Abstract
In his challenging article, Four modalities of the experience of others (2018), Victor Schermer tackles the difficult task of laying the foundations that could connect various philosophical assumptions with the experiences and mutual interactions of group members. He suggests that there are ‘four distinct ways in which people interact and get to know one another in groups’ (Schermer, 2018). He lists the four modalities of mind, body, gaze and face, which rely on his distinction between four separate and unique perspectives. These perspectives are logical representations which parallel four philosophical approaches: the mind represents Descartes’s (1641) cogito ergo sum; the body represents pre-reflective awareness in line with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking (1978); the gaze represents power-relations and relating through power, as depicted by Sartre (1943) and Foucault (1977); finally, the face represents ethical responsibility, a responsibility for the other which precedes all knowledge, according to Levinas (1969).
As far as I know, this is a ground-breaking attempt to relate the experience of group analysis with philosophical thinking and this is what makes its contribution so significant. So far, most attempts to connect group analysis to other disciplines focused on psychoanalysis (for example, Foulkes, 1964; Hopper, 2009) and sociology (for example, Hopper, 2002; Lavie, 2011). Schermer’s attempt to present a comprehensive picture that bridges between the experiences of the individual, as they try to get to know the other group members, and the thinking of particular philosophers is thus a pioneering effort. Schermer even goes so far as to relate these to the field of neuroscience.
It is accepted that one cannot understand what is going on in the group without considering several dimensions of experience and communication, dimensions that offer us a more profound understanding of group processes. Foulkes (1964) discusses the various levels at which members experience the group, several dimensions through which one can observe the group and communication within it or, in other words, different ways of understanding what is going on in the group at a given moment. For Foulkes (1990), communication is the overarching concept illustrating the experience and the curative aspect of the group. Foulkes also discusses four levels of communication: current, transference, projective and primordial (the names Foulkes chose for these levels indicate the effect Freud and Jung had on his thinking). At any given moment, one can observe each of these levels (or dimensions); but usually one of them is most prominent, so that one can highlight a certain aspect of group communication, uncovering certain things and obfuscating others; this could be viewed as a figure-background array or as binocular vision (Bion, 1970). However, group experience cannot be fully understood without the knowledge that all levels are present within it.
Schlapobersky (1993) also discusses different dimensions of communicating and relating (or not relating) to the other, in his depiction of the types of language used in group therapy: monologue, dialogue and discourse. This distinction refers not only to the speakers but also to the other members who observe the present communication and position themselves in relation to it.
Yet another reference to the modalities of group communication is found in Bion’s (1959) discussion of the three basic assumptions: working group, fight and flight, dependency 1 . Even when Bion formulated the notion of ‘container/contained’ interaction, he broadened the scope of the term to refer to the life of the group as well: the group is the container, while the individual is the contained. Bion listed three possible types of interaction between container and contained (group and individual), the most mature of which is termed ‘commensal interaction’ and the most destructive of which is termed ‘parasitic interaction’. The third type is called ‘symbiotic interaction’ (Bion, [1970] 1977). Commensal interaction refers to two objects which share a third one (this third constitutes emotional thinking), to the benefit of all three: each of these objects is enriched by the interaction—the group, the individual and thinking itself. Parasitic interaction represents the kind of relationship in which one object uses the other in order to create the third, thus destroying all three (no thinking is possible). Symbiotic interaction entails a relationship in which one uses the other to the benefit of both, resulting in some degree of thinking. Billow (2004) transposed these three states to the context of the analytic group as ‘bonding’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘anti-linking’ interactions. These forms of communication formulated by Bion and Billow certainly help us in describing and understanding the different coping situations of group members (Ofer, 2016). The various members encounter different forms of experience which can only be understood by relating to these interaction modalities, which allow us to gain deeper knowledge of intersubjective group pathologies and forms of relating to others in various anxiety states in the group.
Another approach to analysing the complexities encountered in the group focuses on the listening modalities utilized by the conductor, when listening to group members (Ofer, 2013). These different kinds of attention shape the way in which the therapist perceives what is happening in the group and in individual members as well as how group members react to the therapist. This line of thinking also relies on the works of various philosophers, though in a way that differs from and sometimes even opposes Schermer’s classification. Let me elaborate:
The philosopher Emmanuel Kant discussed three types of pleasure: sensual pleasure (what is pleasant), cognitive pleasure (what is good) and aesthetic pleasure (what is beautiful). On this foundation, Frogel (2008) discussed different types of satisfaction and attention: epistemological satisfaction/attention, ethical satisfaction/attention and aesthetic satisfaction/attention. Epistemological attention is a kind of attention whose goal is to learn about something in order to discover its intrinsic truth. This kind of attention implies a scientific, objective stance, which requires a certain emotional distance. This kind of attention is similar to the modality that Schermer calls mind. The goal of ethical attention is to make more room for personal freedom according to moral judgement of good and bad. In this context, listening is focused not only on the content of what is being said but also on the person who is speaking, their subjective self and existential experience. Emotional involvement associated with this kind of attention is not only possible but desirable. (This, is an important component of effective leadership because it lends itself to emotional expansion). The aim of aesthetic attention is to make room for understanding, regardless of epistemological (truth) or ethical (good or bad) judgments. Bollas (1978) refers to the aesthetic experience as going beyond cognitive or moral knowledge. The ethical and aesthetic attentions reminds us of the body and the face modalities but are not equivalent to them.
As a corollary of attention, which is a necessary condition for expanding freedom, the kind of observation or looking a person employs is also important for personal transformation. What is the particular quality of observation that facilitates growth? The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas emphasizes that ethical responsibility is the cornerstone of our existence, and that it can be reflected in the looks exchanged between two people, a face-to-face look which enables the person looking to discover his freedom (Levinas, 1982; Frogel, 2006). This is in opposition to Sartre’s view, by which the other’s gaze can limit one’s freedom (Sartre, 1943; Frogel, 2006). I would argue that both views are valid: the other’s gaze can enhance personal freedom and it can also limit it, depending on its kind.
I list all these different classification modalities in order to demonstrate how crucial it is for us to categorize responses, experiences and modes of experiencing others in the group. Each kind of classification adds another dimension to the toolkit which facilitates our understanding of what goes on in the group, of group communication and of the relation to and perception of the other in the group. In a world of intersubjective conceptualization, where instead of grasping a single truth we shift between different subjective and intersubjective truths, between our needs for permanence and for flexibility, between different understandings and views, utilizing different classification systems enriches our understanding of the complexity of the interpersonal encounter in the group. In his article, Schermer uses a clinical vignette to demonstrate how his reliance on different philosophers affords him a deeper understanding of patient reactions in the group setting. For example, understanding a certain response as a ‘power-presenting gaze’ elucidated the reaction of the other patient, who tried to utilize a logic-based response to cope with this gaze. Nevertheless, further experience with this interpretative approach is required in order to determine whether Schermer’s classification indeed both deepens and facilitates therapeutic work.
I find Schermer’s words at the conclusion of his article most significant. He turns to the reader and states: If you are stimulated by this article . . . go further, do it with an open mind. Openness to the lifeworld is the only way to bring together the experience of lived lives with abstract theory and scientific and clinical findings . . . the most important purpose of this article is to encourage you to attend with a fresh eye to the various ways in which group members reach out to and experience on another . . . resist the gaze of others and the need to conform. (Schermer, 2018: x–x)
It seems that today, scientific disciplines cannot sustain themselves without being related to other disciplines; parallel interpretations offered by different sciences are both an accepted norm and a source of enrichment for our capacity for understanding. In one of his articles, Kohut (1968) quotes a letter Anna Freud wrote to a 14-year-old boy, who had asked her what are the most important qualities for a psychoanalyst. Part of her response read: If you want to be a real psychoanalyst you have to have a great love of the truth, scientific truth as well as personal truth . . . Further, I think that a psychoanalyst should have . . . interests . . . beyond the limits of the medical field . . . in facts that belong to sociology, religion, literature, [and] history, [otherwise] his outlook on . . . his patient will remain too narrow. (Freud sited in Kohut, 1969: 552)
To a considerable degree, Victor Schermer’s article resonates with this answer.