Sharma definition, consumer vulnerability stems from limited resource access or control. As with the Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg antecedent alignment, citizens are potentially vulnerable when consumers are persuaded with propaganda to believe that their access to government and societal resources is limited.

Effects and Results of Consumer Vulnerability

The effects of the requisite conditions for consumer vulnerability are similar in both definitions. Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg indicate that consumer vulnerability hinders the consumer's ability to achieve their consumption goals. Hill and Sharma also suggest that consumption is affected but goes further and indicate that consumption is impacted to the point that it negatively influences their lives and harms the consumer. Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg's definition stops short of requiring harm and suggests that the consumer's experiences and perception of self are negatively affected.

For Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg, perceptions of self are negatively affected when consumption goals are hindered by marketing messages or market interactions between the individual, outside forces, and personal experiences. In Hill and Sharma's model, when external forces restrict a consumer's access and control, it leads to an inability to function in the marketplace, ultimately harming the consumer. We reconcile this by accepting that they are injured when experiences of self are affected. For this discussion, this is the minimum impact on a citizen and is the most likely type of harm.

When this harm occurs, according to the Hill and Sharma framework, individuals experiencing consumer vulnerability will utilize either nondefensive or defensive coping strategies. These will be expounded upon as they relate to citizens targeted by propaganda in the discussion section. A better understanding of how consumers cope with being vulnerable in this context may better inform policy decisions and help select potential defensive measures such as education.

A Clarification of the Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg Definition

Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg enumerate a list of what is not consumer vulnerability. These include unmet needs, protected consumer or consumer protection, discrimination or prejudice, stigmatization, and disadvantage or disadvantaged consumers (vulnerability occurs when barriers prohibit control, while the disadvantage is ascribed to different consumer groups) (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005). None of these exemptions apply in the context of citizens exposed to propaganda as vulnerable consumers.

Citizens as Vulnerable Consumers

It may be hard for some to envision categorizing many citizens of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and others as vulnerable consumers in this context. However, while citizens may all be Germans or Americans, marketers can parse them into tens of thousands of market segments. Each segment is describable, with higher propensities to accept marketing messages. One significant influence on Hill and Sharma's framework includes Brenkert's applied ethics perspective on consumer vulnerability requiring an individual to (1) be vulnerable to, (2) be a target of, (3) with respect to some harm, (4) in a specific context (Brenkert 1998). Meeting the Brenkert requirements can help establish some face validity regarding the potential for citizens of a country to be vulnerable consumers.

Both use the individual as the unit of analysis. Propagandists may aggregate individuals into market segments with others with similar attributes. Second, we assert that state actors target these market segments with psychologically tailored messaging to influence citizens’ perception of a lack of control over government and societal resources. Third, harm to the individual can manifest in many ways; it could be control of their government, that the country or government no longer aligns with the goals and morality of the citizens, or even that their government is against them and intends to take some of their rights away. Lastly, the context is the citizen–government relationship in their respective country. Brenkert's requirements are met and provide support for face validity that citizens can be vulnerable customers.

To satisfy the requirements of Hill and Sharma's consumer vulnerability framework, we must show that (1) individual consumers or a market segment thereof are (2) limited in their access or control of government resources, (3) by an interaction between external forces, and consumer attributes, (4) to a level that inhibits their ability to function and (5) thus may cause harm.

First, we classify the citizens of a nation-state who may be targeted by propaganda in a Western democracy as the segment of individual consumers. This large segment can be divided into smaller ones using similar individual-specific attributes and states that may increase target marketing's effect. Some more granular segments may include individuals who monitor internet marketing channels, which may be exploited remotely by state actors in other countries. Entire classes of consumers can be categorized as vulnerable, however (Commuri and Ekici 2013) argue that vulnerability is transient. In the context of citizens and propaganda, the state of vulnerability may be initiated by the propaganda message. Citizens who vote can more directly influence their government's selection. However, voting is unnecessary. Just by being a part of the country, citizens can still affect the country by perpetuating and amplifying the propaganda or reacting in other ways detrimental to the nation.

Second, we identify the resources in question, how they may be restricted, and how citizens may be powerless in affecting their availability to obtain them. We place resources in the context of citizens and their consumption of government services. These resources are either provided or facilitated by their government and its entities. In terms of the Hill and Sharma framework, consumer resources are classified into three categories: (a) individual resources, (b) interpersonal resources, and (c) structural resources. In What Governments must do well, (Kirlin 1996) outlines the services governments must provide. We select the labels for the government-provided resources in column D, while the resource descriptions are a summary or paraphrased (Claridge 2018; Duignan 2016; Kirlin 1996; Rostow 2014; Seeman 1959, and Friedman 1955). We map these services into the three categories of resources above and summarize the classifications and descriptions in Table 2.

Table 2.

Mapping of Government-Provided Resources by Type.

	Description of resource category	Exemplar^a	Resource provided by government^b
Individual Resources	Self-related assets and capabilities of consumers such as money, native intelligence, and physical and mental health	Possessions	Value Protection—Protection of real and personal property, stable value of money. An ability to earn money.
		Physiological characteristics and abilities	Physical Services—such as water, power, etc. Protection from internal and external physical threats.
		Psychological Characteristics	Education and Knowledge—access to information, education, and knowledge creation and dissemination
Interpersonal Resources	Social factors such as social capital, belonging, and social support	Social Capital	Reputation and Representation—status within citizen peer group. Representation of their values by gov’t officials.
		Belonging	Belonging to the Collective— (country and group) of like-minded individuals. Creation of value for the collective
		Social Support	Collective Decisions—defining and protecting the character of the community
Structural Resources	Marketplace and environmental factors such as standard business practices, laws and enforcement, and marketspace configurations	Common business practices	Economic System—Regulatory system for property rights and business organization, consumer protection
		Laws and enforcement	Legal framework—to address disputes and enforce laws to protect the safety and property of individuals. Societal rules.
		Marketspace configurations	Constitutional Role—Institutional framework and arena to make collective decisions, determine who rules, and accountability of leaders

Columns A–C (left to right) are based on Hill and Sharma (2020).

Column D paraphrased government-provided services from Kirlin (1996).

The three primary individual resource categories are possessions, physiological characteristics and abilities, and psychological characteristics. Governments support these resources by protecting the value of possessions; providing physical services such as clean water, power, and protection from threats; and providing for the mental well-being of citizens by providing education and access to information.

Interpersonal resources include social capital, belonging, and social support. Governments facilitate social capital (as defined by Claridge 2018) by aligning government representation with citizen's values; facilitating a sense of belonging to society and the nation; and providing social support by facilitating collective decisions that protect the character of the community.

Structural resources can be thought of as societal frameworks. These include common business practices, laws and their enforcement, and marketspace configurations. The economic system the government maintains facilitates common business practices including property rights and consumer protections. Laws and their enforcement are facilitated by the government's establishment and enforcement of a legal system. Marketspace configurations in the citizen–government context are referred to as the “constitutional role” by (Kirlin 1996) and include the framework that supports collective decision making, an arena for discussion, and a system to determine who rules and how leaders are held accountable.

Returning to the five requirements for the Hill and Sharma consumer vulnerability framework, (3) an interaction exists between external forces and consumer attributes. In the context of government-provided resources and citizens, we assert that it is possible to identify citizens who have attributes and are in a state that promotes their acceptance of segment-tailored state-sponsored propaganda from authoritarian governments.

Fourth, resources are restricted to a level that inhibits the consumer's ability to function. As discussed, it is not necessary to limit or remove control of resources in reality. What is required is citizens’ belief that government-provided resources are limited and that they are powerless to attain them. Negative marketing messages in the form of propaganda can influence the citizen's beliefs as to whether these government-provided resources are limited and out of their control. The level of restriction required is idiosyncratic, but citizens may be similar enough to be categorized into a manageable number of segments.

Lastly, when citizens experience this perceived lack of control or powerlessness over government-provided resources, it can cause customer vulnerability. Both Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg and Hill and Sharma require harm to the consumer for consumer vulnerability to exist. In this context, the harm of consumer vulnerability can occur on a spectrum. At the low end of harm is a degraded perception of self by the citizen from the misalignment of their aspirational views as a citizen (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005) and reality. At the upper end of this harm continuum, it may lead to an avoidance of consumption based on their belief that the resource is restricted—why vote if voting does not matter; why respect the government and its agents if it is not doing its job, are potential examples. Appropriately crafted messaging of propaganda can potentially manipulate a citizen into using a coping strategy predicted by Hill and Sharma that may support an adversary's goals. We now discuss the framework in which propaganda may influence citizens.

A Framework of Citizens Targeted by Propaganda

To this point, we have provided support to the assertion that citizens as consumers can be considered vulnerable consumers in specific segments. We have also discussed how individual citizens can be classified into market segments with characteristics that may lead them to respond more favorably to particular propaganda messages. Lastly, the products and services that the government provides have been categorized into individual-, interpersonal-, and structural resources.

With these in mind, we propose a framework in alignment with Hill and Sharma's consumer vulnerability theory to explain how propaganda increases the propensity of citizens to become vulnerable consumers by leading them to believe that they have lost control of government-provided resources and that these resources are also scarce. Propaganda manipulates the citizen's beliefs about government-provided resources without generally affecting these resources in reality. The framework also identifies regulation and education to mitigate the effectiveness of propaganda. Inducing consumer vulnerability in citizens initiates the employment of coping mechanisms predicted by consumer vulnerability theory that further the propagandist's goals. Figure 1 represents the framework.

Figure 1.

Effects of propaganda on consumer vulnerability.

Referring to Figure 1, the consumer is the individual citizen (or market segment thereof). The availability of all three categories of government-provided resources to citizens and the power to attain and consume them negatively correlates to the propensity for consumer vulnerability. The more government resources the citizen has under her control, the less likely they will be vulnerable consumers. The arrow to the right indicates that consumer vulnerability exists as a continuum, and its existence is not discrete but a probability of occurrence.

Two primary moderators of the relationship between government-provided resources and consumer vulnerability exist. These are resource scarcity and resource control. Based on the prior discussions, it is sufficient for citizens to believe or perceive that a resource is scarce or not in their control. It is also sufficient but not necessary for an actual scarcity or control issue, nor is there a need for the citizens’ beliefs and reality to align.

As depicted, the moderator is above the relationship line in the figure. It represents a citizen's belief that they have the power to control the availability of government-provided resources, which decreases the likelihood of their consumer vulnerability. The model and figure state this regarding resource control instead of the lack of control for clarity and brevity. This terminology also allows for the figure to depict a decrease in the probability of consumer vulnerability downward (implying a reduction). Therefore, a citizen's belief that they have more control over these resources leads to decreased potential for consumer vulnerability. As stated in the terms we previously discussed, a lack of control of resources increases the probability of consumer vulnerability.

Perceived resource scarcity is the second moderator, depicted below the relationship line. It refers to a belief or fact that the resources the government provides are rare or unavailable. As in the original (Hill and Sharma 2020), an increase in resource scarcity increases the propensity for consumer vulnerability. There are numerous potential antecedents to perceived resource control and perceived resource scarcity; of particular interest is propaganda.

The red explosion shape in the model depicts a propaganda message. When a citizen receives propaganda, it can influence the resource–consumer vulnerability relationship in three ways. It can affect the moderating value of their beliefs in either (P1) scarcity or (P2) control of resources. It can also directly reduce the availability of interpersonal resources, effectively mediating the relationship between interpersonal skills and the propensity for consumer vulnerability by acting as a gatekeeper and reducing the positive effect of having the affected resources (P3). The red arrows extending from propaganda depict these relationships. The specific resources and associated psychological mechanisms at work are left to future discussions.

Generally speaking, in terms of the model, we propose that appropriately crafted propaganda (marketing messages) can increase the propensity for consumer vulnerability and initiate coping mechanisms that can benefit the state actor and be detrimental to the citizen and their nation. We discuss these defensive and nondefensive coping mechanisms identified by the (Hill and Sharma 2020) framework in detail in the discussion section in the context of nudging citizens to more productive choices. Until now, we have discussed propaganda in general terms; we now discuss specifics.

Irregular Warfare or Irregular Competition

When conflict occurs between nation-states with drastically different capabilities, it is often beneficial for the underdog to avoid direct conflict in venues where a competing nation outmatches them. We expect efforts to focus on attacks with a higher probability of success or where they anticipate fewer or less damaging casualties. One of Sun Tsu's maxims from The Art of War is summarized in these terms: “Defeat is the invariable outcome where native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on the latter's terms” (Mack 1975). This is the motivation behind irregular warfare.

Recall for this discussion; we have defined war as armed conflict between two nation-states in which the terms of the Geneva Convention apply and that authoritarian regimes will avoid armed conflict to further their goals and have incentives to attack with the most provocative conflict-short-of-war operations against democracies. Irregular and asymmetric warfare are both defined by the US Department of Defense as a “violent struggle … for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” but against different types of combatants (Lumbaca 2022; Ucko and Marks 2022) where “violent” would suggest armed conflict and would be beyond the scope of conflict-short-of-war. While conventional warfare focuses attacks on military units, irregular warfare focuses on the population (irregularwarrior.com 2015). Irregular competition is the non-violent subset actively used today (Ucko and Marks 2022).

It is suggested by (Mack 1975) and others that it is not a foregone conclusion that the country with the more dominant military and industrial complex will prevail in a conflict. The smaller nation may be victorious if it successfully degrades the political will of the larger nation. In fact, the smaller nation has prevailed in about 30% of these conflicts (Arreguin-Toft 2005). Because of this, propaganda plays a significant role in irregular competition operations.

Military war planning is generally discussed in six phases (zero through five); (0) shaping, (1) deter, (2) seize the initiative, (3) dominate, (4) stabilize, and (5) enable civil authority. Phase zero operations are non-kinetic (without armed conflict) and referred to as shaping. Shaping includes strategically positioning material, materiel, and personnel and provides for actions to create an advantage should an armed conflict erupt. Either irregular competition or phase zero operations define authoritarian states’ current use of propaganda today.

Propaganda

In the minds of the Silent Generation, the word propaganda might recall the dropping of pamphlets from airplanes behind enemy lines in World War II. Baby Boomers may remember Radio Free America in the Cold War era. During the World War II era, propaganda did not take full advantage of marketing knowledge and therefore did not maximize its effect (Clampin 2009). Today's generation may not have any association or experiences with the word. However, this generation may be advised to associate fake news, some social media feeds, and the like as the propaganda tools of today, hidden among the positive, innovative power of the internet.

Recall that for this research, propaganda is “ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause” (Merriam-Webster 2023a); we take this definition specifically when used by or at the behest of state entities. Propaganda can be as simple as a single message or as complex as a marketing campaign for a large corporation. State actors can use both true and false information. And it can be propagated covertly or overtly.

Information can be classified as accurate or false/misleading and disseminated with either no malicious intent or ulterior motives in two dimensions. Propaganda can then be based on a subset of combinations of information and intent. In this context, there are four types of information: (1) knowledge, (2) misinformation, (3) disinformation, and (4) malinformation. Knowledge is accurate information spread with no malicious intent. Misinformation is false information, but the one disseminating it believes it to be true. Disinformation is incorrect information the person distributing it knows is wrong, such as a deliberate lie. Malinformation is information based partly on reality but used to inflict harm (mediadefense.org 2022). These are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3.

Information Disorder Classification.

One may expect propaganda to be based only on false information spread with an ulterior motive (quadrant IV). While it is a large subset of propaganda, it is not the only case. Information from all four quadrants can be the basis for propaganda. Even accurate information or knowledge (quadrant I) initially provided with no malicious intent can be the basis for a propaganda campaign; a news story, for instance, perhaps as innocuous as “inflation nominally increased last quarter.” The propaganda message can cite this information from a reputable source and use it to bolster their argument and support their goals. In this example, the propagandist may argue that inflation is out of control and a sign that capitalism does not work.

Propaganda is the most common method of covert and sometimes overt influence operations used by state actors in conflict-other-than-war operations today. “Propaganda, misinformation and fake news have the potential to polarize public opinion, to promote violent extremism and hate speech and, ultimately, to undermine democracies and reduce trust in the democratic process” (Council of Europe 2018).

Fake news is ubiquitous today, particularly online and in social media. Fake news can be defined as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (Pennycook and Rand 2021), which can be either misinformation or disinformation (quadrants III and IV). The effects of fake news are evident in the context of marketing and brands (Peterson 2020), but it is just as effective when used as propaganda. Fake news can be highly effective in furthering state actors’ goals, whether initially generated by state actors or merely referenced in their propaganda campaigns. For this discussion, fake news can be considered propaganda in this context when a state actor uses it to deliver or bolster its claims or effect.

The delivery channels for propaganda have changed dramatically this century. The internet provides access to millions of individuals to send messages and interact with two-way communication. We now focus on how most propaganda messages are delivered today.

Channels of Propaganda Delivery

In the past, propaganda delivery progressed from written leaflets handed out, shot from a cannon, and then dropped from airplanes. Since then, propaganda has been delivered via radio, television, and now, using the Internet (Jowett and O’Donnell 2019). It is argued by (Lock and Ludolph 2020) that today's propaganda is drastically different from the past and classical propaganda. Previously, physical distribution separated the propagandist and their audience, and communication was one-way. Today, the internet allows propagandists two-way communication, subscriptions, feeds, and an ability to tailor their messaging to their target audience, modify, and reinforce their messages by layering additional informational sources to support their position. This two-way communication also makes it difficult to detect since it may be a private conversation and not broadcast to everyone, as in radio.

Today, the most effective and cost-efficient method of delivering marketing messages is through the internet in all its incarnations. It can be provided through social media, news feeds, websites, spam, and SEO advertising, to name a few. As technology and interconnectivity increase globally, the internet provides a forum for anyone with a computer and connection to reach a large international audience at a meager cost (Goel 2011). Long gone are the days of establishing an operation inside the target country to print and distribute propaganda flyers; one only needs an internet connection, a computer, and a few free social media accounts.

The use of propaganda in the twenty-first century is more prevalent and sophisticated than ever. Firms often use the same technologies, channels, and market communication techniques in more benign pursuits. This imposes a critical duty to the marketing profession to not only further the knowledge of influence but also to understand the methods of protecting consumers from the influence of bad actors, particularly in the context of state-sponsored propaganda.

Discussion

It could be argued that propaganda is simply marketing where the value is for the propagandist at the consumer's detriment. State actors can easily apply the tools, theories, and communication channels for marketing activities to propaganda. As marketers, whenever a discovery facilitates exchange or strengthens influence, it also allows bad actors, such as propagandists, to coopt that knowledge. There are consequences of large marketing systems on large social issues (Fisk 1981; Wooliscroft 2021).

For instance, target marketing can be beneficial when adding value to the consumer–supplier relationship but detrimental when used against disadvantaged or vulnerable consumers (Ringold 1995). The processes employed to segment and target consumers with similar attributes are the same for beneficial transactions and predatory behavior.

Consumer vulnerability theory is no exception. While the theory helps macromarketers understand how a consumer enters a state of vulnerability and the associated negative consequences, bad actors can also use the framework to increase the propensity of consumers and, in this case, citizens, to be vulnerable and thereby elicit actions based on predicted coping strategies that are in alignment with the goals of the bad actor.

Defending Using Marketing Knowledge

Using the model of propaganda on consumer vulnerability from Figure 1, we superimpose two primary interventions: regulation and education. These interventions and proposed pathways are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Pathways to reduce the impact of propaganda on consumer vulnerability.

The green arrows extending from the potential defenses of regulation and education against propaganda in Figure 2 are not intended to suggest a moderating role between resources and respective scarcity and control. Instead, they are designed to depict a possible positive effect on the beliefs of resource scarcity and control in the minds of citizens and a potential to increase resources when employed adequately by defending nation-states.

In this model, defending nation-states may employ education campaigns and regulations to bolster government-sponsored resources and reduce propaganda's proliferation and effectiveness on citizens’ beliefs of resource control and scarcity. The specifics of education and regulation follow.

The Role of Regulation

Regulation need not be draconian. It does not require an all-or-nothing trade-off between free speech and protection from propaganda through censorship. Regulation can potentially reduce propaganda's effectiveness in two ways: by increasing the levels of structural and interpersonal resources available to citizens. Recall that structural resources include the government's constitutional role, economic system, and legal framework. Regulation may also influence the creation of additional interpersonal resources by strengthening social networks and creating connections to other perspectives and views. Second, by decreasing the quantity, visibility, and availability of propaganda to citizens by guiding them to identify propaganda and its proliferation, particularly for internet-based information sources.

Some research finds that an echo chamber effect amplifies the proliferation of false information and suppresses alternative views (Cinelli et al. 2021). New regulations may define the responsibilities of information sources to provide free access to accurate information and curb the proliferation of misinformation, perhaps by factoring in the source of information in the algorithms of social media feeds. This may translate into reducing the exposure to false information by managing its frequency and intensity (Van Der Linden 2022).

Freedom of speech is highly regarded. At the same time, censorship is strongly avoided in most Western democracies, to the point of protecting all speech, even if the information is known to be false. For example, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Stolen Valor Act (making it a crime to lie about US military service) was unconstitutional in US v. Alvarez. Alvarez made false statements in a public water board meeting, of which he was a member. He indicated that he was a veteran, awarded the Medal of Honor, and was wounded numerous times; none of this was true. The Supreme Court struck down the law, overturning his conviction (USCourts.gov 2012).

Similarly, in The New York Times v. Sulivan, the Supreme Court indicates that the government may not regulate false ideas, and even false factual statements receive some constitutional protection. However, specific situations remain by statute, including defamation, fraud, perjury or making false statements to government officials, and misrepresentations in political broadcasting or broadcast media. Supreme Court precedent has largely upheld regulations of false speech only if they fall within these limited categories of defamation or fraud (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2022). Hence, statutes like the Consumer Protection Act, which address fraudulent and misleading information in the marketplace, may apply.

Section 5 of the FTC Act (the Act) (15 USC § 41) is the United States’ primary federal statute addressing unfair and deceptive advertising and marketing claims. The Act empowers the FTC to prescribe rules, investigate claims, enjoin and fine violators, and provide recommendations to Congress in connection with its findings. The Act effectively supports truth-in-advertising by requiring all marketing claims to be truthful and evidence-based and not unfair and/or deceptive in any way. (Gardner and Gordon 2022)

Developing an argument to classify propaganda as marketing claims to citizen–consumers may become the basis for future regulation addressing malinformation.

The Role of Education

Education can be an effective intervention against propaganda by increasing interpersonal and individual resources and moderating the relationship between propaganda and citizens’ perceived levels of resource control and scarcity.

Increasing resources is the first potential benefit of education interventions (Vila 2000). Education can potentially raise the levels in two of the three resource categories: individual and interpersonal. Interpersonal resources of citizens can be increased by strengthening social networks between citizens, highlighting similarities, and providing some background on alternative perspectives that affect collective decisions, as examples, Similarly, education may increase individual resources by highlighting the current means of protecting individual value available to citizens and, as defined, increasing their education and knowledge.

The second pathway for education interventions is to moderate the effectiveness of propaganda on citizens’ beliefs on resource control and scarcity. Current literature has investigated three primary types of education interventions concerning misinformation: inoculation, education campaigns, and critical thinking skills.

Inoculation includes methods of providing information and facts to individuals before receiving misinformation (Maertens et al. 2021). They find that the long-term effectiveness of inoculation against misinformation decreases over time, and its efficacy is partly based on the level of trust in the initial information. This is equivalent to pre-message intervention.

Education campaigns have the potential to establish and alter beliefs by improving individuals’ judgments of accuracy (Kahne and Bowyer 2017). This may be the case concerning resource control and scarcity and is the basis for the proposition that tailored education may have a moderating role in the relationship between propaganda and perceived resource control and scarcity beliefs. Education may also provide knowledge to the citizen that challenges the voracity of “facts” provided by alternative sources (Lazer et al. 2018; Swire-Thompson and Lazer 2020). This can be fact-checking or providing perspective on claims made by propaganda and facilitating independent journalists’ abilities to investigate and deliver accurate information (Osborne and Pimentel 2022; West 2017).

Lastly, education also supports developing and using critical thinking skills by allowing citizens to reason through the information and motives behind propaganda messages. Critical thinking education may also be a means of increasing individual resources (Knapp 1991). Additionally, it supports citizens’ ability to seek additional information and sources to make better-informed decisions (Machete and Turpin 2020). Better decisions may reduce the ability of propaganda to influence beliefs regarding lack of control and resource restrictions.

Nudging to Effective Coping Strategies

Individuals experiencing consumer vulnerability employ coping mechanisms categorized as either nondefensive or defensive. According to the framework, they are intended to manage or cope with the effects of powerlessness or insufficient levels of resources (Hill and Sharma 2020). A better understanding of how citizens select from their coping strategy options may mitigate the adverse effects on individuals and society by educating them and providing nudges toward desired outcomes (Loewenstein and Chater 2017).

Nondefensive coping mechanisms are typified by giving up or accepting the restrictions on their consumption and not attempting to alter the situation. Giving in to the situation is similar, except these consumers accept the limits to consumption but actively look for ways to improve their consumption options.

Giving up or giving in are nondefensive coping mechanisms consumers may employ. Regarding the consumer vulnerability framework, those using a nondefensive strategy accept the propaganda message at face value and believe they no longer have control of a government-provided resource. The first option is to give up or to accept the situation and adapt to the new reality. “There is nothing I can do because the government has all the power.” Those adopting the second nondefensive coping mechanism of giving in accept the situation but actively seek alternatives. These alternatives may be in the form of engaging in smaller local government operations or, at the extreme, looking for other means to secure similar resources in different realms like state, regional, or local governments.

Defensive coping has three categories: (1) transcending, (2) rebelling, or (3) creating new structures. These coping strategies require the affected individual to act in some way rather than accepting the situation. The transcending coping strategy attempts to avoid restrictions and find other avenues for control. Rebelling seeks to disrupt, damage, or destroy those in control or coopt these resources for their use. While creating new structures involves establishing or exploiting other contexts to gain control over different resources.

Consumers who opt for a defensive coping mechanism will instigate some action to protect themselves from the negative consequences of having restricted or no power over government-provided resources. The first of the defensive coping mechanisms is transcendence. It describes an attempt to rise above the limitations or avoid their consequences. If citizens believe their views are not represented, yet the governmental system is still viable (their vote matters), they may seek alternative candidates that match their aspirational goals.

Rebellion is another defensive coping strategy. Actions in alignment with the rebellion coping strategy would most likely take the form of protesting at government functions or representative events or acquiring restricted resources through non-conventional means. While this strategy is termed rebellion, and rebellion against the government is an extreme subset, employing a rebellion strategy does not necessarily mean overthrowing the government. Still, these types of events have occurred in the United States in the Oklahoma City bombing of federal offices, for instance.

Lastly, the third defensive coping mechanism suggested by the consumer vulnerability framework is to create new structures. An example of a citizen creating new structures in the context of citizens and limited access to and control of government-provided resources might be making a power structure within one of their social groups to establish control of similar resources within the group. These may explain the rise of Q'Anon and other conspiracy groups.

Each of the five coping strategies has a continuum of potential detrimental effects and benefits to the citizen and their nation. Similarly, defensive and nondefensive coping strategies each have merits and issues. For example, if there is only a perception of powerlessness or limited government resources, nondefensive coping mechanisms may impact stakeholders the least. There is still harm in employing this coping strategy because the individual suffers from the misalignment of their aspirational and actual levels of these resources. Still, it is preferable to violent action against the government and fellow citizens. Therefore, if consumer vulnerability from propaganda is unavoidable, the next-best policy option may be to nudge citizens’ actions to more constructive coping ones.

A Shocking Example of Suspected Propaganda in Use

Take, for instance, a hypothetical propaganda campaign targeting interpersonal resources—specifically reputation and representation. Recall that government-provided resources include the citizens’ status concerning their peer group or government officials’ representation of their values. The campaign will be conducted online via social media. The message is far-fetched; there is a cabal of government leaders who wish to engage in and promote pedophilia in the country. The target market includes citizens who receive “news” from a small group of fringe online providers in social media outlets, believe in one or more conspiracy theories, and have an Internet search history that includes the word “QAnon.”

State-sponsored propagandists may craft messages and coopt facts to increase feelings of alienation from the main population. Applying the propaganda and consumer vulnerability model, the propaganda message may be intended to create a belief that individual safety resources for children are at risk of being limited and out of their control. The message can also appeal to reduced control of interpersonal resources, including reputation and representation, and belonging. Adding accurate information, such as voting records, while framing it negatively bolsters their claims.

For those consumers who experience consumer vulnerability from exposure to this malinformation from propaganda messages, the model would suggest they respond with one of five coping strategies: (1) give up, (2) give in, (3) transcend, (4) rebel, or (5) create new structures. Consumers can enact these coping mechanisms in innumerable ways, but one extreme example of rebelling is violent rebellion against the government. Recall that a defensive coping strategy includes acquiring restricted resources through non-conventional means, leading an individual to take the law into their own hands and attempt to violently retake control of the individual resources they believe are limited. This action could also lead to a cascade that influences other citizens’ beliefs of restricted government-provided resources.

This hypothetical is based on real-life events—Pizzagate. Edgar Welch selected the worst-case coping strategy and fired three shots into the restaurant during operating hours. He believed widespread Internet and social media information perpetuated just before the election that Hillary Clinton led a child sex-slave ring operating out of a popular Washington D.C. restaurant (Haag and Salam 2017).

Coincidentally, in the same year, James Hodgkinson fired more than 50 rounds from a 9 mm pistol wounding House of Representatives Republican Whip from Louisiana Steve Scalice and three others at a Congressional softball practice near Washington D.C. Hodgkinson died in the gun battle with Capitol Hill police that lasted 10 min. Investigators attributed Hodgkinson's violent outburst to his mental instability and his left-wing political views that became agitated by anti-Trump rhetoric in cable news media outlets he watched often (Wall Street Journal, 2017).

These examples illustrate how misinformation and malinformation can affect consumer vulnerability and that neither side is immune. If some of the information could be linked to state-sponsored propaganda, it could provide some evidence to support the model. However, aside from possible internal government investigations, there is no way of knowing whether any of the information that led Edgar Welch to believe that the US Government, media, and financial worlds “are controlled by a group of Satan-worshiping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation” (PRRI Staff 2001; Todd, Murray, and Dann 2021) was state-sponsored propaganda or facilitated by their internet “bots.” However, it is plausible, particularly since the outcomes align with the motives of some authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion

Some Western analysts suggest that the Primakov doctrine has guided the Russian Federation since 2014. The Primakov doctrine suggests engaging with Western democracies using proxies, disinformation, and measures short of war as a substitute for military power (Rumer 2019). The use of multiple disinformation campaigns (propaganda) intended to reduce the power of Western democracies. “Russia may not have hacked American voting machines, but by selectively amplifying targeted disinformation and misinformation … it arguably won a significant battle without most Americans realizing it ever took place…. Now, thanks to Russian actions—we are locked in a national argument over its [the US electoral system] legitimacy” (McKew 2017).

Propaganda by state-sponsored authoritarian regimes is being used as a weapon against Western democracies today, with insufficient defensive responses by democracies citing the protection of free speech. Using consumer vulnerability theory, we have proposed a framework to illustrate how propaganda can manipulate citizens’ beliefs of the control and restricted availability of government-provided resources to create a state of vulnerability in citizens and elicit specific coping strategies that further the goals of the propagandist. Perhaps framing propaganda mitigation in terms of consumer protections may provide a pathway to possible regulation of these messages.

The framework suggests that propaganda directly reduces the availability of interpersonal resources and negatively affects citizens’ beliefs regarding scarcity and the control of government-provided resources. These resources are grouped into three primary categories: (1) structural, (2) interpersonal, and (3) individual resources. Communicating tailored propaganda messages creates a belief that these government-provided resources are scarce and not controlled by the citizens, which leads to a state of consumer vulnerability that causes harm to the citizens and, thereby, their nation.

Additionally, the framework highlights two interventions to reduce the effects of propaganda: regulation and education. Regulation can directly decrease the quantity and visibility of propaganda messages and potentially increase structural and interpersonal resources. Education can improve interpersonal and individual resources and mediate the relationship between propaganda, perceived resource control, and resource availability.

Implications for Marketers

The most important takeaway for marketers here is a reminder that our research is not always used for good. The methods intended to persuade a consumer to buy a particular good or service with mutual benefit can be coopted by bad actors to harm consumers. The use of marketing knowledge to further controversial ends is well established (Blanchet and Depeyre 2016).

Propaganda has the potential to negatively influence citizens of democracies to believe untrue information and lead them to react using coping strategies that may be detrimental to individuals and societies. We have applied consumer vulnerability theory to state-sponsored propaganda on citizens. This model may help better understand the process in terms of beliefs of limited control or availability of government-provided resources leading to a state of consumer vulnerability and causing citizens to employ defensive and nondefensive coping strategies that can injure the nation and further the goals of external states.

Suppose one goal is to reduce the negative impact of state-sponsored propaganda on citizens and democracies. In that case, research in the field of marketing that identifies adverse effects on influence may be just as important as those that increase the influence of marketing messages. Research that has been heretofore unpublishable because it identified a negative effect on influence may be more critical in the context of propaganda and misinformation.

Implications for Policymakers

Using consumer vulnerability theory as a lens may provide insight into the potential pathways that propaganda and misinformation influence citizens’ beliefs about the availability and control of government-provided resources. This information can inform educational interventions.

Additionally, policymakers may be able to better identify target market segments in terms of structural, interpersonal, and individual resources to predict which marketing channels these citizens use and target specific regulations there to reduce echo chamber effects.

Most Western Democracies hold free speech in high regard. Most speech is protected through statute, regulation, and legal precedent, even defending against the spread of known false information. Currently, statute and regulatory protection against propagandists translates to a requirement to register (only if the entity is a known state-sponsored operation), being subject to potential monitoring, or, in many cases, no defensive actions occur. The example from the introduction highlights this issue: known state-controlled propaganda organizations like Russia Today and Sputnik operate unfettered in the open.

By acknowledging that propaganda is equivalent to marketing malevolent products in the context of the citizen–government dyad, perhaps the use of consumer protection statutes and regulations can be applied or used as an exemplar for future regulation to minimize the adverse effects of propaganda and misinformation on citizens.

As you may recall, in the 1930s, the infamous gangster Al Capone, allegedly tied to the St. Valentine's Day Massacre and one-time public enemy number one in the United States, was charged with thousands of violations of the National Prohibition Act (a.k.a. The Volstead Act). However, he was ultimately convicted, not of these charges, but on 22 charges stemming from tax evasion violations from his illegal income (FBI.gov 2023). Eliot Ness famously pursued a criminal investigation, while the efforts of George Johnson and Frank Wilson using tax law brought down Capone's criminal organization. Similarly, it may be possible to defend citizens from propaganda, fake news, and misinformation using consumer protection laws and regulations.

Policymakers might avoid defenses related to freedom of speech and the First Amendment by applying consumer protection laws (or crafting similar ones) to deter and criminalize propaganda otherwise protected by the First Amendment. A violation of the Lanham Act (U.S. House of Representatives 1995) for false advertising requires that the defendant made false or misleading statements about a product or service; an actual deception occurred, or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; the deception is material in that it is likely to influence (purchasing) decisions; the advertised goods travel in interstate commerce; and there was a likelihood of injury (Cornell Law School 2024).

Limitations

One significant limitation to further investigate a consumer vulnerability perspective on propaganda is the ability to determine conclusively whether marketing messages are attributable to nation-states (and, therefore, propaganda) in a particular context. In practice, definitively confirming the identities and motives of individuals and groups initiating messages online is challenging.

Another limitation is that actors may use mis- and malinformation for other motives. These may include economic motives, such as monetizing clicks and views on YouTube, or personal goals related to collecting likes and followers, as examples. They may also have bad intentions, such as manipulating markets or false advertising of products, none of which are related to state-sponsored propaganda. However, these do connect to the spread of misinformation.

Implementing interventions suggested by the consumer vulnerability framework and citizens may be difficult. Censorship aversion of Western democracies is a significant limitation to implementing appropriate policies and establishing public education programs that the proposed propaganda on consumer vulnerability framework may identify. However, the framework may provide evidence that there is harm to the citizen and that mitigating that harm is in the government's best interest.

As a conceptual framework, there is much to do to provide support for or disprove the propaganda on the consumer vulnerability framework proposed here. The propositions presented here and their effects require further research.

Future Research

There are numerous avenues for future research regarding the consumer vulnerability perspective on propaganda and its effects on citizens. We highlight a few regarding the framework, propaganda, and impending artificial intelligence (AI) impacts here. The most obvious potential future research is to test the validity of the proposed framework. Specifically, testing the propositions of whether propaganda's moderating role on (P1) scarcity or (P2) control of government-provided resources and if propaganda can also (P3) directly reduce interpersonal resources available to the citizen. What are the associated psychological mechanisms activated by propaganda to create the beliefs of scarcity and powerlessness?

In terms of the resources in the framework, how is each resource category affected by propaganda; is there a hierarchy of government-provided resources in terms of importance to a citizen? Do citizens react more intensely or destructively when specific resources are affected?

Assuming state-sponsored propaganda will not diminish, how can citizens be better equipped to identify propaganda? How can citizens be influenced to use appropriate coping strategies rather than more destructive ones? What are the methods to recognize and attribute propaganda to the originator to understand their loyalties and motives?

Propaganda can be used for purposes other than attacking and destabilizing another country. It could be used to influence a country's population to support or reject policies that would benefit the state sponsor of the propaganda. The framework could easily be applied to examine how opinion and action can influence issues like forced migration, sentiments about other countries, and support for one side in a war (Ukraine, for instance).

Lastly, as AI becomes more prevalent, will internet bots become more prolific, manipulative, influential, and less costly regarding propaganda use? How will deep fakes influence the believability of propaganda messaging?

In the internet era, state-sponsored propaganda has become a source of influence in societies worldwide. Before this, propaganda was mainly confined to inside a country's borders, where a government ruled and targeted its citizens. North Vietnamese patriotism posters during the Vietnam War (1955–1975) are a relevant example of this. These posters were intended to motivate citizens to support the war effort (Nguyen 2023). With the channel of the internet, governments can now direct their messaging in subtle but persistent ways to not only their citizens but also to the citizens of other countries half a world away. The destabilizing effects of such messaging are now being observed in societies worldwide—particularly in national election years for democracies. Regulation and education will be two responses of societies to this newly empowered threat. Innovations to provide defensive filters against state propaganda are needed now to reduce the threat posed by nefarious state propaganda intended to disrupt democracies in the future.

Footnotes

Associate Editor

M. Joseph Sirgy

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Shawn Enriques

Mark Peterson

Author Biographies

Shawn Enriques is a PhD candidate at the University of Wyoming. His diverse life experiences inform his research interests. Twenty-two years of sales management have informed his research on quantifying and applying gamification dimensions to Salesforce compensation. As the former owner and operator of a small restaurant, he is interested in using gamification to optimize consumer response to loyalty programs. His time as a naval officer feeds his desire to positively influence society through the profession of marketing by addressing state-sponsored propaganda.

Mark Peterson is a Professor of Marketing and Sustainable Business Practices at the University of Wyoming. He served as editor of the Journal of Macromarketing from 2016 to 2019. He is the author of Sustainable Marketing: A Holistic Approach published by SAGE Publications. He is a thought leader for how firms can integrate environmental and social concerns into their business decisions. Mark has lived and worked for more than seven years overseas in Germany, South Korea, Turkey, France, and Canada.

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