Beyond Hedging and Bandwagoning: Approaching Myanmar’s Engagement With External Powers Through the Lens of Diversification and Prudence (2016–2021)

Introduction

Recent studies on Myanmar’s foreign relations during its democratic transition (2011–2021) portray the country as a crucial geopolitical pivot in the US-China competition, due to its geographic proximity with China and the United States’ attempts to engage with, and promote democracy in, Myanmar. On that note, existing literature emphasizes Myanmar’s relations vis-à-vis two great powers during the period. A study by Fiori and Passeri (2015) argues that Myanmar under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government (2011–2016) adopted a hedging approach to strategically position itself between Washington and Beijing, thereby avoiding to choose one great power at the expense of the other. This assertion was echoed by Lim and Cooper (2015) and Goh (2016). By adopting a hedging strategy, Myanmar sought to decouple itself from China as the country under the previous military rule had no alternative but to closely engage with China due to sanctions (Roy, 2005), thereby being labelled as a China’s ‘client-state’ in journalistic accounts (Aung Zaw, 2011). ¹ The USDP government effectively seized the opportunity of the US rapprochement, which is a part of Washington’s wider ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, to foster cordial bilateral relations (Fiori & Passeri, 2015; Goh, 2016; Maung Aung Myoe, 2016). Such move implied Myanmar’s desire to reduce its political, economic and strategic overdependence on China inherited from the previous military junta (Sun, 2012a, 2012b). On the other hand, since the unexpected and unilateral suspension of the Myitsone Dam, China’s mega-dam infrastructure investment project, in September 2011, there was a noticeable decline in Myanmar-China relations. From the perspective of China, Myanmar’s growing positive engagement with the West was widely perceived as Myanmar pivoting away from its neighbour (Sun, 2012b).

While scholarly discussions suggested that Myanmar was hedging between the US and China during the USDP period, narratives shifted markedly when the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) came into power in 2016. Prevailing analyses contended that Myanmar became closer to China under the NLD government. While the NLD was initially expected that it would deepen its engagement with the US and the West while maintaining its non-aligned posture (Maung Aung Myoe, 2017), the Rohingya crisis and the subsequent developments largely overshadowed the country’s foreign relations. The scale of the crisis and the civilian government’s failure to take accountability of the military’s actions damaged the country’s international credibility as well as personal reputation of State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (hereafter Daw Suu). The Trump administration responded by criticizing the government and imposing targeted sanctions, which led to an observable decline in bilateral relations (Thu Htet, 2021). On the other hand, China provided diplomatic support to Myanmar by shielding the crisis as a domestic affair and assured its firm and unwavering support towards Myanmar on the international stage (Htet Naing Zaw, 2017). This led to the scholarly conclusions that Myanmar deepened its reliance on China under the NLD period (Park, 2020; Passeri, 2021). Passeri and Marston (2022) claimed that while diplomatic disengagement was the theme of Myanmar’s great power diplomacy during the NLD period, they highlighted the strengthening of Myanmar-China relations as Naypyitaw bolstered its ties with Beijing on many fronts. Marston (2023) further contended that Myanmar abandoned hedging between great powers and bandwagoned with Beijing under NLD.

As discussed above, existing literature focuses on Myanmar’s relations vis-à-vis great powers through the lens of hedging and bandwagoning. It is fruitful to some degree as they illustrate how a small state like Myanmar adjusted its alignment position between two great powers. However, I argue that such approach is analytically limited for two reasons. First, the concepts of bandwagoning and hedging (as well as balancing) stem from the neorealist assumption of how small states respond to the changing balance of power induced by great powers (Koga, 2018). (Subsequently I focus on hedging and bandwagoning as they constitute the primary focus of this study). By positioning small states between great powers as part of analytical framing, their available alignment choice is limited to either not firmly choosing sides (hedging) (Goh, 2005; Ikenberry, 2016; Kuik, 2016; Roy, 2005) or choosing to align with the rising power through accommodation (bandwagoning) (Schweller, 1994; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1979). Even diversifying their economic and strategic relations beyond great powers is treated as an indicator of hedging to illustrate how small states respond to the changing balance of power, rather than a state’s preferred strategic conduct in itself (Goh, 2007; Kuik, 2016). Undoubtedly, due to their lesser material and social capabilities in the society of states, small states are destined to manage their relations with great powers. However, this capture reduces small states’ alignments as merely a response strategy to the rising powers and the subsequent great power competition. Thus, focusing on small states’ alignments vis-à-vis great powers fails to encapsulate a more coherent picture of small-state agency in managing their external engagements. This limits our understanding of small states’ available, and preferred, alignment options and patterns in their international relations.

Second, while hedging and bandwagoning shed light on small states’ alignments with great powers, they cannot adequately capture internal deliberations of how the incumbent leadership pursued and justified such engagements, as well as its historical, situational and geopolitical considerations. Hedging and bandwagoning offer general theoretical explanations: states pursue hedging to avoid firm alignments, to offset risks and threats, and/or to secure or promote regime survival and political legitimacy (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019; Huang & Ho, 2024) or bandwagoning to reduce its vulnerability or to seek profits from the rising power (Schweller, 1994; Walt, 1985). However, if we aim to focus on how leaders ascertain a situation and their nuanced balancing of opportunities and risks to achieve optimised outcomes, existing conceptualizations and parameters of hedging and bandwagoning were less helpful. For example, while bandwagoning can explain Myanmar’s growing engagement with China under the NLD government, it cannot fully reveal the former’s perspectives, strategic views and calculations that lead to a particular outcome.

Viewed in this light, how can we make sense of Myanmar’s engagement with external powers in ways that move beyond the limitations of established categories such as hedging and bandwagoning? Through an inquiry into Myanmar’s external engagement during the period of NLD government (2016–2021) as a case study, I put forward diversification and prudence as alternative conceptual frameworks that foreground our analysis on small states’ agency, preferences and strategic views. As previously stated, existing theoretical and empirical discussions stipulated that Myanmar bandwagoned with China during the period (Marston, 2023; Park, 2020; Passeri, 2021; Passeri & Marston, 2022). By employing diversification and prudence as conceptual lens, they enable us to explicate alignments with major powers as the country’s preferred conduct and its manifestation of agency in managing their foreign relations (diversification) and to elucidate its strategic considerations and justifications in its growing engagement with China ² (prudence).

This study presents two main arguments. First, diversification allows us to capture Myanmar’s broader alignment options and engagements with major powers, and thus puts forward the country’s efforts to foster relations beyond great powers. It is empirically demonstrated with the country’s diversified relations with major regional and extra-regional powers such as, but not limited to, Japan, India and Russia in different issue areas (military, economic and ideational). Second, prudence enables us to underscore the strategic considerations of the NLD government that resulted in a particular foreign policy outcome: its growing engagement with China. The NLD, or Daw Suu in particular, considered China to be an indispensable partner due to its geopolitical and strategic importance. Therefore, it pursued benefits from China that aligned with the government’s strategic priorities while properly assessing and mitigating risks from bilateral relations, for example, in its reduction of investment size in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. While two concepts are analytically distinct, collectively they fulfil a task of offering a more nuanced and contextually grounded picture of Myanmar’s external engagement, demonstrating how the NLD government diversified its relations to reduce its overreliance on China while simultaneously engaging with it in a prudent manner.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I provide a conceptual and operational discussion of two key terms – diversification and prudence. The second section stipulates a glimpse on the context of Myanmar’s foreign policy under the NLD government and how the Rohingya crisis overshadowed the country’s external engagement, particularly with the US. It is then followed by two main arguments of this study across two separate sections – Myanmar’s diversified relations with external powers and its prudent engagement with China. The concluding section discusses the broader theoretical and policy-relevant contributions of this study.

Illuminating Diversification and Prudence as Conceptual Lens

Broadly speaking, both diversification and prudence explain foreign policy behaviour of states. They both fall under the broad umbrella of foreign policy because they explicate the strategy or approach adopted by the national governments in their relations with external entities, including actions, artefacts and rhetoric (Hudson, 2016). This study emphasizes the roles and perspectives of small states, and their agencies as manifested in their foreign policies, which demand for a proper inquiry and theorizing in the International Relations (IR) discipline (Hudson & Vore, 1995; Kaarbo & Thies, 2024).

Diversification is an autonomy-seeking strategy of small and middle states, which entails various forms of political and social relations such as regional alliances, simultaneous engagements with major external powers, and the South-South partnerships (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). The main goal of diversification as a strategy is to reduce asymmetries and dependencies in their external relations through broadening ties and engagements. Unlike traditional theories of balancing and bandwagoning, and hedging to a lesser extent, which place sole emphasis on states’ relations with great powers in the military-security domains (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019; Lim & Cooper, 2015; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1979), diversification is an expansive concept that incorporates engagements with major external powers as well as that with regional and international organizations in multiple areas of engagements, both material and ideational. Diversifying partnerships, according to small and middle powers, is the most optimal way not only for survival but also for maintaining and exerting autonomy in the conduct of international relations (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).

In this regard, diversification closely resembles with the concept of multi-alignment. Alignment has at least two distinct versions – a narrow one confined to military-security alignments and a broad one that encompasses various forms of interstate partnerships (Chidley, 2014; Wilkins, 2012). Here, I adopt the latter definition of alignment as an umbrella and encompassing concept, as it better reflects the conceptual underpinnings of diversification. I conceptualize diversification as a form of alignment that broadens the ties of relations with various global and regional players (Blarel, 2024) across multiple issue areas (Hall, 2016) in a polycentric, or multipolar, world order interlocked in interdependent relations (Wojczewski, 2017). For example, in his study on India’s vision of world order, Wojczewski (2017) contends that India pursues multi-alignment not only to avoid strategic entanglements and one-sided dependencies but also to keep India’s options and choices open, while cooperating with like-minded countries. In short, diversification is a pursuit of multi-alignment with multiple partners in multiple issue areas.

My highlight on the conceptual illumination of diversification is threefold: (1) the role of major powers in small states’ strategic engagements; (2) multiple issue areas beyond the traditional military-security domain; and (3) an attempt to put forward diversification as their preferred foreign policy conduct than an element of hedging as a response to great power competition. For major powers, I stress, though not exclusively, major regional actors in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, India and Russia, as well as extra-regional ones. An important point to note here: in general, diversification also includes examining small states’ relations with great powers. However, as the main analytical move of proposing diversification here is to focus on small states' external engagements beyond great powers, I emphasize their alignments with major powers that carry significant political and strategic weight in the region, though they have not yet attained great power status. For issue areas, I reference Ciorciari’s (2009) balance-of-influence framework that shows how Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states constrain the rise of China in the region in the military, economic, institutional and ideational dimensions. For the purpose of this study, I categorically adopt the dimensions as they allow for the examination of various forms of alignment across domains beyond the military-security sphere, while excluding the part of balance-of-influence towards China as this study aims to explicate engagements with various major powers across these dimensions. Meanwhile, the institutional dimension is omitted, since how small and middle states instrumentalize regional organizations to balance the influence of a rising power falls beyond the scope of this study. In summary, the idea advanced here is that small states diversify their relations with external major powers across these three dimensions, comprising both material (military and economic) and ideational domains.

The second concept, prudence or prudentia, is rooted in the Western political philosophy of Aristotle to Machiavelli (Gould, 2015). Recently in the IR discipline, it is examined under different paradigms and traditions of classical realism, constructivism and the ‘practice’ turn, and the possible bridge or eclecticism between them (Brown, 2012; Guzzini, 2020). Here, instead of a thick description on the development of, and debates within, the concept of prudence, I treat it as a paradigm to evaluate a certain foreign policy behaviour (Alim, 2023).

To that end, it is helpful to begin with simple definitions by Merriam-Webster (nd), where prudence is a (1) sagacity or shrewdness in the management of affairs, (2) skill and good judgement in the use of resources and (3) caution or circumscription as to danger or risk. A prudent person (or entity) is able to combine and utilize their wisdom, caution and judgement in different situations to make decisions and act accordingly. In the context of foreign policy behaviour, states (or institutions, or individual statesmen) pay attention to historical and situational particularities in their foreign policy decisions and make careful assessment of risks, opportunities and resources which enable them to make sound political judgements and plans (Alim, 2023; Guzzini, 2020). This includes safeguarding and promoting national interests, variedly articulated across different social and political settings and periods, in the conduct of international relations through a careful and thorough assessment of internal (domestic politics, resources, regime security, policy priorities, etc.) and external (geopolitics, regional and global trends, risks, unexpected shocks, etc.) factors, resulting deliberate measures and strategic plans (Beer & Hariman, 2013). In this regard, prudence is a deliberate and strategic exercise of foreign policy and diplomacy. Similar to the context of foreign policy making, Jansson (2018) argued that, in the context of smart power, prudence does not denote the mere combination of hard and soft power; instead, it is the use of hard and soft power according to circumstances and that ‘the virtue of smart power is not “the ability to combine,” but rather “the ability to discern and understand” the “right” set of means in any given situation’ [emphasis original]. In short, knowing how-to through an understanding of entire set of rules is an act of prudence, according to classical realists (Brown, 2012; Gould, 2015).

As such, prudence is essentially a practice, or a socio-political action emerging from practical knowledge (Pouliot, 2008). When foreign policymakers adopt reasoned measures to respond to certain circumstances or to initiate actions that emerge from careful and deliberate assessment, such decision and/or action can be regarded as acted in a prudent manner. As prudential practice is a result of interaction between actors and processes in a given context constituted within certain normative expectations (Hariman, 1991), being prudent is inherently situational. Thus, a certain act is prudent at one particular context but can be hasty or injudicious in a different socio-political setting.

This therefore requires a careful methodological discussion on how to determine if an action is conducted prudently by an actor. Since the government’s considerations, perspectives and justifications, as well as its understanding of the context, are central to the analysis, examining prudence is inherently interpretative in nature (Schaffer, 2016). Taking this into account, and inspiring the original (and simple) definition of prudence as an act of accounting for the appropriate risks and rewards, and internal and external factors (context) to make a deliberate judgement that leads towards action, I establish three generic parameters: (1) the government’s attention to the situation (context), (2) its endeavour to optimise opportunities, and (3) its attempt to minimize risks to the extent possible. These parameters will be employed to explore whether and how an actor acted in a prudent manner in its foreign policy conduct, foregrounding on their perspectives and articulations. To reiterate, being considered prudent cannot automatically imply the relative utility of the outcome, and assessing the latter is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the goal here is to assess whether the government approached or conducted a given action with prudence.

Before proceeding to the empirical discussion, it is useful to highlight an important point. The use of diversification and prudence as alternative conceptual frameworks does not indicate that this paper would provide an account that empirically distinguishes them from hedging and bandwagoning. On the contrary, I present them as methodological-analytical tools to reorient our analysis, intended to present an actor-centric understanding of the topic that centres on their preferred conducts, perspectives and justifications.

An Overview of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy under the NLD Government

Despite variations in interpretation and implementation among different regimes and governments throughout history since its independence in 1948, Myanmar’s foreign policy is understood as being independent, active and non-aligned (Bhattacharya, 1965; Chaw Chaw Sein, 2016; Maung Aung Myoe, 2016, 2017; Passeri & Marston, 2022; Po P. Shang, 2022; Sint Sint Myat, 2021). When the NLD won the 2015 general election by a sweeping majority, many commentators and the international community expected that, being a pro-West Nobel Laureate and democratic icon, Daw Suu would enable better relations with the West, and the US in particular, at the expense of dissatisfying China (Maung Aung Myoe, 2017). The concern was also reflected from the Chinese side. The editorial of Chinese state-backed media, Global Times, warned that the victory of the NLD could potentially causing a pivot away from China and aligning with the US, which would not serve the fundamental national interests of Myanmar (Global Times, 2015).

However, the NLD’s election manifesto stipulated that, if it won the election, Myanmar would maintain an active and independent foreign policy; forge friendly and close political relations with all countries; and prioritize economic cooperation with other countries that foster mutual benefits (NLD, 2015). After the transition, Daw Suu appointed herself as a State Counsellor, a position widely regarded as a de facto leader, and Union Minister of Foreign Affairs who is in charge of the country’s foreign policy and external relations. In her first meeting with Burmese diplomats as Foreign Minister, she reiterated her foreign policy stance that brings into line with the country’s historical trajectory in principle and rhetoric. According to Global New Light of Myanmar (2016), the country’s government-run English-language newspaper, Daw Suu clarified the country’s foreign policy since its independence in 1948 was an ‘independent, nonaligned and active foreign policy direction, dealing closely and warmly with not only neighbouring countries but also the nations of the world’.

The successful ascension of the NLD and Daw Suu into political power raised high hopes and expectations in both domestic and international community that Myanmar would further bolster its role and status in the international arena. However, such moment was short-lived with the rapid escalation of the Rohingya crisis.

Forging Multiple Partnerships: Myanmar’s Diversified Engagements with External Powers

I argue in this section that despite its strained relations with the US, Myanmar was successful in diversifying its relations with external powers through bolstering ties with major regional and extra-regional powers, as stipulated in its foreign policy doctrine. For the sake of clarity, I present such engagements in three dimensions – material (military and economic) and ideational.

In the military realm ³ , Myanmar deepened its ties with Russia, and arms supplies from the latter increased drastically after 2014. The purchase of arms and equipment from Russia rose from US$ 8 million in 2014 to over US$ 115 million in 2020 (Bukh, 2021). The equipment ranged from fighter jets, aircrafts, armoured vehicles, missiles and surveillance drones. Burmese military officials were sent to Russia to receive official training – around 300 personnel, including engineers, receive training in Russian military academies each year (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2022). There were also frequent strategic joint military exercises between the two countries during the period (Cheang, 2021). This is because Senior General Min Aung Hlaing not only considered Russian military equipment superior to that of China, but he was also determined to reduce military reliance on China (Storey, 2023).

Another strategically and symbolically significant event of Myanmar’s diversification in the military realm is the purchase and transfer of its very first Soviet-made submarine from India through a line of credit (Pubby, 2019). Myanmar has long aspired to acquire a submarine for its maritime security as well as international status. The acquisition, therefore, is an attempt to enhance its naval capacity and standing in the region, to balance against Thailand and Bangladesh which have maritime border disputes with Myanmar, and to diversify its military engagements to reduce its reliance on China (Herzinger, 2020). Soon afterwards, the military initiated the process of purchasing more advanced versions of submarines from Russia (Storey, 2022). On the other side, it can be interpreted as a joint strategic move by Moscow and Delhi to counterbalance the influence of China in the region. As a response, Chinese state-backed media the Global Times criticized that the parties involved were ‘hyping’ or exaggerating a single development as a significant move to counterbalance the growing influence of China in Myanmar and in the region, and labelled them as over-interpretation (Leng, 2020). Such sensitive reaction, however, amplified China’s frustration, which is why Burmese media outlet asked a question in an editorial: ‘Has Myanmar’s submarine purchase from India hit a nerve in Beijing?’ (The Irrawaddy, 2020). As a response, China transferred a submarine to Myanmar after the military coup in 2021, which is clearly a counterstrategy to maintain its geopolitical interests in the country (Storey, 2022).

Myanmar also fostered its defence relations with India. In addition to the submarine purchase, India was the third largest arms supplier to Myanmar (17%) after China (36%) and Russia (27%) between 2017 and 2021, according to a global arms export and expenditure report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (The Times of India, 2022). This also marks that Myanmar is a destination of half of India’s arms export (ibid). India has been accelerating its defence ties and sales to Myanmar, ranging from lightweight torpedoes and rocket launchers to construction and communication equipment (Pandit, 2017). In 2019, Myanmar and India signed a MoU to enhance military engagement between the two countries to strengthen security cooperation in defence training, maritime and border security (The Economic Times, 2019). The two nations conducted a series of counterinsurgency campaigns between 2015 and 2020, tactically to suppress armed organizations and rebel groups operating along the border area (Choudhury, 2024).

Although the Rohingya crisis and the US sanctions may seem to have prevented Myanmar’s diversification of engagements with the West, its military and security sector cooperation with Western powers remained evident, if modest, during the period. The most significant engagement can be observed with Ukraine, which includes an agreement on military-technical cooperation in 2018 and an agreement to set up a plant to produce armoured personal carriers, howitzers, and tanks (Strangio, 2021). Israel was also a preferred arms source for the country after 2015, which includes arms, equipment and patrol boats (Ullah, 2017). Purchases increased after the Rohingya crisis as it allowed Myanmar military to diversify its sources and to bypass American and European embargos (Bram & Shauli, 2023). Australia also maintained its defence engagements after the Rohingya crisis, while it is limited to training military personnel in the areas of disaster management, human rights law and English language training, as well as intelligence sharing in human trafficking (Dziedzic, 2021; Handley, 2022; Thomas, 2018). Myanmar also received trainings from the European Union for police reform with an aim of professionalizing police that adheres to international standards and human rights (Dunant, 2018). Singapore, the Philippines and North Korea were also listed as countries selling arms to Myanmar military since 2016 in a UN report. Such engagements continued to take place even after most of them were called to be suspended by human rights groups and civil societies due to the potential use of those weapons in the humanitarian crisis.

Diversified engagement is a much more evident phenomenon in the economic realm. Despite some fluctuations among which country takes up the top spot in each fiscal year, Singapore has been the country’s largest foreign investor nearly every year since 2012, and the trend is consistent during the period of the NLD administration. Total investments peaked in the 2016–17 fiscal year, and slightly declined in the later years due to the impacts of the Rohingya crisis. Its investments were mostly in the areas of information and communication, urban development, real estate, power and manufacturing (Global New Light of Myanmar, 2021). As of August 2019, Singapore’s cumulative investment in Myanmar accounts for US$ 22.1 billion, which is slightly more than that of China (Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore, 2019; Oh, 2019). It is important to note here that as most global companies have their offices registered in Singapore, investments labelled as Singapore may originate from various global sources, including the US (Kyaw Hsu Mon, 2015).

Japan is Myanmar’s indispensable economic partner and a major source of development assistance, and this is no exception under the NLD government. In order to assist the government’s strategic priorities on nation-building, economic development and peace process, Japan launched a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral private and public cooperation program to facilitate a virtuous cycle of development between the urban and the rural including agriculture, infrastructure, education, telecommunication, and financial development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, nd). Through the program, Japan pledged to support ¥ 800 billion over 5 years from FY 2016, as well as ¥ 40 billion for areas in ethnic minorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017). Some of the loan projects under the scheme include Yangon Urban Development Project, Yangon Mandalay Railway Improvement Project, and Yangon and Mandalay Power Distribution Improvement Project. Japanese official development assistance (ODA) enables Myanmar to promote national development through economic and infrastructure investments as well as to reduce its reliance on China. For Japan, ODA is instrumental to promote business opportunities for Japanese firms and also to project its influence and soft power as part of its wider strategic identity construction as a regional great power (Lindgren, 2024).

Arguably, the development of three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Thilawa, Kyaukphyu and Dawei represents the most celebrated and symbolic manifestations of the country’s economic liberalization. Among them, Thilawa SEZ, a joint venture partnership between Japan and Myanmar governments and private entities, stands out as the most successful and high-paced project to date. Initiated in 2011 and becoming the first operational and commercialized SEZ in 2015 (Strefford, 2016), the project continued to rapidly expand during the NLD government. The SEZ began its Zone-B expansion southward of the original Zone-A in 2017 (Bangkok Post, 2017) and Zone-B had to expand its Phase-2 in 2018 due to increasing investor demand. As of October 2020, 113 international enterprises (of which 56 were Japanese companies) entered and invested in the SEZ, while 93 of them (of which 50 were Japanese) have already rolled out their operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020). Some major companies operating in Thilawa SEZ during the period include Toyota, Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Nippon and Sumitomo. The relative success and pace of expansion of the project are significant as they reflect the country’s desire to foster and deepen ties with Japan – particularly when contrasted with its concerns over and stagnating progress of the Kyaukphyu SEZ (which will be discussed in the next section).

Myanmar under NLD also strengthened its economic ties with India. President U Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Daw Suu separately visited New Delhi in 2016 and PM Narendra Modi visited Naypyidaw in 2017. During the latter visit, both governments agreed to deepen political, economic and socio-cultural engagements (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2017). Under Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy, India attempted to accelerate the existing projects in the country as well as initiated new ones. India stepped up its implementation of Kalatan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which was originally signed as early as 2008 under the previous ‘Look East’ policy. Sittwe Port, a first node of the project, was built in 2016 and an MoU was signed to appoint a private port operator in 2018 (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2018). As a counterbalance against China’s Kyaukphyu and Japan’s Thilawa SEZ, India proposed a plan to implement Sittwe SEZ alongside Sittwe Port (Chaudhury, 2016). As Kyaukphyu is located approximately 100 km south of Sittwe, both being in Myanmar’s western coast along the Bay of Bengal, Beijing and Delhi conceive them as geostrategic counterweights against each other and to assert influence in the region as part of wider geopolitical aims. India boosted its energy cooperation in Myanmar by providing an additional investment of over US$ 120 million in Shwe oil and gas project, a large-scale natural gas project mainly operated by Indian and South Korean companies, in July 2020 (Indian Defence News, 2021). In addition to major powers namely Japan and India, Myanmar also strived from its economic diversification with other regional powers such as Thailand, a major investor of Dawei SEZ in the southern Myanmar and a substantial trade and investment partner, and South Korea, with which cooperation in banking, logistics, and science and technology. During President Moon Jae-in’s visit to the country in 2019, a US$ 110 million Korea–Myanmar Industrial Complex investment, was agreed to establish in Hlegu, which is located in the north of Yangon (Nan Lwin, 2019a).

In addition to infrastructure, trade and investments, the NLD government’s dedication to diversify partnerships was also observed in the purchase and manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines during the global pandemic. Just before the military coup, Myanmar received the first batch of vaccines (1.5 million doses) from India in January 2021, and also pledged to procure further vaccine doses (Shoon Naing, 2021). As early as October 2020, Myanmar initiated negotiations with India to jointly produce and distribute COVID vaccines in the country (Sibal, 2020). While Myanmar also welcomed contributions from China when Foreign Minister Wang Yi committed to donating 300,000 doses of vaccines during his visit in January, and also pledged to purchase more from China, initial purchase and arrival of India-made vaccines nevertheless demonstrated the government’s preference and confidence towards India-made vaccines and its successful attempt of diversification (Chen, 2023).

Moving to the ideational realm, Myanmar’s alignment with external powers is factored by two considerations – the identity and historical trajectory of NLD and the Rohingya crisis. As an opposition party standing for democracy and human rights in the country since 1988, the NLD administration, unlike that of USDP which was founded by former military generals, did not need to actively portray themselves as ‘democratic’ in both domestic and international political arenas. The NLD already held a strong identity as a promoter and defender of democracy, and its electoral victory was celebrated as further step in advancing the country’s democratic transition. In this regard, it did not need to actively signal its commitment to democratic transition through alignment or closer engagement with democratic states such as the US and the West – the policy adopted by the USDP administration. Instead, the management of the Rohingya crisis and its international consequences largely influenced NLD’s foreign policy agenda. As discussed above, the government adopted a subtle and balanced approach, seeking to control the outburst of international criticism by framing the issue as a ‘domestic’ matter that threatened sovereignty and territorial integrity. In doing so, it emphasized the terrorist acts while downplaying the subsequent massive human rights violations committed by the military (Biswas, 2020; Paribatra, 2022; Walton, 2018).

Along these lines, international norms such as sovereignty and non-interference were more appealing to the government as they aligned with its way of handling the crisis. Thus, its ideational alignment was apparent with those countries supporting or shielding the government's approach to the crisis through justifications under these normative frameworks. India, concerned about its border security, its relations with Bangladesh and wider geopolitics of its competition with China, offered a balanced approach to the conflict. In a joint statement, India condemned the terrorist acts but did not mention the broader Rohingya crisis (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2017). Also, Delhi framed it as an ‘internal’ issue and that claimed the principles of sovereignty and non-interference must be respected, and pledged to support humanitarian assistance, socio-economic development of the region, repatriation and peaceful conflict resolution (Ghoshal, 2017; Yhome, 2018).

Myanmar also capitalized from Japan’s diplomatic support in which the latter echoed the importance of peaceful settlement and warned the harmful effects of pressuring the government due to its complex domestic political conditions. Japan offered a development-driven model of resolution and humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state, stating that this approach would effectively resolve the conflict (Bhuiyan, 2021; Kasai, 2019). Myanmar also benefited from ASEAN’s principles of non-interference and approaching the crisis from humanitarian perspective, which closely aligns with Myanmar’s view, despite lingering internal divisions between member states towards the organization’s collective approach to the crisis (Al Jazeera, 2020; Geddie & Thu Thu Aung, 2018). Such principles, rooted in its non-intrusive nature of ASEAN towards the member states’ domestic affairs, provided a normative shield for Myanmar (Suzuki, 2019).

To sum up, a more nuanced picture of Myanmar’s strategic engagements with external powers during the period proves that the NLD government was successful in diversifying its relations with major regional and extra-regional powers in both material (military and economic) and ideational realms. The overall goals were twofold: to uphold the country’s and the government’s principle foreign policy objective of maintaining cordial relations with as many countries as possible and to reduce overreliance on China through multiple external ties. This exhibits the small state’s agency and capability in managing its external relations amid turbulence.

Partners with Benefits? Myanmar’s Prudent Engagement with China

In this section, I examine Myanmar’s engagement with China during the NLD period by employing the parameters of prudence established in the conceptual section: contextual attentiveness, opportunity optimization and minimizing risk, while focusing our analysis on its perspectives and strategic calculations of the government.

As illustrated in the introduction, it is widely articulated in the literature that Myanmar under the NLD government closely aligned with China especially after the Rohingya crisis. Evidently Chinese diplomatic support aligned with the incumbent regime’s approach to the conflict. Chinese ambassador Hong Liang labelled the crisis as an internal affair and showed sympathy when the Burmese authorities were accused of human rights violations when dealing with the issues of terrorism, sovereignty and national security (Global New Light of Myanmar, 2017). China also played a pivotal role in watering down the tone of the statement of the UN Security Council in favour of Myanmar (Nicols, 2018) and offered a mediator role to deescalate and resolve the conflict bilaterally between Myanmar and Bangladesh (Ramachandran, 2017). Daw Suu expressed her appreciation to China in a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang for China’s understanding and support on the Rakhine issue (Reuters, 2018).

While political observers highlighted the development of Myanmar–China relations after the escalation of the Rohingya crisis, in reality the NLD government’s foreign policy direction had already been pivoted towards China for pragmatic and geopolitical reasons, as evident in the speeches and state visits made by Daw Suu who was decisively in charge of the country’s external engagement. After Laos and Thailand, Daw Suu visited China as her first non-ASEAN state for an official state visit (Perlez & Wai Moe, 2016), and chose to visit the US after China. During her visit, she confirmed developing relations with China as her government’s priority and expressed her desire to maintain high-level visits and foster bilateral cooperation, and stressed geographical proximity and cultural ties between two nations (Chinese Embassy of the Philippines, 2016). China underscored her visit to China prior to the US, and conceived it as the government’s attempt to normalize relations with Beijing. Given that Daw Suu as an opposition leader visited China since 2015 prior to the Election, it is apparent that she regarded Myanmar’s geopolitical, historical and strategic relationships with its giant neighbour indispensable (Sun, 2016; Wilson, 2015). Soon after the landslide victory, she stressed the importance of the country’s relations with China in an exclusive interview with Xinhua, stating that

Ties between neighbours are always more delicate than that between countries far apart. We'll pay special attention to our relations in order to make them smooth, effective and clear (The Strait Times, 2015).

In this regard, Daw Suu’s foreign policy strategy was to improve the country’s relations with China, while adhering to maintaining non-aligned posture and cultivating good relations with all nations at the same time.

One salient area that the government optimized from its improving relations with China was in the national reconciliation and peace process. Months before government transition from the USDP to the NLD, Daw Suu stipulated that building peace would be the first priority of the incoming government (Associated Press, 2016). As several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) along the Myanmar–China border had profound and complex ties with China, Beijing’s support was pivotal to implement and achieve the government’s agenda. In her meeting with President Xi Jinping, Daw Suu requested China to play a supportive role in Myanmar’s peace process, and Xi promised to constructively engage with and facilitate it (Hancock, 2016). Both nations saw border stability as crucial to promote economic and social development (from the Myanmar side) and to successfully implement BRI projects (from the Chinese side). Following the meeting, China conducted a series of engagements with the government, northern EAOs, and the military, and coordinated meetings between key stakeholders, as part of its communication-facilitation strategy (Lwin Cho Latt, 2022). Beijing’s Special Envoy Sun Guoxiang got several EAOs to attend the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference and pressured them to participate in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement negotiations (Li, 2020). Despite questionable tangible results in the peace process, this exemplifies how the NLD utilized its diplomatic leverage – by underscoring the ties between China and northern EAOs – to facilitate its strategic priority.

As a small state neighbouring China, Myanmar also acknowledged that it could not forcefully extricate itself from China’s strategic orbit, including the initiatives like BRI. Facing this reality, the NLD engaged with China’s BRI in a calculated manner. This is not to suggest that it was flawlessly successful in managing the BRI projects, given that some previous studies highlight limitations its limited capacity to hedge against China’s influence in BRI (Kobayashi & King, 2022) and the uneven distribution of BRI benefits among different economic and political actors (Mark et al., 2020). Rather, I argue that NLD sought to manage the investment of BRI projects as part of its China policy through seeking economic and social development opportunities from infrastructure investments while remaining vigilance towards risks such as sovereignty erosion and adverse environmental and social impacts.

It is evident on the surface level that NLD embraced BRI projects as a way to promote regional development and to foster relations with Beijing (Jones & Khin Ma Ma Myo, 2021). President U Htin Kyaw, in his official visit to China, expressed his interest to speed up BRI-related projects (Xinhua, 2017). Daw Suu signed five agreements at the first BRI Forum, including an ‘MoU on Cooperation within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative’, thereby formally participating in the BRI. Myanmar also signed a series of BRI-related MoUs in the 2nd BRI Forum as well as when President Xi visited the country in 2020, including mega-projects as part of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Nan Lwin, 2020).

The government was interested in the BRI projects as it conceived them as contributing to its strategic national priorities, and hence as opportunities that should be embraced. In her speech at the 2^nd BRI Forum, Daw Suu conveyed her position on BRI as,

Our Government has been making strenuous efforts to improve connectivity within our own country by placing emphasis on the improvement of our infrastructure, in particular, the constructions of roads, ports and railways, and electrification. We believe that the BRI projects selected in line with our national plan and priorities will contribute to our endeavours for the improvement of much needed infrastructure that will not merely enhance domestic connectivity but also improve cross-border connectivity. (Myanmar Digital News, 2019)

Stressing five principles of peaceful coexistence was notable here as, at a strategic level, State Counsellor framed and asserted the importance of cooperation as among sovereign equals to ensure mutual benefits and to respect international norms of non-interference and territorial integrity. This stance concurrently underscored Myanmar’s deep concerns about potential sovereignty erosion stemming from its acceptance of BRI projects. The speech also conveyed the government’s misgivings over the projects’ potential environmental and social impacts, public sentiments towards the projects and their potential (mis-)alignment with national priorities. In the first meeting of the Steering Committee for Implementation of BRI in Myanmar, where State Counsellor herself served as a chair, she conveyed that thorough scrutiny of the BRI projects is crucial to examine both their short-term and long-term impacts and to ensure their alignment with national interests (Nan Lwin, 2019b).

In line with State Counsellor’s direction, the government scrutinized several major BRI projects. One of them was Kyaukphyu SEZ, a pivotal part of BRI, which is geopolitically crucial as part of String of Pearls strategy to balance India and to exert its influence in the Indian Ocean (Poling, 2018). The government scaled down the SEZ project by 80% of the initial agreement – slashing the initial price tag to US$ 1.3 billion from US$ 7.2 billion (Nitta, 2018). According to Burmese officials, such action was taken by drawing lessons from Sri Lanka and Pakistan regarding the possible debt trap. Deputy Finance Minister Winston Set Aung claimed that the project would transform towards a demand-based rather than a supply-based model and thus the further expansions would be considered only when there is sufficient demand (Jagan, 2018). Government’s senior economic advisor Sean Turnell seconded the action and stated that other countries should learn from Myanmar as an example in the future negotiations with China (Nitta, 2018). In addition, the joint venture company between Myanmar and China for Kyaukphyu SEZ implementation was instructed to conduct rigorous environment and social impact assessments of the project and to strictly comply with them under Myanmar’s legal requirement (Nan Lwin, 2021).

Another major BRI project that faced scrutiny was the New Yangon Development Project. The first phase of the urban development project was scaled down to half – from US$ 1.5 billion to US$ 800 million (Kyaw Phyo Tha, 2020). Initially, due to the scale of the project, only the Chinese Communications Construction Company was solely awarded the contract, which was later largely criticized for lack of transparency and fair competition, in addition to the company’s history of bribery and corruption. As a response, Investment Minister U Thaung Tun lowered the bid bar to entry. The project was split into smaller projects to enable international bidders to come with rival proposals (Global Construction Review, 2020). Both cases display the government’s various concerns over several BRI projects, and its efforts to minimize such risks.

Overall, Myanmar’s engagement with China during the NLD period was rooted in pragmatic and realpolitik considerations. As the NLD government, particularly Daw Suu, conceived that Myanmar could not afford to disengage with its proximate neighbour, maintaining robust relations with China became a strategic priority. In doing so, it not only pursued benefits that aligned with the government’s strategic priorities while, at the same time, maintained a firm stance to mitigate risks if necessary and whenever possible. The evidence suggests that the NLD government acted in a prudent manner in its engagement with China.

Conclusion

In this article, I advanced an alternative account of Myanmar’s external engagement under the NLD government through the application of the concepts of diversification and prudence. During the period, Myanmar diversified its engagements with multiple partnerships in both material and ideational realms in order to reduce its overreliance on China and to commit to its foreign policy doctrine. In parallel, the government fostered its engagement with China in a prudent manner, thereby striving to seek opportunities from its improved relations with China, such as China’s normative shielding of the Rohingya crisis and its support in peace process, while mitigating adverse consequences from such engagement, most evidently in the case of the BRI projects.

In conclusion, I illuminate four contributions of this study. First, by bringing diversification and prudence into the analysis, they help us better understand the various manifestations of small-state agency in their foreign relations – how they foster complex engagements with and beyond great powers to reduce overreliance on one major power, how they exhibit their strategic autonomy beyond the binary choices between two great powers, and how actors balance between risks and opportunities by taking contextual factors into account. Employing these frameworks allows us to explore further case studies to understand how small states manage their relations with great and major powers while maintaining their autonomy and agency. While I employ these two concepts in parallel in this study, further studies can use them either separately or simultaneously depending on their analytical focus – underscoring engagements with multiple partners as part of their foreign policy strategy or unpacking actors’ perspectives and considerations in their engagements with major powers. Second, this study challenges the idea of situating small and middle states between two great powers, and reduces their strategies as responses to great power competition. This therefore calls for expanding the horizon and theorizing complex engagements of small states beyond great powers in future research. Third, this study also proposes a research agenda that draws our analytical attention to the actors’ preferences, perspectives and strategic views, thereby fostering a more grounded and agent-centred understanding of international politics. Fourth, this paper’s quest to illuminate the strategic options and considerations of small states contributes to recent debates and intellectual projects in Global IR – to theorize, to reengineer IR concepts, and to rethink the formation of the ‘international’ and practices of international relations from the perspectives of small states or non-Western regions (Acharya, 2014; Hurrell, 2016; Sullivan de Estrada, 2020).