Abstract
Over the last few years, Helion and company have established themselves as publishers of a wide and eclectic range of military history. Their offering runs from the very scholarly to the popular ends of the market; from the fifteenth century to the present day and embraces subjects of land, sea and air. On the whole it seems that their target audience are the well-informed military history enthusiasts. This book by John Dillon hits that particular target market exceptionally well.
Dillon’s book is not designed to challenge or to develop our understanding of naval support for the army in the war, but bring the broad outline of events and systems to the attention of enthusiasts for the Revolutionary War who may not have considered the maritime dimension. He does so in a manner that is clear and well written. Dillon acknowledges the importance of those historians of logistics, such as David Syrett, Norman Baker and R.A. Bowler, upon which much of his work is founded. The illustrative examples and quotations are largely provided by the volumes of the Navy Records Society and the Naval Documents of the American Revolution, put online by the US Naval History and Heritage Command.
Dillon has to combine a sense of chronological narrative with the key themes of naval support. Thus, we have chapters that focus on supply of victuals and stores to the army in America, transportation, amphibious co-operation (both in evacuation and attack) and, more broadly, the strategic role of the navy in the war. As a result, the chronology does drift back and forth somewhat, but the readership will probably have a firm enough knowledge of the war not to let this worry them. What is sacrificed is a sense of the development of naval capability during the war. The entry of France into the war in March 1778, approximately coincides with the last of the Naval Documents volumes so far published. It is noticeable that the weight of the narrative shifts to a more general description of events, particularly the Anglo-French war. Dillon provides us with far fewer detailed examples of how naval support operated after 1778, a period which saw major operations in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. The impact of the Spanish declaration in June 1779, which saw the army needing support in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Florida, also receives little attention. Although some points are covered in a general narrative, the reader is not given much detail on the operational issues involved across the range of maritime support.
While Dillon might need a broader brush narrative to deal with the expansion of the war in 1778, which he does very well, it does make it difficult to establish an idea of evolving maritime capability. It is difficult to tell if Dillon believes the various maritime support functions improved, weakened or even changed in the latter part of the war. The conclusions he draws are those that emerge from the broader consideration of events; that the Admiralty and politicians lacked vision; that the generals and admirals were more concerned with their own objectives than collaboration; that naval leaders lacked aggression and that promotion degenerated into considerations of patronage, precedence and seniority, rather than competence. It leaves the impression that naval support had a difficult start and thereafter was in a state of gradual decline until the decisive failure at the Battle of the Chesapeake in September 1781. That there were increasing demands, which were difficult for administrators, naval and military officers to manage, is evident, but how they coped, which aspects adapted or worked well, and which broke under the strain is left unexplored.
This is a story that is worth bringing to a wider audience of military historians. The study of logistics in the American War of Independence was one of the major contributions made by a new generation of naval historians who, from the late 1950s, focused on the administrative foundations of sea power. Around the world, British military campaigns were underpinned by the development of effective naval/maritime systems, operated by capable and adaptive administrators and naval personnel. With a focus on the battlefield, military historians sometimes neglect this vital contribution. At worst they naval element is seen as little more than a taxi service, but more often it is simply taken for granted. Dillon has done a good job in bringing it to their attention.