Who Can Lean In? The Intersecting Role of Race and Gender in Negotiations

Abstract

Research on gender disparities in negotiation often does not address the intersectional influence of other demographic categories. We tested the hypothesis that race intersects with gender to play a role in constraining assertive behavior in negotiations. In two studies, we examined White non-Latinx and Asian/Asian American women and men’s phrasing of requests for higher salaries (Study 1) and the amounts they requested (Study 2) in hypothetical salary negotiation scenarios. White women reported less confidence and less assertiveness in their salary requests and proposed lower first offers than did White men; Asian and Asian American participants did not show gender differences in these measures. Negotiation backlash, measured by the amount that participants felt they could request without being punished for being too demanding, mediated the relation between demographic factors and first offers. We explored outcomes in light of intersectionality theories and the status incongruity hypothesis of backlash. These results indicate that differences in negotiation are shaped not only by gender but also by racial category membership.

Keywords

gender race intersectionality negotiation assertiveness

Despite years of research and policy efforts aimed at bringing about gender equality, the gender wage gap—the earning differential between women and men in full-time, year-round positions—persists. For the same work, women in the United States earned 81.9 cents for each dollar earned by men (median weekly earnings; Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2017). Gender differences in pay across a career span are tightly linked with initial salaries: A US $1,000 difference in starting salary could translate into about half a million dollars lost over the course of a career (Babcock & Laschever, 2003), highlighting the vital role of salary negotiations for women’s economic advancement. These gender differences also vary by race. For example, as of 2017, White women in the United States are paid 81.3 cents for every dollar White men are paid, whereas Asian American women are paid 78.4 cents for every dollar their same-race male counterparts are paid and 95.8 cents for every dollar White men are paid (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2017). Researchers and practitioners have suggested microlevel interventions for reducing the gender wage gap by training women to adopt more assertive behaviors but have not addressed how negotiation settings may be different for women (and men) of non-White racial backgrounds (e.g., Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; Sandberg, 2013). Nevertheless, based on social science research and theory, we expected in the current studies that race would moderate the effect of gender on negotiation behavior.

Our aim was to offer a novel framework for investigating the intersectional effect of gender and race on negotiation behavior. Bringing together research on gender and negotiation (e.g., Mazei et al., 2015), social roles and stereotypes (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002; Ghavami & Peplau, 2012), and intersectionality (Beale, 1970; Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008), we sought to extend our understanding of how prescriptive gender roles may affect women’s negotiation behavior and outcomes. We contend that social roles that place women at an economic disadvantage in negotiations, relative to men, may also intersect with race-based stereotypes and status differences that may either amplify or inhibit assertive negotiation behavior.

Gender, Race, and Negotiation

Theories of gender and negotiation have shown how stereotypes are applied to women and are strictly enforced through social backlash (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). To our knowledge, the current research is the first to examine how the punitive component of the backlash effect is used to enforce intersectional norms across gender and race in the context of negotiations. Distinct theories of intersectionality, such as double jeopardy (Beale, 1970; Berdahl & Moore, 2006), intersectional invisibility (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008), and gendered race theory (Johnson et al., 2012), suggest conflicting predictions about whether people from underrepresented groups are relieved from, or more heavily penalized for, violating gendered norms of assertiveness. Below, we review the extant evidence for backlash against women in distributive negotiations, then we discuss the content of racial stereotypes and status differences, and their relevance to negotiation. Finally, we explore the intersection of gender and race and the implications for backlash in negotiation. We then present results from two studies that demonstrate how race moderates the effect of gender on negotiation behaviors.

Most previous research on gender differences in negotiation has focused on gender alone without examining the potential moderating influence of race. This research (conducted primarily on White samples in North America) demonstrates that men are more likely than women to ask for a higher salary before accepting a position (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007) and men tend to have higher expectations of economic outcomes than women (Barron, 2003; Bowles et al., 2007; Kaman & Hartel, 1994; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). A meta-analysis of over 123 effect sizes in the negotiation literature, involving both businesspeople and students, revealed that men achieved better economic outcomes than women (Mazei et al., 2015). However, this meta-analysis also demonstrated that the gender disparity was affected by the negotiation context, including assessments of role congruity (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

Gender differences in negotiation behavior are, to a large extent, shaped by the pressure to behave in congruence with social roles and norms (Bowles et al., 2007; Mazei et al., 2015). For example, in an otherwise identical scenario, women performed as well as men when negotiating over items perceived as feminine (i.e., lampwork beads) but worse than men when negotiating over a product perceived as masculine (i.e., motorcycle headlights; Bear & Babcock, 2012). Role congruity theory states that those who behave in conformity with their prescribed roles tend to be perceived more positively and are less likely to experience backlash than those who deviate from them (Bowles et al., 2007; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & Wood, 1991). For women, gender roles tend to prescribe warm, helpful, and passive behaviors, whereas men are expected to display dominant, assertive, and decisive behaviors (Bem, 1981; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Williams & Best, 1982); negotiating assertively, in this respect, is more congruent with male than female gender roles.

Building upon role congruity theory, the status incongruity hypothesis (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, & Phelan, 2012; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012) suggests that backlash functions as a way to preserve the existing status hierarchy. Assertive behavior is prescribed for those who are higher on the status hierarchy and proscribed for those whose status is low. Women who show too much assertiveness (as well as men who fail to behave assertively) are penalized (e.g., Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010). Accordingly, when women try to negotiate for higher salaries, they are more likely to be penalized on salary allocations, perceptions of how hireable they are, promotions, and professional relationships by both male and female counterparts (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & Amanatullah, 2009). On the other hand, if women show less assertiveness by using more verbal disclaimers, asking for less, or not negotiating at all, they obtain lower salaries and may even be seen as less competent (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray, Locke, & Van Zant, 2012). Both adherence to and violation of gender norms therefore may come at a significant cost for women.

Yet, as noted above, the majority of gender and negotiation research has been carried out with predominantly White samples (i.e., people of European ancestry) in North American contexts, with a few exceptions (e.g., Shan, Keller, & Imai, 2016). We investigated whether these particular constraints would be applied in the same way to men and women from different racial backgrounds.

Racial Stereotypes and Status Differences

Each individual has multiple social identities or markers that others may use to categorize them (Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Categories of identities are ascribed to individuals within a broader social context that associates different levels of status and social expectations to each; these categories also interact with each other to produce complex patterns of privilege and marginalization (Babbitt, 2013; Cole, 2009; Crenshaw, 1989; Goff, Thomas, & Jackson, 2008; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Settles, 2006; Warner, Settles, & Shields, 2016; Warner & Shields, 2013). Historically, research has tended to focus on one of these social categories without taking others into account. Consequently, what is believed to be true about one social category may only represent a subset of people. In other words, gender dynamics that have been well-documented in the literature may actually apply primarily to White men and women, but not to individuals from other racial backgrounds or in diverse settings, as evidenced by research on group participation (Toosi, Sommers, & Ambady, 2012), worker evaluations (Biernat & Sesko, 2013), and leadership (Livingston, Rosette, & Washington, 2012). In the current studies, we focused on gender and race, as individuals access these categories immediately upon encountering new people, making them central to interpersonal perceptions (Ito & Urland, 2003). These categories are also predictive of wage gaps in the American society (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2017).

Each social category membership comes with its own prescriptive social roles or stereotypes. In some domains, the stereotypes associated with these categories can reinforce similar characteristics. For example, Asian women encounter congruent stereotypes about their femininity based on their race and gender (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Johnson et al., 2012). In other domains, the social expectations may contradict each other: For example, Asian women face conflicting stereotypes about their math ability and English proficiency (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).

As noted above, gender norms prescribe warmth and passivity for women versus dominant and assertive behaviors for men (Bem, 1981; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Williams & Best, 1982). Racial stereotypes, on the other hand, differ between people of Asian descent (Asians and Asian Americans) as compared to people of European descent (Europeans and White Americans). Although these terms include many groups with substantial historical and cultural variance (e.g., Shek, 2006), we use these categories to refer to groups exposed to similar experiences of discrimination in a North American context (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Mahalingam & Leu, 2005). For people of Asian descent residing in North America, social roles and expectations seem to inhibit assertive behaviors generally (Berdahl & Min, 2012). Both prescriptive and descriptive stereotypes indicate that Asian Americans are expected to behave less assertively than White Americans. Berdahl and Min (2012) found that Asian Americans displaying dominant behaviors were targets of greater dislike from study participants and were more likely to experience backlash in the form of racial harassment due to their violation of prescriptive racial stereotypes, as compared to Asian Americans not displaying dominant behaviors and European/White people.

How do these racial stereotypes interact with gender? In two recent comparative stereotype studies, participants listed stereotypes in a free-response format for racial and gender combinations. Ghavami and Peplau (2012) analyzed the Top 15 traits listed for several groups and found that assertiveness was used to describe White men, whereas Asian men were described as quiet and shy; submissiveness was ascribed to both White women and Asian women. Rosette Koval, Ma, and Livingston (2016) examined stereotypes about women of different races and found that Asian women were referred to as unassertive (“mild-tempered”) and competent (a form of agency distinct from assertiveness) more often than White women (Rosette, Koval, Ma, & Livingston, 2016).

In addition to considering men’s higher relative status as compared to women, we must also take into account racial status differences. Asian Americans are perceived as the “model minority” (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; F. Wong & Halgin, 2006), nevertheless they are located lower in the racial hierarchy than White non-Latinx Americans (though higher than Latinx or Black Americans; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, & Rosenholtz, 1986; Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Ridgeway, 2001). The status incongruity hypothesis might suggest that Asians who try to negotiate for higher salaries would experience more backlash than Whites because the status incongruity would be greater.

Phelan and Rudman (2010) examined backlash against White and Asian participants who performed well in tasks associated with Asian, White, or Black racial stereotypes and with different status. They found that Asian participants were penalized when they behaved non-stereotypically, regardless of whether in a stereotypically White or Black domain. On the other hand, White participants were not penalized for stereotype violations, but rather, they were penalized for doing well in tasks with low-status. One possible inference is that Whites are penalized for not maintaining high status whereas racial minorities are penalized for not conforming to stereotypes (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, et al., 2012). Because stereotypes for Asians relative to Whites prescribe submissive behavior, it seems likely that assertive behavior in negotiations for Asians would result in backlash, whether because of their transgression of status expectancies or racial stereotypes.

Intersections of Race and Gender

How do combinations of racial constraints and patterns of gender disparities affect negotiations? There are several theories that suggest how constraints based on race and gender may operate in tandem. One approach takes a double jeopardy perspective. Researchers (Beale, 1970; Berdahl & Moore, 2006) suggest that racial minority women bear the brunt of both the disadvantages associated with being female and those associated with being a member of a racial minority group. For example, Black women who were leaders of struggling organizations were given more negative evaluations than Black men or White women in the same situation (Rosette & Livingston, 2012). This additive effect was mediated by perceptions of leader typicality, indicating that because Black women, as double minorities, are two steps removed from the stereotypical White male leader, they were susceptible to doubly negative evaluations (Rosette & Livingston, 2012). In a negotiation setting, a double jeopardy approach would suggest that Asian women would be doubly submissive, in keeping with both gender and racial stereotypes. This approach further suggests that Asian men would negotiate similar to White women, and White men would negotiate the most assertively, without fear of backlash.

The theory of gendered-race prototypicality provides similar predictions (Galinsky et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2012; Schug, Alt, & Klauer, 2015). This theory proposes that racial stereotypes for Asian people and gender stereotypes for women overlap due to similar attributions of femininity, and racial stereotypes for Black people and gender stereotypes for men overlap due to similar attributions of masculinity (e.g., Schug, Alt, Lu, Gosin & Fay, 2017; Y. J. Wong, Horn, & Chen, 2013). The different levels of masculinity and femininity associated with each racial group, in combination with the biological sex of the person, create a spectrum of “gender profiles” ranging from very masculine (Black men) to somewhat androgynous (Black women and Asian men) to very feminine (Asian women), with White men and women categorized as moderately masculine and feminine, respectively (Whiteness being construed as neutral). The “gender profile” spectrum is reflected in patterns of job and leadership selection, among other domains (Galinsky et al., 2013; Hall, Galinsky, & Phillips, 2015). Gendered-race theory would suggest that Asian women would be most susceptible to the effect of congruent racial and gender stereotypes depicting them as passive and submissive, followed by White women. In addition, this theory predicts that Asian men, as somewhat androgynous, would be able to assertively negotiate more than both Asian and White women, but not as much as White men, without fear of backlash.

Intersectional invisibility theory presents an alternative, interactive explanation for how people whose social category memberships include more than one subordinate or minority group may be perceived (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Intersectional invisibility is described as a “failure to fully recognize people with intersecting identities as members of their constituent groups” (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008, p. 381). Prototypical members of subordinate categories tend to be the default in other dimensions. In other words, the category “woman” would evoke a White heterosexual woman, and the category “Asian” typically suggests an Asian heterosexual man. Individuals who hold multiple subordinate category memberships, such as gay Asian women, are susceptible to being overlooked. In some cases, this can lead to negative consequences, such as under-representation in the media (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008) or not having their contributions to group discussions properly attributed (Sesko & Biernat, 2010). In other cases, this invisibility can reduce the application of racial or gender stereotypes. For example, under certain conditions, Black women are not penalized for agentic behavior as much as White women or Black men (Livingston et al., 2012; Richardson, Phillips, Rudman, & Glick, 2011). As non-prototypical members of their gender category, Asian women would not be as susceptible as White women to the gender backlash that inhibits assertive behavior in negotiations. And, as non-prototypical members of their racial categories, they also would not suffer backlash for violating racial expectations. Intersectional invisibility theory may predict that Asian women would escape backlash for violating norms that inhibit assertive behavior in negotiations and thus be free to negotiate assertively. Due to their gender prototypicality, White women would be constrained by social norms proscribing dominance, while Asian men, as prototypical Asians, would be constrained by stereotypes of Asians as submissive, and both would be susceptible to status-incongruity backlash.

Given the theory and arguments above, we proposed the following three competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: White men will negotiate more assertively than Asian men, Asian women, or White women. Asian women will negotiate less assertively than Asian men, White women, or White men. Asian men and White women will negotiate with similar levels of assertiveness. We called this the “double jeopardy hypothesis.”

Hypothesis 2: White men will negotiate more assertively than Asian men, Asian women, or White women. Asian women will negotiate less assertively than Asian men, White women, or White men. Asian men will negotiate more assertively than White women. We called this the “gendered race hypothesis.”

Hypothesis 3: Asian women and White men will negotiate similarly to each other and more assertively than White women and Asian men. White women and Asian men will negotiate similarly to each other. We called this the “intersectional invisibility hypothesis.”

The double jeopardy and gendered race hypotheses are similar in their placement of White men as the most assertive and Asian women as the least assertive but differ in their relative expectations of Asian men and White women. The intersectional invisibility hypothesis differs from the other two primarily in the higher levels of assertiveness allowed from Asian women. To test these competing theories, we focused on individuals’ behavior in hypothetical negotiations. Although there are gender and racial differences in the likelihood of initiating a negotiation (Kugler, Reif, Kaschner, & Brodbeck, 2017), we were interested in how people would behave when presented with a negotiation scenario. Study 1 involved a hypothetical job negotiation: White and Asian students generated and rated phrasings of requests for a higher salary. In this initial study, we examined ratings of assertiveness, warmth, and confidence. Study 2, an online negotiation simulation, expanded our findings from Study 1 and allowed us to compare numerical requests made by White American and Asian American participants from a general population (Mechanical Turk [MTurk]) sample who were given a hypothetical negotiation. In Study 2, we measured the effects of gender and race on first offers and the mediating effect of concerns about backlash to evaluate the predictions of the intersectional theories listed above.

Study 1

A sample of MBA and undergraduate students engaged in a hypothetical job negotiation and generated requests for a higher salary. They rated the assertiveness, warmth, and confidence of each request they had produced and selected which of their three phrasings that they would be most likely to use. We tested the self-reported race and gender of the students as a potential predictor of their ratings. We expected that White women would report lower levels of assertiveness and confidence than White men, in keeping with previous research on gender roles and expectations for social backlash. We did not expect the same gender pattern among Asian participants. We also included ratings of warmth as a comparison for assertiveness, but we had no hypotheses regarding this measure. This first study allowed us to test the three different hypotheses outlined above regarding how the combination of race and gender would affect negotiations.

Method

Participants

A total of 145 White and Asian students at a university in the Northeastern United States (M _age = 26.22, SD _age = 4.06) consented and completed this study as an in-class activity. Participants were 47 White men, 26 Asian men, 46 White women, and 26 Asian women. Students categorized as “White” included those of European nationalities as well as White non-Latinx Americans, and those categorized as “Asian” included students from East Asian and South Asian nationalities as well as Asian Americans. Twenty-three other students from Latin American, African/African American, and other backgrounds also completed the survey, but their data are not analyzed here. Of the participants in the current study, some were MBA students (n = 98) in three sections of an elective course on managerial negotiations and the remainder (n = 48) were undergraduates in an elective course on leadership; this difference was controlled for in the analyses. Students in two sections of the negotiations course received the survey in their third week of the class, and students in the leadership course and in the other section of the negotiations course received the survey 8 weeks into the class; the difference in when they received the survey did not have a significant effect on the responses and was not included in further analyses. This sample size resulted in achieved power (1 − β, error probability) of .87 at f ² = .05.

Procedure

Prior to the in-class session, participants completed a separate survey providing their demographic information. During the session, participants were informed that the activity was intended to explore approaches to negotiation behavior when asking for a higher salary and were given the option to opt out fully or partially. Participants were asked to imagine they had received a job offer from a company with a salary of US $70,000 and instructed that all other benefits (insurance, moving costs, etc.) were part of a non-negotiable standard package. No information was provided on the gender or race of the hypothetical company representative. Participants were asked to generate up to three different ways in which they could phrase a request for a higher salary. All participants generated three phrasings except for one, who generated just one phrasing. After entering these phrasings into the text fields provided, they were asked to rate each phrasing on how assertive it was (1 = not at all assertive to 7 = extremely assertive) and how warm and friendly it was (1 = not at all warm and friendly to 7 = extremely warm and friendly). They were also asked how confident they were that each request would result in an increased salary offer (1 = not at all confident to 7 = extremely confident); however, due to a programming error, 23 of the participants did not see this question and were not included for those analyses. The ratings provided for each question were averaged across all the phrasings for each participant. Participants also indicated which of their own phrasings they would be most likely to use in a negotiation; these data are available upon request. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed in a later class session.

Results

We analyzed the average ratings provided for the phrasings generated by each participant using regression analyses, which included terms for gender (0 = female, 1 = male), race (0 = Asian, 1 = White), the covariate for the class type, and the interactions of these terms. There was not a significant main effect of assertiveness ratings based on the participants’ race, β = −.14, t(137) = 0.93, p = .35, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [−0.73, 0.26], or gender, β = −.14, t(137) = 0.80, p = .43, 95% CI [−0.77, 0.33]. However, the interaction of race and gender was marginally significant, β = .37, t(137) = 1.86, p = .065, 95% CI [−0.04, 1.31]. A priori contrasts indicated that White men provided higher ratings of assertiveness for their phrasings (M = 4.68, SD = 0.76) than did White women (M = 4.38, SD = 0.72), t(89) = 2.24, p = .027. However, there was not a significant difference in assertiveness self-ratings between Asian men (M = 4.33, SD = 0.87) and Asian women (M = 4.31, SD = 0.89), t(48) = 0.71, p = .48. There were no statistical differences between the assertiveness self-ratings of White men and Asian men, t(69) = 1.70, p = .093, nor between White women and Asian women, t(68) = 0.95, p = .35. Furthermore, Asian men and White women did not differ in their self-ratings of assertiveness, t(69) = 0.25, p = .80, nor did White men and Asian women, t(70) = 1.29, p = .20 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Average self-ratings of assertiveness (1 = not at all assertive to 7 = extremely assertive) for generated negotiation phrasings across race and gender of participants, Study 1. White men provided higher ratings of assertiveness for their phrasings than White women, p = .027, but there was not a significant difference between Asian men and Asian women, p = .48. No other significant differences found between groups on this measure. Error bars represent standard error.

We next analyzed the ratings of warmth reported by the participants for their phrasings; one participant did not provide ratings on this measure. Neither race, β = .04, t(136) = 0.29, p = .73, 95% CI [−0.43, 0.58], nor gender, β = .14, t(136) = 0.82, p = .41, 95% CI [−0.33, 0.79], nor the interaction between them, β = −.29, t(136) = 1.44, p = .15, 95% CI [−1.19, 0.18], significantly predicted ratings of warmth.

Next, we examined whether confidence in the effectiveness of their requests differed across White and Asian men and women, limited (because of a programming error) to the subset of participants (38 White men, 41 White women, 20 Asian men, and 23 Asian women) who saw and completed this question. Participants’ ratings of confidence revealed a significant main effect of race, β = −.48, t(114) = 2.94, p = .004, 95% CI [−1.52, −0.30], with Asian participants reporting higher confidence than White participants, and a non-significant main effect for gender, β = −.18, t(114) = 0.92, p = .36, 95% CI [−1.05, 0.38]. This was qualified by a significant gender by race interaction, β = .48, t(114) = 2.16, p = .033, 95% CI [0.08, 1.82]. Consistent with prior research, White women (M = 3.72, SD = 1.08) reported significantly lower confidence in their phrasings than did White men (M = 4.08, SD = 0.72), t(75) = 2.44, p = .017. There was no difference in self-reported confidence between Asian women (M = 4.33, SD = 0.78) and Asian men (M = 4.05, SD = 0.91), t(39) = 0.95, p = .35. Asian women reported significantly higher confidence than White women, t(60) = 2.73, p = .008, but not higher than White men, t(58) = 1.16, p = .25. Asian men did not differ significantly from White men, t(54) = 0.14, p = .89, or White women, t(58) = 1.27, p = .21.

Discussion

Compared to White men, White women tended to rate their salary requests as less assertive and express less confidence in their likelihood of getting a higher salary. However, this gender disparity was not statistically significant for Asian participants contrary to what past research on gender alone might have suggested. Asian women did not differ from White women or men in assertiveness ratings, and Asian men likewise did not statistically differ from White men or women. Asian women reported confidence levels akin to the confidence of White men, whereas Asian men did not differ from either White men or women in confidence.

This finding illustrates the limits of the generalizability of past research suggesting that women in general have lower self-efficacy in negotiations than men, by showing that this does not necessarily extend to all racial groups. However, our findings were congruent with past research suggesting that White men report greater confidence and assertiveness in salary negotiations compared to White women. Of the three approaches to intersections of race and gender explored above, the pattern of results in this context most closely matches the predictions suggested by the intersectional invisibility hypothesis: Asian women did not consistently show less assertiveness or less confidence than White women or Asian men, and Asian men and White women did not significantly differ from each other.

In Study 1, we focused on a fundamental aspect of the negotiation interaction, namely, the phrasing of the request for additional value and demonstrated that race moderated the effect of gender on self-ratings of assertiveness and confidence in the phrasing of requests. In Study 2, we aimed to examine the actual amount people requested as their first offer in a salary negotiation. Previous research on gender differences found that the amount of first offers, rather than target prices (one’s desired outcome) or reservation prices (one’s lowest acceptable outcome), was the first aspect of negotiations in which gender differences become apparent (Kray & Gelfand, 2009; Miles, 2010). The first offer represents the initial expression to the negotiation partner of one’s expectations and hopes; thus, the effects of social categories may come into play more strongly. In Study 2, we tested our hypothesis that a gender difference in first offers would be moderated by participants’ racial background. We also tested the potential mediating effect of concern about backlash on participants’ first offers.

Study 2

In Study 2, White and Asian American adults completed a salary negotiation case online. We predicted that race would moderate the effects of gender on participants’ first offers, such that White American men would provide a higher first offer than White American women, but that this same gender pattern would not occur among Asian American individuals. Results of the first study provided support for the intersectional invisibility hypothesis as compared to the double jeopardy and gendered race hypotheses. In Study 2, we were interested in whether similar patterns would extend beyond self-reported perceptions and be evident in the actual amounts that participants requested. Furthermore, and separately from the three intersectionality hypotheses outlined above, we hypothesized that differences in first-offer amounts would be mediated by concern about negotiation backlash.

Method

Participants

A total of 980 White or Asian American adults (M _age = 33.96, SD _age = 10.87; 460 White men, 47 Asian men, 436 White women, and 37 Asian women) completed this study through Amazon’s MTurk system and were included in the analyses below. An additional 85 African/African Americans, 51 Latin Americans, 13 Native Americans, and 25 participants who identified as “other” completed the survey but are not included in the main analyses; readers who would like to know more about these responses are invited to contact us directly. We excluded additional participants (n = 225) who did not provide demographic information or failed one of the comprehension checks embedded in the experiment (e.g., “Select strongly disagree to demonstrate that you are reading carefully”). With the final sample, achieved power (1 − β, error probability) was over .95 at f ² = .05.

Procedure

Participants were asked to imagine they had received a job offer from a consulting firm named “α” and were given information to prepare themselves for a negotiation over the terms of the salary. This material was based on the paradigm used by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). Some participants received additional instructions to focus on specific relational goals in reference to a hypothesis unrelated to the current study (more details are available upon request); these instructions did not produce any significant effects or interactions with our variables of interest (all Fs < 1.5, all ps > .20), so we collapsed across this factor for the analyses. Participants were informed that the average salary for their position was around US $40,000 a year, with 70% of consultants receiving between US $33,000 and US $50,000, a low around US $31,000, and a high near US $54,000. Previous research has shown that having information about the bargaining range can mitigate gender disparities (Mazei et al., 2015), so this allowed us to design a more conservative test of our hypotheses.

Participants provided dollar amounts in response to several questions, adapted from Amanatullah and Morris (2010), to measure their goals and expectations in the negotiation. This included their first offer (“If you are given the opportunity to make the first offer in this negotiation, how much will you suggest α pay you as your starting salary?”), concerns about social backlash (“How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring manager perceiving you to be a pushy person?”), and concerns about negotiation backlash (“How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the recruiter to punish you for being too demanding?”). The 2 backlash items explore different facets of backlash confirmed by their low scale reliability in the current sample (Spearman–Brown, ρ = .50); thus, we analyzed them separately. Participants also reported their target price and reservation price; these results are available upon request, but were not part of our hypotheses. Finally, participants completed a series of demographic questions about race and gender, as well as age, whether they had children, the number of years of work experience they had, their level of education (measured on an 8-point scale), and their level of experience in negotiation (measured on a 5-point scale from not experienced at all to a lot of experience), to consider as possible covariates, as these have been found to predict economic outcomes (Mazei et al., 2015).

Results

To examine the effects of race and gender on numerical values for salary negotiation goals and salary expectations, we ran a separate regression on each outcome variable. We coded gender as female = 0 and male =1, and race as Asian American = 0 and White American = 1. We controlled for age, level of education, experience with negotiations, and whether the participant had children, although significance patterns were no different when these covariates were removed from the model.

First Offer

Participants’ first offers revealed a significant gender by race interaction, β = .47, t(971) = 2.11, p = .035, 95% CI [0.03, 0.92], with non-significant main effects for gender, β = −.19, t(971) = 0.88, p = .38, 95% CI [−0.61, 0.23], and race, β = −.14, t(971) = 0.85, p = .39, 95% CI [−0.47, 0.19]. Negotiation experience (β = .12), presence of children (β = −.07), and level of education (β = .07) but not age (β = −.04) were significant covariates. Controlling for these factors, White American women (M = US $46,341.17, SD = US $5,651.54) asked for less in their first offers than did White American men (M = US $48,247.28, SD = US $5,613.11), t(889) = 4.21, p < .001, consistent with previous research. However, there was no statistical difference in first offers between Asian American women (M = US $47,797.30, SD = US $4,989.52) and Asian American men (M = US $46,436.17, SD = US $4,455.84), t(78) = 1.19, p = .24. Asian American women did not provide first offers statistically different from either White American women, t(472) = 0.68, p = .50, or White American men, t(490) = 0.80, p = .42. Asian American men provided first offers lower than those of White American men, t(500) = 2.16, p = .031, but not different from those of White American women, t(477) = 0.21, p = .84 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Proposed first-offer amounts across race and gender, Study 2. Participants were informed that average salary for their position was around US $40,000 with a low near US $31,000 and a high around US $51,000. White American woman significantly reported lower first offers compared to White American men, p < .001. Asian American men also significantly reported lower first offers than White American men, p = .031. Error bars represent standard error.

Social Backlash

The amount that participants estimated they could request without having the recruiter think they were “pushy” was not affected by race, β = −.06, t(972) = 0.35, p = .72, 95% CI [−0.39, 0.27]; gender, β = −.10, t(972) = 0.46, p = .64, 95% CI [−0.53, 0.33]; or the interaction of race and gender, β = .31, t(972) = 1.34, p = .18, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.76]. Neither level of education (β = .01), having children (β = .02), age (β = −.01), nor negotiation experience (β = −.004) were significant covariates, all ts < 0.53, ps > .59. The concerns about being seen as “pushy” seem, therefore, not to be different for Asian American and White American men and women.

Negotiation Backlash

For how much participants reported they could request without being punished by the recruiter, the interaction term for race and gender was significant, β = .54, t(972) = 2.40, p = .016, 95% CI [0.10, 0.98], but the main effects for gender, β = −.14, t(972) = 0.64, p = .52, 95% CI [−0.56, 0.28], or race, β = −.03, t(972) = 0.16, p = .87, 95% CI [−0.36, 0.30], were not. Level of education (β = .08) and having children (β = −.09) were significant covariates, but age (β = −.001) and negotiation experience were not (β = .01). Follow-up analyses showed that among White Americans, women (M = US $45,406.54, SD = US $5,636.24) estimated they could request a lesser amount of money without incurring punishment than did men (M = US $47,994.56, SD = US $6,547.67), t(890) = 6.00, p < .001. This finding is consistent with previous research. However, for Asian Americans, there was no statistical difference between women (M = US $46,108.11, SD = US $4,647.48) and men (M = US $44,957.45, SD = US $7,026.99), t(78) = 0.53, p = .60, in the amount they felt they could request without being punished. There was no difference between White American women’s anticipated punishment threshold and that reported by Asian American women, t(467) = 0.07, p = .95, and Asian American men, t(477) = 0.75, p = .46. White American men reported they could ask for significantly more without being punished than did Asian American men, t(501) = 3.13, p = .002, and Asian American women, t(491) = 1.98, p = .048 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Reported values at which participants expected to encounter negotiation backlash across race and gender, Study 2. Participants reported the salary amount that they believed they could request without being punished by the recruiter for being too demanding. White American women significantly requested lower amounts compared to White American men, p < .001. White American men also requested significantly higher amounts compared to Asian American men, p = .002, and women, p = .048. Error bars represent standard error.

Moderated Mediation Analyses

We conducted a moderated mediation model using Process Model 8 (Hayes, 2013) to examine the effect of gender on first offers mediated by anticipated negotiation backlash, with race moderating the effects of gender on the mediator and outcome. We first standardized all variables of interest by computing the z-scores. Our process model computed indirect effects for each of 5,000 bootstrapped samples, with 95% bias-corrected CIs to derive the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Indirect effects that do not contain 0 indicate statistical mediation. Our entire moderated mediation model was statistically significant, R ² = .51, F(3, 974) = 2.55, p < .001 (see Figure 4). We found a conditional indirect effect of gender on first offers mediated by anticipated backlash and moderated by race.

Figure 4.

Moderated mediation model for Study 2. The effect of participant gender on first-offer amounts was moderated by race and fully mediated by anticipated negotiation backlash. Participant race predicted how much participants believed they could request without being punished, **p = .001, as did the interaction of gender and race, *p = .007. Anticipated backlash amount significantly predicted first-offer amount, ***p < .001. Path coefficients are included for the direct and indirect effects, with coefficients for indirect effects in parentheses.

As predicted, the effect of gender on anticipated negotiation backlash was significantly moderated by race (the interaction of the predictor and the moderator), β = −.60, SE = .22, 95% CI [−1.04, −0.16], p = .007. The effect of gender on anticipated negotiation backlash alone was not significant, β = .18, SE = .21, 95% CI [−0.24, 0.61], p = .39, but the effect of race was significant, β = .49, SE = .15, 95% CI [0.20, 0.78], p = .001. We conducted conditional effects analyses of the interaction and found significant gender effects among White American negotiators, β = −.42, SE = .07, 95% CI [−0.55, −0.29], p < .001, but no significant gender differences among Asian American negotiators, β = .18, SE = .21, 95% CI [−0.24, 0.61], p = .39, on anticipated negotiation backlash.

The amount associated with anticipated negotiation backlash significantly predicted participants’ first offers (the outcome variable), β = .71, SE = .02, 95% CI [0.67, 0.76], p < .001, such that the higher the threshold for anticipated backlash, the higher the first-offer amount. When including the term for anticipated backlash in our moderated mediation model, the interaction of gender and race no longer significantly predicted first-offer amounts, β = −.15, SE = .16, 95% CI [−0.47, 0.16], p = .35, demonstrating full mediation. Likewise, the simultaneously modeled terms for gender, β = .11, SE = .15, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.41], p = .47, and race, β = −.03, SE = .11, 95% CI [−0.24, 0.18], p = .79, were not significant.

Discussion

In the second study, we found evidence that race moderates the gender differences that disadvantage women in negotiation. For both first offers and anticipated negotiation backlash, there was no gender disparity between Asian American women and men, but there were significant differences between White American women and men. White American men made higher salary first offers than White women; they also tended to ask for more as compared to Asian men, but not Asian women. We also found that the effects of social category membership on first offers was fully mediated by concerns about negotiation backlash, or the fear of being punished for asking for too much, rather than by concerns about social backlash, or being seen as pushy. White men reported being able to ask for higher salaries than all other groups without being punished for being too demanding.

Among the three hypotheses regarding the intersection of race and gender outlined above, the data for Asian Americans and White Americans in negotiation settings most closely match the predictions made by intersectional invisibility theory. Asian American women did not negotiate for significantly lower amounts than other groups as would be predicted by the double jeopardy approach and the gendered race theory based on the combination of social norms associated with their gender and race. Rather, Asian American women’s first offers were neither statistically different from those of White men nor from those of Asian American men or White women, providing some support that intersectional invisibility is applicable to Asian American women in the domain of negotiation.

The pattern of responses for Asian American men was similar in some ways to those for White women. Asian American men provided lower first offers and lower thresholds for anticipated negotiation backlash than did White American men. This may be due in part to the ways in which Asian Americans are treated as racially lower in status and stereotyped as less assertive than White Americans (Berdahl & Min, 2012; Berger et al., 1986; Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Ridgeway, 2001). The extent to which the constraints on Asian American men are due to racial discrimination (targeted more harshly at men in this case) or due to not conforming to societal depictions of normative White masculinity or a combination of these and other factors is unclear and should be the topic of further research.

General Discussion

Across two studies, race moderated patterns of gender disparities in negotiation behaviors. Consistent with previous research on gender and negotiations (Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al., 2007; Mazei et al., 2015), White women rated themselves as less assertive and confident and asked for less than White men in salary negotiations. Conversely, Asian men and women did not differ in their self-ratings of assertiveness or confidence in their phrasings about salary negotiation or in the numerical amounts they specified in a hypothetical salary negotiation. Lower economic assertiveness was mediated by concerns about punishment for asking for too much: White men reported being able to ask for significantly higher amounts before anticipating backlash than the other groups, which in turn allowed them to ask for more in their first offers.

These findings highlight the importance of considering intersectionality when assessing group-based disparities in negotiation performance. In two studies, we replicated the findings of systemic disadvantage to White women in distributive negotiations and found evidence that Asian men, and to some extent Asian women, are likewise disadvantaged. Although a wealth of research has addressed gender differences in negotiation, race also affects negotiation behavior. Further intersections with other social categories may highlight important boundary conditions of extant research (e.g., Martin, North, & Phillips, 2018).

We contributed to intersectionality research by testing its application in the domain of negotiations. Our results provide moderate support for intersectional invisibility. Asian women did not show less assertiveness in negotiations than White women or Asian men, as would have been predicted based on the double jeopardy hypothesis or the gendered-race hypothesis. However, they also didn’t consistently show higher assertiveness than those groups nor did they feel as if they could ask as much as White men without receiving punishment for being too demanding. It is possible that there are cues and contexts that would lead to more assertive behavior and reduced backlash for Asian women in negotiations, and we hope that future researchers will investigate this possibility.

Our findings also indicate that Asian men may be concerned about penalties for asking for higher salaries and negotiate less assertively as a result. Compared to White American men, Asian American men must deal with stereotypes that portray them as less assertive (Berdahl & Min, 2012; Ghavami & Peplau, 2012) and with a lower racial status in the American society (Berger et al., 1986; Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Ridgeway, 2001). The consequences they face are similar to those faced by men who violate gender norms by being agreeable or modest (Judge, Livingston, & Hurst, 2012; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010), by requesting family leave or a flexible work schedule (Rudman & Mescher, 2013; Vandello, Hettinger, Bosson, & Siddiqi, 2013), or by supporting the equality of women and men (Rudman, Mescher, & Moss-Racusin, 2013). Such gender incongruity is linked with lower pay, less respect, and higher risk of demotion (Brescoll, Uhlmann, Moss Racusin, & Sarnell, 2012; Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Judge et al., 2012; Rudman & Mescher, 2013).

Limitations and Future Directions

Our study has limitations that create opportunities for future research. The concepts of “Asian” or “White” in themselves are broad categories encompassing a range of different nationalities and associated cultural norms (Shek, 2006); our focus was shaped by the common structural experiences shared among those who are categorized as “Asian” or as “White” in a U.S. context. However, the different subgroups encompassed by the term Asian have many unique and non-shared experiences, and future researchers should more carefully examine the role of structural inequality and power in shaping their outcomes (Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016b). We did not examine the possible role of cultural norms in shaping negotiation behavior. However, social roles attributing assertiveness to men and passivity to women in negotiations are by no means universal (Cuddy et al., 2015; Peng, 2006; Zhang, Norvilitis, & Jin, 2001). Shan, Keller, and Imai (2016) demonstrated that Chinese women in China show assertive negotiation behaviors in accordance with contextually determined social norms, and Semnani-Azad and Adair (2011) presented research indicating the importance of considering cultural values in conjunction with gender.

One important direction for the future would be to compare the experiences of Latinx and Black Americans with Asian and White Americans. Given the “model minority” status of Asian Americans, the repercussions for Black or Latino/a individuals for negotiating assertively might be even more restrictive. The unique experiences of Black women, out of which the field of intersectionality grew (Crenshaw, 1989; Rosenthal, 2016), merit focused consideration. Although Black women encounter less backlash for assertiveness in some circumstances than Black men (Livingston et al., 2012), some evidence suggests that negotiation may not be one of those circumstances (Thomas, Johnson-Bailey, Phelps, Tran, & Johnson, 2013). Likewise, the experiences of Latinx individuals in negotiation have profound implications for American society’s treatment and marginalization of this growing demographic. Future researchers should directly address these questions, exploring the possibility that tight cultural norms shape how women and men respond to the status expectations and social roles associated with their category or identity memberships, which in turn might be shaped by multiple dimensions of how their social groups are perceived (e.g., “inferiority” and “cultural foreignness”; Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Our research offers a first step in identifying additional factors to study that may shape negotiation behavior.

Another limitation of our research is our focus on self-reports of assertiveness and confidence in the first study, rather than comparing participants’ self-ratings with the ratings of third-party judges. Given that Asian and White men and women may have different standards by which they judge what is assertive, it is feasible that two people may generate an almost identical phrasing but rate it differently based on their own gender and race, their experience with how their own assertiveness is received by others, and other aspects of the context, including the race and gender of the negotiation partner. Our use of single-item measures rather than multi-item measures could also be construed as problematic but is not without precedent in related literature (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). A fruitful avenue of research would be to use an intersectional approach to extend the existing literature on self-perceptions versus others’ perceptions of assertiveness in negotiations (Ames, Lee, & Wazlawek, 2017; Ames & Wazlawek, 2014) and how people apply stereotypes and shifting standards in rating similar phrasings from different people (Biernat & Manis, 1994). Further exploration of these factors might explain the difference between the patterns of negotiation behavior in our results and the patterns of negotiation outcomes illustrated in the gender and racial wage gap described in the introduction (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2017). Finally, moving beyond race, gender, and culture, there are many other categories that may also play an intersectional role in negotiation behavior and backlash that we did not directly address in this article, such as age, religion, and socioeconomic status (Cohen & Varnum, 2016). Much remains to be investigated in this respect.

Practice Implications

There are many practical implications of our findings that race moderates the effects of gender on negotiation behavior. Racial minority women have different experiences from White women and racial minority men have different experiences from White men, experiences that further diverge according to specific racial backgrounds and their relative social status. Although many strategies for improving gender equity in negotiation outcomes have been proposed with White women in mind, those who enact and help others enact such strategies should identify what is most effective for each intersectional group to achieve parity in negotiation outcomes. Negotiators, negotiation coaches, and faculty who teach negotiation courses may need to focus on identifying different strategies for minority and non-minority individuals to help them negotiate efficiently, improve self-efficacy, and counteract negative feedback.

Researchers could contribute in this regard by identifying effective interventions. For example, one possibility is that the beliefs that individuals have about how their own gender and racial identities intersect with each other shape their interaction expectations and thus their behaviors. For Asian and Asian American women, this might suggest an intervention that explicitly outlines the concept of intersectional invisibility or addresses the range of stereotypes of assertiveness they may encounter (e.g., “dragon lady,” “China doll”; Ono & Pham, 2009). Another possibility is that making the race or gender of an individual salient before going into a negotiation might affect outcomes. If Asian and Asian American men are primed with their masculinity versus their racial background, do they negotiate more assertively? If so, would such assertive behavior result in backlash? And would training their negotiation partners reduce the backlash? Although this would be a dual-identity study rather than a study on intersectionality (e.g., Shih et al., 1999), it offers one plausible path to pursue for designing interventions.

Finally, we do not want to suggest that the onus of change be placed solely on those who directly shoulder the burden of inequities. We call upon more organizations to evaluate and alter their treatment of job candidates and employees to ensure parity in outcomes for those of every race and gender. Human resources staff and organizational policy makers should strive to reduce the backlash that contributes to these effects and should increase the transparency of their decisions about staff compensation.

Conclusions

We investigated intersectional effects of race and gender in negotiation in two studies. In addition to contributing to intersectionality research, the results raised a number of key questions for ongoing gender and negotiation research. It is evident that gender and race dynamics are more complex than those of gender or race alone; thus, researchers in these domains should try whenever possible to examine these factors simultaneously. Furthermore, those who seek to redress inequalities in salary negotiations should take race as well as gender into account.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Daniel Ames, Wendi Adair, Michael Slepian, Rachel McDonald, Deena S. Weisberg, and Peter Zheng for their assistance with this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Shira Mor

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