Abstract
This monograph provides a taxonomic introduction to the South China Sea disputes, with emphasis on conflicting territorial claims in the Spratly Islands and on ways to mitigate these conflicts. There is little original research here; however, the book has gathered and analysed a wide range of information on the evolution of these disputes. The text describes the history of disputed claims to islands, rocks, and reefs; the legal questions about jurisdiction over territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the seabed; national and international rights to use the seas for military purposes; and rapid economic growth and its impact on resource competition and environmental degradation. The author contends that increasing competition for energy and fishery resources may exacerbate conflicts and further fuel nationalism and sovereignty issues in the region. This in turn may lead to national security concerns affecting not only to the claimants but also major powers like the United States, Japan, Korea, and India. The book concludes with a discussion about how conflicts have been managed to date and offers a few suggestions for improving conflict resolution in the South China Sea.
Its distinctive contribution to the scholarly literature on maritime history is that it is a clear and concise introduction to the topic. The text is organized into 88 pages of text and tables, plus 24 pages of endnotes, with an additional 30 pages of appendices. The appendices include the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, the EEZ Rules under Part V of the UNCLOS, and the ASEAN foreign ministers Summary of the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. Regrettably, there are no maps in the book.
It is unfortunate but understandable that several important recent developments affecting the South China Sea disputes receive little or no discussion in the book. These developments include China’s rapid construction of military facilities on artificial islands in the Spratlys, the 12 July 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the case of The Philippines v. China, and the 8 November 2016 election of Donald Trump in the United States.
China’s extensive military base construction activities on artificial islands (not ‘land reclamation’, as described in the text) are part of President Xi Jinping’s increasingly assertive strategy in the South China Sea. He and other Chinese officials have repeatedly declared their aim to gain control over the island groups within the nine-dash (now ten-dash) line, to preserve Chinese historic rights in fishery resources, and oil and gas development, to provide a basis for potential maritime delimitation lines, all while avoiding any adverse reaction from other coastal states or the US.
The PCA ruled that UNCLOS supersedes any historical claims by China or Taiwan. It also ruled that none of the rocks, shoals, or low-tide elevations in the Spratlys were islands, and could not generate any EEZ or continental shelf claims. Further, China’s artificial island construction was viewed as unwarranted, and also in violation of UNCLOS environmental provisions. The tribunal’s rulings were final and binding. The PCA had no enforcement authority or capability, but its rulings have been endorsed by all other claimant states. China refused to acknowledge or accept the tribunal’s jurisdiction or its decision. It remains to be seen whether China will comply with the PCA ruling or will risk the opprobrium of being an international maritime outlaw.
Even if UNCLOS and international maritime law are disregarded, China’s historical claims would still be contested by other historical claimants (e.g., Vietnam and the Philippines) and by recent historical research on the validity of China’s claims. For example, Bill Hayton finds that China’s claims (and Taiwan’s) are not ancient, but quite modern. The first known claim to James Shoal, the southern-most feature within the 9-dash line, did not appear until 1936. They developed in response to domestic political crises among contending factions in China in the 1920s and 1930s, a time of rising nationalist sentiment.
The new Trump administration clearly has a different set of goals for Asia and the South China Sea than its predecessor. The Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ has ended, along with its emphases on economic integration through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), neutrality on territorial claims in the South China Sea, and diplomatic engagement for non-traditional security issues. It is not yet clear what the ‘America First’ policy of the Trump administration implies. But the proposed increases in military spending and ‘homeland security’, as well as the US withdrawal from the TPP suggest a more unilateral ‘hard power’ and mercantilist approach. All these recent developments have substantially transformed the strategic framework for managing the South China Sea disputes.
The author concludes with a few ‘modest suggestions for potential ‘win-win’ measures that might help to advance cooperation and lower tensions in future years’ (p. 108). But these seem even less likely given the major recent changes described above. The coastal states of the South China Sea or ASEAN have failed to create an effective maritime security institution on their own. The Obama administration was unsuccessful in its efforts to form an ad hoc coalition of Southeast Asian countries that might constrain China’s ambitions in the South China Sea. The Trump administration seems less inclined even to try. To the contrary, the US still looks unlikely to intervene militarily in any naval skirmish between China and other territorial claimants.