Abstract
William S. Dudley – retired director of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, DC, original editor of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, author of Maritime Maryland: A History and co-author of The Naval War of 1812: America's Second War of Independence – was well positioned to write this significant and much needed study of the War of 1812. His document collection on the naval War of 1812 has provided a major resource for historians of the conflict – this one included. While historians have studied the major military engagements and the participants, as well as the diplomatic, political and even strategic dimensions of this conflict, this book offers a significant and important examination of how the US Navy met its material and logistical needs in a war that matched the world's greatest navy – Great Britain – against a relative upstart – the USA.
By relying on many of the documents from The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Dudley presents the inner workings of the US Navy during the conflict. The structure of the navy department was non-existent prior to 1798. At the time, there was neither a US Navy nor a Secretary of the Navy – or even a navy department. The diplomatic crises with the North African Muslim world during the 1780s and 1790s fuelled the need for a navy, yet the emergence of a parsimonious Democratic-Republican political party resisted the re-creation of the navy until President John Adams’ administration faced a naval war with France in 1798 in the Quasi-War. Persuading Congress to pass legislation to create a US Navy, Adams appointed Marylander Benjamin Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy. The Federalist administration created a navy that successive Republican administrations maintained and used to defend the young republic.
Dudley explains what it took to build, maintain, man, fit out, provision and send armed ships to sea for extended voyages. Securing government land for naval bases on or near deep water where ships could be built, launched and hauled out for repairs offered the first challenge. Once land was secured, naval yards had to develop depots for lumber, machinery, naval stores and ordnance. Civilian agents had to secure oak, spruce and pine for ship construction and repair, copper for sheathing hulls, iron for fittings and hemp for riggings. In addition to supplies, experienced shipwrights, carpenters, coopers, ironsmiths and sailmakers needed to be employed on navy yards and retained to keep ships in operating and fighting condition.
The new navy department had to recruit, train and retrain its officer corps for the voyages and operations that faced every ship. Able and ordinary seamen and landsmen had to be persuaded to sign aboard ships – and, many times, they were encouraged by promises of bounties or other rewards. Meanwhile, naval yards had to continually secure and maintain a supply of ordnance and ordnance stores, including shots and powder to be placed aboard each ship. Commanding officers then had to ensure that the crew had the training to fire weapons and even use cutlasses.
Finally, commanders needed to maintain the wellness of their crews, keeping them fed, clothed and healthy. Medical officials – naval surgeons and assistant surgeons – had to be assigned to each vessel, and medical instruments and medicines had to be provided for the ships’ sickbays. Ashore, the new US Navy had to employ navy agents, storekeepers, pursers, paymasters and other agents to ensure its smooth functioning. Dudley puts a human face on this story by revealing how Secretaries of the Navy Paul Hamilton and William Jones administered their department, and how they interacted with senior officers to make the department effective. Neither had experience running such a governmental institution, and while Jones had served aboard a privateer during the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), Hamilton had no maritime or naval experience. Jones also had good working relationships with senior officers such as Captains Thomas Truxtun, Hugh Campbell and William Bainbridge, which made up for the lack of a designated Chief of Naval Operations.
Dudley should be congratulated for assembling the primary research to reveal this story. His reliance on American and British primary naval documents regarding the War of 1812 and his selective use of secondary sources to illustrate his points further reveals a generally overlooked facet of the war. He reveals the administration of the navy department and the logistical support of the American fleet, which highlights the internal complications faced during the struggle against Great Britain. Anyone interested in the naval War of 1812 should certainly add this to their bookshelf.