Silesians in the Face of Polish Cultural Dominance

Dominated Groups

The problems of dominated groups appeared in sociology relatively recently, and in Polish sociology it is still underused. Initially, an interest in dominated groups heading towards emancipation was associated with the struggle against colonialism and its effects. Independence movements in colonial countries; the awakening of awareness of their rights among newly liberated peoples; the new identity of Africans, Afro-Americans, and Asians; and the crises facing the economies of peripheral countries turned attention to these groups. Therefore, since the mid-twentieth century, sociology has been analysing the functioning and transformation of states or, more broadly, communities that once constituted colonies. At first, this only referred to the countries that were officially under a foreign protectorate, generally non-European countries. Recently, however, this type of analysis is used to analyse subordinate groups in non-colonial countries. This approach attempts to explain why the underlying political process, the unequal status of one group and domination of another, persists. The application of the postcolonial analogy results from the incompatibility of contemporary sociological models with the analysis of dependent and dominated communities that live in Europe. Raewyn Connell described this state perfectly in her book Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science. ² Until thirty years ago, marginalised groups were not discussed in European sociology, for no importance was attached to their existence. It was only the war in the Balkans and the collapse of the USSR and Czechoslovakia that showed the desperation of subordinate nations in their struggle for independence. ³ However, the social sciences could not comprehensively analyse the behaviour of such groups, most of whom, if not affected by forced assimilation, were vegetating on the outskirts of large states or nations. The most noticeable problem in postcolonial or permanently dependent countries is the multitude of different ethnic-national identifications. Academic sociology, which R. Connell calls “North Atlantic” sociology, is generally poor at dealing with this problem. It cannot explain the diversity of these identifications, their complexity and the oppositional classification criteria underlying them. In Europe, there can be observed not so much postcolonial identifications, but rather liberation movements of groups that are not satisfied with their status. ⁴ Recently, it has been Catalonia, but in the past, there were the Basques, Bretons, and (always) the Scots fighting to change their position. This category of emancipation movements can also include the behaviour of borderland groups, who are always doomed to be subordinate to one of the ir stronger neighbours. These groups are often not physically borderline communities, but are primarily culturally distinctive. ⁵ This is the situation of the Hungarians in Romania, the Hungarians in Slovakia, the Turks in Bulgaria, as well as the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians in Poland. Other minority groups also fight for recognition and equal status, e.g. the Silesians in Poland, the Gagauz people in Moldova, or the Roma in the Balkans.

Postcolonial Thought and Its Application

Postcolonial thinkers, including those associated with the Subaltern Studies research group in India (SSC), have tried to present the problems of dependent countries by focusing on their cultural difficulties. Their names have been well known in metropolitan science for almost half a century, but they only function in their area, in their subfield. Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Franz Fanon, Ranajit Guha, Ahmad Aijaz, Leela Gandhi, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ashis Nandy, Amílcar Cabral, Albert Memmi, and Aimé Césaire are occasionally referred to in leading sociological works, but mainly when it comes to non-mainstream social thought or when metropolises do not understand events outside the centre. But a similar situation, a misunderstanding of relations between groups, also appears in Europe and it is worth taking advantage of postcolonial thought.

One of the most eminent thinkers of this trend, Edward Said, claimed that “it was only when subaltern figures like women, Orientalists, blacks, and other ‘natives’ made enough noise that they were paid attention to, and asked in so to speak.” They must win their right to be something different from the dominant group. ⁶ When considering events in Europe or North America, where dominated groups must also make their presence heard, Said’s words are equally understandable. It seems that some of the discussions among postcolonial thinkers can be successfully transferred to the “North Atlantic” area. They can also be borrowed for European analyses. In this case, an interesting reflection from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is contained in the article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” that talks about the role of the anthropologist as a researcher and member of the study group, and also a subordinate group. ⁷ Her questions relate to the anthropologist’s attitude and are also valid among European researchers from dominated groups. Namely, is an anthropologist allowed to study her or his own group, influence it, and at the same time represent it outside? If this person is to remain only a researcher, who can then reasonably and reliably represent this group? On the one hand, the researcher has more professional knowledge than the average member of the group and as an educated and bicultural person, she or he can explain to others what is really important for the group. Then again, is such translation not connected with a non-scientific, subjective presentation of events? Said, similarly, was unconvinced by social studies conducted by persons from outside the subordinate group. He argued that anthropology, as a product of Western thought, approaches the study of “native people” in subordinate countries from a distance while looking down on them. In his opinion, in such studies, the interlocutors are often random people, and the researcher needs to know whom to talk to in order to receive complete information. Researchers from the outside are generally deprived of such knowledge. As he argued, external researchers do not see or understand the subtleties of colonial and postcolonial situations.

Furthermore, the history, tradition, and texts by the dominated are, in this case, a response to the requirements of the West. Sometimes they are formed by local elites who are nevertheless associated with the dominant group. ⁸ They are therefore not representative. The burden of colonialism is on everyone’s shoulders, which makes it difficult for researchers to understand a society other than their own. Therefore, research on such communities must be conducted through a multifaceted approach using different sources of information. ⁹ From a European perspective, it is possible to speak about the inferiority of minority groups (ethnic, cultural, or sexual) and treat their situation through post-colonial analogies. And questions similar to those posed by Spivak can be asked of European researchers. How do you study a group you know well? Should you adopt an emic or etic approach? ¹⁰ Thus, the important questions are whether it is possible to look at the group being examined objectively, from the side, and how far is total objectivity possible? Can one allow for emotional language when describing the group that is being studied and to which one also belongs? Is an analysis free from such burdens more reliable? Perhaps emotional involvement allows a deeper understanding of the essence of problems? Are researchers with a formal education only supposed to describe and analyse the group under examination, or are they expected to give a hint of strategy? On the other hand, according to Connell, native researchers with a ‘metropolitan education’ are able to use a language understood by other scholars, so they can be more effective in action. Is it important who can talk about the problems of subordinate groups, and how? There are further doubts as to whom the researchers are to be loyal to and whom to serve? These dilemmas raised in postcolonial countries are also current in the centre, in “North Atlantic” countries, in Europe.

In an interview with Elizabeth Grosz for Thesis Eleven in 1984, G. Spivak spoke about the specific role of intellectuals in shaping society and their impact on the masses. ¹¹ According to her, intellectuals, especially in postcolonial communities, have no influence on the group, because global events are intellectually more attractive to them. This remark is close to what M. Hechter wrote about when analysing internal colonialism in Great Britain. He noticed there that local elites were trying to find themselves in the metropolitan group, in the political, economic, and cultural centre. The representatives of the provincial elites are therefore faithful to the rules created in the centre, because they have aspirations for metropolitan membership. ¹²

Problems Arising after Liberation

Spivak, like Bhabha and Said, are interested in the next stage in history, namely, the state after liberation from domination. Her student, Leela Gandhi, asks if subordinate groups have ever been represented in history. Can subordinate classes and groups speak about their past and current plans, and if so, with whose voice? ¹³ In her opinion, the past is a big trauma and, as a consequence, a big obstacle for the dominated as they build a new identity. Her views are, in this matter, close to Said, who wrote:

To have been colonized was a fate with lasting, indeed grotesquely unfair results, especially after national independence had been achieved. Poverty, dependency, underdevelopment, various pathologies of power and corruption, plus of course notable achievements in war, literacy, economic development: this mix of characteristics designated the colonized people who had freed themselves on one level but who had remained victims of their past on another. ¹⁴

Building a new group identity, revitalising one’s own culture which has so far been suppressed, clearing accounts with the dominant, is a very difficult activity. Some events must be recalled, while others should be suppressed and muted. Dealing with the past is not only about pondering wrongs. Gandhi even believes that some form of “postcolonial amnesia” is actually necessary. Then the group can talk about their version of history and erase from the group’s memory the painful sensations and humiliation resulting from domination. This is a part of the process of getting rid of the burden. However, the past must be remembered, and complete amnesia is not required. She notes that

the forgotten archive of the colonial encounter narrates multiple stories of contestation and its discomfiting other, complicity. ¹⁵

That is why writing a new history, as well as returning to cultural roots, is extremely important for the group liberating itself from domination and constitutes a kind of catharsis. Attempts to apply postcolonial theories or to adapt such a way of thinking have been made in the Polish case by linguists. Olena Duć Fajfer and Karolina Pospiszil have examined Polish minority literature from the postcolonial perspective. Their textual analysis shows how opposition to the dominant group is created through the group’s literature, how literature supports group cohesion and contributes to a sustained minority identity. ¹⁶ Bogusław Bakuła, in turn, adopted a postcolonial approach while analysing the language of the Eastern Borderlands in Polish literature. ¹⁷ Ewa Domańska applies this theoretical perspective to the analysis of Polish history in the time of the Polish People’s Republic. ¹⁸ She also writes about “Baltic postcolonialism” and “Polish postcolonialism” because this concept allows for the redefinition of such research categories as borderline, otherness, subjectivity or even exile, separatism or nation, marginalisation, and minority. According to this researcher, these terms are too often used instrumentally, without adaptation to the changing social context. ¹⁹

Silesians as a Dominated or Colonised Group?

This brief overview of the history and methodology of the study of subordinate groups is an introduction to how the situation of Silesia and the Silesians can be probed. Since the democratic changes in Poland, that is, for thirty years now, this group has been seeking recognition as a minority and demanding full citizenship rights, but still to no avail. However, very few people without a connection to Silesia can understand the situation of the region and its inhabitants, and on the other hand, all the research conducted by people from outside the group contains a very paternalistic interpretation of the history and culture of the region. In this situation, the application of the post–colonial research paradigm seems justified, because the situation is close to the one described by the postcolonial researchers Spivak, Gandhi, and Said.

Talking about the fact that the situation of Silesia and the Silesians is unique sounds trivial, but in fact it is difficult to find a group with a similar history and geopolitical or social situation today. Each minority group is a specific case. What is important when talking about the Silesians is their number and the reluctance of the dominant group to give them minority status. The Act on National, Ethnic and Regional Minorities was passed in 2005, after interpreting the results of the National Census of 2002, in which 173,000 people declared themselves Silesians. ²⁰ The legislation in force since then does not create the possibility to qualify the Silesian group as an ethnic or linguistic minority, not to mention a national minority, because according to the dominant majority, Silesia is part of Poland and the Silesians are Poles. It should be admitted that in this respect lawmakers show little flexibility and a lot of ill will by rejecting all initiatives coming from this group. Since 1997, the Silesians have been striving for the recognition of their distinctiveness—to begin with they tried to register the Association of People of Silesian Nationality, but they were unsuccessful. ²¹ The group’s leaders later sought to be recognised as an ethnic and, more recently, linguistic minority, which also met with resistance. There was no open consultation with the group, and even if there were any discussions, they were only from a dominant position. The subsequent declaration in the National Census of 2011 of as many as 847,000 people as Silesians did not affect the proper interpretation and correction of the law. Despite civic hearings in the Parliament in 2014 and 2016, ²² the position of the legislature has remained unchanged. Speeches by people considered to be the intellectual and political leaders of the group, Jerzy Gorzelik and Zbigniew Kadłubek, did not help either. Their balanced words, in which they asked the Parliament to debate the issue of 847,000 people declaring themselves to be Silesians, were heard only by a handful of MPs. Therefore, Said’s words, that only noise and noise around the dominated group draws attention to it, are accurate. With their culture of words and the logic of their arguments, Silesians will not win against the dominant group.

The Disputed Past?

The policy of the Polish state is aimed at emphasising the similarity of the Silesians with other inhabitants of the country (the dominant group) in order to justify their membership in the national community. On the one hand, it is difficult to indicate unambiguous connecting elements. There is no historical community, the political community is fragile, there are great cultural differences, and the local language is hardly understood in other parts of the country. The dominant group, questioning the cultural and historical distinctiveness of Silesia, arbitrarily reinterprets the past and makes complicated linguistic analyses to show the ultimate Polishness of Silesians. Such subjective features as the identity and feelings of the interested parties are omitted, which is nowadays the norm when considering minority groups. ²³

On the other hand, Silesia has never been an independent political entity, and there has never been an independent Silesian state, although the group inhabits considerable territory. Many historians have written about it, indicating the changeability of historical boundaries, the changeability of national affiliation, and the multiethnic and multicultural nature of the region. ²⁴ Since the fourteenth century, Silesia was a peripheral region within other countries, dependent on foreign rulers, and never an independent political power. The Silesians were dependent on the dominant Poles, Czechs, Austrians, and Germans. For generations, they lived in closed communities, yet leaving the community did not mean being rooted out and assimilated into a foreign culture. Such a state of affairs could be maintained until the time of increased industrialisation, because at that time the Silesians started to leave their homes in the countryside and move to cities in search of work. ²⁵ In the modern German state, the policy of full subordination to the dominant group was gradually introduced, to reach its apogee during Nazi rule. Then the cultural image of the region was forcibly changed by changing names and surnames, geographical names, so that they were consistent with the culture of the dominant—then German—group. The local language called wasserpolnisch was banned. ²⁶ Since they were German citizens, the Silesians served as German soldiers in battles on distant fronts, fighting for causes not their own.

The past is one of the important factors that the Silesians use to build a new identity. Emphasising a history different from the dominant group’s is an important strategy for the Silesians. At the same time, history inflicts a burden on mutual relations between the groups. Like most groups who seek liberation from domination, the Silesians do their best to attract public attention. E. Said emphasised this aspect and even encouraged such groups to clearly state their distinctiveness. ²⁷ So the fact that the same situation takes place in Silesia is not surprising. There is a dispute over the interpretation of the past. The most spectacular relates to the most recent history, the one that appears in oral communication, is alive in the memory of group members and at the same time is politically exploited by the dominant group. The events of the first half of the twentieth century can be used as an example of how the Polish dominating group interprets historical events concerning Silesia and the Silesians.

One of the significant disputed events is that of the Silesian Uprisings of 1919, 1920, 1921, and another one is World War II and its consequences. ²⁸

Polish propaganda has always recognised the uprisings as the evidence for the Polishness of Silesia and the Silesians. There was even a monument erected in Katowice—its three wings being a metaphor for their three national uprisings. For years, Polish historians have sought to prove not only the participation but also the involvement of the Silesians themselves in the organisation of the uprisings. The oral history of the region contradicted this and either the youth and naivety of the fighters was mentioned or the idea of fighting to join Poland was neglected. ²⁹ In his recently published book, Ryszard Kaczmarek writes about the Silesian Uprisings as a part of what he calls the non-declared Polish–German war of 1919–1921, and claims that it came very close to an actual outbreak of war at that time. The Germans did not want to sign the Treaty of Versailles because of Silesia and they hoped that the Polish–Bolshevik war in 1920 would significantly weaken Poland, which would have to give way. According to research in both German and Polish archives, the uprisings were inspired by politicians from both countries. As he claims, the assistance from the Polish side was as follows:

In my opinion, the Polish–German war continued in the third uprising. . . . We are strongly attached to speaking about the uprising, about the revolutionary impulse of the Upper Silesians, and that is a fact, but this uprising would not last as long as two months, if not through the engagement of Warsaw and Berlin. . . . The command of the Plebiscite Security was under the control of the Polish Army staff. Whole troops were prepared, which at the beginning of May 1921 moved from Poland to Upper Silesia. They were trained and armed by the Polish side. It is estimated that some 50,000—60,000 people fought in the third uprising. ³⁰

Archival research shows that it was not the Silesians themselves who led the uprisings, but politicians of both dominant groups who used the border group for their own purposes. ³¹ The findings reveal how the tradition of the Silesian Uprisings was “invented,” the ways in in which the dominant group—the Poles—for almost one hundred years has shaped the cultural image of the region to be consistent with its policy. Eric Hobsbawm’s term “invented tradition” is in this case a good illustration of an event in which the Silesians undoubtedly participated, while unaware of the intentions of the two dominant groups supporting them. The scholarly discoveries are confirmed by local observations about the lack of interest of Silesians in the idea of armed combat. ³² This does not change the fact that the Silesian Uprisings are still officially treated as a Polish national uprising. They served to justify joining the eastern part of the region to the emerging Polish state. Nowadays, the celebration of the anniversaries has a state dimension, which emphasises the Polishness of the Silesians and justifies the western border of Poland.

Another event from the past that is interpreted differently by the dominant and the subordinate group is World War II and its ending. At the outbreak of the war, Upper Silesia belonged for the most part to the German state (more than 70 percent), while only the eastern area belonged to the Second Polish Republic. When entering Silesia in 1939, Germany recognised the occupation of the region as rejoining the lost territories to their homeland. Thus, the Silesians were again German citizens and had to serve in the German army, the Wehrmacht. ³³

After World War II, the Polishness of Silesia and the Silesians justified the demarcation of a new border in the west, although soon (from 22 March 1945) the nationality verification of its inhabitants began. ³⁴ During this process, Silesians without Polish citizenship were deprived of the right to belong to the local government institutions. The process lasted until 1949, which meant that they practically lost the right to be the hosts in the region, as Krzysztof Kwaśniewski described their expectations. ³⁵ This situation was enhanced by the attitude of the Polish authorities, which generally did not trust the Silesians, which, in turn, led to the Silesians’ disappointment with Poland. The Silesians have never reached partner status with the Polish dominant group. ³⁶

Why, despite the ideological message about the Polishness of the Silesians and about their return to the motherland, were they not treated equally with other citizens? What was the purpose of depreciating their values by selective treatment of the past? In the region, power was taken over by people moving to the region from the dominant group.

The Silesians were also reminded of their life until 1945 in Germany, their service in the Wehrmacht, the bad or rather different Polish language they spoke. From the beginning of their existence in Poland, the Silesians were treated as inferior citizens, both by the rulers and other inhabitants of the country. The decisions taken against them, contrary to governmental declarations, had a very subjective dimension. This can be inferred from the documents in the New Files Archive in the Ministry of Recovered Territories. The directives contained in the document “Problems of verification of the indigenous Polish population in the Recovered Territories” [Problemy weryfikacji polskiej ludności autochtonicznej na Ziemiach Odzyskanych] stated:

We verify only Poles, not “decent” Germans, ³⁷ only the element of relationship with Poland decides, even the weakest. . . . [T]he process of verifying Poles in the Recovered Territories requires in every individual case enormous scrupulousness, reliability, goodwill, insight, and above all knowledge of the area and its problems, knowledge of people, absolute impartiality and objectivity, making general assumptions for the Recovered Territories and general interest. . . . Under these conditions, traditional criteria are not enough and often fail, and these are both objective criteria, such as origin, name, language, religion—all of which can speak for or against, but very often lead to completely wrong conclusions, but very often this will be assessed by local people, usually milder than outsiders, usually very strict, as well as subjective criteria, i.e. self-declaration, where there is a danger of masking Germans. ³⁸

Evidently, the rules for verifying people, as well as the very fact of national verification of those whose Polishness was the justification for moving the border to the west, are difficult to understand. The Silesians mention the verification procedure as a streak of humiliation. ³⁹ One of the documents addressed to the Ministry of Regained Territories mentions ill treatment of the Silesians by the representatives of the new authorities:

However, I would like the relevant authorities to understand the position of the person they treat as a second-class citizen without any rights. These citizens are all those who have submitted applications for the verification and have not yet received such a verification. This kind of citizen is thrown out of his apartment, taken to a camp for Germans, his flat is looted in the meantime. A few days later such a citizen is released, but he has nothing except what he was wearing. ⁴⁰

Such situations must have been quite common, if one dared to address the Ministry with a complaint. Some researchers try to understand the post-war social situation and explain such administrative decisions by the lack of knowledge of the history and culture of individual regions of the country by new officials. However, it seems that the motive for such actions was, unadmittedly, the tendency to subordinate everyone who differed from the dominant group. But then again, not all Polish residents were ordered to prove their Polishness. No such procedure was needed for the displaced persons from the Eastern Borderlands [the Kresy], the Jews, the Ukrainians, or members of other national minorities. Over time, these activities, including nationality verification, have still not been subjected to reflection or consideration by the Poles. There has been no settlement with this past. For example, there are historians who even see the advantages of nationality verification. In their opinion, the verification made it possible to separate the Silesians from the hated Germans and remove the stigma of being invaders from the verified. ⁴¹ This is not true, because the negative stereotype of Silesians being identified with Germans continues to this day. It is enough to recall the words of the chairman of the ruling party, Jarosław Kaczyński, that the Silesians are a camouflaged German option. ⁴²

In Poland, the Silesians were deprived of the possibility to decide about their own fate; they were once again dominated. As the pre-war Silesian activist Arka Bożek noticed: “Some kind of fatality weighs on the Silesians, a curse that degrades us to the service of one or the other.” ⁴³ Bożek’s words are close to the above-quoted sentence of Said about the grave misfortune of being colonised. It seemed that the democratic changes that took place in 1989 would change the social position of the Silesians. But this has not happened.

Other traumatic experiences, not only national verification, weigh on post-war Polish–Silesian relations. With the emergence of the new authorities, many thousands of Silesians were deported to the USSR; others were imprisoned in concentration camps, or displaced from their family homes, from their small homeland. In the memory of the Silesians, the first contact with Poland is negative. The witnesses of these events as well as historians and journalists have written about it. ⁴⁴ Nowadays, these events are vividly remembered and have become the subject of a group narrative in discussion with the dominant group. After years of silence, the Silesians talk about the harm caused by the dominant Poles. It gives some relief, but only to an extent, as there is no satisfaction from admitting guilt. The other party refuses to join a dialogue on topics related to a sensitive past. It is difficult for the Poles to admit that their ancestors did not always act nobly, especially towards weaker ones. ⁴⁵ Despite the publication of historical, linguistic, and sociological works, this knowledge reaches only a small group of interested people.

The researchers of post-colonial societies also faced such a problem and came to the conclusion that one cannot live in harm, one cannot constantly remember humiliation, and bad memories should be replaced by new ones. On the one hand, those who caused pain to their subordinates should, sooner or later, repent for their deeds. On the other hand, victims should forget about their former trauma and learn to forgive. Leela Gandhi believes that this does not happen immediately and it could take several generations to fight the stigma of subordination. Recalling the experiences of other dominated groups, she writes after A. Memmi: “The colonised lives for a long time before we see that really new man.” ⁴⁶ Furthermore, dependent, subordinate people need a lot of time to believe in themselves. They take slow action to mark their presence in society. This is manifested, among other things, in the correcting of history, in the presentation of the events that reflect their place in history and the harm they have suffered.

Silesian Version of the Past—Efforts to Obtain Subjectivity

In Silesia, the victims of post-war persecution are already passing away. Now their children and grandchildren manage the memory of the past. They did not suffer so much humiliation themselves, but interpret past events as they though they did, and emphasise what is important to them today. They present what Aleida Assman called the national (here group) culture of remembrance. ⁴⁷ Thus, they emphasise the wrongs only from the Polish (now) dominant group, which is not a completely objective vision of history. German humiliation and harm are forgotten. The feeling of injustice that has lasted for the past seventy years, the lack of understanding by the environment and disregard by the dominant group radicalise the Silesian narrative about the past. Historians of Silesian provenance who write the history of their own group, including their own perspective, are a novelty. They search for documents in archives, interpret them, and combine them with oral history. This is an important undertaking, but it does not explain the motives of the events. Instead it presents a narrative based on the experiences of individuals. This is, in a way, an alternative history to the official one. Thus, there are fictionalised versions of the past or memories of the Silesians which talk about what was suppressed for years. A good example is the series Ghosts of War [Duchy Wojny] written by Alojzy Lysko who, based on family letters and memories, created a fictional account of the lot of the Silesians fighting on different fronts of World War II. ⁴⁸

The group’s history as now presented is one that they invent to a large extent. It is difficult to obtain all the documents, and the witnesses of events are passing away, so subsequent generations try to interpret the past so that it will be consistent with the current policy of the group. In this situation, the group narrative grasps a new reading of the documents found. An example of such a way of practising history is the work of Dariusz Jerczyński in History of the Silesian people: The Real History of Silesian Lands from the Middle Ages to the Beginning of the Third Millennium [Historia narodu śląskiego: prawdziwe dzieje ziem śląskich od średniowiecza do początku trzeciego tysiąclecia]. ⁴⁹ This work lacks a critical attitude towards historical sources and the ability to link facts with the wider European social and historical context. Such simplifications overshadow the new message about the group’s past.

As postcolonial researchers wrote, despite liberation, trauma weighs heavily on the dominated group. The Silesians are rarely able to view the past positively. Currently, they only talk about the drama they experienced, without considering whether there were any political premises underlying it, for example, German citizenship hostilely taken away after the war by the Poles, who suffered a lot during the World War II. The emotional attitude of the Silesians translates into the separation and non-connection of such events as German citizenship and the war. German citizenship was a historic relic (in the Opole region of Silesia—in the Nazi times: the Opole Regentschaft) or the result of the wartime incorporation into the Reich (former Polish Silesian Voivodeship). Both these events took place over their heads because they had no voice as the enslaved. In private conversation as well, they do not associate their German citizenship and service in the Wehrmacht with the misgivings of Polish society. Something Hubert Orłowski called a civilian and military war tale can be noticed, that is, separate narratives concentrating on various events. ⁵⁰ This is also perfectly visible in the works of Lysko, Marian Kulik, or Father Pawlar. ⁵¹ The military torment that appears in the memories described by Kulik is dehumanised, there are no dead, and the enemy is eliminated. Probably because of low rank in the army and post-war experience, memories from the army hardly ever appear. Structural amnesia works against these events. This aspect of the war is forgotten, because mentioning it is still dangerous and poses a threat of reprisals from the surrounding society. ⁵² Civil memories of war are quite different from military ones. The memories and oral history of the women who had to flee from the front are particularly different. Indeed, their situation was difficult, because when men served in the army, they not only had to keep the house but often worked in the arms industry for the army. At the end of the war, it was they who were responsible for taking care of the children and the elderly, and preparing for the evacuation. They also often fell victim to rape and revenge from the victorious army. The victims generally did not wonder what their loved ones did in the army, and who started the war. For them, their own experiences, otherwise shocking, were the greatest horrors of war. ⁵³ This is clearly visible in the memoirs and the fiction describing this period, where only one’s own suffering is mentioned, and the tragedy of others is not seen. Nowadays, oral history, as well as written memories and Silesian fiction, are focused on post-war trauma. It seems that the war started for the Silesians in 1945, when the front came through and the Red Army entered, followed by the Polish Army.

It can be discussed to what extent such selective recollection of the past has a postcolonial character. Undoubtedly, the Silesians suffered what they did not expect and did not deserve. It was not their fault that they lived in a German-Nazi state in which they had to comply with the law, especially during the war. However, the way the Poles treated them after the war cannot only be explained by war stress. The planned policy of the conquest and enslavement of Silesia is visible in the actions of the representatives of the authorities. What makes it difficult to change the perception of the past is the attitude of the dominant group. ⁵⁴ This is what strengthens the sense of harm and bitterness among the Silesians. Of course, the contemporary Silesian emotions are asymmetrical, because the humiliation by the German dominant group is not mentioned, as these events took place earlier. The intra-group message does not include them. Fighting at the front and killing the enemy is dehumanized, while the anguish suffered personally is a constant trauma.

Consequently, when the Silesians want to distance themselves from Poland, they emphasise that they are not Poles, that they have always been German, but in their stories they distance themselves from World War II, stating that it was not their business. They behave here in a manner typical of post-colonial communities, which, on the one hand, separated themselves from the dominant group and, on the other, used (and often still do) the language of the colonisers and are drawn to their culture. In Silesia, which is a cultural borderland, there have always been people who were associated with one of the dominant groups. They became Germans or assimilated to the Polish culture. The fascination with a dominant culture is a feature of dominated groups. Homi Bhabha pondered this when he described his studies at Oxford and his fascination with British literature. He wrote:

Setting out from Bombay in the 1970s to study English at Oxford was, in many ways, the culmination of an Indian middle class trajectory where formal education and “high” culture colluded in emulating the canons of elite “English” taste (or what we knew of it) and conforming to its customs and comforts. ⁵⁵

Spivak was of the same opinion when she wrote about herself as “born in metropolitan Bengal, having a post-colonial education, gaining expertise in European matters.” ⁵⁶

This is also the case in Silesia. The dominant culture is somehow attractive, but it is difficult to find a place in it without compromising one’s own culture. That is why a movement typical for post-colonial communities has begun in Silesia—a return to the roots. It is not only the story that is rectified, so that it is in line with the Silesian vision. New cultural forms appear: literature in their own language (despite the lack of codification), design using folk motifs, films about Silesia, tours of historical monuments are organised. ⁵⁷ Currently, the double- or even triple-culturality of the region is emphasised in order not to be associated with one dominant group. The Silesians distance themselves from the Germans when faced with difficulties, while at the same time willingly emphasising their connection with German culture. They point to past Czech connections and do not want to be Polish because the Poles treat them instrumentally and with contempt. They want to be Silesians, but there is no political permission for that. Therefore, in the middle of Europe, 874,000 people constantly feel themselves under foreign domination, in a state of permanent submissiveness. All indications are that this state will last for a long time.

It is currently difficult to predict how the process, which has been going on for a hundred years, will end. Will the Silesians liberate themselves from domination? It is difficult to say, because they are not the only inhabitants in their region. After World War II, approximately four to five million Poles from the interior of the country settled in Silesia. They sometimes support the Silesians in their efforts and form the category of the so-called New Silesians, or sometimes they are very nationalistic Poles. Therefore, the borderline nature of the group (in Barth’s understanding) makes it difficult to predict the future. Undoubtedly, equally numerous groups are independent nations (e.g., the Estonians), but in the case of the Silesians, the lack of recognition of their cultural and historical distinctiveness by the dominant group hinders the process of liberation.