The Expansion of International Organizations: Insights From the G20’s Inclusion of the African Union

Structural Incentives

The creation of the G20 in the late 1990s was a response to the perceived failure of the G7 (United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada) to prevent the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 (Parlar Dal & Dipama, 2022). The crisis was a pivotal event that exposed the intrinsic limitations of the G7 as the global economic governance forum par excellence. The crisis revealed the need for a more inclusive global economic forum due to the global implications of a regional financial crisis. The G7 was mainly efficient in tackling economic issues in advanced economies but less well-equipped to tackle the complexities of the interconnected global financial system. This led to the growing idea that a complementary and wider organization should be created to regulate global economic and financial policies. Hence, the G20 was finally established in 1999 and contrary to the G7 structure which was principally composed of the advanced economies, the G20 included the 20 largest advanced and emerging economies in the world.

In parallel, the creation of the G20 stems from the growing recognition of the global redistribution of economic power dynamics with the growing economic power of non-Western countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It was commonly acknowledged that it is more than crucial to move beyond the “reductionist” shape of the G7 by including the incoming emerging economies in global economic discussions to efficiently tackle current and future crises and to instill global prosperity. From being initially, a forum of meetings between the ministers of finance and central bank governors of the 20 members, the G20’s structure evolved in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to the level of a leaders’ summit. Its spheres of action moved beyond financial and economic matters to include health, security, and environmental issues. Today, the G20 stands as one of the most important multilateral fora in global economic governance. In this vein, IOs, far from being static entities, evolve to adapt to the broader structure of the international system (Organski & Kugler, 1980). The changing geopolitical landscape with the shift away from the unipolar world order and growing multi-polarization of the world compels IOs including the G20 to adapt to these changing global power dynamics (Tammen, 2000) by admitting new potential members, particularly the emerging economies from the Global South. These Structural Incentives also laid the groundwork for institutional reforms. Since IOs under structural pressure are more likely to revise their membership norms, opportunities emerged for actors, such as the AU and supportive G20 members, to push for expansion, thereby demonstrating Actor Agency.

The risk for IOs that fail to adapt to evolving global power dynamics is the loss of legitimacy and credibility, particularly in the eyes of global public opinion in the Global South (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Hurd, 2007). Indeed, in the current multipolar world marked by the explosion of international institutions that compete with established institutions, IOs are permanently in the quest for greater legitimacy to avoid becoming obsolete or contested. IOs that resist adaptation are likely to face a legitimacy deficit, which in the longer term can lead to increasing fragmentation of the organization with the exit of dissatisfied members. Because both established and emerging powers see IOs as one of the means through which they can enhance their global status, dissatisfied members are likely to boycott “non-representative” IOs either by exiting or by creating alternative competitive institutions (Morse & Keohane, 2014). For example, emerging powers such as China, frustrated by the reluctance of established institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to adjust voting power in line with shifting global dynamics, have created alternatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to challenge existing institutions and co-opt as many states as possible through the provision of institutional and material benefits (Parlar Dal and Dipama, 2022).

Institutional Adaptation

Besides structural incentives, IO expansion can be influenced by changes in the roles of procedural norms of IOs. From the historical institutionalist landscape, although institutions’ moves are mainly shaped by their past decisions, what is called path dependency, they can have recourse to some kinds of formal and informal arrangements to adapt their structure to the global power structure (Pierson, 2000). Some critical junctures such as major crises can induce institutional adaptation through membership expansion. In the case of the G20 for instance, the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis was a major turnout to the establishment of the G20 in 1999 as a finance ministers’ forum, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was also the critical event that led to the G20’s enhancement to a leaders’ summit.

At the same time, from a critical constructivist perspective, ideational factors, more than material ones, shape actors’ behaviors in the international system. Their identities and interests are socially constructed through interactions with their peers within the international system. Actors behave according to the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of consequences because their actions are judged based on their perceived identities. In this vein, IOs, which are also international actors, are norm-driven and are pushed to constantly adapt their internal structures to the changing global values. In the current context of the worldwide power shift from the Global North to the Global South, major economies in the Global South are striving to enhance their representation in established international institutions and to increase the inclusiveness of their self-created alternative institutions. These dynamics compel IOs to adapt their internal norms to the globally claimed norms such as inclusivity, equality, and representation. In this stance, the creation of the G20 to include both established and emerging economies, stemmed from the global criticisms against the exclusive decision-making structure of the G7 where countries in the worldwide South were not represented. In short, IOs are expected to constantly align their values and procedures with the evolving expectations of fairness, inclusiveness, and multipolarity in global governance (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Checkel, 1998).

Actor-Driven Agency

The membership dynamics within IOs are not merely a passive reflection of systemic features or institutional path dependencies; they are also the product of the agency of key actors such as chairs, rotating presidents of IOs, host states, decision-makers, diplomats, regional blocs, and coalitions. IO expansion, far from being conditioned by the structures of the system, results from a process of negotiation among actors with varying levels of power, interests, and influence. The agency of these actors in the context of IO expansion refers to their ability to drive, shape, negotiate, and contest the membership rules of IOs. Membership expansion is not automatic; it is often the product of strategic negotiation, coalition-building, and norm entrepreneurship by actors seeking to reform existing institutions in their favor. These actors exercise agency through strategic negotiation, coalition-building, and normative framing. The agency can be performed by a coalition of like-minded actors who will bargain among themselves and build coalitional pressure to compel the IO expansion (Koremenos et al., 2001). They can put forward the strategic interests such as material and/or symbolic values the IOs would gain from this membership expansion to mobilize broader support for their claims. Actors can also leverage critical junctures such as global financial crises, growing perceptions of the legitimacy deficit of IOs, and the rise of global inequality discourses to compel IO expansion (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

Some authors like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) highlight that actors can serve as norm entrepreneurs who promote membership expansion through persuasive diplomacy and normative discourse. Through normative discourses, these discursive agents can frame the exclusion of some actors from IOs as contrary to global norms such as equality and justice and progressively socialize public opinion with their normative claims to push for institutional reforms in IOs. These agents through discourse (Schmidt, 2008) can then come to the claimed reform as both a moral imperative and strategic necessity to increase pressure on established powers to widen the organization.

This theoretical framework reveals that the expansion of IOs is a complex and multilayered process. The interaction of Structural Incentives, Institutional Adaptation, and Actor-Driven Agency constitutes key elements for understanding the causes and limits of expansion. As demonstrated in the case of the G20, these factors converge not only to increase the number of members but also to facilitate the reshaping of power shifts within the international system and the evolution of normative expectations. In this context, the acceptance of the AU as a member of the G20 signifies not merely an increase in membership but also exemplifies a new understanding of global governance emerging at the intersection of these three factors.

In the G20-AU case, Africa’s rising economic and political profile (Structural Incentives) spurred calls for greater inclusivity. These calls became possible through representational changes within the G20 (Institutional Adaptation) and the AU’s diplomatic lobbying efforts, along with the support of key G20 members (Actor Agency).

This development serves as a critical case for comprehending how the G20’s historical mission, operational mechanisms, and representational structure are transforming. Thus, analyzing the AU’s participation in the G20 provides significant contributions to debates on global representation and legitimacy, in connection with the structural and normative evolution of the organization.

Geopolitical Calculations

Structural Incentives significantly influenced the G20’s decision to admit the AU, just as they shaped the creation of the G20 itself. The establishment of the G20 stemmed from criticism directed at the G7 for its exclusivity as a “club” of advanced economies, and sought to remedy the G7’s democratic deficiencies by including the world’s 20 largest economies at the time—comprising 19 individual countries (5 from Europe, 5 from the Americas, 6 from Asia, 1 from the Middle East, 1 from Oceania, and 1 from Africa) and one regional bloc, the European Union (EU). Voices have been raised to claim for a restructuring of the membership in the G20 because some original members like South Africa and Argentina are no longer classified among the world’s 20 largest economies. By not adapting the membership structure to the changing global distribution of power, the G20 is accused of reproducing the undemocratic practices of the G7, rendering the group static rather than dynamic. If the original definition of the G20—as the 20 largest economies—were upheld, a regular rolling membership would be necessary to ensure ongoing representation of the world’s largest economies. However, this approach risks excluding less economically competitive regions, such as Africa, where no individual state has yet ranked among the 20 largest economies globally.

Moreover, the G20 has been also criticized for discriminating among regional blocs by admitting the EU and excluding other regional blocks in the world. The admission of the EU, although somehow justified by the prominent place it occupies as the world’s largest market, raises significant normative challenges related to global equity and justice. By admitting the EU in addition to the five European member states, the G20 faces a democratic deficit because all European members are represented in the G20 through the EU membership and the G20’s EU member states benefit from a double representation of their interests in the G20. This puts the EU in a privileged position within the G20 compared to other regional blocs such as the AU where only one member state is represented (Signé and Sangafowa, 2023). This undemocratic picture becomes less acceptable in the eyes of public opinion in a context where geopolitical competition between great powers is at its highest point. This great power competition is increasingly taking place in the African continent where major and emerging powers are courting African countries in exchange for defending their interests in multilateral organizations.

Major events such as the Global Financial Crisis, the Ukraine Crisis, and the rise of populist leaders in both the Western and non-Western world have pushed established and emerging powers to search for Global South leadership and to position themselves as the defender of the interests of Global South countries in international institutions where most the countries in this globe have been excluded. These established and emerging powers increasingly acknowledge the geopolitical importance of the African continent, not only because of its natural resources and positive demographic dividend but notably because the African continent can be instrumentalized to shape multilateral norms and institutions. Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General of the UN welcomed the AU inclusion by stating that “This is a reflection of Africa’s growing influence and importance on the global stage” (UN News, 2023).

In this vein, the advocacy of both established and emerging powers for the AU’s admission to the G20 reflects strong geopolitical competition as it will bolster their leadership claims in the Global South, especially in Africa in a context where soft power is one of the most used foreign policy tools by established and emerging powers to advance their interests worldwide. Emerging powers such as India, which was ensuring the G20 presidency at the time of the AU’s admission in 2023, lobbied extensively within the G20 for the latter’s expansion to the AU (Deutsche Welle, 2023) as this advocacy will enhance its image and credibility in the eyes of the AU and African people, which in turn will smoothly contribute to advancing its self-interests in the continent. Other major powers like China also championed the G20’s AU expansion (NDTV, 2023) for geopolitical calculation, notably for reinforcing their image as the “real” promoter of South-South solidarity, especially in the context of rising anti-French policy sentiment across the sub-Saharan African region.

Western major powers like France advocated for the AU’s admission (France ONU, 2024) in a context of an assertive foreign policy courtesy of non-Western powers in Africa and of decreasing legitimacy of its policies in francophone Africa where it was forced to adopt a lower profile in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. So, by supporting AU’s inclusion, France tries to counter anti-French narratives growing in Africa and to position itself as the defender of a higher profile of African institutions in established organizations. The consideration of geopolitical factors in the G20’s AU expansion are corroborated by the fact that, well before its admission, the G20’s policies targeting the African continent such as its 2017 G20’s Compact with Africa (CWA) initiative meant to reduce the flow of African illegal migrants onto European borders (Paulo, 2017) and to counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, particularly in the critical minerals sector (Matanda, 2025).

Finally, the African continent faced the last decade multi-complex crises related to terrorism, climate change, political instability, economic crises, illegal migration, etc., but for a long has not been a priority of the G20 policies (Bradlow, 2014), despite the risks of spillover effects onto the world. Considering the transnational character of these crises, it was very timely to include the AU in the G20 to tackle these challenges efficiently. Indeed, although the African continent was the main target of the G20 policies, it did not have a say in the decision-making process, except merely the single voice of South Africa. Major and emerging powers recognize the necessity to extend the G20 membership to the AU to benefit from their input in tackling global challenges and to mobilize international support for the African continent in addressing these challenges. In a statement issued on the final day of the summit, held in New Delhi, the G20 declared: “We welcome the African Union as a permanent member of the G20 and strongly believe that inclusion of the African Union into the G20 will significantly contribute to addressing the global challenges of our time” (Munyati, 2023).

Economic Considerations

The G20’s expansion to include the AU also reflects important economic considerations. First, the G20 places green issues at the top of its agenda, encouraging states to progressively shift toward green economic policies. Minerals and renewable resources play a critical role in this global transition toward a green economy. In this sense, the African continent has a critical role to play in the adoption and implementation of such policies because Africa produces 60% of the world’s renewable resources and is home to 30% of the minerals required for carbon technologies and the emerging green economy. Sustainable development is also a key element of the AU’s agenda 2063 where the aim is to achieve economic transformation, environmental sustainability, and inclusive growth by 2063 (AU, nd). The admission of the AU is a strategic opportunity to align the agenda 2063 with the G20’s global environmental policies and to enhance the multilateral governance of minerals and renewable energy in Africa, especially in a context where major and emerging powers are competing for critical minerals in the continent.

Second, although the continent’s GDP is still small, it is home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies with a young and large population accounting for a quarter of the global population and infrastructural potential. The global demand trend is expected to shift increasingly towards Africa. The launch of the Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2021 connects 1.3 billion people across 55 countries (Mangeni & Juma, 2019; Thuo Gathii, 2017), which is the largest free trade area globally by the number of countries further increasing the economic potential of the continent. There is an increasing acknowledgment that maintaining the AU out of the G20 is no longer economically sustainable in terms of global economic governance. The admission of the AU contributes to enhancing the continent’s integration into the global economic market and its critical role in shaping future global economic rules.

Finally, the disruption of the global grain supply chains following the Ukraine Crisis is another key economic motivation behind the AU’s admission into the G20. Indeed, agriculture is a centerpiece of many African economies; but they are yet to exploit half of their cultivable lands due to some technological and financial challenges. The G20 sees the AU admission as an opportunity to align African countries’ agricultural policies with its global food security goals to reduce food supply dependence on geopolitical calculations. The G20 would benefit from the input of the AU to build resilient food production systems and develop sustainable agriculture in the continent through collaboration with both the advanced and emerging economies within the G20.

Normative Commitments

The inclusion of the AU in the G20 reflects not only geopolitical and economic calculations but also an important normative shift in global governance. This expansion can be analytically summarized around three interrelated normative dimensions: representation, institutional legitimacy, and global equity. These are also consistent with the founding goals of the group (Kirton, 2005: 14). In this context, normative commitments refer to the evolving expectations that IOs operate in a more democratic, inclusive, and multipolar manner (Dingwerth et al., 2020: 715).

As highlighted in geopolitical and economic considerations, South Africa’s long-standing position as the sole African representative in the G20, in contrast to Europe’s overrepresentation, both through individual member states and via the EU, has generated persistent critiques of representational asymmetry (Adibe, 2023; Cooper, 2011, 2014). The AU’s full membership offers a response to such critiques, aiming to reduce the democratic deficit by ensuring broader participation from the African continent in global decision-making processes.

Emerging powers have long emphasized the principle of fair representation in global governance institutions and have consistently called for institutional reforms. In this regard, the support extended by India and China to the AU’s inclusion in the G20 reflects their normative commitments and alignment with these reformist demands. At the same time, Western countries have also endorsed the AU’s membership as a means of addressing legitimacy concerns surrounding the G20 and reinforcing the perception of a more inclusive and representative international order. For instance, EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated “The European Union has strongly supported the accession of the African Union. We look forward to working together and contributing to a better functioning, responsive and more inclusive international order” (EEAS, 2023). Similarly, European Council President Charles Michel welcomed the accession, noting that “For more legitimacy, the world must be more inclusive” (EC, 2024). These endorsements reflect a broader commitment among Western nations to enhance the legitimacy of global governance structures by promoting more inclusive representation.

The AU’s membership also carries strong symbolic and ideational significance in terms of global equity. As a collective regional body representing all African states, the AU embodies regional solidarity and identity. Its participation may further help institutionalize African perspectives, priorities, and long-term strategies such as Agenda 2063 within the G20’s normative landscape, facilitating normative diffusion from the Global South. Agenda 2063, emphasizes the aspiration for “an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena” (AU, nd). This long-term strategic framework calls for a reformed global governance architecture in which Africa is afforded equal and effective representation. In this context, the AU’s accession to the G20 symbolizes a partial realization of this vision, providing a potential platform to advocate for core priorities such as climate justice, fair trade, sustainable development, and debt restructuring. This aligns with the growing recognition in the literature that regional organizations can serve as legitimate actors in multilateral forums, thereby reshaping the normative architecture of global governance (Thakur & Langenhove, 2007: 18; Rüland, 2010; Söderbaum, 2015: 21).

Although the AU’s admission to the G20 appears to represent a significant normative turning point, it remains uncertain whether this will translate into genuine equality in decision-making processes and indeed, it had limited impact in the first year of membership (Eickhoff, 2025: 10) particularly on debt restructuring. However, the AU’s transformation into a truly influential actor within the G20 will depend not merely on its presence, but on its constructive and strategic engagement in decision-making processes. Otherwise, this membership may remain little more than a normative instrument serving the legitimacy-producing strategies of existing global powers. More broadly, AU participation could contribute to the dissemination of normative claims from the Global South, thereby strengthening ongoing efforts towards a more equitable and inclusive international order. The drivers, explanations, and G20-specific examples of the AU’s inclusion are summarized in Table 1.

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Table 1.

The Three-Layered Explanatory Framework of the G20’s AU Expansion

Drivers	Explanations	Examples
Geopolitical calculations	Africa’s strategic value in global power competition	-India’s advocacy of the AU during its G20 presidency
		-Chinese strategy to promote South-South cooperation
		-French effort to compensate for its loss of reputation in Africa
Economic considerations	Africa’s young population, natural resources, and trade potential	-Africa’s role in the green transformation
		-AfCFTA’s integration potential
		-Food security and agricultural capacity
Normative commitments	Increasing representation, strengthening democratic legitimacy	-Institutional representation of Africa vs. EU’s dual representation
		-AU’s collective development agenda (Agenda 2063)