The Effect of Egocentric Taste Judgments on Stereotyping of Welfare Recipients and Attitudes Toward Welfare Policy

Abstract

Despite the centrality of purchasing behavior and choice to the welfare debate, research has generally understood attitudes toward welfare at a broader level and as a function of rational or deliberative processes (e.g., self-interest, ideology). This project identifies the effect of egocentrism on welfare attitudes, finding that a welfare recipient’s purchase of an item that the participant personally values less (vs. more) leads to increased stereotyping of welfare recipients (e.g., irresponsibility, impulsivity) and favorable attitudes toward policy that would restrict that purchase. This effect is illustrated for both chronic and situational preferences and across a number of products commonly debated in welfare policy. The authors find that egocentrism is robust to debiasing; therefore, tests of boundary conditions involved countering the stereotype of irresponsibility rather than the bias itself. For example, the effects do not emerge in the context of healthy foods and necessities, nor when information suggests that the target consumer is otherwise responsible (e.g., budgeting, clipping coupons). Implications for policy and welfare advocacy are discussed. In general, these findings establish how personal preferences may shape attitudes toward marginalized consumers and related policy.

Keywords

bias egocentrism social judgment stereotyping welfare

Welfare policy is inherently consumption-related, as it dictates which purchases are acceptable and which ones are not. Snack foods, soda, energy drinks, fast food, concert tickets, and lottery tickets are just a few examples of recently debated purchases. At the same time, consumers simply prefer and choose different products from one another. For instance, a consumer may see a social assistance recipient buy a candy bar when the observing consumer instead prefers salty snacks over sweet snacks. Here, the social assistance recipient simply makes a purchase that varies from the observer’s choice only by taste rather than by more “objective” criteria, such as cost or healthiness. Given that one’s social assistance status is often known to observers (Rogers-Dillion 1995), how will the social assistance recipient be judged, and how do those judgments relate to welfare policy attitudes?

We propose that egocentrism—a relatively automatic and unconscious bias (Epley and Caruso 2004) largely unexplored in policy research—uniquely predicts welfare attitudes beyond other predictors. We find across several controlled experiments that consumers egocentrically make inferences about welfare recipients (i.e., stereotype them) and support or reject welfare policy on the basis of their personal tastes and sense of value, failing to take into account individual differences in subjective tastes, needs, and constraints. Our studies show an unfortunate confluence between (1) a tendency to judge the value of others’ purchases through an egocentric lens and (2) the consumption-related stereotype of welfare recipients as irresponsible, which can have pernicious effects on welfare attitudes.

To briefly illustrate, consider an analysis of online comments regarding a petition to have pet food covered by the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as food stamps). Our analysis (presented in Web Appendix A) found that a strong predictor of support for this policy was simply whether one’s profile photos showed evidence of having a pet. This naturalistic test offers an initial picture of how one’s subjective value of a purchase affects judgments of whether the purchase should be covered by social assistance.

Although being observed using welfare programs contributes to welfare stigma (Rogers-Dillion 1995) and negatively affects well-being and enrollment rates (Currie 2006; Manchester and Mumford 2009), little is known about the processes by which these damaging judgments and stigmatization emerge. Existing research has mostly examined broad predictors of general welfare attitudes as opposed to variation in attitudes toward specific policies regulating specific purchases (however, for a recent exception, see Olson et al. [2016]). Previous work has understood general welfare attitudes to be a function of income, economic self-interest (AuClaire 1984; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Gilens 1995), and principled beliefs, including political orientation, racial attitudes, ideologies regarding individualism, personal responsibility, and work ethic (Appelbaum 2001; Cook and Barrett 1992; Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001; DeSante 2013; Gilens 1995 , 1996; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Fox 2004; MacLeod, Montero, and Speer 1999; Sniderman et al. 1996).

Our research seeks to fill a notable gap in this literature by (1) examining welfare attitudes at the level of specific policies regarding specific purchases and (2) studying welfare policy attitudes as a function of relatively automatic processes, with unique predictive value beyond reasoned or deliberate processes or ideologies. This approach sheds light on challenges for implementing policy and reducing stigma. The current research also addresses the call for research on the experiences of low-income consumers in the marketplace (Mick 2006), and for policy research that goes beyond presuming a rational consumer who will change upon receiving new information (Stewart 2015). Although past work has called for decreased judgment and increased efforts to understand the perspectives of welfare recipients (Corus et al. 2016; Hill and Macan 1996; Sawady and Tescher 2008), our work highlights an important barrier to this goal, as egocentrism is difficult to counter, and we find evidence of this bias across the socioeconomic and political spectrum.

Conceptual Development

Judging and Stereotyping Social Assistance Recipients

A 2016 video of a woman berating a SNAP user at Walmart captured a common experience for welfare recipients (Mazza 2016). Millions of Americans receive discretionary means-tested assistance from the government (“welfare”), such as SNAP and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Many recipients receive criticism for their purchases (Berrigan 2014; Luna 2009; Mazza 2016; Meehan 2014; Rogers-Dillion 1995; Seccombe, James, and Walters 1998) and report decreased self-esteem (Elliott 1996; Kunz and Kalil 1999).

Most past work on welfare stereotypes has considered the stereotype of laziness (Fox 2004; Gilens 1995 , 1996). Such stereotypes can be used to explain and justify outcomes (Jost and Kay 2005; Kay, Jost, and Young 2005; McCoy and Major 2007), such as when welfare recipients are seen as blameworthy and deserving of poverty (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007; Henly and Danziger 1996; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004; Seccombe, James, and Walters 1998), thus decreasing support for welfare programs (Appelbaum 2001; Gilens 1995, 1996; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004).

Our research explores the less studied stereotype of welfare recipients as irresponsible; that is, impulsive, lacking self-control, and generally failing to maximize value in their purchases. This stereotype deserves attention from marketing researchers because it is inherently consumer- and consumption-related. It is also readily reinforced in popular and political discourse. National news stories about specific “wasteful” and “irresponsible” purchases made by specific welfare recipients are frequently referenced in an attempt to restrict funding (Briquelet 2013; CBC News 2005; Congressional Record 2013; Ferdman 2015; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004; Keltz 2011). This reinforcement occurs despite evidence suggesting that welfare fraud is relatively uncommon (Evans and Popova 2014; Milligan, Jones, and Stabile 2015; Moore 2009). Because of stereotyping and stigma, many eligible consumers do not participate in welfare programs (Currie 2006; Manchester and Mumford 2009). In short, judgments of individual purchases can reinforce welfare stereotypes, negatively affect the psychological well-being of recipients, and potentially shape attitudes toward welfare policy.

Egocentrism

Welfare is a particularly relevant context for studying egocentrism in an applied policy context. This is because determining policy for beneficiaries largely requires nonbeneficiaries to engage in perspective taking, which people often struggle with. A wealth of research finds that people egocentrically use the self as an anchor for predicting others’ behavior and project their own feelings onto others (Campbell et al. 2014; Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986; Nickerson 2001; Van Boven et al. 2013). For example, people overestimate how much others share their preferences and attitudes (Epley et al. 2009; Irmak, Vallen, and Sen 2010). Problematically, people do not fully adjust from their personal anchor and fail to take into account situational and idiosyncratic differences between themselves and others (Campbell et al. 2014; Epley et al. 2004; Van Boven et al. 2013), leading to inaccurate predictions. Moreover, egocentrism is largely resilient to debiasing efforts (Eyal, Steffel, and Epley (2018).

Past egocentrism work has traditionally focused on understanding people’s predictions of others’ choices or attitudes (Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986; Irmak, Vallen, and Sen 2010; Nickerson 2001; Van Boven et al. 2013) and has generally been silent on the question central to the current research: how will people respond to the observed choices of others? The related theory of naive realism posits that because people see themselves as rational and objective, they assume that others who think differently must be irrational or ignorant (Griffin and Ross 1991; Pronin, Puccio, and Ross 2002), thus making dispositional attributions when others deviate from one’s own views (Dunning and Cohen 1992; Dunning and Hayes 1996). While this assumption is seemingly reasonable (although often inaccurate) when objective facts and data are relevant and available, it makes little sense to use the self as a basis of judgment when idiosyncratic factors such as personal taste are most relevant. The Latin maxim meaning “in matters of taste, there can be no disputes” speaks to this (Stigler and Becker 1977). Likewise, people can easily defend preferences by appealing to personal taste (Kramer, Maimaran, and Simonson 2012), and people easily see others’ differing purchases as simply reflecting a difference in taste preferences (Spiller and Belogolova 2016).

However, we posit that a pernicious confluence of egocentrism and stereotypes affects judgments about welfare recipients, whereby initial egocentric judgments of a purchase’s value serve as seemingly relevant, diagnostic information for making broader judgments. Because people are already disposed to stereotype welfare recipients as irresponsible spenders, egocentrically judging a purchase as less valuable (because the self does not value it) serves as information that is consistent with this accessible stereotype. This process is analogous to that identified in past work showing that a combination of situational information and a particular stereotype can shape interpretations of a target (Devine 1989). Consequentially, if one sees a purchase and the purchaser as irresponsible, it follows that the purchase will be deemed an illegitimate use of welfare funds. In contrast, when purchases by non–welfare recipients are observed, the observer’s egocentric view of a purchase as suboptimal may not inform any broader inferences about the consumer; the observation does not conveniently fit an existing stereotype, and thus egocentric judgments may have few downstream effects.

Although purchases can be identity-signaling and inform inferences about the purchaser (Burroughs, Drews, and Hallman 1991; Gosling et al. 2002; Haire 1950), the current investigation considers judgments (i.e., stereotyping) in the absence of the specific signaling value of a purchase. Preferring potato chips over soda (or vice versa) does not signal anything meaningful about a person’s character, nor is one choice objectively more optimal than the other. Nonetheless, we find that people will make inferences about a welfare recipient target simply because the target values a purchase that the observer does not. This finding contrasts past work showing that people tend to use personal preferences and valuations when considering similar as opposed to dissimilar others (i.e., in-group vs. out-group: Clement and Krueger 2002; O’Brien and Ellsworth 2012).

Hypotheses

The current research tests how participants judge welfare recipients who make a purchase that is either consistent or inconsistent with the participant’s own preferences. The participant’s preferences may either be chronic (e.g., a preference for chips vs. candy) or situational (e.g., a situational health goal). These designs allow us to test the effects of egocentrism, in which people think others will get less (more) value out of buying what they themselves do not prefer (do prefer), thus failing to appreciate that others have different preferences and constraints.

We predicted that if a participant egocentrically believes that a welfare recipient will get less value from a particular purchase, this perceived suboptimal use of money will be seemingly relevant when the participant is making stereotype-relevant judgments (e.g., irresponsibility) and forming an attitude toward policy that would restrict the item. In addition, beliefs about welfare recipients predict policy attitudes (e.g., Appelbaum 2001; Fox 2004). Thus, we predicted:

H₁ : Participants will more negatively stereotype welfare recipients as irresponsible (e.g., impulsive, lacking self-control, irresponsible with money) when the welfare recipient target makes a purchase that the participant does not value (vs. does value).

H_2a : Participants will show increased support for a policy that restricts welfare funds being used for a purchase that the participant does not value (vs. does value).

H_2b : Stereotype endorsement will predict more support for restrictive welfare policy, mediating the effect of the target purchase (participant’s most vs. least preferred) on policy attitudes.

Across several studies, we explore the specificity of these effects and their boundary conditions. First, we test whether the effect is unique to stereotype-relevant traits, such that egocentric judgments of value are not informative when stereotype-irrelevant traits, such as being violent or rude, are considered (Study 1a). Moreover, if our predicted effects are unique to welfare recipients because of consumption-related stereotypes of welfare recipients as irresponsible, then we should not observe a stereotyping effect when the target is from a group for whom this stereotype is less salient, such as the middle class (Study 2). In addition, we should not find an effect of egocentrism on stereotyping when a purchase does not signal irresponsibility. For example, if a welfare recipient purchases a necessity such as deodorant or shampoo, observing this purchase through an egocentric lens should not lead to stereotyping (Study 3). Finally, because egocentrism is resistant to debiasing interventions such as perspective taking (Eyal, Steffel, and Epley 2018), Study 4 is aimed to attenuate the hypothesized egocentrism effect by instead targeting the stereotype of irresponsibility. We posited that presenting counterstereotypical information about the target (e.g., the target makes a weekly budget, clips coupons) will limit the ability of egocentric judgments of value to inform broader judgments of the target.

Across the studies, we vary the products and purchases that are subject to judgment, capturing a wide range of items that legislators across the United States have considered banning as welfare purchases, as well as items currently banned from purchase with specific funds.

Study 1a: Egocentric Judgments and Stereotyping

Study 1a tested the hypothesis that consumers will increasingly endorse the stereotype of welfare recipients as irresponsible and impulsive when the target welfare recipient buys the participant’s least (vs. most) preferred purchase. In a third, “baseline” condition, no purchase was mentioned, thus allowing us to isolate the unique role of purchases in this process and test whether egocentric judgments either increase or decrease stereotyping of welfare recipients. Finding no difference between the baseline condition (no purchase) and the purchase of one’s most preferred item would help rule out mere liking or similarity as an alternative explanation for our effects. Participants also rated the target on stereotype-irrelevant traits (e.g., violent) to further differentiate our proposed effect from general liking or disliking. Our predicted pattern of effects should not emerge for these traits because they cannot be as easily inferred from egocentric judgments of the value of the target’s purchase.

Method

Materials, details of the pretest, and supplementary analyses are available in Web Appendix B.

Pretest

A pretest found that welfare recipients were rated as significantly more irresponsible, compared with five groups that vary in employment status and income: the middle class, blue-collar workers, businesspeople, nonworking housewives, and retired elderly people. This finding suggests that this stereotype is more relevant to welfare recipients than to other groups.

Participants

Two hundred U.S. participants completed the study online through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Seven participants failed a multiple-choice attention check asking what the target’s profession was (correct answer: “none, was receiving government assistance”), leaving 193 participants (83 men, 110 women; M_age = 35.81 years).

Procedure

Participants were first asked: “Please rank the following things according to how you would prioritize them. That is, with a limited amount of money, what you would keep in your budget and what would you remove?” These five items (including any respective parenthetical content) were shown in random order: salty snacks (e.g., pretzels, potato chips), soda, sugary snacks (e.g., candy, candy bars), frozen processed food, and dessert foods (e.g., cake, ice cream). Participants then rated how much they like each item (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “very much”) and did a filler activity in which they rated their personality on ten personality items.

Next, participants were presented with an image and profile of Tim Garrett, who was said to be unemployed and receiving cash assistance and SNAP funds (i.e., food stamps). Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the “most preferred” condition, participants read, “When Tim goes grocery shopping with his SNAP (food stamp) funds, he will sometimes buy X,” with X being the participant’s most preferred item according to the previous ranking task. In the “least preferred” condition, Tim instead buys the participant’s least preferred item. Participants then completed a manipulation check: “How much value do you think Tim will get from buying X, considering other ways that he could spend his SNAP funds?” (1 = “very little,” and 9 = “a lot”). This procedure allowed us to test whether participants project their own sense of value onto the purchases of others (similar items have been used in past egocentrism research; Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000; Van Boven et al. 2013). Finally, a baseline condition did not include any purchase information.

To measure stereotyping, participants rated how likely it is that Tim is irresponsible with his money, is impulsive, is easily tempted, and lacks self-control (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “extremely”); α = .95. Participants also rated Tim on four stereotype-irrelevant traits: violent, rude, vulgar, and mean; α = .98. Participants then completed the aforementioned attention check and then completed the demographics section, including relevant control variables (income, political orientation [1 = “very liberal,” and 9 = “very conservative”], whether they are or have ever been a welfare recipient, and their overall attitude toward government assistance programs commonly referred to as “welfare” [1 = “very negative,” and 9 = “very positive”]).

Results

Manipulation check

As predicted, when Tim bought the participant’s least preferred item, participants thought Tim would get less value from the purchase (M = 3.17, SD = 2.19), compared with when he bought their most preferred item (M = 4.17, SD = 2.25), t(125) = 3.90, p < .001, thus indicating that participants projected their personal sense of value onto Tim. The baseline condition did not rate this item because they were not presented with purchase information.

Stereotyping

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) supported the prediction (H₁) that participants would stereotype a welfare recipient as more irresponsible when the welfare recipient was buying the participant’s least (vs. most) preferred item, F(2, 190) = 4.75, p = .01. Contrast tests found that Tim was stereotyped more when he purchased the participants’ least preferred item (n = 71, M = 5.05, SD = 1.78), compared with when he purchased the participants’ most preferred item (n = 56, M = 4.08, SD = 1.91), t(190) = 2.84, p = .005, and compared with when no purchase was made (i.e., baseline; n = 66, M = 4.27, SD = 2.05), t(190) = 2.37, p = .02. Effects remained when controlling for income, political orientation, general attitudes toward welfare, and previous experience receiving welfare.

Stereotype-irrelevant negative traits

Because being violent, rude, vulgar, and mean are not salient traits of welfare recipients and cannot be easily inferred from egocentric judgments of value, we predicted no egocentrism effect for these stereotype-irrelevant trait ratings. No egocentrism effect was found; however, the ANOVA was unexpectedly significant, F(2, 190) = 6.184, p < .01. Those in the most and least preferred conditions were no different from one another (most preferred: M = 2.44, SD = 1.61; least preferred: M = 2.04, SD = 1.41), p = .18. The only differences were that in the baseline condition (M = 3.03, SD = 1.94), participants rated Tim significantly higher on these traits than in the other two conditions (all p < .05). These effects are different than those for stereotype-relevant traits and are inconsistent with egocentrism.

In sum, participants thought that a welfare recipient would get less value from purchases that they themselves do not (vs. do) prefer. This egocentrism effect was pernicious, in that it significantly increased stereotype endorsement (e.g., irresponsible, impulsive). Importantly, it did not increase endorsement of negative traits that were irrelevant to the stereotypes. This finding helps rule out mere similarity with the target and disliking of the target as alternative explanations. In addition, buying one’s most preferred item did not decrease stereotyping relative to the baseline condition; this finding is inconsistent with a mere similarity effect.

Study 1b: Replication with Experiential Purchases

Study 1b replicated Study 1a but with often contested experiential purchases (Rooney 2015) as opposed to food purchases, thus illustrating the robustness of the predicted effects.

Method

See Web Appendix C for all materials and supplementary analyses.

Participants

One hundred ninety-seven U.S. participants completed the study online through MTurk. Ten failed an attention check asking what Tim’s occupation was, leaving a sample of 187 (110 men, 77 women; M_age = 33.40 years).

Procedure

Participants ranked five experiential purchases from most to least preferred (zoo, theater, amusement park, museum, and movie). They then read about a welfare recipient (Tim) who finds $50 on the street and, when unable to find the owner of the money, takes his family to either the participant’s most preferred or least preferred activity (thus the money is not welfare funds per se). Participants then indicated a dollar amount ($0–$100) that “accurately reflects the value that one would obtain from making this purchase” and also answered the question “How much value do you think Tim will get from this purchase, considering other ways that one could spend $50?” (1 = “very little,” and 9 = “a lot”). They then rated Tim on four stereotyping items: “Tim is responsible with his money” (reverse coded; 1 = “strongly disagree,” and 5 = “neither agree nor disagree,” and 9 = “strongly agree”), “Tim is impulsive,” “Tim lacks self-control,” and “Tim makes poor purchasing decisions” (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “very”); α = .96. The attention check, demographic variables, and control items were the same as those in Study 1a, except that general welfare attitudes were not measured.

Results

As predicted, participants assigned less value to the purchase (in dollars) when Tim chose the participants’ least preferred (n = 87, M = 44.47, SD = 26.21) as opposed to most preferred purchase (n = 100, M = 56.90, SD = 24.15), t(185) = 3.37, p = .001. Ratings of subjective value were also lower when Tim bought the participants’ least preferred (M = 4.70, SD = 3.37) as opposed to most preferred purchase (M = 5.80, SD = 2.27), t(185) = 3.23, p = .001. Finally, as predicted, participants stereotyped Tim more when he bought their least preferred (M = 5.86, SD = 1.97) as opposed to most preferred purchase (M = 5.17, SD = 2.06), t(185) = 2.31, p = .02. These results held when controlling for control variables, thus conceptually replicating Study 1a.

Study 1c: Situational Preferences

Study 1c tested how the egocentrism effect can also emerge from situational preferences. We also tested whether the effect would emerge for healthy foods in addition to nonhealthy foods.

Method

See Web Appendix D for all materials and supplementary analyses.

Participants

Two hundred eight U.S. participants completed the study through MTurk. Four participants failed to appropriately complete the manipulation (e.g., entered incomplete or nonsense responses) and were removed from analyses, leaving 204 participants (79 men, 125 women; M_age = 38.22 years).

Procedure

Participants were asked to imagine that they were going on a grocery shopping trip. In the “healthy goal” condition, participants were asked to imagine that their overall goal on this trip was to buy healthy food. In the “baseline goal” condition, they were asked to imagine going on a typical grocery shopping trip. They were then asked to list ten items they would buy.

Then, participants were asked to rate how appropriate it is for someone to use SNAP funds to purchase four less healthy items (Coca-Cola, potato chips, instant ramen, and bologna; α = .86) and four healthy items (bananas, milk, boneless chicken breast, and frozen vegetables; α = .69), using a nine-point scale (1 = “not at all appropriate,” and 9 = “very appropriate”). These eight items were chosen because they are among the most common ones bought by SNAP recipients (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2017; Wiig and Smith 2009). Participants were asked to think back to their trip and to rate how expensive they thought the trip was, how healthy they thought their choices were, and the extent to which they thought their own purchases were similar to those of the average SNAP recipient (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “very”). Finally, participants completed the demographics section and the same control variable items from Study 1a (income, political orientation, general attitudes toward welfare, and whether they have received welfare).

Results

Those in the healthy goal condition said their own purchases were healthier (n = 104, M = 7.82, SD = 1.31) than those in the baseline condition said (n = 100, M = 6.56, SD = 1.67), t(202) = 5.99, p < .001, suggesting that our manipulation was effective. Perceived cost was the same between conditions (healthy goal: M = 5.14, SD = 1.49; baseline: M = 5.10, SD = 1.58), t(202) = .21, p = .84. Participants also saw their trip as less similar to that of the average welfare recipient in the healthy goal condition (M = 3.96, SD = 2.20), compared with the baseline condition (M = 5.21, SD = 1.95), t(202) = 4.28, p < .001. Thus, the situational goal to purchase healthy food led to purchases that diverged from those that participants imagined welfare recipients to make. This parallels our previous studies in which the target’s purchase diverged from the participants’ (chronic) preferences.

The two-way interaction between condition (health goal vs. baseline) and welfare recipient’s purchase (healthy food, less healthy food; within subject) was significant, F(1, 202) =13.74, p < .001. We predicted and found that when participants had a situational preference for healthy food, they saw unhealthy purchases as a less appropriate use of SNAP funds (M = 4.26, SD = 2.11), compared with those in the baseline condition (M = 5.41, SD = 1.88), t(202) = 4.10, p < .001. No effect of condition was found for healthy items (healthy goal: M = 8.49, SD = .84; baseline: M = 8.63, SD = .74), t(202) = 1.22, p = .23. All critical effects remained when controlling for all control variables.

Study 1c builds on our previous studies by showing that even situational goals (as opposed to chronic preferences) can lead to purchases that are seen as divergent from those of welfare recipients, leading to egocentric judgments. By measuring the perceived appropriateness of purchases, Study 1c begins to test the effect of egocentrism on policy attitudes. Study 2 tests this more directly, as well as testing the mediating role of stereotyping (H_2b).

Study 2: Effects on Welfare Policy Attitudes

Study 2 builds on Studies 1a through 1c by examining the consequences of egocentrism on welfare policy attitudes specifically. We predicted (1) that participants will show increased support for welfare policy that restricts a purchase that they personally value less versus more (H_2a) and (2) that this effect is mediated by seeing welfare recipients as irresponsible for making this purchase (H_2b). In addition, Study 2 tested whether egocentrism would have an effect on the same judgments of middle-class consumers as the target. Because the stereotype of irresponsibility is less consistent with people’s views of the middle class, egocentrically judging a middle-class target as getting less value from an item should not result in increased perceptions of irresponsibility.

Method

All materials, supplemental analyses, factor loadings, and mediation pathways can be found in Web Appendix E.

Participants

Two hundred one U.S. participants completed the study through MTurk. Fifteen participants failed an attention check asking which food item they completed ratings for. In a suspicion probe, three participants had a guess that approximated our hypotheses. These participants were excluded, leaving 183 participants (99 men, 84 women; M_age = 35.84 years).

Procedure

Similar to Study 1a, participants first ranked how they would prioritize the same five items, completed the same filler personality items, and then completed a manipulation check (“How much value do you think people get from buying X, considering other ways that people can spend money?”; 1 = “very little,” and 9 = “a lot”). Participants were then randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (target product: most vs. least preferred) × 2 (judgment target: welfare recipient vs. middle class) design. The target consumer was either “someone receiving welfare (e.g., SNAP/food stamps),” or “a middle class American.” Participants were asked to what extent they thought that the target consumer buying the participants’ most or least preferred product (depending on condition) reflects the following traits: irresponsible with one’s money, impulsive, easily tempted, and lacking self-control (α = .90), serving as our stereotyping measure.

Then, participants were told, “State legislators in various states are proposing that X be prohibited as SNAP (aka: food stamp) purchases. What do you think of this?” Participants then rated five policy attitude items: “These purchases should NOT be covered by welfare programs,” “I would support this kind of restriction,” “This policy is a good idea,” “Making these purchases should disqualify SNAP/food stamp recipients from receiving their benefits,” and “If this policy was on a ballot, I would vote for it” (1 = “strongly agree,” 5 = “neither agree nor disagree,” and 9 = “strongly agree”; α = .96). Items were coded such that higher scores reflected more support for a restrictive policy. Finally, participants completed the same demographic and control items as in Study 1a and the aforementioned attention check and suspicion probe.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check

The two-way interaction between target product (most vs. least preferred) and judgment target (welfare recipient vs. middle class) was not significant, F(1, 179) = .59, p = .44, and only a main effect of purchase type was found when predicting perceptions of value. Regardless of the target person (welfare recipient, middle class), others were seen as getting less value from the purchase when the target bought the participant’s least preferred item (M = 3.09, SD = 2.01) than when the target bought the participant’s most preferred item (M = 5.15, SD = 2.07), F(1, 179) = 48.20, p < .001. However, we predicted that this projection of personal value would translate into stereotyping only when the target was a welfare recipient as opposed to middle class.

Stereotyping

As predicted, the two-way interaction between target product (most vs. least preferred) and judgment target (welfare recipient vs. middle class) was significant, F(1, 179) = 6.84, p = .01. When the target person was a welfare recipient, buying the participant’s least preferred item led to significantly more stereotype endorsement (n = 44; M = 5.90, SD = 2.29), compared with buying the participant’s most preferred item (n = 47; M = 4.07, SD = 2.22), F(1, 179) = 18.91, p < .001. No such effect was found when the target person was middle class (least preferred: n = 48, M = 4.71, SD = 1.78; most preferred: n = 44, M = 4.43, SD = 1.63), F(1, 179) = .44, p = .51. In addition, when the target purchased the participant’s least preferred item, the welfare recipient was judged significantly more negatively than the middle-class person was, F(1, 179) = 8.13, p < .01. These results support H₁ while also highlighting the unique penalty of being a welfare recipient when making purchases that the observer does not personally value.

Policy attitudes

Next, we tested consumers’ support for a proposed policy that restricted the target item as a welfare purchase. We tested the same two-way interaction (purchase × judgment target) on policy attitudes. The interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 179) = 2.91, p = .09. Critically, in the welfare recipient target condition, participants showed more support for the restrictive policy when it restricted the item they least preferred (M = 6.25, SD = 1.95) than when it restricted the item they most preferred (M = 3.74, SD = 3.04), F(1, 179) = 23.57, p < .001, supporting H_2a. In the middle-class target condition, the effect of the target product (most vs. least preferred) on policy attitudes was still significant (least preferred: M = 4.95, SD = 2.40; most preferred: M = 3.69, SD = 2.27), F(1, 179) = 6.05, p = .015. This result is to be expected, as the middle-class condition still fundamentally tests the effect of egocentrism on welfare policy attitudes.

Mediation

We expected that stereotyping would mediate the effect of the target product (most preferred = −1 vs. least preferred = 1) on policy attitudes in the welfare target condition (−1) but not in the middle-class target condition (1). Specifically, we expected that in the middle-class target condition, the target product would predict policy attitudes, but the target product would not predict stereotyping, and stereotyping (of the middle-class target) would not predict policy attitudes (Model 58, 5,000 bootstrap resamples, PROCESS macro for SPSS; Hayes 2016). Supporting H_2b, the index of moderated mediation was significant (95% confidence interval [CI] excludes zero: [−.80, −.11]). Conditional indirect effects analysis revealed that stereotyping mediated the effect of target product on policy attitudes for the welfare recipient target (B = .72; 95% CI = [.35, 1.12]), but not the middle-class target (B = .03; 95% CI = [−.05, .14]). All effects remain when controlling for control variables.

Study 2 further illustrates the unfortunate confluence of (1) a tendency to egocentrically judge the value of others’ purchases and (2) stereotypes about welfare recipients.¹ Participants saw others as getting less value from buying what they themselves do not value. This view translated into seeing a welfare recipient (but not a middle-class target) as more irresponsible and, in turn, showing more support for a restrictive policy.

Studies 1 and 2 showed that our proposed effect is unique to welfare recipients and to stereotype-relevant judgments (e.g., irresponsible) and that it occurs for both chronic and situational preferences for various purchases that are frequently subject to policy debate. Notably, no effect was found for healthy foods (Study 1c), suggesting that certain purchases may not be consistent with the stereotype of welfare recipients as irresponsible. We further explore the effect of product type in Study 3.

Study 3: Moderation by Product Type (Necessity vs. Nonnecessity)

Study 3 tested whether the hypothesized effects would emerge for necessity items, which are difficult to construe as irresponsible or impulsive purchases and thus are inconsistent with welfare stereotypes. We predicted that when the products are necessities, egocentric judgments of value would not translate into increased stereotype endorsement or policy attitudes. Study 3 also investigated attitudes toward existing policy that does not allow SNAP funds to be used for various necessity items (e.g., dish soap, deodorant) and nonnecessity items (e.g., takeout food such as pizza, coffee/tea, fast food). These items are debated as welfare purchases in popular discourse (Lallanilla 2013; Roth 2017; Sherwood 2015). Studying attitudes toward a policy that would maintain (as opposed to change) the status quo also necessitated changing our measure of policy attitudes, thus offering variety to our measures across studies.

Method

All materials, supplementary analyses, factor loadings, and mediation pathways can be found in Web Appendix G.

Participants

Three hundred participants completed the study online through MTurk. Six participants guessed the broad purpose of the study in a suspicion probe, and six failed an attention check asking what product they answered questions about, leaving a sample of 288 participants (119 men, 169 women; M_age = 35.82 years).

Procedure

Participants first completed a ranking task, followed by a series of filler personality items. Participants were randomly assigned to either rank four nonnecessities (takeout pizza, fast food, takeout coffee/tea, takeout deli sandwiches) or four necessities (shampoo, dish soap, laundry detergent, deodorant). A pretest asked participants to rate the extent to which they would call each of these items (1) a necessity and (2) an impulse purchase, using a seven-point scale (1 = “not at all,” and 7 = “very much”). The four necessities were indeed seen more as a necessity than the nonnecessity items were (necessities: M = 5.81, SD = 1.24; nonnecessities: M = 1.98, SD = 1.45; t(49) = 12.75, p < .001), and less as an impulse purchase than the nonnecessities were (necessities: M = 1.60, SD = 1.09; nonnecessities: M = 5.66, SD = 1.12; t(50) = 16.22, p < .001).

Participants then completed the same manipulation check (i.e., how much value others would get from the item) and the same stereotyping items as in Study 2 (α = .95). Participants were then asked: “Currently, X is prohibited as a SNAP (aka: food stamp) purchase. What do you think of this?” Three items followed: “This restriction is wrong; it should be covered by SNAP,” “I support the current policy; this purchase should be prohibited with SNAP funds,” and “If it was on a ballot, I would vote for allowing this purchase to be made with SNAP funds” (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 9 = “strongly agree”). Items were coded such that higher scores reflected support for maintaining the restrictive policy (α = .89). Finally, participants completed the same demographic and control variable items as in Studies 1a, 1c, and 2 (income, political orientation, general welfare attitudes, and whether they have received welfare).

Results

Manipulation check

A 2 (target product: most vs. least preferred) × 2 (product type: nonnecessity vs. necessity) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction on perceived value that others would derive from the purchase, F(1, 284) = 4.49, p = .035. Not surprisingly, participants thought others would get more value out of necessities versus nonnecessities, F(1, 284) = 35.55, p < .001. The effect of the target product was significant for nonnecessity items (most preferred: M = 5.44, SD = 1.88; least preferred: M = 4.05, SD = 2.15; F(1, 284) = 19.36, p < .001), and this effect was even larger for necessity items (most preferred: M = 7.24, SD = 1.68; least preferred: M = 4.91, SD = 1.84; F(1, 284) = 55.06, p < .001). These results show that people judge even necessity purchases through an egocentric lens. However, because necessities are not seen as frivolous purchases, we predicted that egocentric judgments of value would not translate into increased stereotype endorsement when necessity purchases are considered.

Stereotyping

The 2 (target product: most vs. least preferred) × 2 (product type: nonnecessity vs. necessity) interaction predicting stereotype endorsement was significant, F(1, 284) = 6.10, p = .01. For the nonnecessity purchases, participants saw welfare recipients as significantly more irresponsible when they bought the participants’ least preferred item (n = 80, M = 5.57, SD = 2.44) than when they bought the participants’ most preferred item (n = 64, M = 4.22, SD = 2.00), F(1, 284) = 17.29, p < .001, supporting H₁. However, as predicted, no significant effect of egocentrism on stereotyping was found when necessity purchases were considered (most preferred: n = 70, M = 1.98, SD = 1.54; least preferred: n = 74, M = 2.20, SD = 1.73), F(1, 284) = .46, p = .50.

Policy attitudes

The same two-way interaction predicting policy attitudes was also significant, F(1, 284) = 4.15, p = .04. For the nonnecessity purchases, participants showed more support for banning the use of SNAP funds for their least preferred item (M = 6.86, SD = 2.35), compared with their most preferred item (M = 5.90, SD = 2.33), F(1, 284) = 5.63, p = .02, supporting H_2a. No such effect was found for necessity purchases (most preferred: M = 4.10, SD = 2.57; least preferred: M = 3.90, SD = 2.49), F(1, 284) = .25, p = .62.

Mediation

We predicted that stereotyping would mediate the effect of target product (most preferred = −1, least preferred = 1) on policy attitudes for nonnecessities (−1) but not for necessities (1). Specifically, we predicted that no mediating effect would be found for necessities because of the target product not predicting stereotyping or policy attitudes. The corresponding test of moderated mediation (Model 8, PROCESS macro for SPSS; Hayes 2016)² with 5,000 bootstrap resamples was conducted. In support of H_2b, the index of moderated mediation was significant (95% CI excludes zero: [−.52, −.05]). Conditional indirect effects analysis revealed that stereotyping mediated the effect of the target product on policy attitudes for nonnecessities (B = .32; 95% CI = [.13, .54]) but not for necessities (B = .05; 95% CI = [−.08, .19]). All critical effects remain with control variables.

The results of Study 3 further support our hypotheses using different target products and a different policy context, and the results show that whether the product is a necessity serves as a boundary condition. Although one might egocentrically see a particular necessity as having less value, these perceptions of value do not translate into stereotype endorsement or policy attitudes.

Supplementary Study: The Ineffectiveness of Perspective Taking

An additional study tested whether perspective taking (i.e., making salient the reasons why others may or may not buy a particular product, such as personal preferences or dietary restrictions) would eliminate egocentric effects on judgments of welfare recipients. Although this explicit approach ought to make adjusting from one’s egocentric perspective relatively easy, a recent 25-study paper showed little to no evidence that perspective taking reduces egocentrism (Eyal, Steffel, and Epley 2018). Consistent with Eyal, Steffel, and Epley (2018), we find no reduction in bias (see Supplementary Study 2, Web Appendix H). The robustness of this bias and the challenges faced by welfare advocates are further discussed in the “General Discussion” section.

How, then, can egocentric judgments be prevented from shaping stereotype endorsement and policy attitudes? We reasoned that egocentric judgments did not lead to stereotyping in the context of healthy food and necessity items (Studies 1c and 3, respectively) because purchasing these items is counterstereotypical and not easily construed as irresponsible. We also observed no effect when the target was in the middle class, a group for whom the stereotype of being irresponsible is less relevant. In sum, a key to interrupting this process is the presence of counterstereotypical information. Study 4 tests this potential intervention directly.

Study 4: Counterstereotypical Information

Study 4 tested how information that does not alter the welfare recipient’s purchase choice can reduce the effect that we found. To do so, this study directly manipulated the welfare recipient’s buying behavior (e.g., engaging in fiscally responsible behaviors) independent of the actual purchase. We expected that this counterstereotypical information would limit the relevance of egocentric judgments of value when character judgments are made. We also introduced an additional stereotyping measure: judgments of whether the target also makes various “sin purchases” (e.g., gambling). Because one counterstereotypical case can, but does not necessarily, change the endorsement of stereotypes toward an entire group (Bless et al. 2001; Kunda and Oleson 1995), we did not have a strong prediction for how our manipulation of target responsibility would interact with the target’s purchase in the prediction of policy attitudes.

Method

All materials, supplementary analyses, factor loadings, and mediation paths can be found in Web Appendix I.

Participants

Six hundred thirty-five U.S. participants completed the study online through MTurk. Twenty-six failed a multiple-choice attention check asking the target’s profession, leaving a sample of 609 participants (271 men, 337 women, 1 unidentified; M_age = 37.23 years).

Procedure

Study 4 utilized a 2 (purchase: participant’s most vs. least preferred) × 2 (target welfare recipient: baseline vs. responsible) design. Participants completed a purchase-ranking task as in previous studies (four items: salty snacks, soda, sugary snacks, dessert foods) and were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions regarding the information available about the target person. In the baseline condition, a description of a welfare recipient (Tim) was presented, as in Studies 1a and 1b. In the “responsible” condition, this information was followed by information that undermines the stereotype of welfare recipients being irresponsible: “Tim spends a lot of time budgeting the funds that he receives. He divides his funds so that he knows how much he has to spend each week on food and whether or not he is on track to finish the month with enough groceries to get by. He also clips coupons from flyers and pays attention to sales. He prioritizes his purchases accordingly, avoiding less necessary purchases until he knows he has enough money for them.” Participants were then told that Tim will sometimes buy either the participant’s most or least preferred item (varied by condition). They were then asked to rate how much value Tim will get from this purchase and to rate Tim on the same stereotyping items as in Studies 1a, 2, and 3.

Another way of operationalizing the stereotype of irresponsibility is to measure the common belief that welfare recipients make “sin” purchases (Evans and Popova 2014; Moore 2009). Thus, we also asked participants how likely they thought it was that Tim is also buying fast food, lottery tickets, beer, and cigarettes and engaging in casino gambling (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “very”). These items were combined with our original stereotyping items to form a single composite stereotyping measure (α = .95). Finally, participants completed the same policy attitude items as in Study 2, followed by demographic items and the same control variable items as in Studies 1a, 1c, 2, and 3.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check

The two-way interaction between the target product (participant’s most vs. least preferred) and counterstereotypical information (present vs. not) in predicting perceptions of value was not significant, F(1, 600) = .47, p = .49. As expected, there was a main effect of the target product, such that participants thought Tim would get less value from purchasing the participant’s least preferred item (M = 3.28, SD = 2.22), compared with the most preferred item (M = 4.13, SD = 1.99), F(1, 600) = 25.07, p < .001. We also found a main effect of the target person, such that when Tim was described as counterstereotypical, participants thought he would get more value from his purchases (M = 3.91, SD = 2.12), compared with the baseline condition (M = 3.53, SD = 2.16), F(1, 600) = 5.37, p = .02. Thus, although counterstereotypical information did not eliminate egocentric judgments of value, we predicted that this information would reduce the diagnostic usefulness of these egocentric judgments, thereby eliminating the effect of egocentrism on stereotype endorsement. We tested that hypothesis next.

Stereotyping

The two-way interaction between the target product (participant’s most vs. least preferred) and target information (baseline vs. counterstereotypical) was significant, F(1, 605) = 4.46, p = .035. In the baseline information condition, participants saw Tim as more irresponsible when buying the participant’s least preferred item (n = 152, M = 5.28, SD = 1.85) as opposed to most preferred item (n = 158, M = 4.66, SD = 1.78), F(1, 605) = 9.87, p = .002 (supporting H₁). However, when counterstereotypical information about Tim was presented, not only was there an overall main effect decrease in stereotyping, F(1, 605) = 151.67, p < .001, but the effect of the target product was eliminated (most preferred: n = 149, M = 3.22, SD = 1.70; least preferred: n = 150, M = 3.25, SD = 1.60), F(1, 605) = .016, p = .90. Therefore, counterstereotypical information appeared to have a twofold effect; it reduced mean levels of stereotype endorsement in general, and it eliminated egocentrism as a unique source of bias.³

Policy attitudes

The interaction on policy attitudes was marginally significant, F(1, 605) = 2.93, p = .087. Critically, the baseline target information condition supported H_2a; participants showed more support for a restrictive policy when Tim purchased the participant’s least preferred item (M = 5.58, SD = 2.63) as opposed to their most preferred item (M = 4.12, SD = 2.71), F(1, 605) = 23.30, p < .001. This effect was still significant in the counterstereotypical information condition (least preferred: M = 4.97, SD = 2.55; most preferred: M = 4.25, SD = 2.70), F(1, 605) = 5.48, p = .02, but was notably attenuated: when Tim was buying the participant’s least preferred item, the presence of counterstereotypical information significantly decreased support for a ban on that item, compared with the baseline condition, F(1, 605) = 3.98, p = .05.

Mediation

We predicted that stereotyping would mediate the effect of the target product (most preferred = −1 vs. least preferred = 1) on policy attitudes in the baseline condition (−1) but not when counterstereotypical information about the welfare recipient target was present (1). Specifically, we predicted that counterstereotypical information would reduce the effect of the target product on stereotyping and policy attitudes. The corresponding test of moderated mediation (Model 8, PROCESS macro for SPSS; Hayes 2016) with 5,000 bootstrap resamples was conducted. In support of H_2b, the index of moderated mediation was significant (95% CI excludes zero: [−.49, −.01]). Conditional indirect effects analysis supported the mediating effect in the baseline condition (B = .26; 95% CI = [.09, .44]) but not in the counterstereotypical information condition (B = .01; 95% CI = [−.15, .17]). All critical effects remained when controlling for control variables.

In short, because direct elimination of egocentric effects has proven elusive (Eyal, Steffel, and Epley 2018, Supplementary Study 2), we instead targeted stereotypes about welfare recipients. When a welfare recipient target was presented as counterstereotypical, egocentric judgments of value could not be easily used as diagnostic information for making broader judgments.

Single-Paper Meta-Analysis and Individual Differences Analyses

To gain a broader picture of our results, we conducted a single-paper meta-analysis (McShane and Böckenholt 2017) using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software.⁴ The average effect sizes of our egocentrism manipulation on (1) stereotyping and (2) policy were both d = .46. Egocentrism was a significantly larger predictor of stereotyping than income (higher income = more stereotyping; d = .25; Q = 8.64, p = .003) and past experience with welfare (experience receiving welfare = less stereotyping; d = .30; Q = 4.87, p = .027), and it was comparable to political orientation (more conservative = more stereotyping; d = .47; Q = .03, p = .87). Only general welfare attitude was a stronger predictor (more positive attitudes = less stereotyping; d = .72; Q = 11.61, p < .001). For predicting restrictive policy attitudes, egocentrism was as strong a predictor as income (d = .42) and past receipt of welfare (d = .41;, both Q < .27, both p > .60). Political orientation (d = .64) and general welfare attitudes (d = .92) were significantly larger predictors (both Q > 4.03, both p < .04). Moreover, egocentrism did not significantly interact with income (r = .007, p = .77), general welfare attitudes (r = −.02, p = .42), or past welfare experience (Q = .73, p = .39) in predicting stereotyping. We found a small interaction with political orientation (r = .05, p = .04) indicating that conservatives showed a stronger egocentrism effect than liberals showed. In predicting policy attitudes, egocentrism did not interact with income (r = .025, p = .42) or political orientation (r = .02, p = .49). Egocentrism marginally interacted with general policy attitudes (r = .055, p = .07) and past experience with welfare (Q = 2.88, p = .09), indicating that, if anything, the effect of egocentrism on policy attitudes was larger among those with more positive welfare attitudes and those who have received welfare before.

The fact that egocentrism uniquely predicted these outcomes and did so to a similar degree as other well-known predictors suggests a notable gap in the literature. Further, the general lack of interaction effects suggests that this bias spans the socioeconomic and political spectrum. Our results suggest that if one wants to predict a consumer’s attitude toward a policy that would restrict a particular purchase, simply knowing how much the consumer personally values the product has as much or more predictive value than knowing the consumer’s income or whether the consumer has received welfare before.

These findings help rule out self-interest as an explanation for our effects. Higher-income individuals and those who have never received welfare showed an egocentric bias even though they are less likely to need welfare, which is a reason that these groups show less support for welfare in general (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). These results also speak to the limited ability of perspective taking to reduce egocentric judgments, as those who are traditionally sympathetic to welfare recipients still showed our predicted effects.

General Discussion

Past work has investigated predictors of general welfare attitudes; however, many debates and policies deal with specific purchases. Our research suggests that attitudes toward these specific policies can vary considerably, depending on how much one personally values the purchase in question. This finding contrasts with other work emphasizing the relative immunity of personal tastes to social judgments (Kramer, Maimaran, and Simonson 2012; Savani, Markus, and Connern 2008; Stigler and Becker 1977). Instead, we observe that consumers easily judge others’ purchases based on personal tastes and that existing welfare stereotypes allow these egocentric judgments of value to inform broader character judgments.

The current research echoes the call to “move beyond judgmental rhetoric” (Hill and Macan 1996) but also highlights challenges in accomplishing this. Consistent with Eyal, Steffel, and Epley (2018), we found that egocentric biases are very difficult to overcome, and even those who have received welfare before and those traditionally sympathetic to welfare recipients showed an egocentric bias in evaluating welfare recipients and policy. While many purchasing decisions made by poor consumers can be seen as rational when one appreciates their situation and constraints (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Sawady and Tescher 2008), many policy makers may lack the information or desire to understand how various constraints (e.g., time, money, living in a food desert, poor access to transit) influence welfare recipients’ purchasing decisions.

Recent work has also called for an intersectional approach to policy that does not view disadvantage through a single-factor lens (Corus et al. 2016). However, even among those most empathetic and sympathetic, personal lenses can still be limited to one’s idiosyncratic preferences and sense of value. From an intersectional perspective, our research suggests that multiple factors may create the opportunity for egocentric judgments. For example, a woman may make purchases that are not relevant to men, or a minority-group consumer may make a culturally relevant food purchase that is unappealing to a majority-group observer. Exploring how group differences affect judgments may be important to future policy and debiasing research.

The current research further highlights practical issues in regulating welfare recipients with too much granularity. Deciding what can or cannot be purchased or what assistance should or should not be offered is challenging even when relatively concrete categories exist (Schanzenbach 2017) and may be further complicated by egocentrism. Moreover, even if additional costly monitoring and restrictions could prevent certain purchases from being made (which is dubious in itself; Schanzenbach 2017), purchases could still be judged on the basis of the observer’s idiosyncratic tastes. While many profess concern for preserving the dignity and independence of those who receive welfare, stereotyping and increased monitoring are unlikely to facilitate this aim. In contrast, allowing for occasional indulgences can bring some sense of normalcy, enjoyment, and dignity (Hill 1994; Hill and Macan 1996).

A troubling conclusion of the current research is that egocentrism may add to existing sources of stigma and cannot be easily predicted. Thus, advocates may find it useful to focus on promoting policy and available options that make spending more private. For example, self-checkout machines incidentally add privacy to one’s purchase, and Amazon has recently announced a discounted membership rate for recipients of federal assistance (Perkins 2017; Picchi 2017). Although the use of SNAP funds for online transactions is only in a pilot phase (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2017), this method could be beneficial in reducing judgment.

Our work also offers caveats regarding some current practices aimed at reducing welfare stigma. For instance, poverty simulation and “SNAP challenge” initiatives allow consumers to experience living on a very limited budget firsthand. Giving people firsthand experience of the realities and constraints faced by welfare recipients (as opposed to perspective taking) may positively shape welfare attitudes. On the other hand, one may complete the challenge more easily than actual welfare recipients would (e.g., because of geographical location or easy accessibility of preferred items), fail to account for the idiosyncratic priorities and constraints that others face, and conclude that others fail because of their poor decision making.

Finding reduced or nonsignificant effects for healthy foods (Study 1c) and necessities (Study 3) leads to the seemingly obvious and intuitive suggestion that advocates emphasize buying healthy foods and necessities. However, this approach has its challenges, as healthy diets are more expensive and difficult to maintain (Mulik and Haynes-Maslow 2017; Rao et al. 2013). Healthy food also may not be accessible (i.e., in food deserts). Improving access to healthy food may not only help welfare recipients but also improve general attitudes toward welfare recipients. However, even healthy foods can be seen as inappropriate purchases for welfare recipients (e.g., organic food; Olson et al. 2016).

Our research suggests that information campaigns to specifically combat the stereotype of irresponsibility (e.g., highlighting the ways that welfare recipients budget and cleverly stretch their dollars) may be beneficial. Likewise, offering budgeting apps and money management counseling may not only benefit welfare recipients but also shape the public’s view of welfare recipients (to the extent that they see welfare recipients using these services).

An understanding of egocentrism may also benefit future policy research more broadly. Egocentric processes can be erroneously used in decision making whenever (1) the decision maker or voter is not directly affected by the policy and (2) those affected are thought to have different tastes, priorities, and constraints. Examples include male-dominated governments making decisions for women, such as whether menstrual products are taxed and the availability of birth control products. Such processes may be especially problematic when egocentric judgments of a purchase appear to be relevant to inferences about another group (e.g., having negative views of sexual agency in women and believing that certain products promote promiscuity).

Together, these studies help us understand attitudes toward welfare policy and suggest a new way to think about many controversial policy issues. Although rational factors such as self-interest or explicit arguments based on ideology are certainly important in shaping policy attitudes, hidden behind these factors may be more basic psychological processes like egocentrism that play an important but heretofore unobserved role.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, jppm.17.211_web_appendices - The Effect of Egocentric Taste Judgments on Stereotyping of Welfare Recipients and Attitudes Toward Welfare Policy

Supplemental Material, jppm.17.211_web_appendices for The Effect of Egocentric Taste Judgments on Stereotyping of Welfare Recipients and Attitudes Toward Welfare Policy by Steven Shepherd and Troy Campbell in Journal of Public Policy & Marketing

Footnotes

Associate Editor

Lauren Block served as associate editor for this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Online supplement:

Notes

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