Abstract
This review article offers an overview of the current state of the art in the complexity paradigm of international relations.
Only after we are clear about the shape of our dream will we have a chance of attaining it: not merely a ‘science’, but a powerful, parsimonious, and perhaps even elegant science of international politics.
2
Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a ‘science’? Its ‘scientific’ credentials have long concerned proponents and detractors. As Ronald Rogowski’s claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an ‘elegant science of international politics’ has virtually become a ‘dream’ to which his and subsequent generations of IR scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IR’s social-scientific inquiry can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an ‘exact science’, cohorts of IR students have been developing ‘powerful’ and ‘parsimonious’ models for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the ‘balance of power’, for instance. Its aim is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs – parity between adversaries. Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival.
In this way, IR has tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this ‘dream’ of a scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some – such as John G. Ruggie – have made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this ‘deep Newtonian slumber’, if it is to have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to this decentring project by advancing the ‘complexification’ of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science. 3
Originating in the natural sciences, the complexity paradigm challenges the Newtonian view of an orderly world and suggests that global interactions occur in a non-linear fashion. Consequently, the outcomes of such interactions are difficult to infer, let alone to predict. In this respect, the proponents of the complexification of IR have noted that while the ‘hard’ sciences have become increasingly ‘soft’ as a result of their acceptance of the uncertainty and randomness of reality, IR has ‘hardened’ as a result of its suppression of ambiguity, disregard for surprises and over-investment in its capacity to forecast international developments. Richard Ned Lebow explains this search for (and commitment to) a predictable worldview of regularities as a ‘need for psychological closure’, reflecting a desire for definitive conclusions in support of preferred theoretical assumptions. 4 It is in this context that Damian Popolo asks the pertinent question whether ‘scientific IR’ is not premised on ‘fundamentally misleading notions about science’. 5 In other words, the question that emerges is whether things appear perplexing because the ken of the mainstream is askew.
In its response to this query, the complexity paradigm reveals that Newtonian IR tends to operate on very little information (usually a few variables); yet, this does not prevent it from jumping to conclusions as if it had knowledge about the whole picture. Such lack of sensitivity to what IR does not know then underpins a model of the world that is rarely stumped. As a result, when the accepted framework for explanation and understanding fails – that is, it faces a question that it cannot answer (for instance, ‘Why IR failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War?’) – IR comes up with a question that it can answer (for instance, ‘Why the Cold War ended?’, answer: ‘Because the Soviet Union could no longer maintain the balance of power and, therefore, without such capability it could no longer survive in the international system and had to implode’).
The complexified IR suggests that by answering the wrong questions, Newtonian IR enacts a theatre of validity to generate explanations far more coherent than reality. Therefore, the ‘incredible rate of failure’ of the very frameworks asserting the ‘law-like regularities’ of international politics to anticipate any of the major events of the past 25 years should not be surprising. 6 The irony of this situation is not lost on Lebow, who notes that it is the ‘commitment to science and scientific methods by international relations scholars’ that provides ‘a major impediment to their practice of science’. 7 Thus, this review article assesses the three books under review in the context of the current state of the art in the emerging complexity paradigm of IR. Since this paradigm intends a complete rethinking of the discipline, the article will focus on the complexification of the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of IR. It has to be stressed at the outset that while IR students will find all three books under review of immense interest, their authors reach out to much wider and interdisciplinary audiences – thus, the collection edited by Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight will be of immense relevance to any of the subfields of political science, especially international political economy; Lebow’s work has historians, literary theorists and psychologists in mind; while Popolo’s book addresses political theorists and philosophers.
The Complex Ontology of IR
When he urged IR to come out of its ‘degenerating’ Newtonian repose, Ruggie specifically beckoned that the discipline re-engage with the reality of international life. As he pointed out with chagrin and frustration, ‘the term “ontology” typically draws either blank stares or bemused smiles’ from the IR community. 8 The contention is that IR is plagued by attention blindness – that is, because of its preoccupation with ‘reductive theories about “the logic of anarchy”’, 9 it cannot discern the vast and heterogeneous reality of global affairs. Owing to its Newtonian commitments, mainstream IR views reality ‘not as a continuous flux … but as a series of instantaneous “snapshots” extracted from this flux’. 10 Thus, as Lebow suggests, the dominant accounts of inter-state relations miss the ‘open-ended, nonlinear nature of the social world’. 11 He insists that the ‘confluence and consequences [of international politics] are best envisaged as a complex, nonlinear system’, 12 ‘in which multiple interrelated chains of causation have unanticipated interactions and unpredictable consequences’. 13
The ontology of complexity therefore provokes a reckoning with the multiple possibilities of becoming and becoming-other inherent in the pervasive ambiguity of global life. 14 As Popolo demonstrates, such commitment reflects the philosophical engagement of Gilles Deleuze and his insistence on ‘the continuous precipitation of new life and new meaning’. 15 Of the three books under review, the volume edited by Joseph and Wight engages with the issue of ontology most explicitly. A unique feature of this collection is that it offers the first comprehensive account of Scientific Realism (SR) – one of the strands in the complexification of IR. SR originates in Roy Bhaskar’s work on the philosophy of science. Its application to IR is described explicitly as a ‘shift from epistemology to ontology’. 16 The reason for this shift is the understanding of reality as ‘stratified’ between the actual, the empirical and the real. 17 This stratification addresses three of the key ontological claims animating the complexification of IR: (i) that the international is emergent; (ii) that the international is irreducible to and much more than its constituent parts; and (iii) that the international is subject to unexpected and (often) radical transformations – that is, small alterations in initial conditions can lead to profound changes in outcomes. 18
In this setting, SR asserts that the world with which IR engages, self-organises in complex and contingent ways. This observation is also confirmed by the other two books under review. For instance, Lebow frames world politics as ‘an open system whose outcomes are sensitive to – if not always the result of – chance, agency, and confluence’, 19 while Popolo depicts international life as an ‘irreversible’ process that ‘grows out of complex systems to determine its own rules of development’. 20 Yet, what distinguishes the collection edited by Joseph and Wight is the confrontation with the ‘ontological issue of the different layering of the social (and natural) world’. 21 Conventionally, IR has tended to ignore that international politics both inhabit and are embedded in complex spaces. In this respect, SR infers one of the greatest ontological boons of complexified IR – the recognition of the ‘totality’ 22 of human and non-human interactions in global life.
Newtonian IR has been exclusively anthropocentric and inspired by the ‘Enlightenment belief in a “makeable world”’, according to which human/socio-political systems (such as civil society, states, international organisations, etc.) are both detached from (not only conceptually, but in practice) and in control of the ‘non-human’ environment in which they occur. 23 It is worth pointing out that such diverse and profound considerations of the complex ontology of international politics are intended not merely as a criticism of Newtonian IR, but also as a provocation for re-engaging with the ongoing and overlapping interconnections animating global life. In fact, the radical totality of human and non-human interactions has recently been framed as ‘posthuman IR’. Following SR’s recognition of the qualitative and quantitative difference between human and non-human systems, the ‘complex ecologism’ of ‘posthuman IR’ uncovers that the ‘world is not divided into territories in which bounded societies of humans live under singular political authority and in the context of discrete natural environments’; 24 instead, global life is ‘a complex interweave of numerous systems nested, intersected and embedded in each other, all undergoing processes of co-evolution and linked by innumerable feedback loops’. 25 SR echoes this ontological commitment by describing world affairs as complex interactions ‘between people and each other, their products, their activities, nature and themselves’. 26
An Epistemology for the Complexity of IR
As it can be expected, the inclusive ontological purview of the complexity paradigm presents a number of analytical challenges. Yet, as the proponents of SR indicate, assertions about the appropriate ways of describing the world emerge from the ontological assumptions of what the world is like. 27 Thus, on a meta-theoretical level, the problem stems from the realisation that we can never be fully cognisant of the underlying mechanisms and processes of global life, because this will imply ‘knowing the not knowable’. 28 Lebow explains that the contingency of our knowledge reflects ‘the critical importance of non-observables and non-systematic factors’. This should not, however, be taken as an indication of the impossibility to provide robust IR interpretation ‘rooted in non-linearity and confluence’. 29 In this respect, the acknowledgement of the limits of our knowledge can become a very productive analytical point of departure.
While all three books under review pay attention to epistemological concerns, Popolo’s endeavour specifically addresses this aspect of complexified IR. In fact, he ventures that the complexity paradigm provides a ‘genuine Epistemic Revolution’, which renders the Newtonian paradigm ‘obsolete’. 30 What is revolutionary about this approach is not only its debunking of the common wisdoms of ‘scientific IR’, but also its dedication to ‘“uncertain knowledge”, where uncertainty is regarded and accepted as an intrinsic quality of nature and not as a result of imperfect knowledge’. 31 The suggestion is that by focusing mainly on stable, equilibrium configurations, the study of IR has remained consciously ignorant of a whole ‘new species’ of discontinuous intuition. 32 Thus, by painting itself in to the Newtonian corner, the disciplinary mainstream has, on the one hand, evaded the need to recognise that there are dynamics which are not only unknown, but probably cannot ever be meaningfully rendered comprehensible, and, on the other hand, stifled endeavours that can engage in thoughtful deliberation and productive management of the discontinuities, complexity and non-linearity of global life.
There are several important features underpinning such an approach to knowledge. Firstly, the contingency of both global life and our ability to know it makes it impossible to construct predictive explanations of outcomes. Lebow is quite emphatic when he asserts that ‘[v]ariation across time, due to the changing conditions and human reflection, the openness of social systems, and the complexity of the interaction among stipulated causes make the likelihood of predictive theory – even of a probabilistic kind – extraordinarily low’. 33 Thus, the proponents of the complexity paradigm ascertain that due to its over-reliance on predictive theories, mainstream IR ‘must be totally discarded’. 34 A further reason for such rejection is the observation that the production of knowledge by Newtonian approaches has also limited ‘what is open for debate’. 35 For instance, due to the preoccupation with inter-state relations, the discipline produces foot soldiers for this or that theoretical approach to international anarchy rather than students genuinely interested in observing the complex patterns of global affairs.
Secondly, the unwillingness to engage with the unpredictable becoming of global life reflects the patterns of linear causality that still seem to inform the disciplinary mainstream. The issue of ‘complex causation’, 36 as Lebow puts it, aims to enhance sensitivity to the unintended consequences of international interactions. Such effects defy the conventional focus on purposive behaviour. In fact, it is ‘chance, confluence, and accident that often play a determining role’ in global life, rather than intentionality. 37 The complexified IR thereby intends to supplant reductive explanations by considering the ‘conjuncturally determined’ patterns of world affairs. 38
Thirdly, the complexity paradigm critiques the way in which Newtonian IR has theorised international developments by focusing on major events. Lebow indicates that this bias towards events-thinking belies the predisposition ‘to think of big events as having big causes’. 39 For instance, the origins of war are usually attributed either to singular events or to the resolve of specific individuals, rather than ‘the result of nonlinear confluences’. 40 Thus, the focus on both spatially and temporally proximate causes underpins the blindness to the complex interactions of global life, which turns the disciplinary terrain into a frozen expanse of accidents. Complexified IR evinces that ‘mainstream IR cannot talk about underlying process, only about systems and units’. That is why it advocates the abandonment of the ‘talk of levels of analysis in favour of complex, layered assemblies of social relations’. 41
The three-step of such epistemology for the complexity of IR intends simultaneously to rethink and reinvent the study of international politics. Interestingly, all three books under review are in agreement that this should be done through the ‘demystification of science’. 42 Such demystification entails the rejection of the Newtonian ‘scientific fallacies’ 43 and the acceptance of ‘the fact of epistemological realism: namely, that all beliefs are socially produced, so that knowledge is transient, and neither truth values nor criteria of rationality exist outside of historical time’. 44 It is also worth pointing out that while assisting the explanation ‘of our chaotic and unordered world’, the complexity paradigm is idiosyncratically self-reflexive about its own epistemological investments in a specific understanding of the international and readily concedes that ‘knowledge sometimes has the effect of accelerating disorder’. 45
The Methodology of Complexified IR
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of complexified IR underpin how it examines international politics. Commentators have noted that the complexity paradigm has already spawned a variety of innovative approaches ranging from agent-based modelling and computer simulations to scenario-building and intuitive judgement. 46 The proponents of SR frame this development as ‘methodological pluralism’, which makes possible the ‘direct observational access’ of the patterns of international affairs. 47 Popolo insists that in this way the methodology of complexity assists with gaining a deeper understanding of ‘our own human experience’. 48
Of the three books under review, the issue of how to study the complexity of global life is addressed most consistently by Lebow. What is unique about his project is that he offers a detailed and coherent account of probably the most understudied and underutilised approach in IR – counterfactual analysis. Inhabiting the realms of speculative thinking, counterfactual analysis generates ‘what if’ conjectures, experiments and scenarios to assess the validity of different reality claims. Lebow offers several fascinating and poignantly thorough case studies of such what-iffing – for instance, had Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria not been assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914 would World War I have occurred, or if Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart had lived to the age of 65 would the Holocaust have taken place.
What such speculative thinking does is to disrupt the accepted disciplinary narrative and question what is perceived to be the ‘normal’ course of events. By insisting on the ‘plausibility of alternative worlds’, counterfactual analysis lays bare the ‘contingency of our own world’. 49 In this way, Lebow convincingly demonstrates that the speculative method of counterfactual analysis provides powerful experimental tools for liberating IR from the tyranny of linear logic and allows it to construct ‘more sophisticated understandings of how the world works’. 50 At the same time, counterfactual histories map out potentialities of how the world may work. Lebow is quite blunt that Newtonian modes of thinking lead IR into the rut of accounting for ‘transformative events in terms of single factors’. 51 Lebow’s meticulous consideration of counterfactual analysis unveils that complexified IR offers intriguing heuristic devices that both challenge conventional wisdoms and provoke analytical imaginations.
The Ethics (and Practice) of Political Action under Complexity
The cognitive patterns of complexified IR demand meaningful engagement with the self-organising ambivalence of global life. In this setting, the contention is that ethically oriented political action requires both the acknowledgement of and responsible adaptation to the turbulent reality of international interactions. 52 For instance, Lebow indicates that ‘ethical beliefs and expectations’ inform our ‘understandings of the world and how it works’. 53 The ethos of political action under complexity therefore demands accepting to live with ‘the fundamental principle of uncertainty whilst moving away from the very modern idea [that] the role of reason [is to provide] certainty for decisions on human action’. 54 Such a framing also suggests the emancipatory potential embedded in and emerging from the ‘explanatory critique’ of complexified IR. 55
Normatively speaking, the ethics of political action under complexity demand the development of relevant knowledge about the minimal conditions for resilient and sustainable living. Thus, in summarising the ethical implications of the complexity paradigm in the three books under review, it can be inferred that the ethos of political action discussed by them hinges on three principles: (i) precautionary principle – stressing the need to develop ‘the art of working with uncertainty’; (ii) humility principle – recognising that ‘action escapes the will of the actor’; and (iii) resilience principle – developing the adaptive capacity to ‘expect the unexpected as the norm’. 56
Such consideration of the ethical underpinnings of complexified IR suggests that political action does not occur in a vacuum, but in idiosyncratic and dynamic spatio-temporal context. 57 At the same time such engagement contributes to the conversation on what being free under the conditions of complexity might mean. The following sections briefly tease out the policy and normative implications for political action under complexity. Such suggestions are underpinned by the key ontological position of complexified IR – that the ‘international’ encompasses the global life of human/socio-political and non-human/biophysical interactions. As Ernst Haas reminds us, ‘ethical choices have evolutionary consequences’. Thus, while ‘the state of nature’ is no longer just a fictional narrative but ‘the most pressing of practical issues’, there has been insufficient attention to the policy and ethical choices demanded of decision-making in such a complex context. 58
Improvisation
Recognising the pervasive uncertainty of global life, the complexity paradigm furnishes IR with ‘concepts to act with’. 59 More often than not, such emergent capacities for political action have been associated with the concept of improvisation. Alfonso Montuori points out that improvisation is usually conceived as an exception, ‘as making the best of things, while awaiting a return to the way things should be done’. As he demonstrates, however, improvisational policy-making is neither deterministic, nor arbitrary; instead, it reflects an ability ‘to make choices in context, which in turn affect the context’. Thus, the choice to improvise does not indicate an inability to conduct ‘business-as-usual’, but recognition that it is the cognitive patterns of ‘business-as-usual’ (in particular, the belief in ‘the one correct way of doing things’) that are accountable for the current predicaments of global life, such as climate change. 60
Let us take the experience of surfers (probably one of the most obvious socio-ecological relationships out there) as an example. Surfers go out into the ocean expecting to ride a wave whose size, speed, strength and timing is completely unknown to them. In the ocean, they spend significant time (quite literally) dancing with the rhythm of the water. In this dance, the surfers learn to distinguish between the different ripples of the water and read which one is likely to be an ‘ankle buster’ (a small wave), an ‘awesome’ (a nearly perfect wave), a ‘cruncher’ (an impossible to ride wave) and so on. Premised on their interpretative dancing with the unpredictable motion of the ocean, surfers decide whether they are going to take off or back down from a wave. Their fitness, in terms of adaptation to the movements of the water, allows surfers to make decisions which are crucial to their ability to catch and ride the wave. Yet, while waves are similar to each other, they are never exactly alike, and surfers never know – regardless of whether one is a ‘kook’ (a newbie) or a ‘boss’ (a pro) – how the ride is going to proceed and whether it is going to be successful at all. The acceptance of the normalcy of failure is part of the decision-making of surfers. In essence, each ride is an improvisation combining the individual skills of the surfer and the unpredictable shape, motion and breaking point of the wave.
Yet, it is this inherent insecurity of surfing that underpins its appeal. Having accepted unpredictability as a constituent ingredient of the surfing experience, surfers not only learn to live with it, but also gain the freedom to respond creatively to such uncertainty. In terms of policymaking, the suggestion is that leaders need to develop a surfer-like ability to revel in ambiguity by perfecting the capacity to make decisions based on incomplete and constantly changing information, rather than try to control, constrain and simplify the indeterminacy of global life. In this setting, policy-heterogeneity – the simultaneous maintenance of diverse decision-making strategies (alongside the willingness and capacity to develop new ones) to address the contingencies of unintended changes in global life – reflects the demand for resilient modes of policymaking.
Thus, rather than reducing uncertainty, the ethics of improvisation demands political action capable of continually imagining global life other than what it currently is. In this respect, and paraphrasing Haas, rather than an inflexible steering of the ship of state, a policymaker has to have a surfer-like capacity for ‘zigging and zagging’ through the turbulent reality of global life in which ‘old objectives are questioned, new objectives clamour for satisfaction and the rationality accepted as adequate in the past ceases to be a legitimate guide to future action’. 61 At the same time, it cautions that even if adapting appropriately, improvisation is not boundless. It can be quickly undone by external surprise. For instance, going back to the surfer’s metaphor, the unexpected appearance of a shark riding the same wave infuses the decision-making context with emotions ranging from panic to an adrenaline-fuelled exhilaration. At any rate, such surprises (and the emotions that they provoke) impact on the surfer’s investment in a successful ride (from the one prior to the appearance of the shark). Hence, while those who are afraid of sharks most probably should not go into the ocean, the knowledge that sharks inhabit the same waters and, thereby, are not unlikely to be encountered when surfing encourages an awareness that assists in the development of a capacity to respond appropriately when confronted with rapid change and surprises.
The Art of Acting Politically
The discussion of improvisation above backstops the normative suggestion of the complexity paradigm – namely, that the capacity to respond to the contingent interaction of global life requires learning the art of acting politically. The claim here is that ethical political action requires responsible creative adaptation that addresses the complex interactions of global life while maintaining the coherence and continuity of socio-ecological systems. The contention is that decision-making under the conditions of complexity engages individuals as conscious subjects in a responsible and sustainable interaction with their environment.
Normatively speaking, the complexity of global life confronts IR with the ‘political effects of agents that are not conventionally perceived as “political”’. 62 Hence, the ‘threats’, ‘dangers’ and ‘insecurity’ emanating from non-human systems are not conventionally perceived as intentional – that is, there is no conflict of wills between distinct (and opposing) strategic actors. 63 For instance, the ‘relocation’ of diseases from one part of the world to another is only one instance of the political effects of such ‘non-political’ agents. The question is: how can we all participate meaningfully in something that can plausibly, but still only vaguely, be called international politics populated by actors whose subjectivity lacks ‘agential intentionality’? 64 While this question does not have a singular and definitive answer, a crucial feature of the responses suggested by the complexity paradigm demand an ethos willing to accept and engage with the ambiguity of global life.
Thus, as Edgar Morin suggests, the recognition of complexity has important effects on the ethics of political action: (i) its ‘multiplication of alternatives’ creates favourable conditions for innovative strategies; and (ii) its randomness underscores the increasing significance of individual decisions, which can lead to irreversible and unpredictable changes for the entire process. Thus, just because an action is irreversible does not mean that it should not be undertaken. Instead, acknowledging this ‘ethical complexification’, the art of acting politically engages in an ‘ecology of action’, which Morin calls ‘living life’ – that is, ‘not just living’, but ‘knowing how to resist in life’ by ‘daring the acceptance to risk’. 65 In other words, the ethics of resilience suggests that ‘the search for a single “optimum” strategy may neither be possible nor desirable. Any strategy can only be optimal under certain conditions and when those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal’. 66
Also, since political action takes place in a (complex) context, policy-makers need to accept that their decisions will have unpredictable and (oftentimes) unintended outcomes. Decision-making free from the aspiration to control change rests on a choice to generate ‘desirable pathways’ in the face of rapid and fast alterations and pervasive uncertainty and risk. 67 Therefore, the claim here is that the art of acting politically attests to the ethical choices demanded by a decision-making ‘dancing to the rhythms of global life’. Such normative understanding borrows from (what John Keats has termed as) the poetry of ‘negative capabilities’ – the ‘capabilities of being in uncertainty, mysteries, doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’ – which demonstrate an ability to think ‘under fire’, live with ambiguity, remain ‘content with half-knowledge’ and engage in a non-defensive way with change, while resisting the impulse (merely) to react. 68 Thus, the reference to the art of acting politically reveals that the study and practice of IR should not aim at reducing (and controlling) the complexity of global life, but by acknowledging its interwovenness, develop adaptive capacities for tolerating and working with change.
Conclusion
It has become expected of policymakers, pundits and scholars to refer to a whole raft of global problems – from the economic downturn to climate change – as complex. While the complexity of these issues is indeed staggering, the term complexity is used merely as a descriptor of the intricate nature of these challenges. However, as the three books under review demonstrate, complexity is not an accidental word, but a key to the understanding and explanation of global life. Therefore, all three studies position themselves within the small, but resilient, oeuvre of complexified IR.
A key feature of this literature is its rejection of the linear reductionism dominating the IR mainstream. In fact, some proponents of the complexity paradigm have suggested that such pandering to a truncated representation of the reality of global life has turned IR into a ‘miserable science’. 69 As this review article has demonstrated, at the heart of this misery is IR’s conception of ‘science’, which has no space for the uncertainty and randomness of global life. This ambiguity was not lost on the so-called fathers of the discipline. For instance, Hans Morgenthau was well aware of ‘the inevitable gap’ between ‘the science of political science’ (or, what he also called, ‘good – that is rational’ – international politics) and the fact that the ‘political reality’ of world affairs ‘is replete with contingencies and systemic irregularities’ (or, what he labelled, international politics ‘as it actually is’). 70
It seems that IR has forgotten Morgenthau’s injunction that reality is far more complex than his account suggested. As the books under review evidence, the complexity paradigm provides a much-needed corrective to the ‘deep Newtonian slumber’ of IR. While exposing the ‘scientific fallacy’ of the discipline, it demonstrates that ‘an alternative understanding of IR’ is ‘not only possible, but also necessary’. 71 A critical feature of this alternative understanding is the non-anthropocentric ontology of complexified IR. It asserts that ‘only thinking beyond the human condition can allow us to fully appreciate history as becoming, as the nonlinear process which fully reflects the nature of the vortex of time’. 72 At the same time, a complexified IR offers a non-linear engagement with the dynamics of global life, which perceives the future as uncertain and the present as irreversible.
Thus, going back to the query with which this review article began – ‘Is IR a science?’ – the complexity paradigm suggests that it is much more pertinent to respond to the questions, ‘What kind of science?’ and ‘Science to what ends?’ The three books under review offer distinct, yet veritable, paths through which these issues can be interrogated. Equally significantly, the authors of these prescient investigations have also produced the kind of IR studies that are bound to trigger debate and invite (if not beckon) their readers to pursue further the ideas discussed on their pages. Most poignantly, perhaps, the three books under review have demonstrated that the cognitive crisis in the conventional study of IR becomes the beginning of its complexification.
Footnotes
Author Biography
1.
John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998), 194.
2.
Ronald Rogowski, ‘International Politics: The Past as Science’, International Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1968): 394–418, 418.
3.
Antoine Bousquet and Simon Curtis, ‘Beyond Models and Metaphors: Complexity Theory, Systems Thinking, and International Relations’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (2011): 43–62; Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism, and Global Politics (London: Zed Books, 2011); Robert Deuchars, ‘Deleuze, DeLanda and Social Complexity: Implications for the “International”’, Journal of International Political Theory 6, no. 2 (2010): 161–87; Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy: A New Approach to 21st Century Politics, Policy, and Society (London: Routledge, 2010); Neil Harrison, ed., Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006); Emilian Kavalski, ‘The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International Relations Theory: Notes on the Application of Complexity Theory to the Study of International Life’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 3 (2007): 435–454; Dylan Kissane, Beyond Anarchy: The Complex and Chaotic Dynamics of International Politics (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2011); Orion Lewis and Sven Steinmo, ‘Taking Evolution Seriously in Political Science’, Theory in Biosciences 129, nos. 2/3 (2010): 235–45; Shu-Yun Ma, ‘Political Science at the Edge of Chaos’, International Political Science Review 28, no. 1 (2007): 57–78; Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What to Do about It (London: Little, Brown, 2009).
4.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 259.
5.
Popolo, A New Science, 23.
6.
Cudworth and Hobden, Posthuman International Relations, 10.
7.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 259.
8.
Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 194.
9.
Ken Booth, quoted in Emilian Kavalski, ‘The Complexity of Global Security Governance’, Global Society 22, no. 4 (2008): 423–43, 431.
10.
Popolo, A New Science, 25.
11.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 285.
12.
Ibid., 93.
13.
Ibid., 77.
14.
Emilian Kavalski, ‘Timescapes of Security: Clocks, Clouds, and the Complexity of Security Governance’, World Futures 65, no. 7 (2009): 527–51, 543.
15.
Popolo, A New Science, 43; Deuchars, ‘Deleuze, DeLanda and Social Complexity’, 162; William E. Connolly, A World of Becoming (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
16.
Faruk Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism, International Relations Theory, and Marxism’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 169.
17.
Ibid., 170.
18.
David Leon, ‘Reductionism, Emergence, and Explanation in International Relations Theory’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 38; Jonathan Joseph, ‘The International as Emergent: Challenging Old and New Orthodoxies in International Relations Theory’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 61.
19.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 266.
20.
Popolo, A New Science, 137–8.
21.
Joseph, ‘The International as Emergent’, 65.
22.
Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism’, 171.
23.
Kavalski, ‘The Complexity of Global Security’, 432–4.
24.
Cudworth and Hobden, Posthuman International Relations, 173.
25.
Ibid., 75.
26.
Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism’, 172.
27.
Joseph, ‘The International as Emergent’, 65.
28.
Kavalski, ‘The Fifth Debate’, 448.
29.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 6–7.
30.
Popolo, A New Science, 3–6.
31.
Ibid., 209.
32.
Robert Holt, Brian Job and Lawrence Markus, ‘Catastrophe Theory and the Study of War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, no. 2 (1978): 171–208, 203. Warren Phillips and Richard Rimkunas, ‘The Concept of Crisis in International Politics’, Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 3 (1978): 259–72.
33.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 265.
34.
Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism’, 170.
35.
Joseph, ‘The International as Emergent’, 53.
36.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 10.
37.
Ibid., 258.
38.
Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism’, 171.
39.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 266.
40.
Ibid., 262.
41.
Joseph, ‘The International as Emergent’, 64–5.
42.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 286.
43.
Popolo, A New Science, 22.
44.
Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, ‘Scientific Realism and International Relations’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 13.
45.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 3.
46.
Kavalski, ‘The Fifth Debate’, 447.
47.
Milja Kurki, ‘Critical Realism and the Analysis of Democratisation: Does Philosophy of Science Matter’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 141.
48.
Popolo, A New Science, 34.
49.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 17.
50.
Ibid., 276.
51.
Ibid., 262.
52.
Jorge Rivas, ‘Realism. For Real this Time: Scientific Realism Is Not a Compromise between Positivism and Interpretivism’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 217.
53.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 47.
54.
Popolo, A New Science, 215.
55.
Wight and Joseph, ‘Scientific Realism’, 23.
56.
Cudworth and Hobden, Posthuman International Relations, 184.
57.
Rivas, ‘Realism’, 225; Heikki Patomäki, ‘Exploring Possible, Likely and Desirable Global Futures: Beyond the Closed vs Open Systems Dichotomy’, in Scientific Realism, eds Joseph and Wight, 149–54.
58.
Both Ernst Haas and Ken Booth, quoted in Emilian Kavalski, ‘From the Cold War to Global Warming: Observing Complexity in IR’, Political Studies Review 9, no. 1 (2011): 1–12, 11.
59.
Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy.
60.
Alfonso Montuori, ‘The Complexity of Improvisation and the Improvisation of Complexity’, Human Relations 56, no. 2 (2005): 237–55.
61.
Ernst Haas, ‘Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration’, International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 173–212 at 184–93.
62.
Gwyn Prins, quoted in Kavalski, ‘Timescapes of Security’, 544.
63.
Ole Wæver, Concepts of Security (Copenhagen: Copenhagen University Press, 1997), 230.
64.
Cudworth and Hobden, Posthuman International Relations, 140–68.
65.
Edgar Morin, quoted in Kavalski, ‘Timescapes of Security’, 530.
66.
Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organizations (Oxford: Pergamon, 2003), 14.
67.
Cudworth and Hobden, Posthuman International Relations, 181.
68.
Quoted in Kavalski, ‘Timescapes of Security’, 546.
69.
Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy, 73.
70.
Quoted in Kavalski, ‘From the Cold War’, 3.
71.
Yavlaç, ‘Critical Realism’, 168.
72.
Popolo, A New Science, 28–9.
