Evolution and moral relativism

Harman’s moral relativism

Harman defends a naturalistic approach to ethics. In Harman’s view, a naturalistic approach to ethics most plausibly leads to moral relativism (1984: 30). Naturalists need to give an account of values in the natural world, and Harman thinks moral relativism does it best (1984: 29). For Harman, the issue is, ‘not what is compatible with the evidence, but what best accounts for it’ (1984: 48). And for a naturalistic approach, moral relativism is simply most plausible.

In formulating his version of moral relativism, Harman uses the concept of ‘convention’ or ‘framework’. In one of his writings, Harman says moral relativism is the view that ‘different agents are subject to different basic moral requirements depending on the moral conventions in which they participate’ (1984: 30). In another work, he says moral relativism is the view that ‘moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, etc.) are always relative to a choice of framework’ (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 3). According to Harman’s moral relativism, even though some people may talk of ‘absolute rightness’, there is really only rightness in relation to a particular framework (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 17). Moral relativism rejects the idea that there is a moral law that applies to everyone (Harman, 1984: 34–35). Moral relativism also

denies that there are universal basic moral demands and says different people are subject to different basic moral demands depending on the social customs, practices, conventions, values, and principles that they accept. (Harman, 1984: 35)

Under moral relativism, any individual who claims that something is ‘morally good, right, or just’, is always making that claim relative to a particular moral framework (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 62). In Harman’s version of moral relativism, he thinks it still makes sense to say that moral claims can be true or false; it’s just that moral claims are always true or false in relation to a particular convention or framework. A moral relativist, Harman says,

supposes that the truth conditions of moral claims are relative to one or another moral framework. But that is not to deny that these claims have truth conditions; and a moral relativist will suppose that it is often possible to find out that a given moral claim is true in relation to a given framework. (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 158–159)

Moral relativism is a theory about the nature of ethics, but Harman’s version also takes a position on the origins of ethics. Harman holds that ‘morality arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one another’ (2007 [1975]: 84). Moralities are social and defined by the conventions of groups, Harman thinks (1977: 113). It might seem puzzling to say that one’s morality is a function of one’s group’s conventions, since each individual belongs to different groups that will likely have different – perhaps conflicting – conventions. Harman doesn’t think this is puzzling, though. If you belong to more than one group, and the different groups have different conventions, and you are wondering which conventions determine your moral obligations, Harman’s answer is: ‘They all do’ (1977: 113).

One of the reasons Harman is confident about the relativist view that morality is defined by the conventions of groups is the sheer explanatory power of the theory. For Harman, ‘our having the moral beliefs we have can be explained entirely in terms of our upbringing and our psychology, without any appeal to an independent realm of values and obligations’ (1984: 32). ‘Moral conventionalism’ (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 27), as he calls it, is only one part of Harman’s theory of moral relativism; the theory has other dimensions as well.

Harman also understands moral relativism to involve a rejection of the idea that there are ‘universally applicable objective moral reasons’ (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 63). His position is that an agent’s moral reasons depend on the agent’s desires, goals, aims, intentions, and values (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 62). To illustrate the point, Harman uses several colorful examples: intelligent beings from outer space, cannibals, and criminals employed by Murder, Incorporated (Harman, 2007 [1975]: 85). In each of these cases he says that, if these agents have good reason to injure us, then it doesn’t make sense that by their standards they ought not to harm us. With regard to the intelligent beings from outer space, he says ‘there might be no reasons at all for a being from outer space to avoid harm to us’ (2007 [1975]: 87). By Harman’s estimation:

That a certain course of action on their part might injure one of us means nothing to them … In such a case it would be odd to say that nevertheless the beings ought to avoid injuring us or that it would be wrong for them to attack us. (2007 [1975]: 85)

A criminal, according to how Harman understands morality, ‘may well have no reason at all not to harm his or her victims’ (1984: 36). The mere ‘possession of rationality’, Harman holds, is not sufficient to provide a source for relevant reasons, since certain desires, goals, or intentions are also necessary (2007 [1975]: 87). As evidence of this, Harman observes that

there are people … who do not act in accordance with the alleged requirement not to harm or injure others, where this is not due to inattention or failure to consider or appreciate certain arguments, or ignorance of certain evidence, or any errors in reasoning, or any sort of irrationality or unreasonableness, or weakness of will. (1984: 36–39)

Again, for Harman there are no universally applicable objective moral reasons; rather, an agent’s moral reasons depend on the agent’s desires, goals, aims, intentions, and values (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 62). Harman is quite confident about this moral reasons argument for relativism (1984: 39).

Harman’s rejection of the idea of universally applicable objective moral reasons fits with his moral relativist claim that

[t]here is no single true morality. There are many different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others. (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 5)

For Harman, there are no universal moral reasons, because one’s moral reasons are only meaningful against a particular backdrop. In addition to supporting moral relativism with consideration of moral reasons, Harman thinks actual observed moral diversity supports moral relativism. He says that the claim that there is no single true morality ‘is made very plausible by actual moral diversity’ and ‘is a reasonable inference from the most plausible explanation of moral diversity’ (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 6, 8). Moral diversity and the ‘apparent intractability of moral disagreements’ provide evidence for moral relativism (1996: 187).

Wong’s moral relativism

Wong’s version of moral relativism is a bit different from Harman’s. Wong does agree with Harman that ‘there is no single true morality’ (Wong, 2006: xv). And, like Harman, Wong thinks a naturalistic approach to morality supports moral relativism (Wong, 2006: xiv). Yet, while Harman’s form of moral relativism with its moral conventionalism seems to imply that anything can count as morality as long as there are conventions in place, Wong seeks to develop a theory of ‘relativism with limits’ (Wong, 2006: xiii). Wong calls his view ‘pluralistic relativism’ because it ‘recognizes limits on what can count as a true morality’ (2006: xv). For Wong, these limits derive from the function of morality, and from what the relevant empirical theories tell us about human nature (2006: 44). In terms of morality’s functions, Wong observes that morality has several functions; broadly two: an intrapersonal function and an interpersonal function. Morality functions to coordinate one’s intrapersonal instincts, feelings, and desires; but morality also functions to regulate and organize interpersonal relations (Wong, 2006: 43). In terms of human nature and psychology, Wong is confident that ‘the strength of self-interest in human nature necessitates a norm of reciprocity in moralities that effectively perform the interpersonal function’ (2006: 47).

These kinds of ‘universal limits on adequate moralities’ (2006: 65; 1991: 446–447) lead Wong to a rather moderate moral relativism. In the following passage we see Wong’s considered judgment about the nature of morality. In passages like these, he does not sound like a moral relativist.

Much of what is moral will be the same for, say, Asian and Western societies, because of the common functions of moralities, human nature, and similar conditions across human societies. The commonalities form a shared core that includes duties arising from special relationships, including duties to care for the young and to instruct them so that they can become full-fledged moral agents, norms of reciprocity, and the other norms and reasons necessary for accomplishing the functions of morality. (Wong, 2006: 68)

Moral relativists usually emphasize moral difference, moral disagreement, and moral diversity; yet Wong’s version of relativism acknowledges both ‘commonalities and differences in moralities across societies and within them’ (2006: 68). Although he defends moral relativism, he has no qualms about recognizing ‘shared values’ among those who are in moral disagreement (2006: 251), and ‘universal elements of adequate moralities’ (2006: 58), and ‘a shared core’ to morality (2006: 68).

Wong believes that his theory of pluralistic relativism, with its notion of universal limits and constraints on morality, is not susceptible to the kinds of objections that apply to cruder versions of moral relativism. He writes:

It is commonly thought that relativism simply regards the popularly accepted moral norms in a society as determinative of the truth conditions for moral statements in that society. This crude and uncritical conventionalism does not follow from pluralistic relativism, since moral norms are subject to evaluation according to the universal constraints on morality. (2006: 73)

Although Wong holds that there are ‘universal constraints on morality’, which play a critical role for morality, nevertheless, he still thinks there is enough diversity, and there are enough differences and disagreements – both among and within moralities – to say that morality is ultimately relative. For Wong, it is simply not the case that there is a single, true morality. Consider the contrast between ‘moralities oriented toward rights as a basic source of value’ and ‘moralities oriented toward relationships and community’ (2006: 22; 1991: 445–446). A rights-centered morality versus a community-centered morality is his paradigm example of moral diversity. Yet there are many, many other examples, he thinks. He feels that he paints a ‘portrait of moral diversity’ that ‘points to the ubiquity of serious disagreement and therefore to the constant necessity for accommodation’ (2006: 250). In addition, Wong identifies a special kind of moral disagreement, a ‘widespread phenomenon’ he calls ‘moral ambivalence’ (2006: xiv). Moral ambivalence, he stipulates, is the ‘recognition of severe conflicts between important values and of the possibility that reasonable people could take different paths in the face of these conflicts’ (2006: xiv). He later amplifies this definition:

Moral ambivalence is the phenomenon of coming to understand and appreciate the other side’s viewpoint to the extent that our sense of the unique rightness of our own judgments gets destabilized. In other words, the most discomforting kind of moral disagreement is not simply one in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other but is also a disagreement in which coming to the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. (2006: 5)

Moral ambivalence is not simply a kind of disagreement, but also a reaction to a disagreement. He says it is ‘a kind of moral disagreement’ that ‘evokes a complex reaction I call “moral ambivalence”’ (2006: 5). As an example of moral ambivalence, he points to the ‘stress and ambivalence we feel about conflicts between special duties associated with the personal perspective and duties owed to all arising from the impersonal perspective’ (Wong, 2006: 223). As noted earlier, pluralistic relativism acknowledges commonalities and differences in moralities across societies and within them. As a kind of moral disagreement, moral ambivalence also ‘exists not only across different moral traditions but also within a single moral tradition’ (2006: 23). Particular kinds of moral conflicts involve moral ambivalence because in these kinds of moral conflicts ‘we can understand both sides’ (2006: 21). The reality of moral ambivalence, he thinks, ‘in conjunction with a naturalistic conception of morality, supports the conclusion that there is no single true morality’ (2006: xiv).

Once we accept that moral ambivalence exists, Wong says that we must explain why it exists, and he thinks his theory of pluralistic relativism explains it best. Wong believes that ‘[t]he strongest case for pluralistic relativism includes not only the claim that other moralities are as justified as our own but also the recognition of the genuine values that compose those moralities’ (Wong, 2006: 235). The following passage sums up the main elements of Wong’s account of morality:

My approach is explicitly committed to a naturalistic understanding of morality, and … the combination of moral ambivalence and a naturalistic approach generates a particular way of understanding why there is no single true morality but also of the basis for certain broad constraints on the range of true moralities. (Wong, 2006: 98)

Moral relativism and evolution

In this section I look at how some writers have characterized the relationship between moral relativism and an evolutionary perspective on human origins, Harman and Wong included. William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), for instance, the pioneering sociologist, was known as a defender of both Darwinism and moral relativism. As a Darwinian, Sumner applied an evolutionary perspective to the study of society. He did much research in documenting the diversity he found in societies. He confidently viewed societies as organic entities with complexities that could only be understood by situating them in their historical context. For Sumner, social evolution was a direct development from biological evolution.

The study of societies naturally led Sumner to the topic of morality. Having studied various moralities from various cultures, he reached the conclusion that morality is indeed relative. Morality is a product of ‘the folkways’ (Sumner, 1906: 41). For Sumner, it could not be otherwise: he was convinced that ‘[m]ores define the limits which make anything right’ (1906: 438). He saw ample evidence for moral relativism in the extreme and indisputable variety of moralities he observed in cultures around the globe. ³ A number of contemporary thinkers, though, don’t see moral relativism and evolution as a coherent fit. Michael Ruse and E.O. Wilson, for instance, when working with ethics and evolution, take a stance against moral relativism. Ruse and Wilson state clearly that an evolutionary perspective on human nature and ethics does not lead to moral relativism. Writes Ruse:

[N]ote that the Darwinian’s position does not plunge him/her into wholesale ethical relativism … Against this, the Darwinian recognizes that there are indeed differences from society to society, and also within societies, particularly across time. However, these are readily (and surely properly) explained in the way that most moral theorists would explain them, as secondary, modified consequences of shared primary moral imperatives. (1998: 255; see also Ruse & Wilson, 1986: 188, 190)

Ruse continues:

The differences between us are far outweighed by the similarities … I did not choose my moral code. For the Darwinian, the very essence of morality is that it is shared and not relative. It does not work as a biological adaptation, unless we all join in. (1998: 255)

In an effort to show that biology can indeed throw light on ethics, Ruse claims that ‘there is evidence from human studies pointing to uniformities of moral beliefs beneath all the cultural variations and that these uniformities are innate rather than learned’ (1993: 148). Ruse’s data show moral uniformity, not moral relativity. Whereas Sumner and most relativists emphasize moral diversity among and within societies, Ruse says a Darwinian must also admit the similarities between diverse moralities. Accordingly, says Ruse, ‘the evolutionary ethicist strongly denies relativity because then the universality of cooperating would break down’ (Ruse, 1993: 158). Simon Blackburn, known as a long-time defender of expressivism, is adamant in denying both that expressivism and relativism are one and the same, and that expressivism leads us to moral relativism. Blackburn seems to be in full agreement with Ruse and Wilson on this matter. ‘In the twentieth century’, Blackburn writes,

we have all been impressed by the diversities of human nature and human culture, but it is worth remembering some of the constancies that impressed earlier thinkers. We are social animals, with certain biological needs. We have to coordinate our efforts; we have to establish systems of property and promise-keeping and sometimes even government. (Blackburn, 1996: 90) ⁴

Let’s now look at our two specimen versions of moral relativism, Harman’s and Wong’s, and see whether their ethical theories cohere with an evolutionary perspective. Harman, in opposition to the naturalists just mentioned – Ruse, Wilson, and Blackburn – says that a naturalistic approach to morality lends itself to moral relativism. Harman’s approach seems to fit with Sumner’s general stance. Recall that for Harman’s moral relativism, ‘our having the moral beliefs we have can be explained entirely in terms of our upbringing and our psychology, without any appeal to an independent realm of values and obligations’ (1984: 32). Such a view is reminiscent of Sumner’s notion that morality is a product of folkways and that’s the end of the story.

Harman is aware of how biological considerations lead some theorists away from moral relativism. He acknowledges that ‘[o]ne possible view is that we are genetically constructed so as to feel such concern and respect for others and that makes morality possible’ (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 26). This sounds like what Ruse, Wilson, and Blackburn have said. Harman calls such a view the ‘sociobiological thesis’ and says there may be something to it (1996: 26). In his considered view, though, he is not convinced; for he says ‘there may also be a completely conventional explanation of our concern for others. Perhaps one develops concern and respect for others as part of accepting a convention, on the supposition that others are developing or have developed similar concern and respect’ (1996: 26). This, of course, is Harman’s relativism, which relies on conventionalism. When comparing the ‘sociobiological thesis’ to his own thesis, he oddly concedes that his hypothesis ‘is highly speculative, of course – just a possibility’ (1996: 27).

Harman’s whole case for moral relativism doesn’t merely rest on conventionalism, though. He also supports his case with his account of moral reasons, moral diversity, and moral disagreement. For Harman, these factors presumably tip the scales away from the sociobiological thesis.

Levy is another defender of moral relativism, and he takes head-on the charge that biological considerations make moral relativism implausible (2002: ch. 5). The kinds of biological considerations that Ruse takes as problematic for moral relativism include: that morality won’t work as a biological adaptation unless we all join in; that humans have shared basic values in addition to their differences; and the universality of cooperating. Levy doesn’t think these biological considerations ‘rule out the possibility of a significant relativism’, because they still leave ‘room enough for important disagreements’ (2002: 123). Moral disagreements, as we’ve seen, are central to the moral relativist’s case.

Also, Levy emphasizes that there is a gap between ethics and natural, biological constraints (2002: 137). Levy is making the common point that ‘we cannot simply read our values off our biology’ (2002: 125). Levy’s point is actually similar to Harman’s position on moral reasons. Harman holds that there is no single true morality, and he defends this partly through arguing that there are no universal moral reasons. There are no universal moral reasons because one’s moral reasons are only meaningful against a particular backdrop, the conventions an agent has agreed to. An agent’s moral reasons thus depend on the agent’s desires, goals, aims, intentions, and values (Harman & Thomson, 1996: 62). The biological facts of human nature don’t necessarily give an agent a moral reason to perform or refrain from an action; the agent is free to pursue myriad goals, regardless of his or her natural predispositions, even if those dispositions are biological adaptations. In short, Harman’s account of moral reasons will always cut against any kind of argument that offers ethics as biologically based.

If someone like Ruse counters that ethics is undoubtedly a product of human evolution and for that reason is therefore unlikely to be relativistic, Harman will remain unpersuaded. Since, for Harman, morality depends on the accepted conventions of agents who have subjective desires, Harman’s version of moral relativism doesn’t seem to acknowledge any constraints on what can count as a morality; so it doesn’t matter to Harman that ethics is indeed the product of evolution. This is an aspect of Harman’s version of moral relativism with which Wong disagrees. Here, it becomes clear that Levy’s version of moral relativism is actually more similar to Wong’s, because both Levy and Wong accept that evolution has put particular constraints on morality. And Levy and Wong do not think these constraints stand in the way of moral relativism, because, as Levy puts it,

these constraints are very broad. Within the boundaries they set, there remains a great deal of room for an interesting descriptive relativism, for an endless variety of human moral systems, each of which fulfils the evolutionary function of morality well enough. (Levy, 2002: 134)

Wong wishes for his version of moral relativism to be fully naturalistic, and he takes that to mean that our best account of morality should integrate well with ‘the most relevant empirical theories about human beings and society’, and this includes an evolutionary account (2006: xiv, 36, 41, 42). Somewhat like Sumner, Wong says:

Any system of belief that could be considered a morality today is the product of a long and complex evolutionary (biological and cultural) process. As a society’s circumstances change, old practices and customs that regulate intra- and interpersonal conflicts die off or transform, and new ones emerge. (Wong, 2006: 65)

Yet Wong argues that any adequate morality must contain ‘universal constraints on morality’, such as the functions of morality, human psychology, and the nature of human cooperation. Any adequate morality must acknowledge these constraints because they are a part of our evolved human nature.

Darwin and moral relativism

Where do Darwin’s claims about ethics stand with respect to moral relativism? Darwin does recognize that there are ethical differences from society to society, and also within societies, across time. Darwin observes that some ethical rules are grounded in ‘strange superstitions’ (1995 [1874]: 59). When a rule held sacred by the tribe is breached, he says, it gives rise to ‘the deepest feelings’ (1995 [1874]: 59). He marvels at ‘[h]ow so many strange superstitions have arisen throughout the world’; and he views them as arising ‘quite apart from the social instincts’ (1995 [1874]: 59).

There are two other points Darwin makes that acknowledge ethical differences. First, when he says that any animal with social instincts and a well-developed intellect would inevitably acquire a moral sense, the moral sense that is acquired, he says, ‘wouldn’t be exactly the same moral sense as ours’ (1981 [1871]: 73). Second, he is confident that over time human sympathies have changed; they ‘became more tender and widely diffused, extending to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals’ (1981 [1871]: 103). Given his view of the close connection between ethics and sympathy, his observation about changing sympathies amounts to an acknowledgment that differences in ethics emerge across time. Harman takes diversity and intractability very seriously, as important evidence for moral relativism. While Darwin acknowledges moral diversity, such an observation doesn’t lead him to relativism about ethics. Darwin seems to want to distinguish the ethical rules founded on superstition from those founded on social instinct. He would therefore seem to deny that ethics is solely the product of one’s culture. Further, though, he says it is highly probable that ‘any animal whatever, endowed with well marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become … developed’ (1981 [1871]: 71–72). From this it follows that he doesn’t see the inevitability of gaining a moral sense hitched to the vagaries of one’s culture, as simply a product of the folkways. Because Darwinian ethics denies that ethics is ultimately grounded in one’s culture, Darwinian metaethics is not relativistic. So, Darwin’s approach doesn’t align with Sumner’s. ⁵ For Darwin, the moral sense has much to do with social instincts, so his view works well with ‘the sociobiological thesis’, as Harman calls it, a view that Harman sees as antithetical to moral relativism, and one that Harman does not find convincing. There are reasons to think, then, that neither Harman’s moral relativism nor Sumner’s coheres with ethics as Darwin sees it through his model of evolution. Yet Wong’s ‘relativism with limits’, his ‘pluralistic relativism’, which is a moderate moral relativism – a form of moral relativism that Levy also endorses – seems to be more fitting with Darwin’s approach than Harman’s. Darwin, too, seems to acknowledge what Wong calls ‘universal limits on adequate moralities’. And what Ruse and Wilson say about evolution and relativist ethics seems to be in keeping with Darwin’s model of evolution. Both Harman and Wong, as moral relativists, say there is no single true morality. Would Darwin agree? This is tricky. It is not the impression one gets from reading Darwin’s thoughts on ethics. Darwin discusses various human characteristics that bear on ‘man’s moral constitution’. These include: a moral sense, a conscience, social instincts, parental and filial affections, virtues, sympathy, and other emotions like love, remorse, regret, and shame. Like Ruse and Wilson, Darwin seems to emphasize similarity, not diversity, when it comes to ethics. Darwin’s approach seems to allow for a possible moral objectivity. Maybe not the strong claim that there is one single true morality, but at least the claim that there are universal constraints, as Wong puts it. But rather than accepting these constraints and continuing to maintain moral relativism, as Wong does, it seems possible to acknowledge the constraints and point to them as substantially undermining moral relativism, as Ruse, Wilson, and Blackburn claim.

Dawkins and moral relativism

When we view Dawkins’ genic selection alongside moral relativism, we should bear in mind that Dawkins views genetic rules as constraining and directing behavior for the purposes of genes that are at the helm. Yet human behavior, by Dawkins’ estimation, is not wholly directed by biological rules. Dawkins asserts that ‘[a]mong animals, man is uniquely dominated by culture’ (1989: 3). Being dominated by culture, of course, carries cultural diversity with it. And, consistently, Dawkins acknowledges cultural diversity. He says that ‘human societies’ admit of ‘astonishing variety’ that suggests that ‘man’s way of life is largely determined by culture rather than by genes’ (1989: 164).

As the moral relativists do, Dawkins sees moral diversity among societies and also within societies. He says that ‘we have all changed massively in our attitude to what is right and what is wrong’ (2006: 265). To Dawkins, ‘[t]here seems to be a steadily shifting standard of what is morally acceptable’ (2006: 268). Moral diversity and moral change are facts about which moral relativists demand explanation. Does Dawkins’ acknowledgement of moral diversity lead him, then, to relativism about ethics? Is he led to something like Harman’s conventionalism or Sumner’s folkways?

It seems not. First, the moral change that Dawkins observes seems to him to be moral progress. He is confident that ‘over the longer timescale, the progressive trend is unmistakable and it will continue’ (2006: 271). While moral disagreement and change fit with a relativist outlook on ethics, the notion of moral progress has been thought to be an obstacle to moral relativism (Stace, 1937: 48–50). The challenge for moral relativists is to explain – or explain away – moral progress. If moral relativists wish to accept that moral progress has occurred, then they must explain with respect to what standard moral progress has occurred. If they wish to deny that moral progress is possible, then that flies in the face of the very observation Dawkins makes about the progressive trend of social consciousness (2006: 270–271).

Further, Dawkins does not seem led to moral relativism, since he thinks there is evidence for moral universals, as well as a consensus about right and wrong, and a shared moral sense (2006: 222–223). About morality, he thinks ‘there is a consensus about what we do as a matter of fact consider right and wrong: a consensus that prevails surprisingly widely’ (2006: 262). And he is confident that ‘[t]he consensus has no obvious connection with religion’ (2006: 262). More plausibly, in his view, our sense of right and wrong comes from our ‘Darwinian past’, by which he means our evolutionary past, of course (2006: 214). Dawkins claims that human moral sensibilities have evolutionary roots. ‘Sensitivity for unfairness’, he says ‘is built into us’ (2001: 10). Like Darwin, he thinks that evolution is responsible for humans having a moral sense.

When it comes to morality, because Dawkins accepts that there are both cultural diversity and moral universals, his position does seem to be in keeping with Wong’s version of moral relativism. Wong points to ‘universal constraints on morality’, while at the same time claiming that there are enough moral diversity, difference and disagreement – both among and within moralities – to say that morality is ultimately relative.

In the following passage, Dawkins shares some of Wong’s concerns about explaining morality.

Kin selection and selection in favour of reciprocal altruism may have acted on human genes to produce many of our basic psychological attributes and tendencies. These ideas are plausible as far as they go. But I find that they do not begin to square up to the formidable challenge of explaining culture, cultural evolution, and the immense differences between human cultures around the world … . (Dawkins, 1989: 191)

Dawkins’ suggestion for explaining the immense differences between human cultures is memes. Like genes, they are replicators. But memes are not biological, they are mental. Memes ‘propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation’ (Dawkins, 1989: 192). Whether meme theory successfully explains cultural evolution is not our immediate concern here. With regard to moral relativism, the main point here is that, as an evolutionist, Dawkins, like Wong, views morality as possessing both universal and relativistic features. Wong has chosen to call such a view ‘pluralistic relativism’. As with Darwin, though, the overall impression one gets from Dawkins’ characterization of morality from an evolutionary perspective is not that of moral relativism. In the course of natural history, Darwin and Dawkins see moral progress, not unending ethical disagreement, and this seems to hold them back from an endorsement of moral relativism.

I turn now to one other model of evolution.

Gould and moral relativism

In Gould we find yet another example of a naturalistic evolutionist who does not think a naturalistic approach to morality lends itself to moral relativism. At one point, when discussing evolution and ethics, Gould even uses the phrase ‘destructive ethical relativism’ (1999: 203–204). There, Gould is pointing out that his position does not lead to ‘a destructive ethical relativism’, even though some might imagine that it does.

Before considering Gould’s view on ethical relativism, let us consider what he says about human nature. As an evolutionist who defends a hierarchical theory of natural selection, Gould has some things to say about human nature, including the comparative influences of biology and culture on human beings. Gould writes:

We have come to see ourselves as a learning animal; we have come to believe that the influences of class and culture far outweigh the weaker predispositions of our genetic constitution. Nonetheless, we have been deluged during the past decade by a resurgent biological determinism. (1977: 237)

For Gould, cultural forces swamp genetic constitution, and so with humans we cannot accurately posit a direct genetic basis for fundamental human traits, as he thinks biological determinists try to do. Interestingly, Gould agrees with Dawkins’ claim, then, that humans are dominated by culture. Cultural variety is the norm, so Gould claims that human flexibility is what is most important for understanding and explaining human nature, not particular human traits that have been genetically determined. If so, why – when it comes to ethics – don’t these considerations lead Gould to a moral relativism? Wouldn’t the belief that culture dominates what humans are like, along with a belief in ineradicable human flexibility, help support the case for moral relativism?

The stasis of human phenotypic stability would seem to make the difference for Gould. Even though human beings are flexible and adaptable, and even though it is difficult to match particular human traits with a particular genetic basis, that doesn’t take away a salient fact about human nature, namely that it has been in stasis for at least fifty thousand years or more, as Gould says. For Gould, the reason for the stasis of human nature is not that cultural evolution has suppressed natural selection, however. Rather, on Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium, human phenotypic stability is predictable.

Expressivists such as Blackburn make an assumption about a stable human nature with propensities toward particular feelings and attitudes. This seems to be reasonable when viewed from Gould’s evolutionary perspective. The expressivists’ assumption about a stable human nature with propensities toward particular feelings and attitudes is actually part of the defense that expressivists such as Blackburn offer to distinguish their view from moral relativism. There is reason to think that Gould would take the same approach against relativism. Gould would point out, like Wong does, that there are limits to what can count as an adequate morality, and these limits are partly set by what the relevant empirical theories tell us about human nature (Wong, 2006: 44).

Gould says we cannot posit a direct genetic basis for fundamental human traits, so this would include human ethical traits, also. In terms of understanding values, Gould says we cannot look to nature, since nature is indifferent to humanity. We are simply unable to glean moral truth from the facts of nature, he thinks. But though we have this inability to glean moral truth from the facts of nature, he doesn’t think this leads to a ‘destructive’ moral relativism. Gould proposes that moral principles, those premised upon ‘desire, negotiation, and reciprocity’, have appeared in many cultures in many different eras, and have shown their wisdom (1993: 50). These frequently appearing moral principles Gould mentions seem like those universals that Wong and Ruse take note of. One of the reasons that Ruse rejects moral relativism, for instance, is that he doesn’t think it fits with the idea of universality of cooperating. Recognition of the kinds of moral principles Gould has in mind is not consistent with Harman’s relativism, which denies that there are universal basic moral demands and universally applicable moral reasons. Wong, as we have seen, does recognize universal limits on adequate moralities, and he says these universal limits play an important role in evaluating moral norms and helping us avoid crude conventionalism.

Wong believes that his theory of ethics, which acknowledges these universal limits on morality, still merits the name ‘moral relativism’. But because Gould apparently thinks relativism is ‘destructive’, he would not likely accept Wong’s choice of moniker, even though, like Wong, Gould, in addition to noting universal limits on morality, acknowledges the power of culture to shape human behavior.

Before I proceed to my overall conclusion, there is one more issue worth considering. Wong (2006: xi) airs the complaint that moral relativism usually gets caricatured and not fairly considered. Foot (1982 [1978]: 152) and Harman (1984: 27–28) also say that moral relativism is not given the attention it deserves. Labeling ethical relativism as ‘destructive’ is the kind of treatment Wong regards as uncharitable. While some theorists have dealt with moral relativism in short order with swipes of this kind, I have tried to avoid this kind of perfunctory treatment. I have dealt with versions of moral relativism that relativists have actually defended, not straw versions of it. And I have incorporated passages from two prominent defenders of moral relativism, Harman and Wong.

Conclusion

Moral relativism is a metaethical theory that contrasts with other metaethical theories such as error theory, expressivism, and moral realism. In this article I first explained the main elements of moral relativism by focusing on the versions developed by Harman and Wong. I have sought to determine whether moral relativism fits within an evolutionary framework. Harman does not connect his version of moral relativism to evolution, yet he does argue that naturalism leads most plausibly to moral relativism. In his version of moral relativism, Harman stresses conventionalism. For Harman, we are all under multiple conventions. There is no single true morality, since there are many different frameworks. Harman believes that actual observed moral diversity and disagreement support his case for moral relativism. The very nature of moral reasons, he thinks, also supports moral relativism. This is because there are no universally applicable moral reasons: all moral reasons are relative to an individual subject and his or her desires, values, or goals. While Harman himself doesn’t develop connections between evolution and moral relativism, he doesn’t view biological considerations as having much relevance for ethics. More significantly, he thinks, humans operate in the space of reasons.

Wong goes into more detail than Harman about how to situate moral relativism within an evolutionary perspective. Wong agrees with Harman that naturalism leads most plausibly to moral relativism, but disagrees with Harman’s moral conventionalism. In Wong’s pluralistic relativism, or ‘relativism within limits’, morality does, after all, have a function: an intrapersonal and interpersonal function, which constitutes universal limits on adequate moralities. Yet, he thinks there is enough difference and diversity to call his view moral relativism. Wong thinks his commitment to a naturalistic approach requires him to take empirical theories about human nature seriously; this includes evolutionary theories about human nature, which he views as bolstering his case for the intrapersonal and interpersonal functions of morality.

Beyond Harman and Wong, other theorists such as Sumner, Ruse, and Wilson have commented on the relationship between moral relativism and evolution. Sumner conjoined moral relativism and evolution, but Ruse and Wilson saw them as incompatible.

Because of the weight given to disagreement and diversity by relativists, and the weight Darwin puts on social instinct over culture, there are reasons to think that neither Harman’s moral relativism nor Sumner’s coheres with ethics as Darwin sees it through his model of evolution. Yet, Darwin’s approach fits very well with Wong’s ‘relativism within limits’, since Darwin’s approach seems to allow that there are universal constraints.

Dawkins, because he accepts that there are both cultural diversity and moral universals, also seems to be in keeping with Wong’s version of moral relativism. Wong points to ‘universal constraints on morality’, while at the same time claiming that there is enough moral diversity, difference and disagreement – both among and within moralities – to say that morality is ultimately relative. Yet Dawkins sees moral progress, a notoriously difficult datum for moral relativism to accommodate. Dawkins’ model could perhaps align with Wong’s moral relativism if moral progress could be explained as moral progress made with respect to ‘universal constraints on morality’. Because, if moral relativists wish to accept that moral progress has occurred, they must explain with respect to what standard it has occurred.

Gould mentions that moral relativism is a potentially ‘destructive’ moral view. It might be surprising to find that Gould, as an evolutionist, emphasizes cultural variety as most salient about human behavior. Human nature does have stability, too, though, so we also see potential for alignment with Wong’s version of moral relativism. Gould accepts that there are some universal demands, so Harman’s moral relativism seems too strong for Gould.

Moral progress is a significant datum in need of explanation. Wong’s relativism could perhaps explain moral progress in terms of ‘universal constraints on morality’. If we qualify moral relativism, as Wong does, by making provisions for universal constraints on morality, then perhaps that would make moral relativism acceptable. Overall, Wong’s version of moral relativism, which eschews moral conventionalism, does seem to have the best fit with an evolutionary perspective. This may be the case, though, because Wong’s version is quite flexible and leaves us with the lingering question of whether it is really moral relativism.