International virtue signaling: How female combatants shape state support for armed rebellion

Abstract

International audiences view rebel groups with female combatants as more virtuous and legitimate because of gender norms regarding women and war. As actors who care about their international reputation, states often virtue-signal their support for popular humanitarian norms—norms such as promoting gender inclusivity in political processes. I argue that this performative dynamic motivates states to signal support for rebellions that include female combatants because doing so offers these states a pathway for signaling support for this international norm without requiring stronger commitments to gender equality and women's rights. I thus hypothesize that the inclusion of female combatants in rebel organizations positively corresponds with the quantity of external state support rebels receive. Specifically, I expect that these virtue-signaling motives render less costly forms of external state support more common for these groups. I statistically evaluate these claims and contribute new insights on gendered, transnational civil war dynamics.

Keywords

Civil wars female combatants gender rebel movements state intervention virtue-signaling

Introduction

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has fought for an independent Kurdish state for over 40 years, and women have fought as combatants on behalf of the PKK since the 1990s. Images and stories of these female fighters have circulated far and wide, capturing the attention of a variety of international audiences. The Wall Street Journal has posted video content of Kurdish female fighters with headlines such as, “In PKK, Kurdish Women Fight Alongside Men” (2015), implying that “fighting” is not something audiences expect men and women to do side by side. Similarly, the BBC, CNN, and PBS have all published stories including interviews and images of the PKK heroines fighting for Kurdish freedom and to defeat ISIS (BBC, 2014; Lazarus, 2019; PBS, 2015). Headlines such as, “Women. Life. Freedom. Female fighters of Kurdistan” (Lazarus, 2019) and “How the Kurdish women soldiers are confronting ISIS on the front lines,” (PBS, 2015) paint a picture of these women as virtuous protectors of “life” and “freedom” and once again emphasize that “soldiers” is a surprising descriptor to see connected to “women.”

Internationally circulated photographs of Kurdish female fighters match this rhetoric (see Figure 1). While such photographs often capture that these women are armed soldiers (e.g. wearing uniforms and holding weapons), these photos also emphasize normative understandings of their femininity (e.g. posing in non-threatening positions, smiling, wearing makeup). The portrayal of these combatants as simultaneously armed fighters and feminine women sends the message that even those who are traditionally expected to be the furthest removed from fighting in armed conflict (i.e. women) are taking up arms and fighting for this movement. The attention-grabbing nature of this messaging is founded on gendered assumptions that women have no place in conflict or political violence. In this article, I argue that external state supporters of armed groups like the PKK are motivated by this gendered messaging.

Throughout the civil war for an independent Kurdistan, the PKK has received external state support in the form of territorial support from Syria and Greece, as well as territorial and sometimes financial support from Iran (Sawyer et al., 2017). Likewise, the United States has supported coalitions of Kurdish fighters with direct links to the PKK in battles against the Islamic State¹—coalitions such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). American political leaders such as Tulsi Gabbard have centered women in their advocacy for this support, going so far as to invite a woman leader of the Syrian Democratic Council—the political wing of the SDF—to the State of the Union address in 2019. Gabbard described Syrian Kurdish leader, Ilham Ahmed, in a tweet² stating, “She has been a leader in the fight against ISIS in Syria, and a strong advocate for peace,” implying a moral connection between Ahmed, the armed groups she represents, and American foreign policy. While these external state supporters are also undoubtedly influenced by their complex relationships with Turkey, they are not willing to endure all possible costs to ensure PKK victory in the group's armed struggle. This raises questions about what else motivates these external state supporters—motivations currently underexplored in the literature on transnational civil wars. As such, my research asks: how does the inclusion of women combatants in rebel organizations shape patterns of external state support for these armed groups?

I contend that external state supporters are at least partially motivated by the message sent to the international community by supporting a rebel movement that has incorporated women into combat roles. Importantly, this motivation does not require that the external state supporter actually cares about women's rights or advocates for gender equality within its own institutions, although, they might do so. Rather, this motivation stems from the international norm of promoting gender inclusivity. While creating deep, substantive changes in gender relations may seem costly and unappealing to some states, signaling support for revolutionaries abroad who appear to promote gender inclusivity within their own ranks offers potential reputational benefits for states across the international system. This dynamic incentivizes states to signal—even if only weakly—that they support the international norm of promoting gender inclusivity by providing support to rebel movements that have incorporated women combatants.

A growing literature engages with how difficult it is to resolve civil wars, both through decisive defeat and through negotiated settlements, which has sparked curiosity over the role third-party involvement plays in expediting or prolonging conflict resolution. Civil war scholars have shifted from solely focusing on direct military intervention by external states to considering the wider pool of sources and forms of external support that are often provided to warring parties (e.g. Byman, 2007; Corbetta and Dixon, 2005; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Salehyan, 2009; Sawyer et al., 2017). Researchers interested in the processes of civil war also continue to consider the gendered makeup of rebel organizations and how the presence and participation of women in such hypermasculine, violent contexts affect these groups and the wars they fight (e.g. Henshaw, 2017; Thomas and Bond, 2015; Thomas and Wood, 2018; Wood, 2019). While most of this attention has been centered on what leads rebel groups to recruit women and what leads women to take up arms, scholars of women's participation in armed rebellion have also investigated how these processes influence civil war dynamics and outcomes (e.g. Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018; Manekin and Wood, 2020; Trisko Darden et al., 2019; Wood and Allemang, 2022).

In this article, I contribute to the civil war literature expanded insights on what motivates external states to provide support for armed rebel movements, highlighting the important role of gender norms in those political decisions. I develop a theory connecting the gendered makeup of rebel organizations to international gender norms and state support for rebel groups. I ultimately argue that as actors who care about their international reputations, external states face incentives to offer their support for those rebel movements that appear more virtuous and legitimate because they have incorporated women into combat roles. Because this argument is focused on performative, virtue-signaling behavior, I also expect that the state actors that support these particular rebel groups are more likely to provide types of support that represent a lower investment in the outcome of the civil war, as opposed to types of support that require a higher investment and risk greater costs to the external state supporter. My arguments are based on previous work in the female combatants and civil war intervention literatures, and my findings open new doors to further investigate the gender dynamics and transnational politics of armed rebel movements.

External state support for armed rebel movements

Understanding external support during civil wars is important because different types of international intervention have varying effects on the duration and outcomes of intrastate armed conflicts. Some argue that civil wars last longer when third-party intervention is equally distributed among combatants (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000) or when that intervention reduces the costs of coordinating an armed rebellion (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). Conversely, civil wars are shown to end earlier when interveners are biased and offer support clearly in favor of one of the warring parties (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Collier et al., 2004; Regan, 2002). Sullivan and Karreth (2015) find that the effects of external state support on civil war outcomes largely depend on the baseline fighting capacities of the warring parties, with rebel groups more consistently benefiting from external state support than state armed forces. Previous research has also demonstrated that when one side of a civil war receives external support, the likelihood of achieving a negotiated settlement increases, whereas that likelihood decreases when multiple parties receive external support (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). Relatedly, researchers have worked to expand the available quantitative data on diplomatic civil war interventions, improving the tools available for studying transnational civil war dynamics and conflict resolution (Regan et al., 2009). Olson Lounsbery and DeRouen (2018), for example, find that although diplomatic intervention can help bring civil wars to a swifter end with more comprehensive peace negotiations (Regan and Aydin, 2006), this added complexity also corresponds with a higher likelihood of peace agreement failure. Given these important effects on conflict dynamics, the field of international relations (IR) has a vested interest in continuing to investigate and better understand third-party intervention in civil wars.

While much of the civil war intervention literature focuses on the direct military intervention of states, others have demonstrated that external support can come in many different forms from a variety of sources. These forms of support can include military intervention as well as financial support (Byman, 2007), weaponry (Sawyer et al., 2017), international diplomacy, non-governmental and international government organization support (Corbetta and Dixon, 2005), and access to territory (Salehyan, 2009), among others. Because external state support can come in many different forms with unique effects on civil war dynamics, it is important to distinguish when and why states are motivated to provide specific types of support.

Civil war intervention scholars have also considered the varying motivations of external states to offer their support for warring parties. For example, San-Akca (2009) argues that external states consider their own ability to extract domestic resources when deciding whether or not to support a rebel organization fighting against an enemy state. Relatedly, Maoz and San-Akca (2012) argue that external states are motivated to support armed rebellions abroad when they are dissatisfied with the international status quo and deem the risk of retaliation sufficiently low. Others have similarly argued that if two states are rivals, rather than enduring the high costs of direct military conflict, an external state can instead provide support for a rebel organization within its enemy's territory to destabilize or defeat their political enemy (Salehyan, 2010; Salehyan et al., 2011). However, other scholars have challenged this framework, questioning common assumptions within the civil war literature that external actors intervene either to help one of the warring parties win or to help the warring parties negotiate a settlement. For example, Kathman (2011) finds that external states are often motivated to intervene in civil wars if they care about the overall stability of the region where the war is waged, regardless of their dyadic relationship with the incumbent regime. Likewise, Cunningham (2010) argues that external states often intervene in pursuit of an entirely separate agenda that does not overlap with the goals of the internal combatants.

One separate agenda that external state supporters might pursue is boosting their own reputation to the international community. Although scholars have long debated whether state reputation really matters to international politics (LeVeck and Narang, 2016), many have concluded that it indeed does matter; when, why, and how much reputation matters, however, may vary. Previous research has indicated that international reputation matters to states because it helps them maintain existing cooperative relationships and avoid hindering new cooperative relationships in the international system (Keohane, 1984). Scholars in this literature have also demonstrated that state reputation matters for alliance formation (Crecenzi et al., 2012; Gibler, 2008; Miller, 2012), deterrence outcomes (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015), and international investments (Tomz, 2007). Additionally, international actors face potential collateral benefits for appearing to support humanitarian norms such as expanding gender inclusivity (Hathaway, 2007). For example, Bush and Zetterberg (2021) find that implementing gender quotas boosts the international reputation of electoral autocracies by making such regimes appear more democratic, which in turn corresponds with greater public support for sending financial aid to those countries. These findings suggest that states face incentives to appear to align with humanitarian norms because doing so might improve their international reputations, leading to potential future gains.

The extant literature on civil war intervention makes clear that, “external support to rebels … is more nuanced than just [military] intervention or not” (Sawyer et al., 2017: 1178). I would add that it is also more nuanced than just supporting rebels or not. External state supporters are often motivated by agendas other than destabilizing their political enemies—agendas such as improving their international reputations. This reputational motivation is connected to rebel group attributes that are normatively understood by the international community as positive or negative signals of the armed group's values and goals, all of which influence whether and how potential supporters will intervene on the rebel group's behalf. Likewise, rebels strategically consider how to present themselves to the international community in ways that might increase their legitimacy and help them garner support (Jo, 2015; Loken, 2021). It is therefore important to consider what makes certain rebel groups more appealing recipients of external state support.

Female combatants in armed rebel movements

The growing literature on women's participation in armed rebellion shows that more than half of armed rebel movements worldwide have included women as members, and over a third of these groups have incorporated women into combat roles (Henshaw, 2017; Loken and Matfess, 2023; Thomas and Bond, 2015; Thomas and Wood, 2018; Wood, 2019). While it is not uncommon for women to participate in intrastate armed conflict, there is substantial variation in the extent to which rebel organizations include women in their combat forces. Previous research has demonstrated that ideology plays a major role in whether rebel organizations recruit women and deploy them in combat roles (Thomas and Bond, 2015; Wood, 2019; Wood and Thomas, 2017). Some also argue that the decision to recruit women as combatants is a pragmatic response from rebel leaders to rising conflict costs that threaten the group's ability to achieve its primary military objectives (Israelsen, 2020; Wood, 2019). Understanding how and why rebel organizations incorporate female combatants is important because women's inclusion and the means by which they become fighters are known to affect civil war dynamics (Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018; Wood and Allemang, 2022).

Female combatants’ transgression of traditional gender norms also influences international perceptions of rebel movements. Underlying assumptions about women and war often presume that society's mothers, daughters, and sisters are among the most fragile and innocent—that they are naturally inclined to avoid participating in violence and instead are in desperate need of protection from it (Elshtain, 1987; Sjoberg, 2010; Toivanen and Baser, 2016). Even in cases where female combatants are not portrayed as innocent, they are assumed to be motivated by exceptionally desperate circumstances that warrant an extreme transgression of their “natural,” non-violent femininity (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). These gendered understandings of women's participation in political violence distinguish female combatants as unique symbols for rebel movements. Rebel organizations that incorporate women as combatants have been shown to leverage this symbolism to garner sympathy and support for their armed struggles (Loken, 2021). Manekin and Wood (2020: 7) argue that this potentially explains why, “the overwhelming majority of rebel propaganda materials featuring women catalogued in recent studies depict them carrying firearms,” given that this depiction highlights their combatant status and triggers gendered sentiments about women's participation in war.

Rebel groups are likely to advertise their inclusion of female combatants, even if that inclusion only represents a small fraction of their combat forces, because the portrayal of women in combat roles integrates the mission of the rebel group with the broader community (Jones and Mattiacci, 2019; Loken, 2021; Trisko Darden et al., 2019). As such, even women combatants in relatively small numbers are considered highly visible to external audiences, both because their inclusion draws attention by transgressing traditional gender norms and because rebel organizations often promote women's inclusion (Loken, 2021). When outside observers see that even women are taking up arms to fight against the incumbent regime, they perceive the conflict as especially desperate and view the rebels’ cause as symbolic of what is best for everyone in the community—as more “virtuous.” Writing about the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Viterna (2013: 76) argues that the leaders of the FMLN benefited from the international publicity of their deployment of female combatants by using it to construct a narrative of the rebel group as the “righteous protector” of civilians from the brutal Salvadoran state military. Likewise, Stack-O'Connor (2007) argues that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) publicized their recruitment of female combatants as a strategic move in the competition for legitimacy among other Tamil liberation movements in Sri Lanka. From their novel survey experiments, Manekin and Wood (2020: 14) also find that, “across diverse empirical contexts, the visible presence of female fighters exerts a positive influence on external observer attitudes toward an armed group.”

Incorporating women into combat roles allows rebel organizations to portray certain messages about the supposed gender inclusivity, equality, and virtue of their armed movements. In turn, this helps rebel groups attain legitimacy and support from external audiences. Although female combatants directly “bend gender” by transgressing expectations that they remain passive, peaceful, and disengaged from armed violence (Viterna, 2013: 64), it is precisely this transgression that rebel organizations leverage to portray their movements as more sympathetic and in need of support. For example, Terpstra and Frerks (2017: 300) conclude that although the conservative Tamil community was resistant to the LTTE's inclusion of women in combat roles because it challenged traditional gendered divisions of labor, the LTTE framed women's involvement as part of the group's larger claims to “a common Tamil nation, sacrifices, martyrdom … and the LTTE as protector from Sinhalese threats,” which helped legitimize their rebellion to various audiences. Likewise, other scholars have noted that women war criminals receive far less attention than their male counterparts owing to gendered assumptions that women's participation in armed conflict is limited to passive, non-violent roles (Cohen, 2013a; Steflja and Trisko Darden, 2020) and that women exert an ethical, pacifying influence on armed groups (Loken, 2017). Although there is much variation across rebel groups that recruit women for combat and the extent to which those women are deployed, gendered narratives consistently surround female combatants—narratives that present certain rebel groups as more legitimate and more virtuous owing to the gendered symbolism of women in war. I argue that these gendered assumptions render rebel organizations with female combatants the ideal recipients of performative external state support.

Female combatants and international virtue signaling

Although there does not appear to be a singular, agreed upon definition of the social phenomenon of virtue-signaling, some have succinctly captured the concept as, “the act of engaging in public moral discourse in order to enhance or preserve one's moral reputation” (Westra, 2021: 1) or as, “an ethically dubious phenomenon whereby individuals and groups accumulate recognition, credit, repute, and/or power by trumpeting their support of abstract ideals they think will define them as superior to others” (Dilevko, 2019: 12). The practice of virtue-signaling has been studied more extensively in business-related fields³ than in international relations, but the concept can be thought of as a form of “cheap talk” specifically tied to perceptions of moral commitments.⁴ Rebel groups’ portrayal of themselves as virtuous, representative, and sympathetic does not necessitate that all of their behaviors align with these attributes.⁵ Similarly, external states’ performative support of apparently virtuous causes does not necessitate that they fully embody strong humanitarian norms in their own institutions, policies, or governance.⁶ In fact, engaging in performative, “virtue-signaling” behaviors offers a pathway for states to reputationally benefit from appearing to support certain international norms without having to deeply engage in modifying their own domestic practices.

Importantly, political actors often leverage gender as a tool for signaling their relative positions in a conflict environment (Szekely, 2020). This is because the inclusion of women in combat roles is such a visible characteristic of armed groups, and this gendered policy can therefore help draw clear (dis)associative lines between political actors. States face the potential for reputational risks and benefits from both domestic and international audiences regarding their gendered signaling behaviors. Domestically, state leaders benefit from virtue-signaling support for gender inclusivity because greater women's representation in various political processes is stereotypically associated with peace and non-violence (Brannon, 2023). Although supporting a gender-inclusive rebel movement abroad does not directly impact women's domestic political representation, domestic audiences might view this support through a gendered lens—perceiving it as a fundamentally less violent and more virtuous political endeavor than supporting male-only troops in a foreign country.

Internationally, states have engaged in virtue-signaling behaviors that similarly leverage global norms of expanding gender inclusivity and women's rights to boost their own reputations. For example, many states have signaled their support for such norms by nominally committing to the international treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Hathaway, 2007). While the majority of states in the international system have signed and/or ratified this treaty, it would be a far stretch to label all those same states as firm defenders of women's rights. Likewise, states face reputational pressure from global powers and international organizations to implement gender quotas that would improve women's representation in government (Bush and Zetterberg, 2021). However, that increased descriptive representation does not necessarily equate to actual improvements in domestic norms regarding gender equality and women's rights. Both internationally and domestically, the performative nature of these virtue-signaling behaviors is more effective in distinguishing certain states from others that fail to signal any commitments to gender inclusivity and women's rights, rather than symbolizing a holistic effort to embrace these norms. In other words, virtue-signaling sends clearer messages to audiences about what states are not (e.g. wholly opposed to women's increased descriptive representation) rather than what states are (e.g. feminist institutions committed to gender empowerment).

Relatedly, the relationship I propose between rebel groups with female combatants and external state supporters is not contingent upon either of these parties authentically embracing gender equality and a deep concern for women's rights. Rather, it is contingent upon international norms regarding gender inclusivity and the visible behaviors these actors can engage in to appear more committed to those norms (albeit, only weakly) in hopes that their performance will lead to future reputational gains. It is true that states could choose to implement domestic policy changes that would perhaps more obviously virtue-signal their support for gender inclusivity to the international community than providing support to a rebel movement abroad. However, domestic changes—even if only meant as window-dressing—are not necessarily more appealing to states that are only weakly committed to signaling support for gender inclusivity because new domestic gender policies can demand greater change from states in the long run by legitimately increasing women's descriptive representation in state institutions. My claims do not hinge on external states being interested in authentic changes to gender relations. Instead, my arguments suggest that virtue-signaling through external state support for more gender-inclusive rebel movements offers those states a way to signal support for certain international norms without having to commit to changing their own domestic practices.

Rebel groups that incorporate female combatants are perceived more favorably as all-encompassing social movements with more legitimate and virtuous goals because of gendered assumptions tied to women's inclusion in armed violence (Loken, 2021; Manekin and Wood, 2020; Viterna, 2013). Given that much of the international community believes that gender inclusivity is an important norm to encourage (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; UN-Women, 2017), supporting rebel movements that publicly represent this norm might boost an external state's international reputation. Therefore, external states face incentives to support rebel movements that include women combatants because these movements represent “virtuous” causes and (perhaps falsely) embody international norms regarding women's rights. These arguments lead me to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: Rebel groups that include women combatants are likely to receive more total external state support than rebel groups that do not include women combatants.

As previously mentioned, even the inclusion of women combatants in relatively low numbers is considered a highly visible recruitment dynamic. Gender diversity in combat forces is highly visible not only because it transgresses normative assumptions about women's roles in war, but also because rebel movements often benefit from publicizing their incorporation of women into combat roles (Loken, 2021; Manekin and Wood, 2020; Viterna, 2013). As such, I expect that a relatively low percentage of female combatants is sufficient for a rebel organization to receive significantly more external state support. However, I also expect that with a greater proportion of women in combat roles comes even greater visibility for the rebel organization, even if the baseline visibility of women combatants is relatively high. I therefore include Hypothesis 1b to account for the empirical difference between the presence and the prevalence of women combatants in rebel organizations.

Hypothesis 1b: Rebel groups that include a greater proportion of women combatants are likely to receive more total external state support than rebel groups that include a smaller proportion of women combatants.

Although previous studies have claimed that “state actions are more likely to be driven by strategic interests than by sentiment or affinity” (Manekin and Wood, 2020: 16), framing external states’ motivations to support rebel movements with female combatants as driven by either strategy or sentiment creates a false dichotomy. Instead, I posit that in response to international sentiment toward rebel groups that incorporate female combatants, external states strategically decide whether they think offering their support to such groups will boost their own reputation in the international community. I have also argued that these incentives are largely performative in nature. If external states are driven by the opportunity to virtue-signal to the international community through their support of certain rebel movements, then offering support in and of itself is sufficient for achieving that goal, regardless of the outcome of the civil war. Therefore, I also contend that external states are not willing to offer all types of support to rebel groups that deploy female combatants, since some forms of support are costlier than others.

Salehyan et al. (2011: 710) argue that external supporters deciding whether to empower opposition groups “not only gauge their motivation for intervening, but also evaluate their potential options for doing so.” While external states want to be seen supporting virtuous and legitimate causes, they do not necessarily want to endure the high costs associated with military interventions (Salehyan et al., 2011). The potential reputational benefits for external states that support rebel groups with female combatants rely on the appearance of supporting an all-inclusive, virtuous rebel movement—not on whether that movement actually succeeds. As such, offering military resources that represent a higher degree of investment in the outcome of a conflict do not necessarily lead to greater reputational gains for an external state supporter.

In addition to providing their own troops to a rebel organization, I categorize providing military training/expertise abroad, providing access to their own state's military infrastructure or conducting joint military operations as higher-stakes forms of external state support. I define these resources as higher-stakes forms of support because they directly insert external personnel into the conflict and/or require the external state to relinquish some of its military autonomy to the rebels. Instead of these higher-stakes forms of support, I expect that external states are more likely to offer resources that represent a relatively lower investment in the conflict while still signaling support for the rebel movement. I categorize permitting rebels to cross an external state's borders and providing rebels with materiel and logistics as mid-stakes forms of support. These options do not directly insert external personnel into the conflict or require the external state to relinquish its military autonomy.⁷ However, both of these forms of support require direct and continuous contact between the rebels and the external state, rather than a one-off exchange of equipment or information. In contrast, I categorize sending weaponry, giving financial support, and providing military intelligence to rebel organizations as lower-stakes forms of external state support. Again, even these lower-stakes forms of support are not without their potential costs to the external state. Nonetheless, the risks involved with offering these types of support largely include a misuse of the provided equipment or information rather than direct harm to the external state's personnel or military autonomy. Table 1 presents these three categories of external state support and the specific resources that fall under each category as I have defined them.

Table 1.

Categories of external state support for rebel groups.

Category	Forms of external state support	Support inserts external state personnel into the armed conflict	Support relinquishes some of the external state's military autonomy to the rebel group	Support requires continuous collaboration with the recipient rebel group
Higher-stakes support	Troops on the ground Access to military infrastructure and joint operations Military training and expertise
Mid-stakes support	Permission to Cross borders materiel and logistics
Lower-stakes support	WeaponsFundingIntelligence

I argue that providing a signal to the international community that a given state supports a more gender-inclusive rebel movement only requires that the external state provides lower-stakes forms of support. While an external state might face additional incentives to provide mid- or higher-stakes forms of support, I expect that the gendered, reputational influence of women combatants is strongest for the least costly forms of support. I propose Hypotheses 2a and 2b to evaluate these claims, while continuing to account for the empirical difference between the presence and prevalence of female combatants.

Hypothesis 2a: Rebel groups that include women combatants are likely to receive more lower-stakes forms of external state support than rebel groups that do not include women combatants.

Hypothesis 2b: Rebel groups that include a greater proportion of women combatants are likely to receive more lower-stakes forms of external state support than rebel groups that include a smaller proportion of women combatants.

Data and methodology

I primarily rely on the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) (Wood and Thomas, 2017) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Dataset (ESD) (Meier et al., 2022) to test my hypotheses. The unit of analysis for evaluating Hypotheses 1a and 1b is the rebel movement, given that the primary interest of these hypotheses is how the gendered composition of each rebel movement shapes the likelihood of the group receiving external state support.⁸ However, because Hypotheses 2a and 2b are primarily interested in the types of support external states provide to rebel movements, the unit of analysis for these hypotheses is the Rebel Group/External State Supporter (RG-ESS) dyad. As such, the dataset used to test the first set of hypotheses includes 218 rebel movements and the dataset used to test the second set of hypotheses includes 531 RG-ESS dyads. Altogether, the data used to test my hypotheses provide information on external state support for armed rebel movements spanning the globe from 1975 to 2017.

My independent variables of interest, Female Combatants and Female Combatant Prevalence, come from the WARD (Wood and Thomas, 2017). Female Combatants is a binary variable that accounts for whether the observed rebel movement ever incorporated female combatants. Conversely, Female Combatant Prevalence codes for the estimated proportion of a group's combat forces comprising women, categorized as either None/No Evidence, Low, Moderate, or High Prevalence. Table 2 provides the coding specifications for this variable, along with example rebel groups for each category and the percentage of this sample constituted by each prevalence level.

Table 2.

Female combatant prevalence.

Category	Prevalence	Percentage rebel combat forces comprising women	Example rebel groups	Percentage of sample
0	None / No Evidence	0%	Eelam People's Liberation Front (EPRLF)Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)	52.69%
1	Low	< 5%	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)	26.24%
2	Moderate	5–20%	Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (UNRG)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	14.05%
3	High	> 20%	Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)Communist Party of Nepal—Maoist (CPN-M)	7.02%

The ESD (Meier et al., 2022) offers data on the timing, type, and provider of external support for the rebel movements in this sample. Total Support is the dependent variable I use to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, whereas the other support variables (Lower-Stakes, Mid-Stakes, and Higher-Stakes Support) serve as the dependent variables to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b. For each rebel movement, I calculate Total Support by adding the total number of instances of external state support provided to the given rebel group as observed in the ESD (Meier et al. 2022). Similarly, I calculate Lower-Stakes Support, Mid-Stakes Support, and Higher-Stakes Support by adding the total number of instances of the types of support that fall into each of these categories (see Table 1) over the support period for each RG-ESS dyad.

I also include a series of relevant control variables. Beginning first with variables that account for rebel group characteristics, I control for the ideology of each rebel movement, as this has been shown to influence the extent to which rebel organizations include women in their armed ranks. I use the binary ideology variables from Wood and Thomas (2017) to code for Leftist Rebels, Nationalist Rebels, and Islamist Rebels within my sample. I also develop the binary variable Weaker Rebels from the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013) because a rebel group's fighting capacities relative to the opposition state might shape the group's incorporation of female combatants and its perceived need for external support.

Next, I include the ordinal variable Rebel Sexual Violence (SV) Prevalence to account for the average magnitude of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians by the observed rebel organization. Such human rights abuses might influence an external state's perspective on whether or not supporting the observed rebel organization will boost the state's reputation. This variable comes from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset (Cohen and Nordäs, 2014) and accounts for whether there was no evidence of sexual violence (0), isolated incidences (1), numerous reports (2), or a massive prevalence of sexual violence (3). I also include the binary variable Rebel Trans-Ethnic Kinship from the Transborder Ethnic Kin dataset (Vogt et al., 2015) because these transborder ethnic ties have been shown to meaningfully correspond to support for insurgent groups (Cederman et al., 2013). I also include the binary variable Rebel Transnational Non-State Actor (TNSA) Support from Manekin and Wood (2020) because external states might take cues from TNSAs when considering whether or not to provide support for rebel organizations. Finally, in the analysis testing Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I include the count variable Total Democratic Supporters to account for the number of external state supporters of each rebel movement who, on average over the course of the rebellion, were considered liberal democracies according to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022). I include this control variable given the potential influence the choices of democratic states might have on others in the international system.

Moving on to variables accounting for conflict characteristics, I include the binary variable Separatist Rebellion from the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013) because the goals of a rebellion might influence whether and to what extent external states choose to intervene. I also include the binary variable Conflict Intensity from the UCDP Dyadic dataset (Davies et al., 2023), which accounts for whether the average conflict-year surpassed 999 battle-related deaths, given that rebel organizations fighting in more intense civil wars might be more likely to open combat roles to women and be in greater need of support. I likewise control for Logged Conflict Duration using the conflict years provided in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Davies et al., 2023) to account for the role that time probably plays in whether and how external states provide support for rebel organizations.

To control for characteristics of the individual external state supporters, the opposition states, and the supporter–opposition dyads in the analysis testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b, I first include the variable Supporter–Opposition MIDs. I develop this count variable using the Dyadic MID dataset (Maoz et al., 2019), and it provides the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between the external state supporter and the opposition state within 10 years before the external state began providing support to the observed rebel organization. I include this variable to account for the degree of hostility between the states in my sample, as this might influence external states’ desires to support certain rebellions along with their willingness to engage (directly or indirectly) with an opposition state's military. Next, I include control variables that account for other performative measures external states might take to signal their support for expanding gender inclusivity and women's rights. I develop the binary variable Supporter Gender Quotas using the Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time dataset (Hughes et al., 2019) to account for whether the external state implemented any gender quotas prior to supporting the observed rebel movement. I develop Supporter CEDAW using the information provided on the UN Treaty Collection Depositary⁹ page for CEDAW. This variable accounts for whether the external state ratified CEDAW prior to supporting the observed rebel organization (2), signed but did not ratify CEDAW (1), or if the external state neither signed nor ratified the treaty (0). Next, I include the continuous variable Democratic Supporter to account for how the regime type of an external state shapes its decision to intervene in a civil war. This variable comes from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022), and it accounts for the average Liberal Democracy Index score of the external state from the year support for the rebel movement began to the year it ended. This index reflects the average protection of civil liberties and minority rights, which potentially correspond to measures taken to expand gender inclusivity and women's rights. I also include the dummy variable Post-2001 to account for RG-ESS dyads that began in or after the year 2001, as this year marked a notable shift in global norms regarding both armed conflict and gender dynamics.

Finally, I control for characteristics of opposition states in the analysis for both sets of hypotheses. I control for the average level of liberal democracy and economic development in each opposition state, given that external states might consider these factors when determining their own willingness to provoke an opposition state by supporting a rebellion within its borders. Democratic Opposition is a continuous variable reflecting the opposition state's average Liberal Democracy Index score (Coppedge et al., 2022) over the course of the armed rebellion. Logged Opposition GDP Per Capita is the natural log of the average GDP per capita of the country in which the civil war occurred and comes from Gleditsch (2002). Table 3 provides the summary statistics for all of the variables included in my analyses.

Table 3.

Summary statistics.

Variable	Observations	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Female Combatants	484	0.473	0.5	0	1
Female Combatant Prevalence	484	0.754	0.943	0	3
Total Support	531	8.311	13.353	0	115
Lower-Stakes Support	531	3.851	6.789	0	57
Mid-Stakes Support	531	2.77	5.438	0	43
Higher-Stakes Support	531	1.689	3.495	0	27
Leftist Rebels	431	0.19	0.393	0	1
Nationalist Rebels	422	0.552	0.498	0	1
Islamist Rebels	428	0.199	0.399	0	1
Weaker Rebels	531	0.652	0.477	0	1
Rebel SV Prevalence	416	0.457	0.79	0	3
Rebel Trans-Ethnic Kinship	435	0.494	0.501	0	1
Rebel TNSA Support	435	0.28	0.45	0	1
Separatist Rebellion	531	0.384	0.487	0	1
Conflict Intensity	531	1.343	0.475	1	2
Logged Conflict Duration	522	3.25	0.986	0	4.304
Democratic Opposition	531	0.198	0.191	0.006	0.785
Logged Opposition GDP Per Capita	435	10.55	1.592	7.019	15.081
Total Democratic Supporters (H1)	218	0.339	1.369	0	18
Supporter-Opposition MIDs (H2)	531	1.151	1.771	0	8
Supporter Gender Quotas (H2)	522	0.19	0.392	0	1
Supporter CEDAW (H2)	406	1.268	0.913	0	3
Democratic Supporter (H2)	528	0.195	0.239	0.005	0.881
Post-2001 (H2)	531	0.279	0.449	0	1

Because my dependent variables are all counts of the total occurrences of different types of external state support for rebels, I estimate negative binomial regression models to test my hypotheses. The negative binomial regression model is particularly useful for estimating over-dispersed count data because it does not assume that the conditional variances and means of the data are equal.¹⁰ In the following section, I present the results of these models and discuss how they relate to my hypotheses.

Results and analysis

Based on my arguments connecting rebel groups’ incorporation of female combatants with external states’ reputational incentives to support these groups, I hypothesize that both the presence and prevalence of female combatants correspond to more total external state support for rebel movements (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). I also contend that the presence and prevalence of female combatants specifically correspond to rebel organizations receiving more lower-stakes forms of external state support (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). I expect that external state supporters are often more interested in the potential reputational benefits of appearing to support a more gender-inclusive rebel movement than they are in deeply investing in conflict outcomes. Table 4 presents the results of the statistical models I estimate to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b.

Table 4.

Negative binomial regression model results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b.

	Total support (H1a)	Total support (H1b)
Female Combatants	0.463*
	(0.223)
Female Combatant Prevalence (None)		0.000

Female Combatant Prevalence (Low)		0.348
		(0.234)
Female Combatant Prevalence (Moderate)		0.818*
		(0.397)
Female Combatant Prevalence (High)		0.965*
		(0.481)
Leftist Rebels	0.812*	0.536
	(0.333)	(0.382)
Nationalist Rebels	−0.682*	−0.620*
	(0.309)	(0.312)
Islamist Rebels	0.817**	0.912**
	(0.279)	(0.283)
Weaker Rebels	0.086	0.007
	(0.243)	(0.250)
Rebel SV Prevalence	0.244	0.193
	(0.147)	(0.152)
Rebel Trans-Ethnic Kinship	0.204	0.189
	(0.229)	(0.227)
Rebel TNSA Support	0.422	0.423
	(0.244)	(0.243)
Separatist Rebellion	1.040**	1.098**
	(0.349)	(0.351)
Conflict Intensity	0.636*	0.583*
	(0.270)	(0.272)
Logged Conflict Duration	0.590**	0.614**
	(0.152)	(0.150)
Total Democratic Supporters	0.146	0.152
	(0.091)	(0.087)
Democratic Opposition	−0.300	−0.280
	(0.348)	(0.359)
Logged Opposition GDP Per Capita	−0.081	−0.090
	(0.082)	(0.082)
N	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

These results generally provide statistical support for my first set of hypotheses. According to the results of the model testing Hypothesis 1a, rebel organizations that include female combatants indeed receive significantly greater amounts of external state support. Likewise, the results of the model testing Hypothesis 1b underscore the importance of female combatant visibility. It appears that although rebel organizations with at least 5% of their combat forces comprising women (i.e. moderate or high prevalence) receive significantly more total external state support, rebel organizations with a low prevalence of female combatants do not receive significantly different amounts of total external state support than groups that exclude women from combat altogether. While this relatively low threshold of 5% demonstrates the powerful influence of even a small number of women in combat positions, these findings also suggest that rebel organizations must surpass the bare minimum inclusion of women in combat roles in order for these dynamics to take hold. Moving on to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, Table 5 presents the results of the statistical models I estimate to test the relationships between the presence and prevalence of female combatants and the different categories of external state support.

Table 5.

Negative binomial regression model results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

	Lower-stakes support (H2a)	Mid-stakes support (H2a)	Higher-stakes support (H2a)	Lower-stakes support (H2b)	Mid-stakes support (H2b)	Higher-stakes support (H2b)
Female Combatants	0.635**	0.443*	0.377
	(0.206)	(0.221)	(0.283)
Female Combatant Prevalence (None)				0.000	0.000	0.000

Female Combatant Prevalence (Low)				0.424	0.340	0.184
				(0.232)	(0.249)	(0.312)
Female Combatant Prevalence (Moderate)				0.844*	0.494	0.711
				(0.346)	(0.341)	(0.454)
Female Combatant Prevalence (High)				1.635**	1.125*	1.158
				(0.510)	(0.484)	(0.658)
Leftist Rebels	0.707*	0.604	1.165**	0.075	0.217	0.696
	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.443)	(0.436)	(0.410)	(0.551)
Nationalist Rebels	−0.890**	−0.202	0.050	−0.808**	−0.178	0.132
	(0.288)	(0.294)	(0.349)	(0.285)	(0.295)	(0.353)
Islamist Rebels	0.879**	0.769**	0.767*	0.915**	0.785**	0.819*
	(0.248)	(0.267)	(0.340)	(0.252)	(0.278)	(0.350)
Weaker Rebels	−0.194	−0.036	−0.199	−0.302	−0.091	−0.273
	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.307)	(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.311)
Rebel SV Prevalence	0.119	0.184	0.155	0.085	0.191	0.144
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.181)	(0.157)	(0.152)	(0.189)
Rebel Trans-Ethnic Kinship	0.536*	0.355	0.674*	0.501*	0.336	0.677*
	(0.250)	(0.247)	(0.299)	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.298)
Rebel TNSA Support	0.030	−0.011	−0.496	0.040	−0.053	−0.507
	(0.257)	(0.255)	(0.314)	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.314)
Separatist Rebellion	0.980**	−0.194	0.729	1.050**	−0.162	0.772
	(0.361)	(0.364)	(0.418)	(0.360)	(0.366)	(0.417)
Conflict Intensity	0.372	0.185	0.258	0.387	0.203	0.269
	(0.252)	(0.256)	(0.306)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.306)
Logged Conflict Duration	0.724**	0.300*	0.038	0.760**	0.323*	0.049
	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.179)	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.177)
Supporter–Opposition MIDs	0.060	0.102	0.052	0.038	0.102	0.044
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Supporter Gender Quotas	−0.155	0.410	0.020	−0.151	0.423	0.129
	(0.271)	(0.278)	(0.332)	(0.271)	(0.278)	(0.339)
Supporter CEDAW	−0.183	−0.122	−0.288	−0.195	−0.130	−0.313*
	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.155)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.155)
Democratic Supporter	0.421	−1.313**	−0.284	0.374	−1.369**	−0.368
	(0.434)	(0.473)	(0.624)	(0.430)	(0.476)	(0.628)
Democratic Opposition	−0.790	0.207	−1.139	−0.522	0.435	−0.919
	(0.778)	(0.767)	(0.954)	(0.792)	(0.783)	(0.986)
Logged Opposition GDP Per Capita	−0.056	−0.060	−0.045	−0.033	−0.058	−0.041
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.104)
Post-2001	−0.555*	−0.941**	−0.350	−0.595*	−0.970**	−0.376
	(0.239)	(0.258)	(0.296)	(0.243)	(0.263)	(0.303)
N	285	285	285	285	285	285

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Overall, the results of these models also provide statistical support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The findings from the models testing Hypothesis 2a make it clear that in general, rebel organizations with female combatants receive significantly greater amounts of lower-stakes forms of external state support, as hypothesized. Somewhat unexpectedly, these results also suggest that rebel movements with female combatants receive significantly more mid-stakes forms of external state support as well. However, the results of the models testing Hypothesis 2b add important clarity and nuance to this finding. The results from these models suggest that while rebel organizations with a moderate prevalence of female combatants (i.e. 5–20% of the group's combat forces) receive greater amounts of lower-stakes forms of external state support, rebel organizations with a high prevalence of female combatants (i.e. > 20% of the group's combat forces) receive significantly greater amounts of both lower-stake and mid-stakes forms of support. Likewise, similar to the results from the models testing Hypothesis 1b, these results suggest that rebel organizations with less than 5% of their combat forces comprising women (i.e. low prevalence) do not receive a significantly different amount of any category of external state support than organizations with no female combatants.

Once again, these findings underscore the importance of female combatant visibility. Not only do they suggest that a relatively small percentage of female combatants in a rebel organization is enough to motivate external states to provide their support, but they also suggest that external states are willing to go beyond providing just lower-stakes forms of support for rebel organizations that incorporate the greatest percentages of female combatants. These findings speak to a greater willingness than expected on the part of external states to invest in rebel movements that appear to be the most gender-inclusive. This not only highlights the power of gender signaling for states but also the power of women rebels in (directly or indirectly) securing benefits for their organizations.

Consistent across these results is the finding that the inclusion of women in combat roles does not significantly increase how much higher-stake support rebel organizations are likely to receive. This further supports my arguments regarding the gendered, performative motivations of external states. While it is nearly impossible to test and confirm what the states in this sample would have done in alternative circumstances, these results suggest that external state supporters are possibly motivated by the inclusion of women combatants to intervene in conflicts where they otherwise would not have. The consistency of my finding that the presence and prevalence of female combatants correspond to greater amounts of lower-stakes forms of support—combined with the consistent statistical insignificance of alternative motivations for external state support, such as Supporter-Opposition MIDs—suggests that many states in this sample were significantly more motivated by characteristics of the rebel organizations they supported than by spurious relationships with opposition states. If this inference is correct, then the gender composition of armed groups is worthy of more serious consideration when it comes to predicting and understanding international intervention in civil wars.

Several of the control variables in my analyses also have statistically significant relationships with external state support for rebel organizations. First, leftist and Islamist rebel organizations appear to receive significantly greater amounts of external state support. This finding aligns with previous arguments in the literature that rebel organizations with stronger transnational constituencies, such as religious and ethnic diasporic ties or ideologically aligned political powers, are more likely to receive external support (e.g. Salehyan et al., 2011). With this in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that rebel organizations with trans-ethnic kinships also receive significantly greater amounts of external state support. Interestingly, according to some models, nationalist rebel movements receive significantly lower amounts of external state support. This is perhaps because the goals and identities of many nationalist rebel movements are fundamentally less transnational than those of other rebellions.¹¹ Conversely, separatist rebellions appear to receive significantly greater amounts of external state support. This suggests that external states are more inclined to support rebel movements that are fighting for independent statehood rather than those that aim to overthrow a current regime.

According to one model, external states with a greater formal degree of commitment to CEDAW provide significantly less support to rebel organizations. This is perhaps because these states have already signaled their general support for gender inclusivity and women's rights and thus do not perceive additional reputational benefits in supporting certain rebel movements. Additionally, for those states that are authentically committed to CEDAW, that stronger commitment to human rights might also correspond to a stronger commitment to not supporting armed violence abroad. Similarly, I find that more democratic states are significantly less likely to provide support for rebel organizations. This is potentially due to liberal democratic norms that discourage non-state violence, along with global hierarchies that leave many nondemocratic states with more to potentially gain from international virtue-signaling behaviors.

Finally, these results suggest that time indeed plays an important role in the relationship between external state supporters and rebel organizations. I find that longer lasting rebellions and rebels fighting in more intense conflicts receive significantly greater amounts of external state support. I also find that rebel organizations have received significantly less external state support in the post-2001 period. It makes sense that the duration and intensity of a civil war would positively correspond to how much support rebels receive. External states probably wait and observe the unfolding dynamics and magnitude of an armed conflict before deciding to intervene, with longer, more brutal conflicts demanding more support. Likewise, state support for rebel organizations is perhaps less common post-2001 because of modern shifts in global norms. From the United States’ very public battles and failures with non-state armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early-2000s, to the Great Recession that rocked the global economy in 2008, to the rise of isolationism among certain world powers over the past decade, a variety of global political events since the year 2001 could contribute to external states providing significantly less support for rebel organizations in this time period.

Overall, these statistical results bolster my claims regarding the gendered relationship between the composition of armed rebel movements and external state support for these armed groups. In general, rebel organizations with at least 5% of their combat forces comprising women receive significantly greater amounts of total external state support. They specifically receive significantly more lower-stakes forms of support including weapons, funding, and military intelligence. However, rebel organizations whose combat forces comprise at least 20% women receive significantly more mid-stakes forms of support as well, including permission to cross international borders, materiel and logistics. While this research supports my claims regarding the gendered virtue-signaling behaviors of states, it also offers important implications regarding rebel strategy. From the perspective of rebel leaders, these findings suggest that there are substantial strategic benefits to incorporating more women into combat roles—benefits beyond those previously established in the literature, such as enhanced sympathy, legitimacy, and group survival (Loken 2021; Manekin and Wood 2020; Wood and Allemang 2022). External states are potentially motivated by gender symbolism, even if only performatively, and rebels can leverage those motivations to garner valuable resources and support for their armed struggles.

Conclusion

Although there are many reasons why external states might choose to provide support for armed rebellions, the magnitude and ways in which women are incorporated into rebel organizations have previously been underexplored as potential motivating factors. As a discipline that has historically struggled to see women in war, the field of IR has perhaps implicitly assumed that states fail to see them too. However, the research I have presented here challenges that assumption. As political entities that care about boosting their international reputations, states face incentives to virtue-signal to the international community their apparent support for humanitarian norms—norms such as promoting gender inclusivity and women's rights. One way external states might do this is by providing support to rebel movements that have opened combat roles to their female members, as these groups appear to be more gender-inclusive. Previous research has elaborated on how rebel organizations elicit greater sympathy and support from external audiences by leveraging gendered assumptions historically tied to women's participation in armed conflict. As such, the inclusion of female combatants helps portray rebel organizations as all-encompassing social movements in desperate need of support as they engage in legitimate, virtuous armed struggles against oppressive incumbent regimes.

I have argued that reputational motivations for external states only necessitate that they signal general support for rebel movements with female combatants, not that they bear maximum costs to ensure rebel victory. Thus, external states are more likely to provide lower-stakes forms of support to these groups, rather than types of support that are costlier and represent a greater investment in conflict outcomes. Overall, the empirical results I present in this article support my claims, while also highlighting the underestimated significance of female combatant visibility in securing external state support for rebel organizations. My research demonstrates that there is indeed a significant statistical relationship between the gendered composition of armed rebel movements and their ability to garner external state support—particularly lower-stakes forms of support, but also mid-stakes forms of support for those rebel groups that include the most female fighters.

However, the research I have presented here is not without its limitations. Without access to temporal data on female combatant recruitment, it is not yet possible to systematically analyze whether and how the timing of external state support for rebel groups corresponds to when rebel organizations begin including women on their frontlines. Likewise, quantifying the reputational motives of states remains a challenge for IR researchers, leaving many to instead quantify state behaviors and infer reputational motivations that support those behaviors. While these inferences certainly offer valuable contributions to the field in terms of understanding general political patterns, they admittedly fall short of demonstrating causality. To improve upon this shortcoming, future qualitative analysis of the rhetoric surrounding states’ decisions to provide support for rebel organizations could be useful for unpacking the ways that gender potentially drives those decisions. Finally, future research on external support for armed rebellions ought to consider how women's diverse participation in these movements shapes the dynamics I underscore here. Specifically, I recommend that researchers further explore how variations in the visibility and perceived morality of certain rebel duties—including but not limited to frontline combat—correspond to support for rebel organizations that include women. Overall, by connecting the gendered composition and perception of rebel movements to transnational state behaviors, this study contributes valuable new insights on the importance of rebel women in shaping global conflict dynamics.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-cmp-10.1177_07388942241234224 - Supplemental material for International virtue signaling: How female combatants shape state support for armed rebellion

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-cmp-10.1177_07388942241234224 for International virtue signaling: How female combatants shape state support for armed rebellion by Lindsey A Goldberg in Conflict Management and Peace Science

Supplemental Material

sj-zip-2-cmp-10.1177_07388942241234224 - Supplemental material for International virtue signaling: How female combatants shape state support for armed rebellion

Supplemental material, sj-zip-2-cmp-10.1177_07388942241234224 for International virtue signaling: How female combatants shape state support for armed rebellion by Lindsey A Goldberg in Conflict Management and Peace Science

Footnotes

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Lindsey A Goldberg

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Correction (April 2024):

Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) was replaced with ‘Kurdish’ in Figure 1 and in its citation.

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