Abstract
This study offers an interpretation of Ecclesiastes 10.8–11 in light of the Egyptian literary topos of scribal satire most popularly exemplified by the Teaching of Khety. Scholars have traditionally posited a link between Khety and Sirach 38.24—39.11, yet Qohelet likewise lists a series of tasks, their outcomes, and, at the end, the superiority of some other thing. Unlike the Egyptian motif and Sirach, however, Qohelet’s teaching is brief and a mere setup for the punchline he provides in the final part of his message (v. 11) where he repudiates the view that wisdom makes one invincible. Rather than judge the snake charmer of verse 11 to be lazy, unprepared, incompetent, or slow (all popular readings), Qohelet sees the conjuror’s wisdom as useless before a serpent that cannot be charmed in the first place. By this assessment, wisdom itself is shown to be inadequate rather than the worker.
1. Introduction
In Ecclesiastes 10.8–11, Qohelet lists a number of ordinary chores he claims will result in eventual disaster. It is against this backdrop of inevitable calamity that he, citing a traditional proverb (v. 8a) along with others he may have invented himself, props up the value of applying wisdom to one’s work (v. 10b). His brief exposé on labor is only a setup, though, for his main contribution to the topic when he reveals that wisdom is utterly useless in certain circumstances (v. 11). 1 Qohelet’s claim is jarring and arguably unique among the Hebrew sages, and yet his entire presentation strikes a traditional chord. Stylistically, he delivers the first part of his message (vv. 8–10) by mimicking two motifs known from Hebrew and Egyptian wisdom texts. The first is the act/character-consequence topos known primarily from Proverbs, where wicked behaviors have inevitable repercussions. The second pattern reflects a rhetorical technique known to us from the much older Egyptian Teaching of Khety and comparable texts that address the superiority of the scribal profession to all others. 2 Qohelet uses this model to shore up his own satirical claim that wisdom solves all the laborer’s problems (v. 10b). He then contradicts that claim in v. 11 by demonstrating the limits of wisdom.
The present study begins with a brief survey of modern interpretations of Eccl. 10.8–11 followed by exegetical notes that reflect the preferred reading. The article then concludes with a comparison of Qohelet’s satire with the Egyptian Teaching of Khety.
2. Modern interpretations of Eccl. 10.8–11
For the last century and a half, the meaning of this passage has been debated vigorously in biblical scholarship, and it is not difficult to see why. Charles Wright, along with many others since, noted that this pericope, ‘linguistically speaking, is confessedly the most difficult passage in the book of Koheleth’. 3 Gary D. Salyer called it ‘notoriously opaque and obtuse’. 4 As Graham Ogden noted regarding his own tentative interpretation of these verses, we ought to ‘caution against building theological “castles” on an uncertain foundation’. 5 Accordingly, traditional readings remain fairly close to one another, as the summary below shows; however, newer interpretations have since emerged that attempt to relate verses 8–11 to 4–7 and/or 12–15.
a. Traditional and alternative approaches
Chapter 10 is largely understood in modern scholarship to be a miscellaneous collection of sayings from Qohelet generally centered around the topic of wisdom versus folly, couched within which is a passage on how wisdom can help to mitigate the inherent risks of life (10.8–11). 6 Ogden, for example, identifies 9.17–18 as an introduction to chapter 10, all of which he labels ‘Wisdom’s Strength and Vulnerability’, seeing 9.17–18 as the key proverbs that make this very point. 7 For Ogden, wisdom is presented as useful but not inviolable: It only takes one fool to undermine its effectiveness (e.g., 10.1). Hence, the dominant interpretation of this passage sees it as a straightforward exhortation by Qohelet to apply wisdom to one’s work while acknowledging, in verse 11, that wisdom is limited by the inevitability of human error. In other words, the magician of verse 11 is typically thought to be negligent, careless, lazy, slow, or somehow inept. Scholars may acknowledge that this shows wisdom’s limitations, but they often explain verse 11 as an example of human error, not a failure of wisdom itself. We could summarize this majority interpretation of verse 11, as do Wright (1888), Barton (1908), Gordis (1968), and others, with a version of the expression, ‘There is no use locking the stable after the horse has bolted’. 8
Non-traditional interpretations include the popular view that chapter 10 is more specifically about how to behave with respect to the royal court or in light of ruling authorities. 9 Seow combines the topics of risk and corrupt authority by explaining that verses 4–7 are about how the incompetence of rulers has led to the topsy-turvy world of uncertainty described in vv. 8–11. 10 For Seow, this fits best within a Persian context, but for others, the Ptolemaic setting makes better sense. 11 Still others divide verses 8–11 by referring to various layers of redaction, but Lavoie argues that this is often done without sufficient support. 12
b. A nuanced understanding of a traditional approach
A smaller number of scholars share the traditional reading but articulate the function of verse 11 differently. For them, it is not the ineptitude of the laborer that results in wisdom’s failure to protect but the ineffectiveness of wisdom itself to save from all calamities. As Loader (1986) notes concerning verse 11, Qohelet ‘robs wisdom of its certainty’. 13 This subtle difference is very important. If Qohelet is arguing that the snake-charmer has failed to use his wisdom, then the onus is on the laborer just as it was in verse 10, creating a redundancy in Qohelet’s lesson. While the parallelism of verses 10–11 may lead the reader to expect similar meanings for both, this need not be the case. If the object of Qohelet’s criticism is not the laborer but an unrealistic view of wisdom, then the effect of verse 11 is to rip the rug from beneath the feet of verses 8–10. According to this latter approach, verse 11 would be speaking to wisdom’s inefficacy, offering a counterpoint to those who think that wisdom makes one invincible. Though beneficial (7.11–12), wisdom clearly cannot guarantee positive outcomes (9.11). 14 Hence, wisdom’s value is portrayed by Qohelet not only as vulnerable to human misapplication but as vulnerable to God, since nothing can alter his ‘work’ (7.13; 8.17; 11.5). 15
If Qohelet is exposing wisdom’s inefficacy in verse 11, then the content of verses 8–10 cannot be taken as sincere. Accordingly, some deny that Qohelet offers real advice here, noting that these lines comprise a setup for his true opinion in verse 11. Schwienhorst-Schönberger (2004), for example, is among those who see verses 8–11 as going beyond the basic standard of communication, exposing a distinction between verses 8–10 (traditional wisdom) and verse 11 (Qohelet’s correction of traditional wisdom). The first set of verses (8–10) features the targeted teaching, that if a person applies wisdom, they can be protected from all of life’s dangers. 16 He sees in verse 10b the notion that wisdom provides absolute protection from harm, putting the onus squarely on the folly of humans who have failed to apply it. In other words, Qohelet has allowed the traditionalists to have their say before criticizing them in verse 11. 17
My own reading of this passage follows the fundamental observation found in Heim, Weeks, and several others, that Qohelet is doing more here than meets the eye. As Heim puts it, ‘Why [does Qohelet] spend so much effort on stating the obvious? The answer lies in the proverbial string’s contextual function. Qoheleth is making a pointedly funny yet subversive point’. 18 While I agree that Qohelet’s words entail overly obvious advice that hints at subversive messaging, I do not take verses 8–11 as his attempt to apply ‘the threat of accidental injury to the strained political situation’ 19 but rather as an attempt to confront a problematic claim within Israelite thought, that wisdom never fails.
3. Translation and notes on 10.8–11
v. 8a Whoever digs a pit, into it he will fall;
v. 8b Whoever breaks down a wall, him will a snake bite.
v. 9a Whoever quarries stones will be injured by them;
v. 9b Whoever splits logs will be endangered by them.
v. 10a If the iron becomes blunt, and one has not sharpened the face,
then he must exert greater strength,
v. 10b but the advantage of the skilled worker is wisdom.
v. 11 If the uncharmable snake bites, then there is no advantage for the charmer.
a. Chore #1: Digging pits (v. 8a)
The line reads: ‘Whoever digs a pit, into it he will fall’. The chiastic arrangement of verses 8–9 and 10-11 argue in favor of keeping them together as a single teaching: serpent (v. 8b), cutting logs (v. 9b) // cutting (v. 10a), serpent (v. 11a). The act-consequence topos in 10.8a appears abundantly elsewhere, of course (e.g., Prov. 10.2, 9; 11.25; 12.3, 14, 21, 23; 14.11; 21.21; 22.8), but the verse belongs to a subgroup of wicked people who fall into the traps they set for others (e.g., Pss 9.15; 35.8; Prov. 28.10, 18). To narrow things further, only five parallel expressions in the Hebrew Bible exhibit both the action of digging and the consequence of falling into one’s own trap: Ps. 7.16 [Eng. 15], 9.16 [Eng. 15], 57.7 [Eng. 6], Prov. 26.27a, and Eccl. 10.8a. However, the proverb in 10.8a most likely refers to hunting or other agricultural activity given the nature of the parallel proverb in verse 8b and the remaining chores. 20
The two most closely related Hebrew expressions, grammatically speaking, are Prov. 26.27a and Eccl. 10.8a. Though lexically distinct, their syntax is identical, suggesting that Qohelet has made use of this proverb to set a traditional tone for what follows. The remaining chores of breaking down hedges, quarrying stones, and splitting logs in verses 8–9 are also represented by substantival participles, a common way of referring to actors in Proverbs. Qohelet’s apparent use of the act-consequence topos is represented by 10.8a’s close relationship to these parallel expressions, which has implications for the mood of the verb ‘to fall’ (נפל) as a future indicative. To this list of Hebrew parallels one could add Sir. 27.26a (ὁ ὀρύσσων βόθρον εἰς αὐτὸν ἐμπεσεῖται) 21 which is a mirror image of Eccl. 10.8 in the LXX (ὁ ὀρύσσων βόθρον εἰς αὐτὸν ἐμπεσεῖται) and very close to Prov. 26.27a in the LXX (ὁ ὀρύσσων βόθρον τῷ πλησίον ἐμπεσεῖται εἰς αὐτόν), the latter adding ‘for his neighbor’. In each of these, the wicked who dig a pit will fall into it, a result expressed as a certainty and not merely a potentiality. 22 While this pedagogic tactic (promising that disaster always follows evil) may be useful for instructing youngsters, those with greater experience (the sages themselves) will have a much more nuanced understanding of life. But what about those who never arrive at such an understanding? They cling to the delusion that wisdom never fails, which opens the door for Qohelet’s scathing correction.
Ultimately, how one understands the passage as a whole typically drives one’s translation of the yiqtols. The dominant view sees the passage as speaking to life’s inherent unpredictability and danger, leading scholars to render the finite verbs as potentialities: ‘he may/might fall’, etc. 23 They take the proverbs of vv. 8–10 to be genuine advice from Qohelet. Since ordinary chores do not always certainly result in the horrible outcomes listed here, it is assumed that Qohelet must mean for these to be understood as potential outcomes. For example, Longman asserts, ‘To translate these verbs as simple futures makes no sense of experience’—but, in my view, that incongruity is precisely Qohelet’s point as he exposes an unrealistic view of life. 24 Accordingly, the other major interpretive tendency is to translate the yiqtols as future indicatives, meaning that Qohelet guarantees certain consequences for those who misapply wisdom or fail to apply it altogether. 25 If this seems too traditional for Qohelet, that is because it is–his aim in verses 8–10 is to satirize traditional claims that he will later contradict in verse 11.
b. Chore #2: Breaking down walls (v. 8b)
The line reads: ‘Whoever breaks down a wall, him will a snake bite’. The literal use of the verb ‘to break down’ (פרץ) in the Qal stem most commonly refers to making a breach in a city wall in military contexts (e.g., 2 Kgs. 14.13; Prov. 25.28), though there are a few examples where it is used with the noun ‘wall’ (גָּדֵר) to refer to breaking down the stone hedge of a vineyard (Ps. 80:13 [Eng. v. 12], but esp. Isa. 5.5). 26 Given the individualized context of the chores listed in verses 8–11, the activity described here is consistent with the work of a farmer who is disassembling a stone wall, likely to change its width/trajectory or to use its stones in some other building project. The consequence for anyone performing this unexceptional chore in an unwise manner is that ‘a snake will bite him’ (יִשְּׁכֶנּוּ נָחָשׁ). But does a lack of applied wisdom guarantee such a consequence? In Qohelet’s satire, it does.
c. Chore #3: Quarrying stones (v. 9a)
The line reads: ‘Whoever quarries stones will be injured by them’. The unskilled stone-quarrier will be harmed by the stones he digs out. Holmstedt et al. (2017) translate the expression with potentiality: ‘may be hurt by them’, arguing that verse 9 lacks the moral overtones of the verbs in verse 8, which they translate as future indicatives—the lack of ‘a moral overtone’ in verse 9 and ‘the lack of any over focus-fronting [of the prepositional phrase] in this verse’ requires a different sense from the verbs. 27 I agree that the quotation in 8a comes from Prov. 26.27a (cf. Sir. 27.26a), which justifies restricting its yiqtols to future indicative, but there may be insufficient evidence to reject the future in verse 9. In verse 8a, the prepositional phrase ‘in it’ (בּוֹ) appears before the verb; likewise, the verb in 8b is fronted to highlight the object suffix ‘him’ in the expression ‘Him will a snake bite’ (יִשְּׁכֶנּוּ נָחָשׁ), but the lack of a parallel syntax for the outcome/consequence clause of verse 9a ‘he will be injured by them’ (יֵעָצֵב בָּהֶם) is not an indication that a moral overtone has now been lost. Rather, the fact that the verb precedes the preposition + pronominal suffix has to do with the dominant way in which passive Niphal verbs typically express agency with בְּ: the prepositional phrase tends to follow the verb. 28 This represents Qohelet’s third satirical claim, that the quarryman will be injured by falling stones if he fails to work wisely.
d. Chore #4: Splitting wood (v. 9b)
The line reads: ‘Whoever splits logs will be endangered by them’. The only other place where the verb ‘to split’ (בקע) refers to chopping wood is in Gen. 22.3 and 1 Sam. 6.14 where it appears in the Piel. Most other uses of the verb involve dividing rocks, water, humans (in war), and so on. The outcome of splitting logs is that one will ‘be endangered by them’ (יִסָכֶן בָּם), a verb appearing nowhere else in the Niphal but in the Qal having the meaning ‘to be of use’ (סכן I, acc. to HALOT), 29 which could be related to the Aramaic cognate סכן I ‘to arrange, manage’, 30 the Ugaritic verb skn ‘to place’ and ‘take care of’, 31 and possibly Akkadian sakānu ‘to care for’ 32 or šakānu ‘to put, place’. 33 Nevertheless, the meaning of סכן I elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible does not make good sense of the consequence pattern observed in verses 8–9. This has led interpreters to relate the verb to the Ugaritic noun skn ‘danger’ 34 and Jastrow’s סכן II ‘to be in danger’. 35 In all, the nuance of danger makes the best sense in the present context. This concludes Qohelet’s list of chores and accompanying satirical claims, though the lumberjack receives mention once more in verse 10.
e. The traditional lesson: Wisdom always brings success (v. 10)
The takeaway from verses 8–10 would be in keeping with the claim that wisdom (in this case, practical skill) saves from all harm. Qohelet portrays this unrealistic claim in verse 10 through both an object lesson (v. 10a) and a stated principle (v. 10b).
i. The object lesson (v. 10a)
The line reads: ‘If the iron is blunt, but one does not sharpen the face, then he must exert greater strength’ Verses 10 and 11 each begin with ‘if/when’ (אִם) and feature a term exclusive to Qohelet in the biblical corpus: יִתְרוֹן ‘gain/advantage/surplus’. 36 Just as verses 8–9 bear parallel features, so 10–11 are meant to be read together, though the two verses convey opposing principles. The difficult syntax of 10a has been rendered in a number of ways, 37 the majority of which do not drastically change Qohelet’s point: If the laborer does not sharpen his implement, ‘then he must exert greater strength’ (וַחֲיָלִים יְגַבֵּר).
Verse 10a implies that the problems faced by the four laborers in verses 8-9 could have been avoided if wisdom had been employed in their efforts. If only they had been more careful, like a skilled lumberjack who first sharpens his tools, they would have succeeded. However, their lack of wisdom resulted in falling into a pit, being bitten by a snake, being injured by boulders, and being endangered by flying axe heads or shanks of wood. Wisdom is thus presented as a sure path to success. Qohelet now moves on to state the principle explicitly (v. 10b below).
ii. The stated principle (v. 10b)
The line reads: ‘but the success of the skilled worker is wisdom’. This may be the most difficult line to interpret in all of Ecclesiastes, but scholars’ various translations of it present the majority view that when wisdom is involved, one succeeds. The infinitive absolute ‘succeeding/being skilled’ (הַכְשֵׁר) is the Qere and the infinitive construct ‘to make successful’ (הַכְשִׁיר) the Ketiv. If the infinitive construct is correct, then the line could be rendered: ‘It is an advantage to appropriate wisdom’. 38 But Michael Fox (1999: 306) repoints the term הכשׁר as hakkaššir, a substantival: ‘The advantage of the skilled man is wisdom’. The point is that if wisdom is not used, then ordinary chores will result in disaster.
The lesson so far in verses 8-10 feels overly simplistic for Qohelet. Why would his pupils, who have had to ingest the otherwise weighty prose of Qohelet’s teachings, now need to be reminded of something so obvious, like securing a ladder before climbing? He must have an ulterior lesson in mind, and verse 11 reveals it. However, if one reads verse 11 the way most interpreters have, as just a reiteration of the object lesson from v. 10b, then all we have in verse 11 is a redundancy. Why would Qohelet’s pupils need the lesson three times? It is first given in the form of an object lesson (v. 10a), then stated explicitly as a principle (v. 10b), and then provided a third time in verse 11 as both an object lesson and a principle (according to most interpreters who see the charmer as being negligent, like the dullard of v. 10). A superior reading, however, takes verse 11 not as an example of a magician who failed to apply wisdom, but as one whose wisdom is irrelevant in the face of a snake that cannot be charmed in the first place.
f. Qohelet’s counter-lesson: wisdom can fail (v. 11)
The line reads: ‘If the uncharmable snake bites, then there is no advantage for the charmer’. The phrase בְּלוֹא־לָחַשׁ should be rendered ‘without a charm’ since the temporal aspect provided by several translations (‘before it is charmed’) takes things a bit further than the grammar allows. 39 Granted, my own reading of the prepositional phrase as ‘uncharmable,’ modifying הַנָּחָשׁ ‘snake,’ is likewise the result of contextual considerations.
i. Reading בְּלוֹא as atemporal
The majority of interpreters translate the first part of verse 11 temporally: ‘If the serpent bites before it is charmed’ (ESV; see also the NIV, NLT, NKJV, NASB, NRSV, NET, JPS 1917, etc.), taking the preposition + negation (בְּלוֹא) as ‘before’, 40 rather than simply ‘without’ (KJV), but as Stuart Weeks aptly points out, there is no indication of time here in the verse—it simply means ‘without’. 41 However, he argues against the majority reading when he claims that snake charming is not in view here at all: ‘On linguistic grounds alone, it is difficult to exclude absolutely the possibility that Qohelet is referring to protective incantations’, and if we were to adopt this traditional reading, ‘then it would be hard to see the point here: since the snake is biting in the absence of incantations, this hardly reflects on the usefulness or otherwise of the enchanter’. 42 But this is precisely the point Qohelet wishes to make: Verse 11 is not about the charmer but about the failure of wisdom (in this case, snake charming). 43 Verse 11 offers a counterpoint to verses 8–10 that precede it but much more emphatically than what has been traditionally thought.
The preposition בְּ with the negation לוֹא has various functions in the HB, each of which is, of course, heavily dependent upon context. 44 Both occurrences of בְּלוֹא in Ecclesiastes (7.17; 10.11) are translated ‘before’ in most English versions. However, another possibility for 10.11 is to understand בְּלוֹא לָחַשׁ as a description of the serpent, which would entail a rejection of the disjunctive tiphcha and a reading of the prepositional phrase as qualifying the noun הַנָּחָשׁ rather than as an adverbial expression pointing to the charmer’s inattention or ineptitude. The notion of an uncharmable snake is more apparent in Jer. 8.17 thanks to the syntax of the relative particle followed by the negation אֵין. 45 Though Eccl. 10.11 lacks this more precise syntax, the sense of ‘uncharmable’ may still be intended.
ii. The uncharmable serpent
The Hebrew Bible speaks in several places of the danger of serpent bites and the perceived need for serpent incantations 46 The closest comparable texts to Ecclesiastes 10.11 in the Hebrew Bible are Ps. 58.6 [Eng. v. 5] and Jer. 8.17, both featuring snakes that cannot be charmed. While the mention of a spell-deaf serpent in Ps. 58 is a useful example of the uncharmable snake, the more relevant example, grammatically speaking, is in the noun phrase of Jer. 8.17. It reads, ‘poisonous serpents for which there is no charm’ (נְחָשִׁים צִפְעֹנִים אֲשֶׁר אֵין־לָהֶם לָחַשׁ). Many versions render the line ‘cannot be charmed’ or ‘for which there is no charm’ (NET, JPS 1985, NIV, ESV, NRSV, NKJV, NASB, CSB, etc.) rather than something that communicates the temporal idea ‘yet uncharmed’, and understandably so since all snakes are, by default, already uncharmed. Poisonous snakes by themselves may not seem like an adequate threat to people who think they can use incantations to defend themselves, but in Jer. 8 God is threatening to send snakes for which there is no effective incantation. Technically then, the adjective ‘poisonous’ (צִפְעֹנִים) may not be necessary to make the point, but its inclusion perhaps heightens the sense of threat.
The very mention of ‘charm’ (לַחַשׁ) in verse 11 implies the likelihood that a poisonous snake is in view, 47 but is this serpent the kind mentioned several times in Akkadian magical texts as the s.erri[MUŠ] la šiptim ‘serpent without charm’? 48 While similar, the syntax of Qohelet’s expression does not precisely follow the Akkadian pattern (noun + negation + noun) though the pattern does appear in biblical Hebrew elsewhere. 49 Rather, he uses the expression בְּלוֹא לָחַשׁ, which, according to Forti, may refer ‘to the deaf viper that shuts its ears to the charmer’. 50 For this, she cites Seow, a passage from Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and the Netherworld (Sumerian), featuring the uncharmable snake, and the biblical parallels, namely Jeremiah 8.17. 51 As with Weeks, Heim, and others, so Forti understands Qohelet to be doing more than meets the eye in this passage, though each differs on what exactly that is. My proposal agrees with Forti and Seow in seeing the creature of Eccl. 10.11 as ‘the uncharmable serpent’, but in my view this serpent serves as a foil for a delusionally high view of wisdom’s worth. By rejecting the tiphcha on הַנָּחָשׁ, one may assert that the prepositional phrase בְּלוֹא לָחַשׁ ‘without charm’ modifies הַנָּחָשׁ ’serpent’ rather than the verb יִשֹּׁךְ ‘bites’ and enables Qohelet to target wisdom rather than the worker of wisdom. Qohelet’s quest to undermine an unrealistic appraisal of wisdom’s value is realized in a final example of wisdom-wielding where, unlike the hunter, the wall-breaker, the stone-quarrier, and the lumberjack, it is not the laborer who has failed but wisdom itself. 52 On the reading, Qohelet has done here what he does throughout Ecclesiastes–confronting unrealistic claims by contradicting them with a realistic view of the world. 53 The supposed ‘advantage’ יִתְרוֹן afforded by wisdom in verse 10b is now lacking in verse 11 where, despite the presence of the conjurer’s skill חָכְמָה, ‘there is no advantage’ וְאֵין יִתְרוֹן to having wisdom.
4. An Egyptian topos as the model for Qohelet’s satire
That Egyptian thought influenced Qohelet is well established in scholarship, 54 as is the influence of Egyptian wisdom on Hebrew wisdom, generally. Beyond the character-consequence nexus featured in both cultural corpora as well as recurring motifs (such as nature, romance, speech, social propriety, and pragmatism) and very similar kinds of advice, there are particular passages that resemble each other formally. One of the most striking of these parallels is the shared format of the Egyptian Teaching of Khety and Sir. 38.24–39.11, with the Egyptian text antedating the compositions of both Qohelet and Ben Sira. The Teaching of Khety is a popular Egyptian Middle Kingdom text that humorously touts the value of the scribal profession over all other trades, including the work of sculptors, carpenters, jewelers, gardeners, farmers, washers, fowlers, and fishermen, among others. 55 All such occupations, argues the sage to his young son, are undesirable and accompany many dangers, weariness, and other unpleasantries. 56 These are to be contrasted with the occupation of the scribe, which Khety hails as superior to them all for its benefits, vowing, ‘I’ll make you love scribedom more than [you love] your [own] mother!’ 57
As for the outcomes of ordinary occupations, the scribe/father states that the washerman and fisherman work by the river, so they are in a constant state of paralyzing fear that they will be eaten by crocodiles. The barber has to run around in the street looking like a fool as he chases people’s chins to shave. Many of the jobs result in a severe degree of weariness and in one’s clothes and body smelling bad. The text makes it seem like death would be a better alternative to being a jeweler, mason, or farmer. The father’s description of the workers’ woes comes through as almost slapstick in nature. 58 His negative description of these supposedly lesser occupations is so exaggerated as to make them humorous, which is why the text is labeled by some as satire. Thus, Lichtheim writes, ‘What are the stylistic means of satire? Exaggeration and a lightness of tone designed to induce laughter and a mild contempt. Our text achieves its satirical effects by exaggerating the true hardships of the professions described, and by suppressing all their positive and rewarding aspects’. 59
Ben Sira picks up on this topos from Egyptian literature when he hails sacred scribedom as superior to all other professions. In his 2021 commentary on Sirach, John Snaith notes, An earlier Egyptian work, the Maxims of Duauf, had followed the same theme as Sirach, but the contemptuous satire in Duauf’s work is absent here: Sirach does not despise those who work with their hands. He goes through such workers: farmers, craftsmen, blacksmiths, potters, and so on (vv. 25–30). All are useful to society— they ‘maintain’ God’s handiwork (v. 34) but do not practice more intellectual tasks (v. 33).
60
Sirach sanitizes the content of the Egyptian topos by 1) conveying the value of non-scribal professions before God and by 2) propping up the study of the ‘Law of the Most High’ (νόμῳ Ὑψίστου) as the highest form of scribedom (38.34). The Teaching of Khety, on the other hand, is only part of a much larger literary tradition in Egypt that exalts the scribal profession above others. Rollston explains: ‘Statements about the superiority of the scribal profession, accompanied by derogatory statements about artisans, are quite common in ancient Egyptian literature, from various periods’.
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Following a number of Egyptologists, he writes, I shall argue that the Egyptian Texts, which are part of the Satire of the Trades tradition were intended to be understood not as indicative of actual scribal views but as humorous texts, designed to assist in the recruitment and retention of scribal students. The Egyptian texts were scribal propaganda, tempered with humor. Understanding this aspect of the Egyptian texts reduces the presumed ‘chasm’ between the perspectives of Ben Sira and the Egyptian scribal tradition.
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In listing occupations or chores and some superior alternative, Qohelet and Khety have something in common that Sirach does not—the hyperbole and humor of satire. This potential connection between Qohelet and the Egyptian topos has not been addressed in Ecclesiastes scholarship. Krüger (2004) noted a similarity between Eccl. 10.8–10 and this very passage from Sir. 38–39; yet, he did not go further to posit a connection running all the way back to the potential Egyptian precursors. 63
Admittedly, Sirach offers a positive assessment of the professions while both Khety and Qohelet offer a negative evaluation. For the latter two, the negative outcomes of these labours are not possibilities, but certainties. Qohelet’s four chores include pit-digging/hunting (v. 8a),
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hedging/farming (v. 8b),
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stone-working (v. 9a), and woodworking (v. 9b), all of which have close parallels in Khety’s list of professions.
66
Both before and after pointing out the inevitable problems endured by such workers, Khety repeatedly mentions the lack of advantage for them, all of whom are portrayed as achieving a zero-sum or negative balance on the ledger of life. This lack of anything gained/left over may apply to the financial profit accrued from the profession (e.g., the mason who has insufficient food for his children, the washerman’s job that does not satisfy) or the amount of energy left at the end of the day (e.g., the farmer who is depleted by his walk home, the courier’s joyless trek). These zero-sum professions are then contrasted with ‘writing’, which is ‘better for you’ nfr n.k 
(see Papyrus Sallier II in §XXIIa of Helck Vol. II) and a day of school, which is ‘profitable/useful for you’ 3ḫ n.k 
(see Papyrus Sallier II in §XXIIe of Helck Vol II).
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Writing, argues the scribal father, ‘will do better for you than those professions I’ve set before you’.
68
Qohelet likewise speaks of profit in labor, specifically with respect to something being gained or ‘left over’ (יִתְרוֹן) at the end of any human enterprise, the term appearing exclusively in Ecclesiastes. He begins his investigation in 1.3 by asking rhetorically what ‘gain’ (יִתְרוֹן) there is in the entirety of human endeavor, and he repeats the term throughout his teachings (2.11, 13; 3.9; 5.8 [Eng. 9], 16 [Eng. 17]; 7.12; 10.10–11). In these verses, it appears that any gain that can be had is temporary since death levels the balance sheet of life (2.11–14). Important for our study is how Qohelet uses the term in 10.10–11. He concludes his own Khety-style description of daily chores by asserting, tongue-in-cheek, that wisdom can produce gain in one’s labors (וְיתְרוֹן הכְשֵׁיר חָכְמָה). However, unlike Khety, this is immediately followed in verse 11 by a rejection of the entire teaching when Qohelet exposes the failure of wisdom to produce gain unfailingly.
69
5. Conclusion: A satire of the chores
The passage under consideration has traditionally been understood as a brief lesson on the relative value of wisdom, one where Qohelet emphasizes wisdom’s usefulness for protecting laborers from unpredictable danger, noting at the end (v. 11) that one must actually apply wisdom if one wants to reap its benefits. Indeed, in his teachings, Qohelet elsewhere affirms wisdom’s value (e.g., 2.12–14a; 7.1–12) and notes its limitations (e.g., 2.14b–17; 9.11–18), so the popular reading of 10.8–11 is not at odds with the content of the book as a whole. However, just as a snake lies unnoticed in the grass, so the subtleties of Qohelet’s rhetoric may be easily overlooked. The first sign that something is amiss is the simplicity of his message. In a text otherwise replete with complex reversals and appeals to realism that undermine a simplistic view of life, it seems odd for Qohelet to give such obvious advice, that when one applies wisdom one can stay out of harm’s way—advice akin to ‘buckle your seatbelt!’ Indeed, Qohelet intends to contradict the very proverbs he has cited and partly created.
To make his subversive point, Qohelet adopts the act-consequence topos known primarily from Proverbs, though he replaces the expected nefarious behaviors common to that construct with the foolishly performed chores of the ordinary laborer. He also adopts a known topos from Egyptian literature where a scribe extols the superiority of scribalism by decrying the menial professions (in Qohelet’s use of the topos, working with wisdom is hailed as superior to doing anything without it). Qohelet thereby satirically exaggerates the consequences of working unwisely. Furthermore, both Qohelet and Khety make the point that while other tasks result in a zero sum or negative balance, at least some ‘gain’ (יִתְרוֹן) or ‘good’ (nfr 
) or ‘profit’ (3ḫ 
) can be realized from the superior thing. Furthermore, both texts also go on to discuss the importance of respecting authority, among other potential parallels. Yet, lest his satire be lost on us as we read, Qohelet provides in verse 11 a clear rebuttal to the teaching of verses 8–10. His message: even properly applied wisdom fails to perfectly protect a person from harm. In the end, wisdom proves to be completely useless against a force of nature that, unlike the chores in verses 8–10, only God can control—the uncharmable serpent (cf. Jer. 8.17; Ps. 58.5–6 [Eng. 4–5]; cf. Job 20.16; 26.13).
Footnotes
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1.
Some hold that Qohelet’s intent in such places is to reject altogether the simplicity of traditional proverbial wisdom (see Shields, 2006; see Adams, 2008: 6, 102; for Adams, this is especially so for Qohelet given life’s prevailing injustices, the certainty of death, and the lack of an afterlife where justice would theoretically be meted out). However, it is important to acknowledge as well that Qohelet at times affirms the act/character-consequence principles of Proverbs (e.g., Eccl. 7; 10.1–4, etc.; see, e.g., Whybray, 1989: 30; Dell, 2016: 49; 2020). Even the book of Proverbs itself acknowledges exceptions to the retribution principle, though it does so less overtly (e.g., the existence of wealthy wicked people and poor righteous people, etc.; see Adams, 2008, 102 n. 5; on the purpose of proverbs as general observations rather than exceptionless absolutes, see Wilson, 2018: 21; Estes, 2005: 219). At least in practice, there seems to be a fine line between the claim that Qohelet is rejecting a ‘somewhat facile understanding of act and consequence in Proverbs’ (Adams, 2008: 6) and the claim that he is simply ‘presenting further alternatives, highlighting existing contradictions and deepening different possibilities’ (Dell, 2016: 49). In other words, while these contrasting viewpoints are instructive for one’s understanding of Ecclesiastes as a whole, they can manifest similarly whenever Qohelet confronts a traditional proverb with a contradictory claim or new proverb. In favor of seeing Ecclesiastes as a development within rather than a rejection of traditionalism, it is possible for Qohelet to reject an implied claim (e.g., that wisdom makes one invincible) without rejecting the entire system of which that claim is a part.
2.
Henceforth, the Egyptian topos under consideration will be referred to as ‘superiority’ or the ‘superiority topos’. This famous ancient Egyptian scribal text has gone by several titles, including The Maxims of Duauf/Dua-Khety, The Teaching/Instruction of Khety, The Satire of/on the Trades, and even ‘The Instruction for Little Pepi on His Way to School’ (for this last label, see Foster, 2001: 33). The present article employs the title Khety or The Teaching of Khety in reference to the poem’s fictional father who is instructing his son to pursue scribal training.
3.
Wright, 1888: 423.
4.
Salyer, 2001: 364.
5.
Ogden, 1987: 171.
6.
E.g., Crenshaw, 1987: 168–73; Murphy, 1992: 102; Whybray, 1989: 154. Early and medieval Jewish and Christian interpretations of 10.8–11 are typically allegorical and moralizing, with a simple survey of writings on sefaria.org and ccel.org demonstrating the point (e.g., Jarick, 1990: 258–64).
7.
Ogden, 1987: 61; so Krüger, 2004: 176–85, for all of 9.13–10.20.
8.
A sampling of scholars who present this general position includes Alter, 2010: 382; Barton, 1908: 172, 177; Crenshaw, 1987: 173; Eaton, 1983: 136; Fox, 1989: 268; 1999: 406; Gordis, 1968: 323; Kaiser, 1979: 109; Kidner, 1976: 91; Murphy, 1992: 102; Ogden, 1987: 171–72; Rudman, 2001: 74; Salyer, 2001: 364; Schoors, 2013: 734; and Wright, 1888: 426.
9.
E.g., Fredericks and Estes, 2010; See Heim, 2019, who argues that these verses contain an encoded polemic against the Ptolemaic Empire; etc. Note also Zimmerman, 1973, who sees in these verses ‘a metaphor on the political intrigue at court’ (157; see esp. the note on v. 11). Relatedly, see 
: 202, 497) who understands verses 8–10b as a criticism of the hapless accidents of those who retain their position of authority despite failure.
10.
Seow, 1997: 328–39.
11.
e.g., Lohfink, 2003; Heim, 2019.
12.
Lavoie, 2012: 459. For a survey of scholars’ various delimitations of chapter 10, see pp. 458–61.
13.
Loader, 1986: 119–20. A sampling of others who present v. 11 in this way includes Bianchi, 1998: 117; Christianson, 1998: 247; Longman, 1998: 244–46; Ogden, 1987: 171–72 (Ogden leaves room for both approaches); and Seow, 1997: 327, who likewise offers both.
14.
Christianson, 1998: 247. Christianson: ‘He also states that wisdom is generally an ‘advantage’ (יִתְרוֹן; 7.11– 12, 19; 9.16—10.1), but that fate will not be influenced or changed by it or by anything else under the sun (9.2, 11–12; 10.8–11; passim)’.
15.
See Bianchi, 1998: 117; Lauha, 1978: 187.
16.
Schwienhorst-Schönberger, 2004: 493. Whybray (2005) notes the complications inherent in identifying quotations in Ecclesiastes and distinguishing them from Qohelet’s own voice. The four criteria he lists for identifying quotations are helpful in identifying vv. 8b–10 as likely not a series of quotations but an invention of Qohelet intended to mimic traditional sayings (126; see also Gordis’s earlier work on quotations, 1968: 95–108). Whether such an invention constitutes parody is beyond the scope of this study. Scholars have not traditionally viewed the proverbs of Eccl. 10.8–9 as parody, but Krüger (2004) may be an exception: ‘Since at least v. 8a (on v. 8b cf. Amos 5:19) doubtless alludes to contemporary tradition, we must have here an intentional parody of the concept of a “deed-result connection”’ (185). He does not, however, develop this theory more fully. It may be that Morson’s diagnostics for identifying parody could be applied to Qohelet’s chores in vv. 8–9: ‘Exaggeration, understatement, punning, incongruity, and change of context’ (: 63, 67, 72; cf. Kynes, 2012: 294–95).
17.
See Bartholomew, 2009: 323, who similarly understood Qohelet to be attacking traditional views on wisdom in these verses, contra Fox, 1987: 137–54, ‘who argues forcefully against Ecclesiastes being simply a polemic against traditional wisdom’ (Murphy, 1992: 103). Qohelet, notes Murphy, 1992: 103, ‘leaves room for traditional wisdom, not as a panacea for life, but as reflecting part of reality’. It may be true that Qohelet has no intention of completely undermining traditional wisdom, but that does not keep him from attacking the absurd claim some undoubtedly held—that wisdom never fails.
18.
Heim, 2019: 176; see Pinker, 2011: 173–91, who also believes the straightforward reading of v. 10 is too simplistic for Qohelet, arguing instead that it is a metaphorical lesson about how sages ought to apply their wisdom properly. Gordis, 1968: 320, on the other hand, thought that ‘the simple meaning is thoroughly appropriate to Koheleth’s role as a Wisdom teacher, who enjoins care and circumspection in all the affairs of life’; however, the observation made by Heim, Pinker, and others (of there being a hidden message) reflects a more defensible perspective on Qohelet who, though he promotes simple joys, does not go about teaching them in a simplistic way.
19.
Heim, 2019: 176; see also Lohfink, 2003: 127–28.
20.
Others share this understanding of 10:8a. See Loader, 1986: 118, who contends that if farming is the context for v. 8b, then an agricultural context should likewise be assumed for the parallel expression above in v. 8a. See also Crenshaw, 1987: 172, who assumes גָּדֵר refers to the wall of one’s house. See also Seow, 1997: 308; Fox, 1999: 305; Brown, 2000: 99; and others who do not read the activities of Eccl. 10:8–10 as nefarious in nature.
21.
Hebrew text for Sir. 27.26 is non-extant.
22.
Holmstedt et al., 2017: 272–73. However, note below their differing treatment of the chores in v. 9.
23.
E.g., Weeks, 2022: 491; Longman, 1998: 243.
24.
Longman, 1998: 243 n. 26.
25.
E.g., Forti, 2014: 87; Bartholomew, 2009: 323; the LXX also renders them as future, though that does not altogether rule out a modal reading (ἐμπεσεῖται, δήξεται, διαπονηθήσεται, and κινδυνεύσει). Forti writes, ‘The four activities detailed in vv. 8–10—digging a pit, breaching a fence, quarrying stones, and splitting wood—are all formulated as indicative sentences composed of a similar grammatical and rhythmic structure. The four verbs are participles (‘he who…’), the outcome of the action being denoted by a verb in the future tense (‘will…’). Verses 8–9 exhibit the correlation between the act and its consequence without adducing any moral element or reference to the ethical character of the person performing it. Herein, they resemble the ‘act–consequence nexus’ paradigm of sayings in Proverbs …’ (87). While I agree that the consequences should be read as simple futures, the actions of vv. 8–11 should not be considered amoral or ethically neutral, since the folly of working without wisdom does carry ethical weight among the sages—see Ansberry, 2010: 162, on how righteousness/wickedness and wisdom/folly are ‘intimately related’ in the moral vision of Proverbs. Hence, Qohelet’s chores should rather be identified as non-nefarious, meaning that there is no apparent evil intention behind quarrying stones unwisely, swinging a dull axe blade, etc.
26.
This verb-noun pair is used in a military context in Ps. 89.41 [Eng. v. 40], but with the feminine גְּדֵרָה. The act of moving boundary stones (Prov. 23.10; Amenemope §6.15 in COS I §1.47) should be distinguished from the act of breaking down walls in either military or farming contexts, the latter appearing here in v. 8b. Traditional commentators (e.g., Eaton, Barton) assume the presence of nefarious activity in v. 8b (see a list of such interpreters in Schoors, 2013: 275 n. 2; however, see Wright’s [1888: 422] interpretation of v. 8b, namely, that it does not involve moving a boundary stone). More recent commentators treat the activities of these verses as examples of ordinary chores (e.g., Krüger, 2004: 185).
27.
Holmstedt et al., 2017: 273.
28.
Epistemic possibility expressed by the imperfective may appear in the hypothetical scenario Qohelet concocts in 1.10 (see Cook, 2024: 210), but the proverbial form adopted by Qohelet in 10.8–9 argues in favor of the indicative (contra Cook, 2024: 210 n. 194). The yiqtols in v. 8 are Qal active verbs while the yiqtols in v. 9 are Niphal passive verbs, and the dominant way in which a passive Niphal’s agency is expressed with ּבְ + pronominal suffix is with the prepositional phrase following the verb. The formula ּבְ + pro. suff. immediately preceding the verb occurs only 15 times with none expressing agency. And while the agentive prepositional phrase without a pronominal suffix may precede passive Niphals in a few cases (e.g., Zeph. 3.8), there are many more examples of the order seen here (i.e., passive Niphal + בְּ + pro. suff.) in Eccl. 10.9 (e.g., Gen. 12.3; 18.18; 28.14; 48.16; Exod. 25.28; Lev. 11.43; Num. 20.13; Deut. 7.25; Judg. 16.11; Ezek. 20.43; 21.3; 22.16; 33.12; Pss 19.12; 22.6; 69.7; Eccl. 7.26; 10.9; see also WOC §23.2.2f; searches were conducted using Accordance Bible Software). The search could of course be expanded beyond pronominal suffixes to include any object of the preposition בְּ expressing agency for (and following) passive Niphal, as in Prov. 24:16, וּרְשָׁעִים יִכָּשְׁלוּ בְרָעָה ‘but the wicked will be brought down by calamity’ (NET). In sum, the Niphal stem is the likely culprit for the altered syntax of v. 9 rather than Qohelet’s supposed desire to express potentiality.
29.
HALOT, 755.
30.
Jastrow, 1903: 991.
31.
DULAT, 2003: 757.
32.
CAD S, 69b.
33.
CAD Š I, 116b.
34.
DULAT, 2003: 760.
35.
Jastrow, 1903: 991.
36.
On יִתְרוֹן as a personally customized term in Ecclesiastes, see Samet, 2021: 360.
37.
See Schoors, 2013: 728; Holmstedt et al., 2017: 274; Seow, 1997: 317; see also : 189–190) unique reading of the line.
38.
Seow, 1997: 318.
39.
See Jenni, 1992: 357, whose brief treatment of בְּלוֹא in Eccl. 10.11 is, like most comments on the passage, more dependent upon the supposed temporal scenario in view than on the Hebrew phrase itself.
40.
See the related causal reading of בְּלוֹא in 10.11 (Rose, 1999: 430).
41.
Weeks, 2022: 519. Lavoie, 2012: 469–70, actually divides scholars into three distinct groups when interpreting the point of בְּלוֹא־לָחַשׁ in verse 11. First, there is the temporal approach (‘before it is charmed’), though not all agree on whether that means the charmer was negligent or just caught off guard (is there a difference?); second, there is the causal approach (‘because it was not charmed’), which is similar to the first and also suggests human ineptitude; and third, there is the idea that a particular kind of snake is in view (‘the serpent that cannot be charmed’), which represents a smaller group of scholars who assert that the point of verse 11 is not human error but the limitations of wisdom. My reading follows the last approach. While most acknowledge that the term on its own simply means ‘without’, they translate it ‘before’ due to their opinion that Qohelet is expressing potentialities (e.g., Gordis, 1968: 323; Seow, 1997: 318).
42.
Weeks, 2022: 519–20. Weeks understands the dangers Qohelet lists as ‘a sequence of accidents that illustrate the haplessness of someone who may exercise authority even when everything that can go wrong for them has gone wrong’ (: 497).
43.
Weeks, 2022: 517, denies the presence of snake charming in the passage: ‘The ancient versions, however, do not reflect what has come to be the dominant interpretation of this verse, and which goes back at least to Rashi’. However, the fact that ancient interpreters do not align with dominant modern readings of vv. 10–11 should occasion little discomfort in this case, given that most early exegetes altered the passage to the point that it no longer made sense (Pinker, 2011: 176).
44.
Those include ‘at not’, with respect to time, Lev. 15.25; ‘with not’, as in ‘without’ in various contexts—‘without enmity’ and ‘without seeing’, Num. 35.22–23; ‘without price’ Isa. 55.1; ‘without righteousness’ and ‘without justice’, Jer. 22.13, Ezek. 22:29, Prov. 16.8; ‘without lips of deceit’, Ps. 17.1; ‘without marsh’, Job 8.11; ‘without knowledge’, Prov. 19.2; ‘without strength’, Lam. 1.6; ‘without violence’, 1 Chron. 12.18 [Eng. v. 17]; ‘without division’, 1 Chron. 12.34 [Eng. v. 33]; ‘without desire’, 2 Chron. 21.20; Jastrow also cites בלא as ‘very frequently’ meaning ‘without’; ‘with/by [what is] not’: Deut. 32.21, Isa. 55.2, Jer. 5.7, Ps. 44.13, Prov. 13.23; ‘what will not/cannot do X’: Isa. 55.2, Jer. 2.11; ‘before’: Job 15.32, Eccl. 7.17; ‘by not’: Job 30.28; Lam. 4.14 (‘while’, see NET). Note that some books contain more than one sense of בְּלוֹא (e.g., Isa., Jer., Job, Eccl.), meaning that Qohelet’s temporal use of the phrase in Eccl. 7.17 does not require a temporal use in Eccl. 10.11.
45.
Compare similar uses of ןיאֵ, e.g. Isa. 9.6 ‘endless peace’; Isa. 33.19 ‘unintelligible tongue’; Jer. 2.32 ‘numberless days’ (similar to Akk. ša la nibi ‘without number’); Jer. 22.28 ‘despised vessel’; etc.
46.
General references: Num. 21.4–9 speaks of הַנְּחָשִׁים הַשְּׂרָפִים ‘fiery serpents’ (LXX: ὄφεις τοὺς θανατοῦντας ‘deadly serpents’); see also Gen. 49.17; Deut. 8.15; 2 Kgs 18.4; Prov. 23.32; Isa. 11.8 (implied); 14.29; 30.6; Amos 5.19; 9.3. References to magical serpents and serpent incantations: Exod. 4–7; Ps. 58:5–6 [Eng. 4–5] (the only place where the verbal form לחשׁ ‘charm/incantation’ appears in reference to incantation, though cf. διαψιθυρίσει in Sir. 12.13–18. The term is used for non-magical whispering in 2 Sam. 12.19; Ps. 41.8 [Eng. v. 7]); Isa. 3.20 (where the noun ‘incantation’ (לַחַשׁ) appears as a magical amulet in a list of jewelry and other fine accoutrements that the Lord will remove in an act of judgment); 26.16; Jer. 8.17. For context, it is important to consider that Old and Middle Babylonian and Assyrian incantations were read to ward off an impressive variety of dangerous animals, people, and ailments. See two helpful resources: Wasserman and Zomer, 2022; Zomer, 2018. The Akkadian term cognate to Heb. לַחַשׁ is liḫ šu, ‘a whisper’ (CAD L, 184), which can refer either to non-magical or magical whispering (incantation). The verbal form, laḫāšu, ‘to whisper’ (CAD L, 40), is likewise used in both senses, the magical sense being used to whisper-incant into the ears of humans or animals (e.g., horses, bulls, etc.).
47.
Ancient peoples would likely have had some basic familiarity with snakes native to their region, and while there is an impressive cataloguing of snakes in Mesopotamian texts (based primarily on their appearance), these do not reveal whether people always knew whether or not a snake was poisonous. As for the layman today, so then, it would be safe to treat every snake as poisonous; accordingly, the ancients’ had need for incantations to control them. The charmer must speak to the snake in its own language, hence the need even in Egypt for Semitic spells designed specifically for snakes that spoke a Semitic language (see Steiner, 2011: 5–6; Becking, 2012: 212–13).
48.
Wasserman and Zomer, 2022: 273. Wasserman catalogues AMD 1, 245 (fig. 5), an incantation against snakes, as text No. 105 and translates s.erri(MUŠ) la ši-ip-tim at the end of line 13 as ‘a snake impervious to spell(s)’. He renders the following lines (14–15) as, ‘(even) the vine-snake, the one who fights with his magician!’ The serpent in view is antagonistic and less susceptible to spells than other snakes. The same expression appears in incantation No. 106: CUSAS 32, 27a on page 274 of Wasserman and Zomer—a s.erri(MUŠ) la ši-ip-tim that is seized by the magician. In yet another text that was previously thought to belong to the Gilgamesh Epic but later recognized as an incantation features a snake that is ‘furious against the clever physician’ as well as a s.erri(MUŠ) la ši-ip-tim!(TUM) (283). This especially challenging type of serpent appears also in TIM 9, 65 (ṣé-ri la ši-ip-ti-im) and a parallel witness, TIM 9, 66a (ṣerri(MUŠ-ri) la ši-ip-ti-[im]), labeled No. 110 in Wasserman and Zomer (285–6).
49.
This syntactical pattern (noun + negation + noun) in biblical Hebrew creates a negative adjective (e.g., ‘a cloudless morning’ in 2 Sam. 23.4; Deut. 32.20 ‘faithless children’; Isa. 31.8 ‘otherworldly sword’; Ps. 107.40, Job 12.24 ‘trackless wastes’; Job 26.2 ‘strengthless arm’; Job 38.26 ‘uninhabited land/desert’).
50.
Forti, 2014: 90.
51.
Seow, 1997: 318; note the JPS: ‘Adders that cannot be charmed’. Forti cites version A, line 42 of the Gilgamesh text from ETCSL translation: t.1.8.1.4, which reads, ‘At its roots, a snake immune to incantations made itself a nest’. Seow presents both the temporal and atemporal readings of בְּלוֹא: ‘Yet, it appears that there are problems for which there are simply no remedies. If one is dealing with a dangerous snake, a snake charmer may be summoned as a precautionary measure. However, if the snake bites before it is charmed, or if the snake is of a species that simply cannot be charmed, then there is no advantage in having a snake charmer (v 11)’ (1997: 327). Forti, 2014: 91, asserts that verse 11 is working on two levels, as a hinge for verses 8–10 and 12–15 ‘that serves to link the two literary units, whose themes are dangerous activities and destructive folly respectively. In the context of performing potentially dangerous routine tasks, the epithet בעל הלשׁון refers to the snake. In the framework of folly, it alludes to the fool’s venomous tongue’. For Forti, the serpent and its tongue represent the fool and his words—‘no spell exists that can counter the damage inflicted by the fool’. Verse 11 does appear to function as a hinge, but only stylistically in my view since the purpose of vv. 8–11 (to undermine an unrealistic valuation of wisdom) is distinct from the purpose of vv. 12–15 (to confront the fool’s abusive tongue).
52.
Brown writes, ‘Yet, as demonstrated time and time again, wisdom also has its limitations; its efficacy is subject to chance and accident like everything else, as much as snake charming is subject to the serpent’s will (v. 11; see also 9.11–12). Wisdom is thus no panacea. Indeed, there are many occasions in which wisdom serves only to generate false hope, particularly with regard to profitable gain, until reality “bites back”’ (Brown, 2000: 99).
53.
See Fox, 1989; Adams, 2008: 102.
54.
Numerous intertextual connections between Ecclesiastes and ANE literature are acknowledged by scholars, primarily with respect to Egyptian and Mesopotamian texts (see Anderson, 2014: 157–75). In his work, Anderson distinguishes the study of intertextuality from the simpler approach of the comparative method, identifying key types of intertextual connections such as allusion, echo, and influence. My proposal in this essay is not to posit a direct link between the Teaching of Khety and Ecclesiastes (though, given the large number of Egyptian connections in Ecclesiastes and the extensive copying of Khety through the centuries, it would not be surprising); rather, I suggest that the established literary model represented in Khety and other Egyptian texts on scribalism was sufficiently well known to have influenced the models represented not only in the text of Sirach 38.24–39.11 but also in Eccl. 10.8–10 (see Rollston, 2001; see also Schniedewind’s [2024: 52–54] brief discussion on Egyptian influence on Israelite scribalism and Egyptian literary traces in biblical literature). The classic study of Egyptian influences on Qohelet is Humbert, 1929. For a list of important scholarly works up to 1983, see Shupak, 1983: 217, esp. n. 3; see also Seow’s helpful summary: 1997: 61–62.
55.
The text was first composed in Middle Kingdom Egypt (2040–1640 BCE) and was repeatedly copied, as a writing exercise, throughout the succeeding New Kingdom (1550–1070 BCE). Over 600 copies of this text have been found (Matthews and Benjamin, 2016: 321).
58.
Note Weeks’s similar description of Eccl. 10.8–9 as ‘slapstick’ (Weeks, 2022: 479).
59.
Lichtheim, AEL I, 1973: 184. She notes further that what makes this text satire is its ‘deliberately derisive characterization of all trades other than the scribal profession. Helck, however, in his new edition of the text has denied its satiric character and has claimed it to be a wholly serious, non-humorous work. I continue to think of it as a satire’ (184; see Helck, 1970). Humor is classically difficult to detect in ancient literature, but the hyperbole and irony of the Satire, which I propose are also features of Eccl. 10.8–9, can point toward it.
60.
Snaith, 2021: 52.
61.
Rollston, 2001: 133.
62.
Rollston, 2001: 137. For related traditions and accompanying analysis, see Guglielmi, 1994.
63.
See Krüger, 2004: 186, who cites Johannes Marböck, 1979: 299–300.
64.
65.
See פָּרֹץ גְּדֵרוֹ in Isa. 5.5 among other HB uses of גָּדֵר to describe vineyard walls.
66.
For hunting (v. 8a), note Kety’s mention of fowlers (AEL I, 189); for farming (v. 8b), note Khety’s mention of farming (AEL I, 187); for stone-working (v. 9a), note Khety’s mention of masonry (AEL I, 187); for wood-working (v. 9b–10a), note Khety’s mention of carpentry (AEL I, 186).
67.
Helck, 1970: 121–23. Compare with Ben Sira’s claims in Sir. 38.24–39.11 regarding the benefits of the scribal profession, beginning with ‘the opportunity of leisure’ (Σοφία γραμματέως ἐν εὐκαιρίᾳ σχολῆς) that is both needed to be a scribe and afforded by the life of a scribe.
69.
Beyond these similarities, there is the repeated concern of the scribe that his son respect political authority, learning to remain silent at the proper time, and learning to eat when appropriate (e.g., see sections 9–11 of Lichtheim’s translation). These are also concerns of Qohelet (4.17–5.6 [Eng. 5.1–7]; 8.1–6; especially the entirety of ch. 10). In fact, the material in Khety that follows the satire is strikingly similar to the concerns expressed by Qohelet following his own teaching in 10.8–11. Interestingly, the Egyptian teaching begins with, ‘Set your heart on books!’ (see Papyrus Sallier II in §IIa of Helck Vol. I, 1970: 19), but the frame-narrator of Ecclesiastes concludes with ‘Watch yourself! They’ll never stop making books. And extensive studying will drain your energy’ (my paraphrase of 12.12).