Abstract
First published in hardback form in 2008, Naval Firepower remains one of the more prolific of Norman Friedman’s most notable recent works, focusing primarily upon the genesis and development of fire control techniques for naval artillery.
A significant and increasing issue with many academic/specialist texts is one of affordability, specifically the lack thereof for many on modest incomes. This is a matter of considerable concern, for it renders some of the most recent research either out of reach, or even entirely unknown to large numbers of people who might otherwise have great interest in the subject matter, but are obliged, through circumstance, to rely on more accessible texts. While accepting the issues of economies of scale, and the fact that some texts will naturally always be of restricted interest, the price of some other works that may be of wider appeal remains problematic. This is currently being demonstrated by the fact that many of the articles in the popular press, along with television and radio programmes produced to mark the centenary of the Great War, are not reflecting the latest, or even particularly recent, research. While there are undoubtedly other factors, it is not an issue that should be taken lightly by the community.
Seaforth are one of a number of publishers that appear to be making a commendable effort to produce significant works at a price that more people can afford, and this paperback edition of Naval Firepower continues the trend, the price being quite reasonable for what is on offer. Essentially, this edition is simply the original hardback book, reproduced at a reduced scale, with a good quality softback binding and paper. The large number of photographs and the drawings by William Jurens and Friedman’s long-time collaborator, A. D. Baker III, are all as cleanly printed as the resolution of the original images will allow; the downside is that the main text is in a relatively small font and the footnotes/endnotes are tiny—good lighting is mandatory for comfortable reading! However, this would seem a good compromise in order to provide a quality text at an affordable price.
Effective fire control was, of course, central to the success of the all-big-gun ‘dreadnought’ concept (notwithstanding Cuniberti’s rather questionable views on employing a proliferation of heavy guns at close range for their smashing power): without the ability to acquire and strike a target at long range within a reasonable timeframe the concept falls apart. Prior to the introduction of radar control, this required a combination of factors: salvo firing by director, accurate spotting of splash for establishing range and tracking range-rate—all for a target around 30 yards wide and 200 long some ten or more miles away, potentially manoeuvring at high speed in poor weather and visual conditions, while further accounting for the speed and motion of one’s own vessel. This would culminate in the development of highly complex fire control tables (mechanical computers) into which range and rate change data were fed, and the emerging of two rival systems in Britain, which largely led the way in this technology, one from outwith and one from within the Royal Navy.
Norman Friedman requires little introduction in maritime, and especially naval history, circles, and Naval Firepower follows the general style of logical format and structure of many of his other works. The first seven chapters take a loosely chronological approach to the broad subject in the Royal Navy, from the work of Captain (later Admiral Sir) Percy Scott around the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, up to the close of the Second World War. The second half of the book provides individual chapters on fire control and gunnery in most of the other major contemporary naval powers. Like most of Friedman’s works, the sheer quantity of information, much drawn from primary archival research is impressive, and the excellent illustrations and photographs with detailed captions provide extra depth. It should be a valuable text for any naval historian who wishes to gain an insight into the technological developments in this field, and how these affected tactical and even wider strategic considerations. Of particular interest are Chapters 8–14, dealing with the subject in the US, German, Italian, French, Imperial Japanese and Russian/Soviet navies—likewise Chapters 6 and 7, in which Friedman treats interwar and Second World War developments in the Royal Navy. All are extremely useful as they are less frequently treated by historians, let alone in a single text, and it is well worth acquiring Naval Firepower for these alone. Friedman raises many significant related points along the way, an example being the effectiveness of medium/intermediate calibre shell-fire at neutralising even heavily-armoured targets during the Second World War—something that rather flies in the face of the all-big-gun principal, but should not be overlooked—and the comparative difficulty of actually sinking a target with gunfire alone. The possible impact of the fire-control systems on board HMS Hood is also treated, with the difficulties her fire control system may have had in the Bismarck action at dealing with cross-role being considered—further points not often raised.
Where the book is arguably at its weakest is in the first chapters, which deal with the creation and early development of fire control in the Royal Navy. This is a field that has been ploughed at length before, most notably by Jon Sumida in In Defence of Naval Supremacy—Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1889–1914, and John Brooks in Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control. In essence, these two texts take somewhat opposing views on the matter, specifically whether the British Admiralty was correct to favour the Dreyer fire control table over that of the rival Pollen-Argo in the quest to improve the accuracy of long-range firing. Friedman broadly appears to hold a similar view to Sumida, both on the history of the development and that a more widespread use of the Pollen-Argo system would have wrought a substantial improvement in Royal Navy gunnery—matters Brooks disputes in his detailed analysis. On the whole, Brooks’s assessment appears more convincingly and tightly argued on this particular matter, but Friedman’s is the better illustrated, and, of course, covers a far wider timescale and number of services. Therefore, the two works, with Sumida’s, can reasonably be said to complement each other, while there is a broad concurrence that, whether the Pollen-Argo system was superior or not, the Dreyer fire control tables were of somewhat limited effectiveness. The referencing could also be slightly improved in outright terms; while the endnotes are lengthy and thorough in themselves, a greater number would have been advantageous. Single examples sometimes cover a relatively large piece of text, which can become slightly confusing, while, on occasion, data are provided without any obvious reference to a source, although this is usually for background—presumably a restriction imposed by practical reasons of time and space.
Overall, while not without some issues, this new edition of Naval Firepower comes as recommended as it did before: it is reasonably priced, well presented and contains much interesting information that should earn it a place on many shelves.