A Call for Afrocentric Decolonial Endogenous Marketing and Public Policy Research and Practice: Toward Sustainable Peace and Well-Being in African Societies

Why Africa Matters

Africa has been the site of approximately one-third of all conflicts globally since the end of the Cold War (Hoeffler 2015, 2019). These conflicts tend to result in a much higher number of casualties and fatalities, with one estimate indicating that social conflict–related fatalities in Africa are twice as high as in other regions (Fenske and Kala 2017). Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa inflict immense human, social, and economic tolls, resulting in estimated losses of over $18 billion per year and amounting to $284 billion since 1990, as well as lowering annual growth by 2.5% and shrinking the economy by 15%. These are conservative estimates, with the likely cost being even higher (Fang et al. 2020; International Action Network on Small Arms et al. 2007). This has resulted in enormous strain on countries’ public finances, increasing inflation and debt and reducing investments, as economic activity slows or halts while spending is diverted toward security and military efforts and to dealing with human crises, including medical crises. Other consequences include high levels of unemployment, trauma, and limitations in public services offered as investments and spending are diverted away from development and social investments (Fang et al. 2020; International Action Network on Small Arms et al. 2007). Conflicts in northeastern Nigeria alone accounted for estimated cumulative losses of U.S. $150 billion–$200 billion over a ten-year period (Sesay et al. 2023). Social impacts of conflicts include loss of social cohesion and consequential negative intergenerational health impacts. For example, an empirical study of the Biafran War concludes:

Women exposed to the war carry the scars of exposure into adulthood, being shorter, more likely to be overweight and obese, and less educated than unexposed women. … Their children are more likely to die in early childhood, and, if they survive, they are more likely to exhibit growth stunting and reduced educational attainment. (Akresh et al. 2023, p. 490)

Despite these deleterious impacts, there is a relative paucity of research from the African decolonial perspective. Within the marketing literature, perspectives based on non-Western paradigms are limited. Although much has been written about the continent of Africa in the disciplines of economics, politics, and policy studies, these works have been based on “the standard prescriptive discourse of economism,” so “the upshot is that while we now feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies and economies are not, we still know absolutely nothing about what they actually are” (Mbembé 2001, p. 14). Precolonial marketing systems and their embeddedness in sociocultural context of African societies have been largely ignored in the marketing literature.

The Long Arc of Slavery and Colonization on Contemporary Social Conflict

Any attempt to understand African contemporary violence and its causes, consequences for marketing systems and for community and consumer well-being, and public policy implications must start with the slave trade and colonization, given that “this … violence … has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, the customs of dress and external life” (Fanon 1965, p. 40). These historical forces have contemporary relevance, as their impacts extend beyond the formal end of the slave trade and colonization. This is particularly evident in policy discourses that have tied the continent to a series of destructive policies reflecting what the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkruma, argued to be acts of neocolonialism: “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Nkruma 1965, p. 1). Policies related to Africa have often continued to reflect the interests, perspectives, and worldviews of the Global North.

The Historical Context of Conflict in the African Continent for Marketing

The slave trade was a marketing system in which humans were debased as commodities and cargo and secured through violence. Research in marketing has failed to contend with the slave trade as a marketing system and its effects on well-being (Francis 2021). The accompanying economic, social, and political upheavals stemming from capturing and selling Africans into enslavement sowed the seeds of enduring social conflict. Yet, little research has addressed the impact of these events on African provisioning and marketing systems and hence community and consumer well-being on the continent.

Drawing on work presented by Fisk (1974, 1981) and advanced by Benton (2021), this article takes an expansive view of marketing systems that includes a range of activities beyond classical market exchanges. Fisk (1974, 1981) draws attention to the multiplicity of ways beyond markets that society provides for itself in what he refers to as “the provisioning system of society” (Fisk 1974, quoted in Benton 2021, p. 94) and the “provisioning technology” (Fisk 1981, p. 4). Benton (2021) relies on the work of Polanyi to widen Fisk's notion and encourages marketers to not be “hobbled by traditional conceptualizations and studies of the market” (p. 96). He further argues that “those working in marketing and development, especially, must remember that market capitalism grew, and grows, by reaching into and often destroying traditional economies integrated by institutions other than the market” (Benton 2021, p. 98), and encourages marketing to widen the frame to the global system of “powerful institutions” (Benton 2021, p. 96). Therefore, although this article refers to marketing systems, this term is to be understood within this broader framing.

The transatlantic slave trade wrought direct and indirect impacts, including the massive depletion of the population, incitement of war and social conflict, and disruption of internal market development, resulting in the loss of community well-being as Africans were captured and sold to fill the voracious demand for know-how and labor. The transatlantic slave trade, which started in the 16th century, resulted in the mass bondage of Africans captured through war, mass raids, and brutal kidnappings. They were transported under inhumane circumstances from West, West Central, and Eastern Africa to the Americas (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2017). This was the largest of four documented slave trades out of the continent of Africa beginning in the 14th century. Predating the transatlantic slave trade were the trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean slave trades, in which enslaved people were forced against their will to Northern Africa, the Middle East, India, and islands in the Indian Ocean (Nunn 2008). However, the most devastating impact came from the transatlantic trade (the slave trade), and its greatest impact was felt by the late 18th century, with a trade average of “one hundred thousand humans per year” (Manning 1983, p. 849). Over centuries, due to the slave trade, 12 million Africans were forcibly and brutally taken from their homes against their will, and this estimate does not include the untold numbers who were murdered or died as a result of raids to capture Africans, or the brutality unleashed during their forced journey to the coast (Nunn 2008). By 1850, these slave trades had halved Africa's population (Manning 1990). As Rodney (1974) points out, the forced removal of Africans not only depleted the continent of its people and institutions but also robbed it of its prosperity. The enslavement of African peoples also simultaneously transferred this wealth to European hands through the transfer of labor, know-how, and skills to European colonies (Rodney 1974).

The slave trade also significantly disrupted internal market systems and trading patterns. In West Africa, for example, in the pre-European phase, there were thriving internal market exchanges with the Gold Coast; gold and koala nuts were exchanged for goods, including textiles and other manufactured goods, from internal marketing systems such as the Niger Bend (northern Nigeria). However, the commodification and export of humans transformed the economy of the Gold Coast into one that depended heavily on the trading of enslaved people in return for manufactured goods. The effect was a decline in local investments, including in commercial agriculture, in favor of participating in the exchange of humans: “For three centuries the slave trades largely crowded out cash crop production, despite the region's favorable agro-climatic suitability for agricultural products” (Roessler et al. 2022, p. 4). Because enslaved people were secured through violence, their initial capture required no market exchange, further dampening internal trade. Reductions in commercial investments combined with a stifling of internal marketing systems meant that these economies failed to integrate into the developing Atlantic commodity production processes, resulting in long-term external trade dependencies (Inikori 2007, p. 86). Long-term economic performance suffered, with Nunn (2008) empirically showing “a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from each country and subsequent economic performance. The African countries that are the poorest today are the ones from which the most slaves were taken” (p. 140). These findings have been corroborated by Zhang, Xu, and Kibriya (2021) as one of the factors underlying ethnic violence.

Notably, the slave trade fostered persistent and ongoing violence. The “domestic warfare, raiding, and kidnapping” (Nunn 2008, p. 141) sowed the seeds for the ongoing weakening of states, state collapse, “ethnic fractionalization,” and corruption of judicial institutions and long-term societal and institutional trust (Nunn 2008, p. 142). Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) empirically show that contemporary levels of trust in relatives, neighbors, and local government, factors known to be associated with social conflict, are lower in communities where individuals’ ancestors were significantly affected by the slave trade. Further empirical data from sub-Saharan Africa show “that the effects of the slave trade are more pronounced in contemporary ethnic conflict and riots” (Zhang, Xu, and Kibriya 2021, p. 791) and that the impact of the slave trade led to higher levels of political fragmentation, reflected today in higher incidences of bribery (Obikili 2016, p. 1157).

In an in-depth study of Igbo-speaking people, Matera, Bastian, and Kent (2012) describe the devastation of the slave trade:

The Igbo-speaking people of southeastern Nigeria have inhabited, for perhaps four thousand years, the territory situated between the Niger and Cross rivers of West Africa. … For centuries, it appears that they lived self-sufficiently although not in isolation, producing their own food, textiles, and iron goods, and importing only salt and fish from Delta traders and more luxurious items like copper and beads from more distant locales. … In the years from 1730 to 1810, Igbo speakers provided the majority of slaves to the New World. Men in the prime of their lives were kidnapped by neighboring villages for sale to the coastal traders. … The depredation, endemic corruption, and local warfare that accompanied the slave trade had a profound destabilizing effect on all the Igbo-speaking groups. (pp. 15–16)

The abolition of the slave trade did not end the violence; as the formal slave trade came to an end, this coincided with the shift in Europe toward industrialization, whetting Europe's appetite for commodities and raw materials and increasing the need to seek markets for European manufacturers’ products (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). European colonial policies in Africa were primarily aimed at raising the standard of living of the European population, and it is this population with whom their political allegiance lay. Supporting colonial business interests and narrowing and constraining local market structures while ensuring free access to raw materials were fundamental to such policies (Meredith 1975). Therefore, the transition from slavery to colonization increased European control, with deepening incursions into and control of territories. Thus, colonization proved to be even more disruptive for internal market development. Economic gain was a major motivator for colonization and the violence that followed. In his description of the reasons for the war in Vietnam, Shultz (2007) argues that the reasons “principally included economic gain (e.g., access to physical goods, human resources, and markets)” (p. 295). Similarly, the goals of colonization and slavery “were the dispossession of labor, lands, property and rights and the transfer of these to white ownership through violence, brutality and genocide. … Though colonization manifested itself in various forms … it was carried out through violence, brutality and genocide … with the central aim being to extract riches and transfer them to European and white interests” (Francis 2023, p. 560).

As colonial policies supported increased incursions into Africa to secure raw materials to fuel industrial development in the metropole, they also disrupted local supply chains and marketing systems. As Matera, Bastian, and Kent (2012) describe:

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, most southeastern Nigerian people suffered under the intensification of colonial activities within their region. … Armed troops routinely swept through the villages of the southeast, … often sweeping up as many of a particular village's youthful male population as they could find for use as bearers, road and rail builders, miners, and any other work that the colonial authorities deemed necessary. … Their livelihoods were placed in jeopardy when their fathers, husbands, and sons were marched away to unknown destinations, leaving seed yams unplanted, the yam hills half-constructed, or the planted fields unweeded. (p. 40)

Demand from the Global North for a range of agricultural products also grew, and by the turn of the 19th century, African economies began to be structurally transformed to provide export crops during the so-called “cash crop revolution” (Roessler et al. 2022, p. 4). Much of this transition was accompanied by coercion (Hogendorn 1969) and laws that specifically prohibited production for local domestic consumption (Roessler et al. 2022). Thus, Africans’ ability to continue developing internal markets, internal trade, and commercial interests was significantly undermined. Beyond the direct land dispossession that robbed Africans of their subsistence and commercial agricultural economy, taxation policies imposed had the further effect of impoverishing the African subsistence economy. These policies forced labor away from the land and trade into employment dominated by European interests, which in turn resulted in further European domination, economic inequality, and stifled African-led marketing systems (Lewis 1954).

Colonial capitalism thus failed to engender capitalism or a system of productivity and innovation in Africa; instead, it left a legacy “of structural dependency culture and a reliance on external stakeholders to replace even basic goods it had previously produced” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, p. 18). A range of other policies, similarly, aimed directly at limiting African involvement in the economy, included laws and regulations prohibiting Africans from participating in trade. The livestock trade was controlled through the imposition of quarantine laws drafted to specifically exclude pastoralists. Local farmers were also forbidden from growing cash crops for trading in local markets (Kinyanjui 2019). In some cases, Africans were forced into reserves where they could not practice their traditional livelihoods to dispossess them of their lands (Van Zwanenberg and King 1975). The net effect was a diversion of market development away from producing crops for domestic markets and consumption, leading to significant market changes (Austin 2014). The long-term impacts of this transition include the reduction in locally owned livestock, which “drastically reduced the dietary intake of animal protein, resulting in malnutrition” (Francis 2023, p. 563). At the same time, the markets for European goods in Africa were protected. Despite the ever-present threat of violence associated with colonization, the maintenance of and support for developing capitalism, specifically the maintenance of a flow of raw materials and the cultivation of a market for European goods, was always an essential part of the bargain that the European metropole placed on its colonial possessions (Fanon 1965).

Some have pointed to the investments made by Europeans in developing infrastructure as a benefit to African societies. However, here again, investments in support of the marketing system, such as in developing transportation infrastructure, also served European colonial interests, resulting in suboptimal infrastructure to support intra-African markets. Railways penetrated inland only as was necessary to exploit resources and would terminate at ports designed to export such resources to the metropole and beyond. This infrastructure failed to promote intra-African trade, thus limiting the development of internal marketing networks (Debrie 2010).

The Scramble for Africa, in particular the formalization that took place at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), imposed the most significant partitioning of the continent of Africa by Europeans, who designed spheres of influences, protectorates, and colonies that indiscriminately divided ethnic groups across national boundaries. These borders were drawn up solely with European interests in mind, and despite the arbitrariness of these boundaries, these divisions are still enforced today, in spite of states becoming independent (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). These partitions have proven to be a significant factor in conflict escalations and persistence (Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002; Ito 2021). Empirical findings show that the likelihood, intensity, duration, and casualties of civil conflict are higher in places with partitioned ethnicities, with split groups having a destabilizing impact across borders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). In addition to violence, partitioning per se has had detrimental impacts on community and consumer well-being. As Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) find,

Members of partitioned groups have fewer household assets, poorer access to utilities, and worse educational outcomes, as compared to individuals from non-split ethnicities in the same country (and even in the same enumeration area). This applies both to respondents residing in their ethnicity's ancestral homeland and to individuals residing outside of it (both in non-split and in partitioned ethnic homeland). (p. 1804)

Rwanda's Afrocentric Homegrown Policies

The events that led to genocide were in large part attributable to colonial governance that exacerbated and created tensions at the fault lines of ethnic difference. Rwanda was subjected to German colonial rule following the 1885 Berlin Conference, marking the beginning of the imposed racial hierarchy that would be at the root of the 1994 genocide (Scholz 2015). Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, Rwanda came under Belgian control, which entailed a particularly ruthless rule that built on and embedded racist policies that would later pit ethnic groups against each other. The Belgian occupation also profoundly impacted the traditional governance structures through the imposition of European languages, medical and legal systems, and governance to supplant Rwanda's indigenous development model (Marchak 2003). There was little development of local marketing systems (Schimmel 2021), and Rwanda became heavily reliant on Belgium for its various needs, weakening its self-reliance (Desrosiers and Swedlund 2019). After gaining independence, Rwanda became one of the largest recipients of international aid as part of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment programs and was heralded as a success story prior to 1994 (Salmon 2004). This was despite the fact that 85% of the population continued to live below the poverty line, and the main industry, the coffee industry, was in crisis, with more than a 50% decline in production (Millar 2014).

Despite the 1994 genocide, by most measures, Rwanda today is a remarkable story of postconflict peace and prosperity and has risen from the ashes of one of the most horrific conflicts, one that saw the complete destruction of an already impoverished country (Adeleye et al. 2018). Using Western measures, the World Bank lauds it as a success story, arguing that

Rwanda's economy has remained resilient and adaptable despite challenging external and domestic factors, achieving a 7.6% growth rate in the first three quarters of 2023. GDP growth is expected to regain momentum in 2024–26, with a projected average growth of 7.2%. The services sector sustained domestic demand, and the rebound of the industrial sector contributed to the robust growth and the positive economic trajectory. (World Bank 2024b)

Rwanda has indeed seen gains in well-being, evidenced by its resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic (Francis and Mugabo 2022) and its gains in gender parity, ranking 12th in the world in 2023, although down from 6th place in 2022 (World Economic Forum 2023).

To What Does Rwanda Owe This Remarkable Postconflict Recovery?

The World Bank acknowledges that “a strong focus on homegrown policies and initiatives has contributed to significant improvement in access to services and human development indicators” (International Development Association 2024). What are these policies and how did they emerge?

Following the liberation of Rwanda in July 1994, many international pundits wrote off Rwanda as a failed state (Gros 1996). While many external to Rwanda were proposing a two-state solution—a Hutu state and a Tutsi state—judging that Hutus and Tutsis could never live in the same nation (Waldorf 2005), Rwandans rejected this approach and sought new policy directions that directly engaged Rwandans through dialogue. In May 1998, the victorious Rwanda Patriotic Front convened a process of national dialogue to make sense of the history that had led Rwanda to the tragic events of 1994. Participants were offered total immunity to speak their minds without fear of reprisal.

Between 1994 and 2000, this national consultation process occurred. Rwandan academics, political leaders, opinion leaders, business leaders, the public sector, and civil society convened every Saturday for 11 months to debate and generate solutions to the myriad questions the nation faced. The Urugwiro Village talks, as they were known, catalyzed the vision that the people of Rwanda aspired to realize. During this time, Rwandans confronted challenging questions, such as how to finance the essential services required to meet the population's needs. The belief that the people themselves constitute the nation's true wealth underpinned the deliberations. Thus, Rwandans sought to identify solutions inspired by their own culture and history (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2016).

To initiate the dialogue, the representatives of the two competing parties, the PARMEHUTU (Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu) and UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise) parties, were allowed to elucidate to the audience the factors that precipitated the 1994 genocide. Rwandans from diverse backgrounds were encouraged to participate freely in the discussions. This marked a significant departure from the prevailing conditions in colonial and early postcolonial Rwanda, where citizens were not free to voice their opinions, engage in constructive debates, or propose solutions to rebuild a new Rwandan society.

The Rwandan diaspora was crucial to the resistance movement, advocacy, and fundraising efforts. Throughout the liberation war, individuals from all walks of life participated in various ways. Those who held jobs or owned businesses contributed a portion of their salaries to support the Rwanda Patriotic Army. Those residing in Western countries made financial contributions and utilized their networks to raise awareness and gather resources for national reconstruction efforts. A key focus was placed on providing support to survivors of the genocide in Rwanda, prioritizing their needs in the process of rebuilding the nation (Davies et al. 2008).

There was also a growing consensus that Rwanda needed to look to homegrown solutions, a policy direction that was later embedded in the constitution. According to the Rwandan Governance Board, as provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003 amended in 2015, Rwandans, based on their values, initiated homegrown mechanisms to deal with matters that concern them to build the nation, promote national culture, and restore dignity. Being locally created, these mechanisms are appropriate to the local development context and have been the bedrock of Rwanda's reconstruction and transformation journey. The Rwandan people sought inspiration from their history, as reflected in the Kinyarwanda proverb “ak’imuhana kaza invura ihise”—help from outside comes when the rain has stopped, suggesting the need for self-reliance before relying on outside help (King et al. 2016). Instead of passively waiting for external assistance, Rwandans took the initiative and actively engaged in the rebuilding process.

Another outcome of these talks was the launch of Vision 2020 in 2000, outlining national policies for development, which marked a turning point in Rwanda's history. The ambitious policy document aimed to transform Rwanda from an impoverished and highly indebted nation into a middle-income economy. Homegrown solutions were recognized as crucial tools to facilitate sustainable development and rebuild the nation. To illustrate, five key homegrown policy solutions are subsequently described in more detail: (1) the Gacaca courts, (2) Nd’umunyarwanda (“I’m a Rwandan”), (3) Umuganda (community work), (4) Ubudehe, a system to measure poverty and help one another, and (5) Girinka (one cow per family).

Rwanda’s Approach to Internal and External Cooperation and Investments

Rwanda also applies these homegrown approaches in engaging with foreign lenders, donors, and investors:

In Rwanda, the expectation is that all concerned actors engage in a way that is consistent with the overall priorities set out by the government and the ruling party. … In principle, the government seeks to orchestrate all actors involved in development in the country, including international and local civil society organizations (CSOs), with a crucial role played by the Rwandan Governance Board. (Keijzer, Klingebiel, and Scholtes 2020, p. 37)

Rwanda's homegrown solutions, such as the Gacaca courts, Nd’umunyarwanda, Umuganda, Ubudehe, and Girinka, have played a substantial role in supporting the objectives of Vision 2020. These solutions are aligned with the government's development priorities and have been instrumental in achieving positive outcomes in various areas. In 2001, the combination of Umuganda, Ubudehe, and Girinka contributed to a remarkable poverty reduction milestone, where a million people were lifted out of poverty. This success was attributed to “the uniquely Rwandan approach of blending traditional institutions and programs into modern development theory and practice” (Ladipo 2012). The successful implementation of Vision 2020 and homegrown solutions has resulted in significant improvements in access to services and human development indicators in Rwanda (International Development Association 2024). Rwanda's Vision 2050 continues to build on this homegrown approach in its goals to reach upper middle-income status in 2035 and high-income status in 2050 (World Bank 2024b).

Rwanda's endogenous “homegrown solutions” strategy should not be interpreted as an inward-looking strategy. Rwanda's development approach extends to its external relations, where the government works with foreign donors and actively tries to attract foreign direct investments. What is critical is that the strategy is indeed “home-grown,” as the Rwandan government plays a major role in defining the policy frame, exerting strong government ownership and control in directing development assistance and foreign direct investments. For example, the Rwandan government has been assertive in its efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign aid (Keijzer, Klingebiel, and Scholtes 2020) but acknowledges that “whilst the Government of Rwanda makes important efforts to realize a gradual reduction of dependence on external aid, it sees high quality aid as crucial to Rwanda's development in the medium-term” (Government of Rwanda Development Partners 2006, foreword). Despite these efforts Rwanda is still heavily dependent on multilateral donors who provide concessional loans accounting for 65% of its public external debt (World Bank 2024a).

The Rwandan government has also made clear its interest in attracting foreign direct investments (Keijzer, Klingebiel, and Scholtes 2020). Rwanda has implemented a range of reforms to foster a climate that is conducive to private sector investments (Djiofack and Aimee 2023), resulting in Rwanda ranking 38th globally in ease of doing business in 2020 (World Bank 2020), the second highest in sub-Saharan Africa. But the government’s approach has been to take steps to ensure these initiatives align with national priorities by orchestrating the activities of all actors in the country, including international investors, under the guidance of the Rwanda Governance Board (Keijzer, Klingebiel, and Scholtes 2020).

These examples, drawn from Rwanda, are meant to illustrate what Afrocentric, endogenous marketing and public policy could look like. It is not our intent to present them as unilateral success but rather to point to the possibilities in the hopes of stimulating new research and policy directions.