Check the checks: A comparison of fact-checking practices between newspapers and independent organizations during 2020 U.S. election presidential debates

Abstract

By conducting content analyses of 440 fact checks (N = 440), the study examined the fact-checking practices of three leading national newspapers (i.e., The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today) and three independent fact-checking organizations (i.e., FactCheck.org, PolitiFact, and Snopes.com) in the United States during the 2020 presidential debates and town halls. The results found differences in fact-checking within three independent organizations, in terms of candidates, ratings, and used sources. Meanwhile, the three news outlets had differences in fact-checked candidates but consistency in sources and ratings. H1 was supported suggesting that three news organizations fact-checked Trump’s statements more than Biden’s, and as incorrect, compared with three independent organizations.

Keywords

fact-checking presidential debate content analysis U.S. election gatekeeping theory

The 2020 U.S. election was marked by unprecedented chaos and hyper-political division for many reasons, including the COVID-19 pandemic, then-President Trump’s coronavirus infection, and the increase in absentee ballots and their acceptance extension time. The situation sparked false claims about election fraud and ended up with an attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Indeed, during the 2016 campaign season, American voters confronted inaccurate statements made by both presidential candidates and saw a rise in so-called fake news (Patterson, 2016). Given this political environment, scholars urged that it was more important than ever to correct misinformation delivered by political leaders swiftly and vigilantly (Amazeen, 2020; Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018).

Since the 2012 presidential election cycle, there has been a major spike in fact-checking sources, namely news media and independent organizations (Graves et al., 2015). The context has highlighted the vital role of the two institutions in verifying information given by political figures, which influences a healthy democracy predicated on a well and accurately informed electorate. Regarding the public, the more frequently audiences visit fact-checking websites, the more politically accurate they are compared with those who do not visit these sites (Gottfried et al., 2013). In other words, reading fact-checking articles can enhance the public’s political knowledge and, thus, their ability to make informed decisions at the ballot box (Dunn et al., 2015; Graves et al., 2015). Furthermore, fact-checking, such as the media’s response to both candidates’ misleading claims, can decrease politicians’ likelihood to make incorrect statements (Amazeen, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2012).

Given the significance of fact-checking journalism, which is described as “truth-seeking” and as a new form of a “political watchdog” (Graves et al., 2015), the current study sets out to examine how leading U.S. news outlets executed their role in the 2020 election, in comparison with independent fact-checking organizations. Its objectives are to explore the fact-checking practices of news media and independent bureaus by looking at multiple criteria such as statements’ selection and evaluation, as well as cited sources, and to examine if there are any differences across two types of institutions. This comparison and the lack of consistency in approaching fact-checking among news outlets themselves are worth further investigation (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018; Lowrey, 2017).

Fact-checking of presidential debates is chosen for examination since these debates are key in the decision-making of voters (Katz, 2016). Furthermore, the 2020 presidential campaign presented an unprecedented situation when the second debate was canceled and replaced by two separate concurrent town halls, which was considered a good opportunity to explore fact-checking practices about two candidates separately, albeit in the same nature and occasion. By examining fact-checking practices at The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today, versus at FactCheck.org, PolitiFact, and Snopes.com, this thesis aims to apply the gatekeeping theory to contribute to literature in an emerging field of scholarship (i.e., fact-checking) and to discuss implications for organizations.

Literature Review

Gatekeeping Theory

As fact-checking is a new genre of journalism (Graves et al., 2015), this study chooses the gatekeeping theory to explore its practices across organizations. The theory suggests that there is a selection process within a media organization to determine what information will be turned into a story (Shoemaker et al., 2009). Scholars have identified various pressures that shape news content (Shoemaker, 1991; Shoemaker et al., 2001, 2009; Shoemaker & Reese, 2013). To illustrate the gatekeeping process in more complexity, they categorize these pressures into five levels: individual journalists, newsroom routines, organizational structures, social institutions, and the broader social system. Each level can influence news production positively and negatively (Vos, 2015). This current study focuses on the first three levels, including individuals (i.e., journalists or independent fact-checkers), routines (i.e., the application of routine news values: objectivity and source choosing), organizations (characteristics, such as policies and standards, that differentiate outlets, i.e., newspapers or fact-checking organizations).

Gatekeeping focuses on human decision-making in news selection that involves the diversity of journalists and news organizations (Shoemaker et al., 2009; Vos, 2015). However, gatekeeping is not highly individualized decision-making and may not apply to journalists anymore (Le Cam & Domingo, 2015; Vos, 2015). Gatekeeping goes beyond conscious selection by journalists as the structure of online newsrooms—a consistent power—shapes the news selection process (Le Cam & Domingo, 2015). Journalists are integrated into the organization, following established procedures and directives by editors and leadership (Schudson, 2012). Online newsrooms, specifically, have streamlined the process, significantly reducing the individual journalist’s influence (Le Cam & Domingo, 2015). This mirrors the findings of the limitations of individual journalist power within the broader context of newsroom culture and professional norms (Schudson, 2000; Tuchman, 2002).

Communication routines in journalism define the field, not individual journalists or news organizations (Shoemaker et al., 2009). These routines are constantly evolving (Vos, 2015). With shrinking budgets and the rise of digital media, campaign coverage of U.S. newspapers’ online versions now emphasizes fact-checking, analysis, and interpretation (Singer, 2015). Building relationships with sources and audiences remains crucial; journalists increasingly incorporate voices from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and everyday citizens through social media, apart from elite sources (Raeymaeckers et al., 2015; Vos, 2015).

While individual journalists and routines play a significant role in what news gets reported, organizations hold ultimate power. They hire and fire gatekeepers, and their policies and leadership shape the news selection process (Shoemaker et al., 2009). Different organizational environments lead to distinct routines and news reporting styles (Carpenter, 2008). For instance, editorial policies and editor ideologies influence news selection despite journalists using news values in discussions (Reisner, 1992), while the publisher’s racial biases filtered down impact the staff’s photo selection choices (Bissell, 2000). Different media outlets may concentrate on distinct attributes of a chosen speech, debate, campaign advertisements, or claims to fact-check (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018). Organizational size, type, and ownership structure are also crucial factors in forming policies and, thus, constructing news reports (Demers, 1994, 1995; Shoemaker et al., 2009).

In short, gatekeeping goes beyond individual journalists making choices. Personal experiences shape their perspective (individual level). Professional norms and established practices within their field guide their decisions (routines level). Finally, their organization plays a crucial role (Shoemaker et al., 2009). Applicable to fact-checking, fact-checkers (or fact-checking journalists) act as gatekeepers, using their judgment to select the material they will verify. Next, they consult various sources for corroborating information. After verification, the fact-check undergoes editing to meet the organization’s standards and be published according to established communication strategies (Missau & Storch, 2022). The process highlights the role of fact-checkers, fact-checking routines, and standards of the organizations, or the three levels of gatekeeping.

Fact-checking has emerged as a response to the growing fragmentation of American public discourse (Graves, 2016). Graves (2016) views fact-checkers as “the core of a professional reform movement” (13), emphasizing their role in advocating for a more informed society. Not all fact-checkers identify themselves as journalists and often come from civil society groups or universities (Graves et al., 2023). Meanwhile, around 60% of fact-checkers globally operate within media organizations (Stencel et al., 2022). Regardless of their affiliations with journalism, their actions are viewed as an intervention aimed at reforming institutions (Amazeen, 2020; Graves, 2018). Given this focus on reform, comparing fact-checking practices between newspapers and independent organizations may yield distinct characteristics—insightful results contributing to understanding gatekeeping in fact-checking.

Fact-Checking—A Superior Form of Journalism

The emergence of fact-checking journalism can be traced back to the early 2000s, while its initial unofficial fact-checkers were seen as early as the muckraking journalism era when reporters challenged false claims of politicians or businesspeople, e.g., patent-medicine producers (Amazeen et al., 2018). Fact-checking practice has gained popularity and massive increase over election cycles (Fridkin et al., 2015; Graves et al., 2015). Interestingly, Kurtzleben (2016) found that approximately 80 percent of Americans, either Democrat- or Republican-identified, likely favored the media’s utilization of fact-checking.

Fact-checking possesses distinct characteristics compared with other forms of journalism. Its primary focus is the accuracy of information, such as a speech, rather than the concern if journalists collected the right information or quoted correctly (Amazeen, 2013; Graves, 2016). Hence, fact-checking arguably results in higher effectiveness at correcting false statements providing veracity scales to audiences with regular reporting methods of he-said/she-said (Pingree et al., 2014). Amazeen (2020) even argued that fact-checking is “a superior form of journalism,” whose diffusion helped to improve the profession in terms of practices, standards, and credibility.

Despite several attributing differences, fact-checking and other forms of journalism share one particular core characteristic: objectivity. Objective journalism found its roots in the 1920s, which marked a distancing from partisan journalism and paved the way for the next century of journalistic trends (Graves et al., 2015). In the case of fact-checking, the first code of principles for fact-checking organizations promoted by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), which has been providing more than 100 global fact-checking operations since 2015, is “commitment to non-partisanship and fairness.” It means all parties’ information needs to be fact-checked equally. Thus, objectivity arguably stems from individual journalists’ practices but also reflects the routines’ standards and organizations’ commitments.

Likewise, two of the multiple best practices for fact-checking coverage relate to IFCN’s approach, namely lessening partisan cues and minimizing sources having political affiliations (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012). Graves (2016) also suggested five areas of fact-checking practices, specifically choosing claims to check, contacting the speaker, tracing false claims, dealing with experts, and showing your work. Each of them needs to ensure the objectivity of the reportage. These two frameworks (i.e., dealing with experts and showing your work) are later discussed and applied to the current study.

Political Fact-Checking

The increase in partisanship and polarization has affected media systems around the globe since 2004 (Dunham, 2016). During the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the significance of fact-checking journalism became more critical than ever. As a part of journalism’s watchdog role, this practice has been valued by both sides of the political spectrum amid election cycles since it offers the public evaluations of what information presented by politicians is true or false (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018).

Despite a general appreciation from the public, journalism fact-checkers are now facing frequent accusations of being partisan, usually in favor of Democrats (Stencel, 2016), particularly when partisan media has started to grow in ratings since the latter part of the 20th century (Amazeen, 2020). Reporters’ fact checks have been seen as commentary, which violates the rules of objectivity and impartiality of journalism (Li et al., 2018), thus, being found to backfire (Garrett & Weeks, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). This is exaggerated by the hostile media bias perception of audiences, which makes them likely to perceive media bias if the articles do not align with their existing beliefs even when these reports are balanced (Gunther et al., 2012).

When covered unfavorably, politicians often attack the media as biased to avoid accountability (Smith, 2010). Allegations of liberal media bias in the United States, which rose dramatically in the 1990s (Domke et al., 1999), have become extreme recently. Calling the press “fake news” or the “enemy of the American people” are unprecedented and threatening example toward the fifth estate and watchdogs (Grynbaum, 2017; Sullivan, 2017). This rhetoric promptly turned into a conspiracy theory claiming mainstream journalists as partisan actors who wrote misleading or even false stories (Hayes, 2008). Meanwhile, the attitudes toward news or perceptions of media bias are arguably shaped by others’ comments, not by audiences’ direct observations of news content (Domke et al., 1999; Ladd, 2011).

Fact-checkers need to do the uncomfortable task of challenging public figures by checking and publicizing their mistakes, exaggerations, and deceptions. They interfere with heated political debates and decide which side tells the facts (Graves, 2016). Many (journalist) fact-checkers’ decisions are motivated by the wish to minimize risks of losing access to official sources or of receiving negative reactions from audiences, which leads to a scarcity of sources willing to adjudicate and check facts in a story (Cunningham, 2003; Jamieson & Waldman, 2004; Pingree et al., 2014). It can in part explain why many fact checks had a full verdict, while others were just partially adjudicated or did not have clear conclusions.

To address these critics, the current study explores whether media organizations applied approaches recommended by scholars for correcting false information in comparison with independent bureaus, in the context of a highly politicized and polarized situation of two presidential debates and two town halls. Furthermore, while media outlets’ fact-checking practices differed across newsrooms (e.g., Marietta et al., 2015), this lack of consistency in approaching ways is also worth exploring further (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018).

Behind the Checks

The study sets out to examine fact checks of three national newspapers, namely, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today, and three independent organizations, including PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, and Snopes.com. Except for The New York Times, the rest of the organizations are Verified signatories of the IFCN code of principles. Although they have different guidelines, processes, ratings styles, and human resources for fact checks, the core principles are similar. The New York Times, however, was included in the sample because of its status as newspaper or record (e.g., Ringel, 2021), which has been shown to be an influential agenda-setter for other news outlets (Golan, 2006).

Regarding topics of their fact-checking operations, USA Today and Snopes.com fact-check several issues, while The New York Times, The Washington Post, PolitiFact, and FactCheck.org, put their focus on political subjects, particularly the people and party holding power. They strive for balanced, but not unintentionally count, and non-partisan articles by checking inaccurate statements on both the left and the right, committing not to participate in any partisan political activities, and using non-partisan sources. Speaking of sources, all of them prioritize primary, original, and official ones, looking for experts and data documents, not statements from politicians.

Scholars argued that fact-checking conducted by independent organizations such as FactCheck.org and PolitiFact was not identical to traditional journalism (Humprecht, 2020; Robertson et al., 2020). Independent fact-checkers exclusively concentrate on debunking false information, which may complement their colleagues in media outlets (Brandtzaeg et al., 2018; Graves & Cherubini, 2016). Another area of difference concerns the use of rating systems (Amazeen, 2013; Graves & Amazeen, 2019). Fact-checkers seldom harmonize in adjudicated conclusions (e.g., Amazeen, 2015; Marietta et al., 2015). Most fact-checking organizations employ the accuracy scale to rate claims, while others view the practice as simplifying the complexity of rhetoric (Amazeen, 2013; Graves, 2018).

Furthermore, independent fact-checkers also distinguish themselves from media peers and aim to deliver neutral and non-partisan information (Humprecht, 2020). Thus, their fact-checking sources and targets are expected to differ from editorial outlets’ practices. Independent organizations, for instance, were more often provided with a higher level of source transparency than news agencies (Humprecht, 2020). Regarding fact-checking subjects, Bucciol (2018) found that Fact Checker, which belonged to The Washington Post, tended to fact-check Republicans, U.S. Senators, and politicians living in the West. Meanwhile, PolitiFact was less focused on particular targets of political actors. The independent outlet indeed fact-checked a wide range of politicians, namely Democrats, Republicans, members from other parties, and even from other countries (Nieminen & Sankari, 2021). PolitiFact and Fact Checker staff rarely fact-checked the same statement, and if yes, verdicts were not consistent across outlets (Lim, 2018).

Graves (2018) urges research examining the relationship between differences in practice and organizational characteristics (e.g., independent and editorial outlets), especially when it comes to a highly polarized situation such as a presidential election. Graves (2018) posited that a lack of independent journalism might influence news organizations’ targets of fact-checking, such as the willingness to fact-check their associated actors.

In addition, the 45th U.S. President addressed unprecedented topics to the public, describing the press as fake news and “the enemy of the people,” and threatening the Constitution of the United States (Brewer & Egan, 2021). In fact, Trump made 23.3 lies per day in 2020, as of early April (Markowitz, 2020), and 30,573 untruthful statements during his four-year presidency (Kessler et al., 2021). The media further amplified his misinformation (Gaufman, 2018), while he was the most influential individual in his network on Twitter, where his supporters unquestioningly circulated falsehoods he made (Tran, 2021). Hence, it is expected that he would be fact-checked more than his counterpart by both independent and news organizations.

Fact-Checking in the Era of Trump

“I will always tell you the truth,” Trump promised at a campaign rally in August 2016, when he started his presidential race, becoming the 45th President of the United States. Nevertheless, Trump has seemed to struggle with the truth during his presidency, triggering a new era of journalism fact-checking (Golshan, 2016). Donald Trump has made “fact-checking great again,” at least by volume (Mantzarlis, 2016), when there has been a 200% increase in fact-checking organizations launching since his 2016 election, according to data from the Duke Reporter’s Lab.

Rieder (2020) described Trump as a fact-checker’s dream or nightmare because of his disregard for the truth, which kept the whole fact-checking industry busy and rarely had time to fact-check other politicians (Kessler, 2020). Its efforts to deal with Trump’s falsehoods have indeed intensified throughout his presidency, with the production of plentiful lists of corrective information about Trump’s repetitive untruthful statements, some non-facts (Rieder, 2020; Schwartzman, 2021). While misstatements from political figures are not a new phenomenon (e.g., Arendt, 1971), Trump stands out with floods of exaggerating and untrue quotes and his negligence (Schwartzman, 2021).

Meanwhile, analyzing authoritarian leaders worldwide, Ben-Ghiat (2020) argued, “Trump departs from all previous heads of American democracy, though, in devoting so much effort to the destruction of the meaning of truth in the absolute.” He is different as having the unusual ability to spread misinformation and his supporters appreciate that (Hahl et al., 2018). Trump performed his role as a U.S. president who challenged factual reality (Schwartzman, 2021). His transcripts at rallies and White House briefings possessed two outstanding characteristics namely the sheer volume of misinformation and its repetition regardless of the times of being fact-checked (Rieder, 2020).

It is one of the discouraging aspects of fact-checking businesses when the perpetrator does not regard the fact that false information is discredited (Rieder, 2020). Fact-checkers normally track politicians repeating statements that have been debunked as false. They even create a special section on repeated inaccurate claims (Lim, 2018). Political actors, in turn, will decide to pull back fact-checked as false claims as they are concerned about their reputation (Lim, 2018). Notwithstanding, Trump may not be the case. With the existing weaponized rhetoric on fact checks by politicians, the unrepentant attitude and attacks of then-President Trump toward misstatements have placed fact-checking in a more adversarial role and contributed to political crisis declaration in scholarship (Porter & Wood, 2019). His repeated falsehoods and truth indifference arguably make him a fascist politician and signal the rise of fascism (Snyder, 2017; Stanley, 2030).

Donald Trump is seen as a prime exemplar of a broader political communication transformation, placed in a context where “politics has become largely affective” (Grossberg, 2018; Schwartzman, 2021). Although he may not be the only political figure employing untruthful statements, he deems to be willing to make false claims more unhesitatingly than his predecessors (Porter & Wood, 2019). Compared with other politicians from different parties, Trump is also distinguished. Biden is assessed as more disciplined than Trump with short and well-drafted speeches (Kessler, 2020). Between October 12 to October 16, 2020, in six events of 2 hr and 46 min, Biden’s statements were fact-checked as false nine times by FactCheck.org, compared with 46 incorrect and misleading claims of Trump at six rallies with more than 8 hr (Rieder, 2020). Despite the efforts of organizations to fact-check both two presidential candidates, Trump was debunked more partly due to the fact that “he spoke more,” even in the 2016 election, with TV shows and unprepared scripts at rallies (Mantzarlis, 2016).

Based on the theoretical frameworks and literature review, the current study sets forth the following research questions and hypotheses.

RQ1:How did three news organizations fact-check the 2020 presidential debates and town halls in terms of chosen candidates, ratings, sources, and topics?

RQ2:How did three independent organizations fact-check the 2020 presidential debates and town halls in terms of chosen candidates, ratings, sources, and topics?

H1:There were differences between news organizations and independent organizations in fact-checking regarding candidates and ratings.

Method

Data Collection

The study chose content analysis to examine fact-checking practices of news outlets and independent organizations during the presidential debates and town halls of the 2020 U.S. election. These events were selected for two reasons. First, they create an ideal opportunity to fact-check statements presented by two candidates; second, Americans find debates helpful in learning about the two candidates, thus contributing to their decisions on election days (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018; Heimlich, 2012; Holbrook, 1999). The first and final debates occurred on September 29, 2020, and October 22, 2020, respectively, while two town halls happened concurrently on October 15, 2020.

The study aims to explore fact checks of three leading national newspapers, namely The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today, and three dedicated and popular independent organizations, namely PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, and Snopes.com. The three leading national newspapers were chosen because of their popularity and daily circulation in the United States, along with The Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times (Turvill, 2021; University of Minnesota, 2016). Compared with their colleagues, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today provided systematic fact-checking coverage during the 2020 presidential debates and town halls. Still, these three news organizations are alleged to lean left, and their audiences are more consistently liberal (AllSides, 2021; Grieco, 2020). Studies have shown, however, that journalists’ political ideologies did not make their way into their coverage (Hassell et al., 2020), and meta-analysis research that examined news coverage across several presidential elections showed that the so-called liberal bias in the media was a myth (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000). It is both a limitation and a puzzle of “liberal myth” to explore in this study.

FactCheck.org launched in 2003, while PolitiFact.com and The Washington Post’s Fact Checker began in 2007, both focusing on political issues. Non-political fact-checkers have also proliferated. For instance, Snopes.com launched in 1995. Two other news organizations, namely The New York Times and USA Today concentrate their fact-checking efforts on the political arena, such as politician’s claims, along with “health, science and other topics in the news, significant national issues or those that could be confusing to people.” The selection of organizations was adapted from multiple previous research investigating fact-checking practices (Dimitrova & Nelson, 2018; Graves, 2016; Luengo & García-Marín, 2020; Shin & Thorson, 2017). Regarding style of fact checks, PolitiFact.com, Snopes.com, Washington Post, and USA Today have explicit truth scales, while FactCheck.org and The New York Times do not mention their rating scales. The unit of analysis is a fact-check of claims made by each candidate, which were collected from six organizations’ websites. The search resulted in a sample size of 440 fact checks (N = 440).

Coding Scheme

Many recommended criteria for fact-checking include (a) getting the story right the first time, (b) early corrections are better, (c) beware making the problem worse, (d) avoiding negations, (e) minimizing repetition of false claims, (f) reduce partisan and ideological cues, (g) use credible sources, (h) don’t give credence to the fringe, (i) use graphics where appropriate, and (j) beware of selective exposure (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012). Graves (2016) suggested looking at five areas of fact-checking execution, namely choosing claims to check, contacting the speaker, tracing false claims, dealing with experts, and showing the work. To understand and compare fact-checking coverage between news organizations and independent bureaus, the areas of examination are based on practices (d), (f), (g), and (i) proposed by Nyhan and Reifler (2012) and choosing claims and dealing with experts, as proposed by Graves (2016). They are answers to these questions: which candidate was fact-checked, what the evaluation of fact-checking or rating was, what supporting information and/or visuals were used, as well as what sources were cited.

These variables’ coding schemes are adapted from Dimitrova and Nelson (2018) as follows.

Candidate

Trump or Biden.

Rating

Correct (article states candidate statement is accurate);

Incorrect (article states candidate statement is inaccurate);

Partially correct (the article states candidate statement is somewhat, but not completely, accurate, e.g., candidate exaggerated facts or cherry-picked content);

Inconclusive (no explicit rating of claim is provided; statement cannot be determined as either accurate or inaccurate).

Supporting Information/Visuals

URL links, photos, videos, infographics, or tweets.

Sources

Since the literature suggests that fact-checkers should use credible and neutral sources and avoid partisan cues, source categories are modified as:

Experts: such as academics and/or scientists;

Authority: such as government agencies;

Non-partisan sources: such as NGOs;

Media: such as media organizations, fact-checking websites;

Others: individuals, politicians.

Fact checks’ topics were manually noted and their frequencies were analyzed by R to explore the top 10 topics that were chosen to be fact-checked by news and independent organizations.

Two coders coded 20% of the corpus (i.e., 87 fact checks). The intercoder reliability was 1.0 for the candidate, .837 for the rating, .84 for the source, and .943 for supporting information, as calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha for nominal data via ReCal (Freelon, 2013).

RQ1. How Did Three News Organizations Fact-Check the 2020 Presidential Debates and Town Halls in Terms of Chosen Candidates, Ratings, Sources, and Topics?

Three news organizations had a total of 227 fact checks in the 2020 presidential debates and town halls. One hundred eighty fact checks (or 79.30%) were about then-President Trump’s statements, while former Vice President Biden was fact-checked 47 times (or 20.70%). Ninety-six fact checks on Trump’s statements (or 53.33%) were rated as incorrect, followed by 58 partially correct (e.g., misleading or exaggerating), 19 inconclusive, and seven correct claims (or 32.22%, 10.60%, and 4%, respectively). Meanwhile, Biden’s statements were fact-checked as partially correct 18 times (or 38.30%), correct 14 times (or 29.80%), incorrect 11 times (or 23.4%), and inconclusive four times (or 8.51%). Table 1 illustrates fact-check ratings for each candidate from both news outlets and independent organizations.

Table 1

Fact Checks’ Ratings on Two Candidates of Two Types of Organizations

Organization	Candidate	Count	Rating				Total
Organization	Candidate	Count	Correct	Incorrect	Partially correct	Inconclusive	Total

Newspapers	Trump	Count	7.000	96.000	58.000	19.000	180.000
		% within row	3.889 %	53.333 %	32.222 %	10.556 %	100.000 %
		% within column	33.333 %	89.720 %	76.316 %	82.609 %	79.295 %
		% of total	3.084 %	42.291 %	25.551 %	8.370 %	79.295 %
	Biden	Count	14.000	11.000	18.000	4.000	47.000
		% within row	29.787 %	23.404 %	38.298 %	8.511 %	100.000 %
		% within column	66.667 %	10.280 %	23.684 %	17.391 %	20.705 %
		% of total	6.167 %	4.846 %	7.930 %	1.762 %	20.705 %
	Total	Count	21.000	107.000	76.000	23.000	227.000
		% within row	9.251 %	47.137 %	33.480 %	10.132 %	100.000 %
		% within column	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %
		% of total	9.251 %	47.137 %	33.480 %	10.132 %	100.000 %
Independent organizations	Trump	Count	1.000	68.000	51.000	19.000	139.000
		% within row	0.719 %	48.921 %	36.691 %	13.669 %	100.000 %
		% within column	6.667 %	77.273 %	64.557 %	61.290 %	65.258 %
		% of total	0.469 %	31.925 %	23.944 %	8.920 %	65.258 %
	Biden	Count	14.000	20.000	28.000	12.000	74.000
		% within row	18.919 %	27.027 %	37.838 %	16.216 %	100.000 %
		% within column	93.333 %	22.727 %	35.443 %	38.710 %	34.742 %
		% of total	6.573 %	9.390 %	13.146 %	5.634 %	34.742 %
	Total	Count	15.000	88.000	79.000	31.000	213.000
		% within row	7.042 %	41.315 %	37.089 %	14.554 %	100.000 %
		% within column	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %
		% of total	7.042 %	41.315 %	37.089 %	14.554 %	100.000 %
Total	Trump	Count	8.000	164.000	109.000	38.000	319.000
		% within row	2.508 %	51.411 %	34.169 %	11.912 %	100.000 %
		% within column	22.222 %	84.103 %	70.323 %	70.370 %	72.500 %
		% of total	1.818 %	37.273 %	24.773 %	8.636 %	72.500 %
	Biden	Count	28.000	31.000	46.000	16.000	121.000
		% within row	23.140 %	25.620 %	38.017 %	13.223 %	100.000 %
		% within column	77.778 %	15.897 %	29.677 %	29.630 %	27.500 %
		% of total	6.364 %	7.045 %	10.455 %	3.636 %	27.500 %
	Total	Count	36.000	195.000	155.000	54.000	440.000
		% within row	8.182 %	44.318 %	35.227 %	12.273 %	100.000 %
		% within column	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %	100.000 %
		% of total	8.182 %	44.318 %	35.227 %	12.273 %	100.000 %

Comparing the two candidates, Biden’s claims were fact-checked as correct more than Trump’s, 14 times (or 66.67%) and seven times (or 33.33%), respectively. Vice versa, 96 fact checks (or 89.72%) on Trump’s statements were labeled as incorrect, compared with 11 publications on Biden’s quotes (or 10.28%). Trump’s claims were also adjudicated as partially correct and inconclusive more than his opponent’s, 58 and 18 times (or 76.32% and 23.68%) and 19 and four times (or 82.61% and 17.40%).

There was no statistically significant difference among the three news organizations in choosing which candidate to fact-check, χ² (2) = 0.154, p = .926. Nevertheless, their rating employment was significantly different, χ² (6) = 23.348, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.227. The New York Times was likely to balance its rating as incorrect and partially correct with 47 fact checks (or 41.60%) and 41 fact checks (or 36.30%), respectively. It also had the highest number of partially correct works (61.84%) compared with the two other organizations. Meanwhile, publications from The Washington Post were dominantly rated as incorrect, 57 works (or 62%), while partially correct and inconclusive adjudications were employed equivalently, 20 and 12 times (or 21.74% and 13.04%). The USA Today fact-checked the least and equally used incorrect and partially correct ratings, nine fact checks each (or 41%). No inconclusive rating was used by USA Today.

Regarding sources, three news organizations had no statistically significant difference in using them, χ² (10) = 11.874, p = .294. The media, that is, news agencies and fact-check organizations, was the most frequently used source of the three newspapers, acquiring 36.60% of the total, followed by the authority at 24.23% and other sources, including individuals, politicians, and campaigns, comprising 17.62%. Notably, there were 14 fact checks from The New York Times and seven from The Washington Post that did not cite any sources.

Regarding topics, the top 10 issues fact-checked by three news organizations were COVID-19, election fraud, health care, climate change, Hunter Biden, economy, Trump’s tax, black community, candidate background, and COVID-19 prevention, while three independent bureaus focused on fact-checking statements about COVID-19, health care, economy, Hunter Biden, climate change, COVID-19 prevention, election fraud, Fauci, black community, and candidate background. Table 2 shows the top 10 fact-checking topics by two types of organizations for the two candidates.

Table 2

Top Fact Checks’ Topics From Newspapers and Independent Organizations for Each Candidate

Topic	Newspapers		Independent orgs		Total
Topic	Trump	Biden	Trump	Biden	Total
COVID-19	17	8	14	13	51
Health care	12	1	5	6	24
Election fraud	13	1	5	1	20
Hunter Biden	7	0	6	2	15
Economy	4	2	7	2	15
Climate change	6	1	4	3	14
COVID-19 prevention	4	1	2	5	12
Trump’s tax	5	1	3	1	10
Candidate background	5	0	3	2	10
Black community	5	0	4	1	10
Jobs	4	1	3	2	10

RQ2. How Did Three Independent Organizations Fact-Check the 2020 Presidential Debates and Town Halls in Terms of Chosen Candidates, Ratings, Sources, and Topics?

Three independent organizations fact-checked 213 statements in the 2020 presidential debates and town halls. One hundred thirty-nine fact checks (or 65.26%) were about Trump’s claims, while Biden was fact-checked 74 times (or 34.74%). Trump’s statements were predominantly rated as incorrect 68 times (or 49%) and partially correct 51 times (or 36.70%), while the adjudication of inconclusive and correct was 19 (or 13.70%) and one (0.71%), respectively. Meanwhile, 28 claims of Biden (or 37.84%) were labeled as partially correct, followed by 20 incorrect (or 27.03%), 14 correct (19%), and 12 inconclusive statements (or 16.22%), as shown in Table 1.

Between the two candidates, Biden’s claims were dominantly fact-checked as correct more than Trump’s, 14 times (or 93.33%) and once (or 6.67%), respectively. In contrast, 68 fact checks (or 77.27%) on Trump’s quotes were adjudicated as incorrect, compared with Biden’s 20 inaccurate claims (or 22.73%). Trump’s claims were also rated as partially correct and inconclusive more than his rival’s, 51 times compared with 28 times (or 64.56% and 35.44%) and 19 times compared with 12 times (or 61.30% and 38.71%).

There were statistically significant differences across three independent organizations regarding their chosen candidates, ratings, and sources. The association between organizations and examined candidates was however low, χ² (2) = 7.775, p = .02, Cramer’s V = 0.191. The PolitiFact and FactCheck.org were more likely to fact-check Trump’s statements than Biden’s, 54 times compared with 25 times (or 68.35% and 31.65%) and 67 times compared with 28 times (or 70.53% and 29.47%); while Snopes.com had balanced publications on two candidates. In fact, Biden was fact-checked more (21 times, or 53.85%) than Trump (18 times or 46.15%).

Cross-tabulation of organizations and their rating tendency suggested differences across these outlets, χ² (6) = 45.020, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.325. PolitiFact tended to rate claims as partially correct (39 fact checks, or 39.37% across three organizations), while FactCheck.org was more likely to adjudicate statements as incorrect (49 fact checks, or 55.82% across three organizations). Snopes.com considerably balanced its ratings as correct, incorrect, partially correct, and inconclusive with 11, 10, 11, and seven publications, correspondingly. Overall, incorrect and partially correct ratings were frequently used, while accurate evaluation was employed the least. There was notably no correct rating from FactCheck.org, which could be explained by its fact-checking mission, focusing on “claims that are false or misleading.”

There existed a moderate association between the three organizations and the sources employed in their fact checks, χ² (10) = 32.592, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.277. Similar to news organizations, the three independent organizations primarily employed the media as their main source, being cited in 52.58% of 213 fact checks. While it was a predominant source in PolitiFact’s (55.70%) and Snopes.com’s fact checks (82.05%), the media and the authoritative sources shared an equal prominence in FactCheck.org’s works, with 36 (or 37.90%) and 31 fact checks (32.63%), respectively (Table 3).

Table 3

Sources Employed in Three Independent Organizations’ Fact Checks

Organization	Count	Source						Total
Organization	Count	Expert	Authority	Non-partisan	Media	Others	None	Total
PolitiFact	Count	4.000	18.000	4.000	44.000	9.000	0.000	79.000
PolitiFact	% within row	5.063 %	22.785 %	5.063 %	55.696 %	11.392 %	0.000 %	100.000 %
FactCheck.org	Count	9.000	31.000	12.000	36.000	7.000	0.000	95.000
FactCheck.org	% within row	9.474 %	32.632 %	12.632 %	37.895 %	7.368 %	0.000 %	100.000 %
Snopes.com	Count	0.000	3.000	2.000	32.000	1.000	1.000	39.000
Snopes.com	% within row	0.000 %	7.692 %	5.128 %	82.051 %	2.564 %	2.564 %	100.000 %
Total	Count	13.000	52.000	18.000	112.000	17.000	1.000	213.000
Total	% within row	6.103 %	24.413 %	8.451 %	52.582 %	7.981 %	0.469 %	100.000 %

H1. There Were Differences Between News Organizations and Independent Organizations in Fact-Checking Regarding Candidates and Ratings

A chi-square test was performed to examine the difference between organizations, that is, newspapers and independent fact-checking agencies, and their fact-checked candidate. There was a statistically significant albeit low association between them, χ² (1) = 10.860, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.157. The log odds ratio further posited that group Trump was greater than Biden. The log odds ratio value of 0.712 was calculated to the probability, suggesting that newspapers had two times more chance of fact-checking Trump than independent outlets. Thus, the first hypothesis was supported.

In a total of 440 fact checks, 180 (or 40.90%) were fact checks of Trump’s statements by three newspapers, while independent organizations fact-checked the candidate’s claims 139 times (or 31.60%). The three newspapers’ fact checks were more likely to focus on Trump (79.30%) than Biden (20.70%). The proportion of fact-checked statements from Trump was higher in newspapers than in independent organizations, whose works focused on Trump’s statements 139 times (or 65.26%) compared with 74 Biden’s quotes (or 34.74%).

A Chi-square test of independence was performed to determine the relation among organizations, fact-checked candidates, and ratings. The relation among these variables was statistically strongly significant, χ² (3) = 59.302, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.367. The rating of each candidate was different across organizations, that is, newspapers and independent outlets.

The three newspapers’ fact checks on Trump’s statements as incorrect had the largest proportion within 440 works across organizations, acquiring 42.30%. The three independent fact-checking organizations adjudicated Trump’s claims as incorrect 31.92% of the time, the second-highest ratio. Compared with his opponent, Biden was fact-checked as incorrect merely 11 times (or 4.85%) by newspapers and 20 times (or 9.40%) by independent organizations, much lower than fact checks on Trump’s claims. H1 was thus supported. Figure 1 shows two examples of fact checks from Snopes.com and The New York Times.

Figure 1

Examples of Fact Checks From Snopes.com and The New York Times

Discussion

The current study examined fact-checking practices of news outlets and independent organizations and found that there were differences in their work, which contributed to fact-checking scholarships, especially the gatekeeping theory aspect, and suggested some practical implications.

First, the dominance of truthless rhetoric of the two candidates was partly due to the guidelines of the six examined organizations, which highlighted the mechanics of the gatekeeping theory regarding routine and organizational levels. On their websites, newspapers and fact-checking outlets emphasized the concentration on verifying inaccurate and controversial claims, leaving the precise ones aside. Thus, they concentrated on debunking false information. These codes of conduct also clearly stated the tendency to fact-check people in power or a ruling party. It explained why then-President Donald J. Trump was fact-checked more than his counterpart, not merely because he might, in fact, have made more untruthful claims. Moreover, Trump’s claims were rated as equally inaccurate between news organizations and independent fact-checking organizations lends credence to the literature suggesting the so-called liberal media bias is merely a myth (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Hassell et al., 2020).

Focusing on debunking false information can reduce the chance of politicians making repeated false claims after they were fact-checked (Amazeen, 2013; Graves, 2016). Even Trump’s probability of repeating a statement decreased by 9.2 percentage points if it was fact-checked as inaccurate before (Lim, 2018). Nevertheless, Porter and Wood’s (2019) findings suggested that fact checks had little impact on Trump himself, as president, and he continued to spread misinformation. Not only Trump, but politicians also embedded in a widespread disregard for the truth kept making debunked false claims (Carr, 2012; Graves, 2016).

Second, the findings demonstrated an inconsistency in fact-checking practices among independent organizations themselves and across two types of outlets, in part stemming from organizations’ standards and policies. Within similar events (i.e., 2020 presidential debates and town halls), newspapers tended to fact-check Trump more than Biden compared with fact-checking bureaus and rated the then-President negatively. Nevertheless, the three news outlets were not significantly different regarding used sources and ratings. On one hand, the results were consistent with previous studies suggesting that fact checks labeling claims of Trump and Republican political actors false were higher than Democratic politicians. On the other hand, it posed a question that was asked before to what extent fact-checkers agreed on who lied more, as well as the concern about how these organizations complied with their promises of non-partisan and balanced works (Davis, 2013; Ostermeier, 2011).

Not only the candidate but rating scales for veracity levels were also considerably distinct across outlets. During the coding and analyzing process, coders also recognized the inconsistency in labeling the same statements among organizations. For instance, when fact-checked on Trump’s claim that he had done for “the African American community” more than any president since Abraham Lincoln, PolitiFact rated it as inconclusive, citing historians who disputed this, and as partially correct when suggesting the claim needed context. Meanwhile, The Washington Post labeled it as wrong when historians dismissed Trump’s statement as a fantasy.

This lack of consistency might be problematic, especially in currently politicalized and polarized political spheres like in the United States. Rich et al. (2020) argued that the higher rate of fact checks on Republicans than on Democratic counterparts could lead to backfires toward fact-checking and exacerbate partisan beliefs about attacking conservatives. In short, the excessive difference in the number of fact checks comparing two political sides might negatively influence the effectiveness of fact-checking movements.

There were also 54 fact checks labeled as inconclusive, higher than the number of correct statements. It could be a limitation of fact-checking which might not determine the truthfulness of information. Cloud (2018) posited that fact-checking outlets limited their attention to definition and conjecture, overlooking a bigger and more prominent picture of value and direction of action. In other words, the central problem of fact-checking was the lack of guarantee about substance; thus, despite continual fact-checking on Trump, it did not work in the case of Trump, or any cases of political figures having immunity from responsibility and reasoning (Cloud, 2018).

The current study and previous literature did not intend to disregard the critical role of fact-checking. However, they suggested different approaches for achieving their missions and goals, particularly to deal with outliers, who did not follow the rules of fact-checking, and when institutional trust levels in media and the government were at an all-time low (Edelman, 2018). The current practices of overtly and overwhelmingly fact-checking one political side, although its politicians spread false information, were considerably deemed as inappropriate way and backfired, leading to reduced trust in the fact-checking entities rather than the fact-checked politicians.

Implications

Given the fact that fact-checking still limits the spread of dis- and misinformation, fact-checkers are encouraged to keep doing their work. “While the appeal of the lying demagogue is real, through continued correction that appeal can be blunted,” Porter and Wood (2019) recommended. Fact-checkers indeed took the right direction to fulfill their democratic ideal mission as political watchdogs (Lim, 2018). Writing fact checks did not reasonably aim to influence the behaviors of politicians and readers but to inform voters. Therefore, what they did with the fact checks was truly their decision (Kessler, 2020). Full Fact Director Will Moy said the organization had put efforts to “play the ball and not the man,” the approach to isolate audiences from political tugs of war. Meanwhile, PolitiFact Editor-in-chief Angie Drobnic Holan employed fact-checking strategies “with an emphasis on newsworthy claims and a research method based on primary evidence” (Mantzarlis, 2016).

Trying to balance the fact checks is a dilemma. More false statements appeared from the right than from the left; thus, fact-checking organizations, similar to many social media platforms, had to fact-check those statements. Nevertheless, it, in turn, triggered a backlash from audiences blaming the fact-checkers for partisanship. It eventually drove people who did not believe in fact-checking to other sources offering inaccurate information (Hasen, 2022). The evenhandedness in fact-checking was indeed ideal and necessary to follow, albeit impractical, as the illusion of the media’s objectivity. Another solution was finding ways to make fact checks an engaging read and reach diverse audiences, not separate public (Rogers & Niederer, 2020).

In addition, the defense of fact-checkers was considered vital in explaining why and how they did their jobs, as Pingree et al. (2018) posited when talking about journalists’ defense of media bias. Studies found that media literacy could reduce perceived media bias (Vraga & Tully, 2015, 2016). These interventions, for example, defending journalism, might focus on articulating professional norms and practices that ensure journalism impartiality (Ashley et al., 2013) and regain the gatekeeper role. Currently, the six fact-checking organizations mention their guidelines and processes on their websites. These defenses should be included in their works, where audiences could directly absorb information to explain their choice of actors, topics, and sources.

One question posed for fact-checking outlets is shall they include the personality of political actors in deciding factors, particularly those who do not follow the rules or keep repeating their false claims. If so, the practice needs to be careful to avoid bias and backfire responses from the audience. Moreover, labeling a politician as a liar, for example, Pinocchio, can be problematic in terms of journalistic subjectivity violation when judging and the reality that fact-checkers do not know absolutely if that person intends to make false statements. They rather fact-check and rate the information based on facts and reliable data they collect, not an individual’s personality. If they intend to do so, an alternative approach is frame-checking proposed by Cloud (2018), which aims to critique political discourse that is possibly partially false. Discovering the discursive frame in a certain instance can explain the context and purpose why a politician omits or exaggerates pieces of information, which makes their claims hard to fact-check (Cloud, 2018).

One more way to guarantee their non-partisan and unintentional imbalance among political sides is to have associations to certify the quality and compliance of members (Hasen, 2022). As previously mentioned, except The New York Times, the other five are the Verified signatories of the International Fact-Checking Network code of principles. If they do not abide by the code, audiences can report to the IFCN. However, the penalty is not clearly stated, and it is not always easy to report the imbalance or partisan of an organization which may require well-studied and statistical reports.

Limitations

The study has several limitations to address, which may suggest directions for future research. First, the study chose solely three leading national news organizations in the United States, all three of which have been rated as “lean-left” outlets by companies like AllSides (2021).

The choice of three news organizations is deemed the most noteworthy limitation of this thesis, although it followed procedures employed in previous literature and was guided by the outlets’ popularity and leadership, as well as their systematic and live fact-checking of 2020 presidential debates and town halls. Given the fact that there were no newspapers considered neutral or lean-right that fact-checked these events, the choice was reasonable. Examining them further suggested the likelihood of depending on their editorial boards and the inconsistent practices between newspapers and independent organizations. Future studies may expand the sample to diverse topics that would be covered by multiple news outlets stretching across the political spectrum.

Second, although informed by the gatekeeping theory, the current study merely examined the content but not the decision-making process and its influences on fact-checkers or journalists. Based on the current findings which suggested there were differences in fact-checking practices, probably due to different routines and organizations’ standards, future studies can interview or survey practitioners about the influential factors to their choice of candidates and sources, and how they decide the ratings.

The third limitation was related to the scope of the analysis. The current study merely looked at 2020 presidential debates and town halls involving two main characters of two parties. The conclusion of partisan cues in fact-checking labels might be too early to call. Furthermore, comparing Trump and Biden may be an expectably statistically significant difference, given that Biden is viewed as more disciplined than his opponent. At the same time, Trump seems to talk more, producing more materials to fact-check. Future research could investigate broader events with the participation of various politicians, which may start with comparing intra-party-political figures.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The author wants to thank Dr. Raluca Cozma and Dr. Sam Mwangi at the A.Q. Miller School of Media and Communication, Kansas State University, and Dr. Timothy Shaffer at the Joseph R. Biden, Jr. School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Delaware, for their feedback and support in the very first version of my paper. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback that strengthened this research.

ORCID iD

Pham Phuong Uyen Diep

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