The corvette Africa : An episode on Känsö quarantine station 1817

Introduction

On 25 May 1817, the Ottoman corvette Africa set sail from the North African port of Alexandria and headed for Livorno. The purpose of the journey was to sail further to Sweden with a cargo of cotton, saffron and other Egyptian products addressed to the Ottoman general agent to Europe, Ismael Gibraltar, in Stockholm. The goods were then to be presented as samples to the Swedish Board of Commerce in an effort to promote trade relations. ¹ However, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the plague sporadically flared up in ports around the Mediterranean. Around the time of Africa's departure from Livorno, several consular reports reached Sweden informing the authorities of plague outbreaks in Alexandria, the port of Bona and Algiers. The only bulwark against shipboard epidemics at the time was the quarantine station on the island of Känsö in the Gothenburg archipelago on the west coast of Sweden. ²

However, there was a problem, the elaborate quarantine station, which was to be built on four artificial islands, was still under construction by the summer of 1817 and was thus unable to accommodate any vessels infected, or suspected of being infected, by the plague. ³ The quarantine commission in Gothenburg, which had been formed in 1804 as a response to the outbreak of yellow fever in the West Indies and North America, therefore had to resort to some rather extraordinary measures to accommodate Africa. ⁴ The measures taken indicate that the quarantine of Africa was of great importance, not only to prevent a possible outbreak of the plague, but also to secure future commerce and trade relations with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in the event of a virulent outbreak, or if Africa had to be sent to another Nordic quarantine station, the reputation of the costly quarantine station on Känsö would be put in serious jeopardy.

The aim of this article is twofold. First, it will trace the voyage of Africa from its departure from Alexandria, via Livorno, to Sweden, examining how the quarantine commission managed the episode, the eventual quarantine of Africa, and how the construction of the quarantine station subsequently developed. This will chiefly contribute to the existing historical scholarship on permanent maritime quarantine stations during the nineteenth century in general and the limited historical research on Känsö quarantine station in particular. ⁵ Second, the episode will be considered within the broader context of Swedish–Ottoman relations in the early nineteenth century. While historical scholarship has extensively examined Swedish connections with the Ottoman Empire and North Africa during the eighteenth century, these relationships in the early nineteenth century remain comparatively under-researched. ⁶ This article therefore seeks to contribute to the existing literature by illuminating this episode and, in doing so adding another piece to the broader historical understanding of Swedish–Ottoman interactions during this period. ⁷

To fully understand the significance of Africa's voyage and the measures taken by the quarantine commission, it is necessary to consider the episode within its wider historical context. Africa's arrival occurred at the intersection of changing Swedish commercial ambitions, shifting diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire and the development of new institutional responses to the persistent threat of epidemic disease. Quarantine practices, maritime trade and foreign policy were closely intertwined in the early nineteenth century, particularly in relation to the Mediterranean world, which was simultaneously perceived as a region of commercial opportunity and a source of epidemiological risk. The following section therefore outlines the broader expansion of European and Swedish maritime engagement in North Africa, the transformation of Swedish foreign policy after 1809, and the emergence of permanent quarantine institutions such as the station on Känsö.

Swedish Mediterranean trade and quarantine

European maritime trade with North Africa expanded significantly in the late eighteenth century, and by the early nineteenth century several European powers sought to establish a more permanent presence in the region. Sweden's maritime activity in the Mediterranean had increased markedly from the mid-eighteenth century, facilitated by peace treaties with North African principalities, which enabled Swedish merchant vessels to operate with greater security. Nevertheless, tensions periodically escalated into open conflict. Sweden participated alongside the United States in the First Barbary War during the first years of the nineteenth century to defend its commercial interests and safeguard its maritime access to North African waters. In the aftermath of the conflict, and throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Sweden maintained a substantial merchant fleet operating in the region, reflecting the continued importance of North African trade to Swedish commercial interests. ⁸ At the same time, Sweden's relations with the Ottoman Empire deteriorated towards the end of the eighteenth century. Sweden and the Ottoman Empire had previously maintained a defensive alliance against Russia, formalized in 1739, which reflected their shared strategic interest in offsetting Russian expansion. However, this alignment weakened as Sweden's geopolitical priorities shifted. The alliance was effectively terminated in 1790, when Sweden concluded a peace treaty with Russia which ended the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. This development marked a significant reorientation of Sweden's diplomatic position and contributed to a more strained relationship with the Ottoman Empire in the subsequent years. ⁹

After having to cede Finland to Tsarist Russia in 1809, Sweden was forced to change its foreign policy. The so-called politics of 1812 directed trade relations from the Baltic region in the east towards the Mediterranean in the south as per agreement with Russia. ¹⁰ Three years later, the Congress of Vienna established a new framework for managing international relations, in which the major European powers were expected to resolve their disputes through diplomacy at the conference table rather than through armed conflict. This system was mainly promoted by the colonial and commercial interests of Britain and France. In this context, issues regarding maritime quarantine in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century must be considered not merely as public health measures but also as an instrument to prevent trade disputes and other conflicts from escalating across borders. ¹¹

The adoption of permanent and preventative institutions, such as maritime quarantine stations, in late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century Europe was largely based on the notion of a perpetually diseased Levant and North Africa as opposed to the healthy western Europe. ¹² This notion would in turn shape the later nineteenth-century definition of these areas as diseased, unable to control outbreaks of the plague, and even politically backwards. During the eighteenth century, the plague was therefore widely believed to be transported to Europe from Ottoman lands through traded goods. Contempt would also be directed towards the alleged refusal of the Ottoman Empire to adopt specific preventive practices against the plague in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Maritime quarantine stations were thus extensively adopted to safeguard Western nations from the Ottoman Empire; furthermore, this was generally framed in terms of religious opposition between the healthy Christendom and the diseased non-Christendom. ¹³

Before the nineteenth century, there were no permanent quarantine stations in Sweden; however, temporary stations were sometimes constructed upon news of epidemics in Europe. In 1771, for example, a temporary quarantine station was built on Känsö, but it was abandoned only a year later. A herring saltery was instead constructed on the island in 1775 by a wholesaler named Nils Tengberg. A few years later he sold his establishment to another wholesaler named Adam Gavin who managed to secure a lease of the entire island of Känsö for 50 years, starting in 1794. The Board of Commerce, which had the authority over all quarantine matters in Sweden, would instead rely on certificates of health from foreign quarantine stations for entry into Swedish ports. Certificates were only to be issued to ships bound for Sweden that had unloaded and fumigated their cargo and undergone the requisite period of quarantine in the port of Malta, Marseille or Livorno. By the late 1770s, news of outbreaks of the plague in Ottoman ports and on the northern coast of Poland reached The Board of Commerce and several temporary quarantine stations were once again established along the Swedish coast. ¹⁴

From the mid-seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, the period commonly referred to as the ‘Great Herring Period’, large schools of herring frequented the western coast of Sweden. The resulting increased fishery yield demanded larger quantities of salt for preservation, which was chiefly brought from the Iberian Peninsula. By the end of the eighteenth century, concerns regarding yellow fever on the southern coast of Spain, coupled with alarms of outbreaks of plague in Ottoman ports, thus brought the matter of a permanent quarantine station to the top of the agenda. ¹⁵ As a response, the quarantine commission in Gothenburg was formed in 1804 with Admiralty and Provincial physician Pehr Dubb as its chief medical expert. Dubb proposed a permanent quarantine station on the island of Känsö to meet the demands of the increased import from possibly infected areas. Dubb's plan, which was eventually agreed upon, was remarkably ambitious for its time; a hospital and three storehouses were to be built on artificial islands on the north side of the island. Nevertheless, Gavin still had his lease on Känsö for another 40 years; consequently, the Swedish Crown was forced to lease Känsö from Gavin. Drawn-out legal disputes would therefore postpone the start of construction of the quarantine station until the spring of 1816. ¹⁶

The quarantine commission also made provisions for new quarantine regulations based on the ‘contagium vivum’ theory propagated by physician Pehr von Afzelius. Epidemic diseases, Afzelius contended, as Carl Linnaeus had done half a century before him, spread via tiny insects invisible to the naked eye. The extermination of these insects through fumigation was therefore to be the basis for the quarantine treatment on Känsö. ¹⁷ The regulations, which were approved in 1806, thus focused on fumigation of all textiles, animal hides and living animals, but also objects crafted from metals, such as tools, medallions and coins. ¹⁸ Transmission of disease from one person to another was thus not considered in any depth in the new regulations; it was the cargo that was perceived as dangerous and the main source of disease. ¹⁹

Arguably, the most significant accomplishment of the 1806 quarantine regulations was the establishment of a standardized and comprehensive network for the dissemination of information. Swedish trading agents and consuls in foreign ports were now liable to report to the Board of Commerce of any contagious diseases in their trading district; the reports would then be sent to the quarantine commission in Gothenburg. ²⁰ The general Swedish populace, its civic leaders, physicians, and especially skippers, were also to be attentive to any information regarding epidemic diseases. If they could gather any information on possible virulent outbreaks of illnesses, they were to report it directly to the Board of Commerce. If an epidemic disease was confirmed, this was then to be communicated in the pulpits of every church in Sweden as well as in all the newspapers. ²¹ After the announcement had been given, the quarantine regulations were to be enforced and the quarantine station on Känsö was to be isolated. All cases of disobedience and breaking of the quarantine regulations were punishable by the death penalty or a life sentence in one of the notorious fortress prisons. Upon the enforcement of these regulations, ships lacking both a certificate of health and a comprehensive inventory of their cargo were prohibited from entering Sweden prior to arrival at the quarantine station on Känsö. There, ships were either placed in quarantine for a set number of days, depending on their origin and the extent of cargo requiring fumigation, or had their cargo burned entirely. ²²

The new regulations also gave the quarantine commission extensive authority in cases of emergency; for example, if an epidemic disease gained foothold in Sweden, they had the power to encircle entire localities with armed guards. ²³ This was never put into practice; it is nonetheless significative of the quarantine commission's staunch determination and uncompromising attitude towards all quarantine matters. While the quarantine commission gained authority, the local population of the islands in the archipelago on the Swedish west coast gained new responsibilities. For example, they were to select trustworthy persons among themselves to act as quarantine inspectors and be particularly attentive to any suspicious ships passing by the coast. Furthermore, in the case of a shipwreck, the island dwellers were to report the incident and in no way come into contact with the wreck while the regulations were enforced. ²⁴

In early 1817, the voyage of Africa was being prepared. The purpose of the journey to Sweden, as stated in a letter addressed to the Swedish Crown, was to present the Board of Commerce with samples of Egyptian goods and to establish friendly trading opportunities between Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. The venture had been planned by Muhammed Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, and tasked with this undertaking was his general agent to Europe, Ismael Gibraltar. ²⁵ Ali became the Viceroy of Egypt in 1805 and began imposing sanitary restrictions and quarantine on shipments from plague-stricken ports such as Constantinople. These restrictions were imposed to favour local shipping and to foster manufacturing locally, all in line with Ali's mercantile ambitions. However, Ali's push for sanitary restrictions was also driven by other political objectives such as the reorganisation of Egypt's military capacity. ²⁶ Having effectively eliminated a number Mamluk beys in Cairo by 1811, Ali acquired independence of action in Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. Emboldened by his surge to power, he undertook a series of innovative reforms wholly reorganizing Egyptian society, which has led historians to consider him the founder of modern Egypt. ²⁷ Ali also developed the Egyptian navy, and its first ocean-going ship was none other than Africa, which was launched in Alexandria in 1810 and fitted out and coppered in London the same year. Other ships were then hired, and one American brig was bought on Malta; this newly acquired fleet was then sent of to Europe loaded with Egyptian goods and with orders to buy arms for campaigns into the Arabian Peninsula. ²⁸ To summarize, by the early nineteenth century, Swedish maritime trade in the Baltic Sea was severely restricted by Russian control, necessitating a strategic redirection towards commerce in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Ali required European weaponry to equip his developing army and navy. However, putting this mutually advantageous exchange into practice proved far more difficult than one might expect. The 1806 quarantine regulations were rigid, and in early nineteenth century Sweden, the Levant and North Africa were widely perceived as regions of persistent disease. Furthermore, ongoing legal disputes with Gavin over the lease of Känsö also meant that no quarantine station had yet been established to receive Africa upon its arrival.

A race against time

Gibraltar arrived ahead of Africa in Stockholm in June of 1817 and had reportedly already made considerable orders of both rifles and ammunition at the foundries of Finspång and Åker. ²⁹ However, on 24 June, Swedish consul Johan Wilhelm Karström in Naples reported to the quarantine commission in Gothenburg that multiple ships had sailed from Alexandria despite the port being stricken by the plague. ³⁰ Among these was a Swedish ship on board which one of the crewmen had already succumbed to the plague. ³¹ The first mention of Africa was reported to the quarantine commission by consul Joachim Grabien on 2 July. Grabien, who was the Swedish consul in Livorno, reported that Africa, under its Captain Hafiz Aly, had already sailed from Livorno and headed for Sweden but had not undergone any treatment of its cargo despite having sailed from the plague-stricken port Alexandria. Africa had only been in quarantine for 20 days in Livorno and its cargo had not been unloaded and fumigated. ³² This is somewhat remarkable, as the port of Livorno always enforced strict quarantine procedures for all ships coming from the Ottoman Levant and North Africa because of the frequency of epidemic diseases. Even ships arriving from Ottoman territories with a clean certificate of health were required to undergo a 30 day quarantine, while those carrying a foul certificate were subject to 40 days of quarantine. ³³ The Ottoman Empire also collaborated extensively on surveillance and control policies regarding quarantine matters with Italy during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the news of the plague in Alexandria was thus most likely well known in Livorno at the time. ³⁴ We can only speculate as to why Africa was not subject to the proper quarantine procedures. One reason could be that commercial pressures competed with medical precaution and that the former outweighed the latter. Another plausible explanation could be corruption in the port of Livorno. British Philanthropist and prison reformer John Howard, for example, visited Mediterranean lazarettos in the 1780s and found countless claims of extortion and bribery. ³⁵ The captain of Africa, Aly, could thus plausibly have bribed his way to more beneficial quarantine arrangements. Although these are, as noted, merely tentative speculations, it is sufficient for the purposes of this article to determine that the ship Africa departed Livorno and headed towards Sweden without its cargo having undergone any treatment.

The quarantine commission continued to receive worrisome reports of plague outbreaks throughout the Mediterranean. By 7 July, Swedish consul David Gustaf Ankarloo, for example, reported to the quarantine commission of an outbreak of the plague in Algiers. ³⁶ On 17 July, he also reported that the plague had most likely spread to Algiers from Alexandria via the port of Bona. However, Ankarloo did not appear to be too worried about the situation at the time. He stated that the plague always: ‘lost its strength during the hot season’, and that, speaking from experience: ‘it is hoped that by the month of August it will come to an end’. ³⁷ The rapid dissemination of the reports of the consuls to the commission is quite noteworthy, Swedish consuls in North Africa showed a strong ability to adapt to local cultural and political contexts. ³⁸ Their extensive knowledge, connections, personal interests and network in many ways helped maintain the political and economic systems in North Africa as well as Swedish trading interests. ³⁹ But despite their best efforts, Africa was now unreachable as it had already prematurely sailed from Livorno; a race against time had started for the quarantine commission in Gothenburg.

In late July and early August, skippers and residents of the archipelago outside Gothenburg were formally notified of their responsibilities under the 1806 quarantine regulations concerning ships arriving from the Mediterranean region in general, and Africa in particular. The orders were to employ the utmost vigilance towards any suspicious ship passing by or arriving at the quarantine station and on no condition board any ship without proper permission. Initially, as the quarantine station on Känsö had not yet finished construction, the quarantine commission also ordered that, should Africa arrive, its entire cargo was to be burned as per the 1806 quarantine regulations. ⁴⁰ The formal owner of the cargo, Ismael Gibraltar, was still in Stockholm at the time and, given his likely significant stake in the matter, was presumably reluctant to see the samples and gifts intended for the Board of Commerce be burnt. The mutually beneficial trade arrangement was thus, at that moment, at risk of quite literally going up in flames.

On 16 August, the day finally came when Africa arrived in the anchorage at Känsö; however, there were still no facilities to accommodate the ship; the option of burning the cargo was therefore still considered. ⁴¹ On its arrival, Captain Aly provided Quarantine Master Backman with the ship's manifest, the ship's crew numbered a total of 60 men, all of whom appeared healthy. It was also recorded in the manifest that no privateers had been onboard, but as mentioned earlier, no quarantine treatment such as fumigation had been performed and consequently no certificate of health had been issued from Livorno. This was most likely the first time the Quarantine Master had been faced with a challenge of this magnitude; he therefore ordered the ship to remain in the anchorage until the quarantine station's physician, Dr Hultén, could further inquire as to the state of health of the ship. ⁴²

The quarantine commission was now under severe pressure and faced with either burning the cargo, but only with Gibraltar's permission, or sending the ship to a quarantine station in a neighbouring country. These were two options that, according to the quarantine commission, would seriously damage the reputation of the almost finished and extremely costly quarantine station on Känsö and most likely also deter future commerce. Remarkably, the option of burning the cargo had despite this already been approved on behalf of the Collegium of Commerce by Dubb. This action fell outside his jurisdiction, prompting a heated debate within the quarantine commission, one that was later removed from the official protocol. In this debate, Dubb vigorously defended himself against the harsh criticisms directed at him by the rest of the quarantine commission. He emphasised the emergency of the situation and that there was no time to convene the entire quarantine commission for deliberation, leaving him no option but to make an executive decision. Moreover, Dubb pointed to the perceived impossibility of treating a suspected plague-infected ship in the half-built storage facilities, given that some 150 officers and contractors were working on Känsö at the time; the risk of an uncontrolled spread was deemed far too high. The debate culminated when a third option was finally conceived wherein the quarantine commission decided that a provisional storehouse specifically designated for Africa was to be built. The planks used for this storehouse, it was argued, could after the treatment of Africa's cargo be reused as building materials for the remaining permanent buildings. Additionally, building the provisional storehouse would only take a few days with so many labourers already on the island. ⁴³

An entirely new building was, however, most likely not constructed for Africa. ⁴⁴ It is more likely that an older storehouse, the so-called ‘quarantine storehouse’, was refurbished and repurposed for storage and fumigation. Originally constructed in 1771, it had served as a herring saltery from the late 1770s before being leased by Gavin to the Crown in 1804. The building was demolished in 1818, and some of its materials may very well have been reused in some of the permanent structures later constructed at the quarantine station. ⁴⁵ To further ensure the safety of the quarantine procedures, the commission also ordered an armoured vessel from the Swedish Navy to be stationed near the quarantine station when the cargo was eventually unloaded from Africa. ⁴⁶ Concurrently, while Africa was moored at the anchorage, the commission received new reports from Swedish trading houses in Livorno reporting ‘unpleasant news regarding the outbreak of plague in Alexandria’. ⁴⁷ Tensions on Känsö were thus most likely at their peak at this time.

Nine days after Africa arrived, on 25 August, the provisional storehouse was presumably completed since the quarantine treatment, with its many intricate fumigation procedures, finally commenced. The quarantine commission also ordered Quarantine Master Backman to relinquish his other duties and focus entirely on Africa, with Carl Rydell assuming command as Quarantine Master. ⁴⁸ In addition to its own storehouse and designated Quarantine Master, Africa also appears to have received several other notable privileges. By 30 August, for instance, the Governor of Gothenburg, Axel Rosen, unilaterally decided, without consulting the quarantine commission, that Gibraltar could select which parts of his cargo were to be shipped to Stockholm first after their fumigation. This effectively allowed Gibraltar to dictate the order of fumigation, a privilege not provided for in the 1806 quarantine regulations. ⁴⁹ The significance attributed to Africa, its cargo, the fate of the quarantine station and indeed the future of trading relations between Sweden and the Ottoman Empire thus become unmistakably clear.

The quarantine of Africa

Africa would remain in quarantine on Känsö from its arrival on 16 August until 28 September. The archival records do not offer a complete account of the quarantine procedures carried out on Africa. However, Dubb described the intricate quarantine treatment and fumigation procedures in a report published in 1818, most likely based on the experiences with the quarantine of Africa. In his report he stated that all ships arriving from areas of infection, or under the suspicion of being infected, or if any of the crewmembers had been sick in any way or inexplicably died on board the ship, were to raise a black flag at the fore of the ship or on the top of the main mast. Those responsible for the ship's quarantine were to provide the skipper of the quarantined ship with a form translated into English, German, and French. This form was then encased in a plate box which was given to the skipper of the quarantined ship by a boat hook. When the skipper had filled out the forms, he was to soak the forms in vinegar and then put the forms back in the plate box. After this, the skipper attached a long rope to the plate box which was then lowered down a few metres under the sea. A quarantine officer would then pick up the plate box using the boat hook and bring it back to the quarantine station. Following this, all the passengers and crew were to stand on the railing of the ship for the quarantine officer to inspect from a nearby vessel. The passengers and crew were then to perform certain body movements to assure the officer of their health. The forms were then opened in an examination room by personnel wearing wax gloves, the forms were then hung on strings and again dipped in vinegar and fumigated. A report was then submitted to the quarantine commission, who decided what action needed to be taken. ⁵⁰

If a ship was deemed to require a 40 day quarantine, as was the case with Africa, it warranted the most comprehensive fumigation procedures. Firstly, the ship was to be fumigated with hydrochloric acid gas three times a day, with each room fumigated for three hours before being aired while the passengers and crew were on the top deck. The second fumigation employed a combination of sulfuric and nitric acids, which was reported to be safe for crew and passengers, allowing them to remain in the rooms during treatment. In contrast, the third fumigation utilized oxygenated hydrochloric acid, representing the most potent and aggressive of the fumigation procedures. ⁵¹

On 25 August, Backman boarded Africa, unpacked some of the wool, fumigated it three times, closed all the hatches of the ship and fumigated the decks while the crew was onboard. The next day the wool and linen goods were unloaded and brought to the provisional storehouse for fumigation and airing. The entire crew of Africa was then ordered to stand by the railing for medical inspection; all were found to be in good health. The subsequent weeks passed much in the same way and as outlined by Dubb in his 1818 report of the quarantine station. Goods were being unloaded, fumigated, and aired, and the crew was also continuously inspected until 18 September when the goods were loaded back on board Africa. ⁵² Finally, on 28 September, the quarantine station's physician Dr Hultén came on board Africa and provided Captain Aly with the ‘praktika’, which was the officially issued written permission for a quarantined ship to have free communication with land and unload its cargo. There had been no cases of illness and Africa was declared plague-free. ⁵³

The crew of Africa could now, after a total of 44 days of quarantine, reportedly with joy, set foot on land. One of the newspapers described the crew as follows: ‘you could not enough praise the proper conduct this mixture of nationalities observes which proves that good discipline on board prevails’. ⁵⁴ The newspaper article also reported that a celebration had been prepared for the successful quarantine of Africa, but due to poor weather conditions, it had to be postponed until 30 September. On this day, by 11 AM, the ship Droust arrived from Gothenburg to the quarantine station on Känsö. On board was Axel von Rosen, Vice-Admiral Carl Johan af Wirsén, all the members of the quarantine commission, military and civilian officials, Gibraltar and his lieutenant Effendi, and ‘foreign consuls and several other dignitaries’. After inspecting the almost-finished quarantine station, the quarantine commission set the tables and invited the eminent party to a midday meal. von Rosen made a toast with the ‘liveliest enthusiasm’, which was accompanied by music and gun salutes. After the meal, the eminent party visited the barracks where the quarantine station workers were also having a celebratory meal. When the eminent party reached the barracks the two parties converged, and everyone celebrated together and proclaimed toasts all around. By 6 PM the eminent party had sailed off on Droust back to Gothenburg accompanied by gun salutes from both the canons on Känsö and the canons on Africa. A considerable number of the local populace from surrounding islands had also witnessed the celebrations, which increased the liveliness of the departure. ⁵⁵

Interestingly, these very grand celebrations seem to have been lost to time. The only reference to these celebrations, academic or otherwise, is a superficial mention in the 1966 Styrsö parish book chronicling the overall history of the island community of which Känsö is a part. The celebrations in the early autumn of 1817 are referred to as being held as the official inauguration of the quarantine station, but there is no mention of Africa, Ismael Gibraltar, or the risk of an outbreak of the plague. ⁵⁶ It is also important to keep in mind that the quarantine station at Känsö was not yet finished by the time of this supposed official inauguration in late September of 1817; the construction of the complex quarantine station had after all started only about a year earlier. Construction officially started on the first of May 1816 when 120 men from Bohuslän's Regiment arrived at Känsö; the overseer of construction was Captain Jacob Forsell. By September of that year, three of the four artificial islands had been constructed; these were meant for storehouses, the so-called plague-lazaretto, and a hospital. In the spring of 1817, construction resumed after a halt over the winter months with a total of 150 men, again from the Bohuslän Regiment, but now accompanied by a few civilian contractors. A lookout tower and a small house called the ‘parlour’ were included. ⁵⁷

By the spring of 1818, work commenced once again after the winter break, this time with men from Älvsborg's Regiment. This last workforce built the last storehouse and performed rock blasting while civilian contractors finished the interiors of the quarantine station's buildings. The quarantine commission finally inspected the entirety of the quarantine station by the spring of 1819 and found everything to be ‘exceptional’. Forsell received much praise for his contribution, although the budget had been surpassed rather excessively. ⁵⁸ Taken as a whole it would appear as if the quarantine station on Känsö was by no means finished by the celebrations in late September 1817. For this reason, I would suggest that the celebrations were more likely to have been in recognition of the successful quarantine of Africa and an opportunity to promote trading relations with the Ottoman Empire, rather than an official inauguration of the quarantine station. At the very least, the celebrations may be considered a premature inauguration of the quarantine station, insofar as the quarantine of Africa constituted the first successful quarantine on the permanent quarantine station on Känsö.

Epilogue and conclusions

The last part of the episode on Känsö quarantine station started on 12 December 1817, roughly two months after the celebrations. On this day, two ships loaded with ammunition arrived in Gothenburg and still two more ships with ammunition and canons were on their way. The material was to be loaded onboard Africa which would set its sails back to Alexandria. ⁵⁹ Gibraltar would remain in Stockholm for much of 1818 as well, from there he made numerous travels to different foundries across Sweden. He also commissioned a ship from Karlskrona which was given the name Det Sköna Sverige, later named Asia, which was also to be loaded with ammunition, canons and iron before setting sail towards Alexandria. ⁶⁰ On 8 December of 1818, this ship with a crew of 50 Swedish and Finnish mates sailed through the Helsingör strait headed for Livorno and then to its destination in Alexandria. ⁶¹ Only a few years later however, both Asia and Africa would be sunk by Greek fireships in 1824 and 1825 respectively. ⁶²

The episode of the Känsö quarantine station can thus be considered within the wider context of Swedish–Ottoman relations and demonstrates significant parallels with both earlier and subsequent Swedish commercial interactions with the Ottoman Empire. For instance, to settle the debts incurred by King Charles XII, following his residence in the Ottoman Empire after his defeat at Poltava, and to strengthen trade relations in the Mediterranean, two Swedish envoys were dispatched to Constantinople in 1734. The Collegium of Commerce appointed Edvard Carlesson and Fredric von Höpken, who, through a combination of bribery and gift-giving, successfully negotiated the settlement of the debt. This mission subsequently laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Swedish Levantine Company. Festivities celebrating trade with the Ottomans were held aboard the Swedish ship Patrioten, which was loaded with approximately 30,000 rifles and other ordnance intended for Constantinople. Another vessel, Sverige, was fitted out as a warship in Karlskrona for presentation to the Ottoman Sultan. However, it was intercepted and sunk by Spain, which, together with Russia, Austria and the Vatican, opposed the provision of Swedish arms to the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, Patrioten was presented to the Sultan, and the debt was formally annulled. ⁶³

Furthermore, by 1817–1818 Sweden delivered cannons, ammunition and ordnance to Ottoman Tripolitania in North Africa. Initially, the Viceroy refused to pay; however, after careful deliberation, he accepted the terms of the purchase and publicly presented the Swedish ship with oxen, sheep and bread as a gesture of goodwill. ⁶⁴ The Swedish consuls in the North African states would thus adopt a discourse and course of action centred on gift-giving, celebrations and tributes to gain the trust of the Ottomans. The last Swedish consul in Tripoli, Adolf Hahr, for example, emphasised annual fees, gifts and trust to reduce the price of protection of commercial ships in the Mediterranean in the 1830s and 1840s. His way of doing this was to consent to the many high demands of the Pasha. ⁶⁵

These examples share several similarities to the episode on Känsö quarantine station and further demonstrate how Swedish authorities had to navigate complex, high-stakes situations, balancing multiple priorities to achieve their objectives. It also shows how commercial interactions were closely intertwined with diplomacy and how Sweden took proactive steps to secure trust and maintain good relations with Ottoman authorities. There is also a fair share of ritualized public ceremonies and symbolic gestures involved in Swedish–Ottoman relations, which served to reinforce diplomatic and commercial relationships. Lastly, the Swedish authorities were also continuously engaged in risk mitigation, whether from disease or diplomatic complications, before trade could safely proceed.

Lastly, this article suggests that maritime quarantine was not just a health measure; it was a complex system at the intersection of medicine, commerce, infrastructure and international politics. This article has also demonstrated how the establishment of the first permanent quarantine station in Sweden required a great deal of improvisation, especially since infrastructure and political and commercial stakes made strict enforcement impractical. Rules were bent or adapted on several occasions, such as the construction of the provisional storehouse, thus avoiding the burning of Africa's cargo, or the special privileges given to Gibraltar by von Rosen. This suggests that the establishment of permanent quarantine stations in nineteenth-century Europe could be considered an adaptive process based on real-life experiences and not solely preconceived notions of the perpetually diseased and un-Christian Ottoman Empire or North Africa. At the same time, cultural bias and geopolitical perceptions cannot be disregarded. As historian Marina Iní emphasises, nineteenth-century European maritime quarantine practices continuously reinforced an East–West divide; she argues that these practices were shaped primarily by considerations of nationality and ethnic identity. ⁶⁶ Despite this, this article has proved that commercial and infrastructural pressures could, at least temporarily, override this divide.