The Gender Gap in the Populist Vote: The Bulgarian and Hungarian Cases

Abstract

What are the differences between men and women who vote for populist parties? Do these features vary between countries? To answer these questions, this study examines attitudes that influence voting patterns in Bulgaria and Hungary using data from the nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018). Holding other factors constant, the results indicate that men with heightened anti-immigration attitudes tend to vote for populist parties in Bulgaria, while women supporting policies tackling income inequality have a higher propensity to vote for populist parties than men in Hungary. In Bulgaria, women following political news have an increasing probability to vote for a populist party when compared to men. These findings clarify the cross-country variability of populist demand in post-communist countries and invite further research in the matter.

Keywords

electoral gender gap Bulgaria Hungary right-wing populist parties post-communism logistic regression survey data

Socio-economic circumstances, the nature of employment, or certain attitudinal traits make women less interested in radical politics. This phenomenon is known as the electoral gender gap.¹ Giuliano Bobba and his colleagues observed that attitudes toward the radical right are frequently linked to the nature of work performed, the degree of religiosity, or a willingness to embrace authoritarianism.² Ipek Ilkkaracan had similar observations regarding the electoral gap among populist voters.³ Careful not to equate one with the other, I select populist right parties in Hungary and Bulgaria that have some degree of electoral success and a similar anti-gender rhetoric to explore potential variation in voting patterns of men and women.⁴ The structure of the article is the following: I start with the theoretical framework, describe parties classified as populist right in Bulgaria and Hungary, and then present the methodology, the analysis, my findings, and the discussion.

Theoretical Framework

Individuals from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, confronted with financial uncertainty, receptive to authoritarian discourse, or skeptical of migration are likely to endorse a populist party.⁵ However, I expect that certain factors will have a distinct influence on women’s electoral preferences compared to those of men. For instance, women remain the primary caretakers of children, and thus welfare policies are crucial in fostering gender equality and women’s potential for professional growth.⁶ Therefore, I can anticipate that welfare policies addressing maternity, family, and child benefits are relevant elements of the campaign. Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk showed that these elements are also integral to the anti-gender narrative of populist parties.⁷ The electoral attitudes toward the selected elements of the campaigns are, however, difficult to isolate. Electoral expectations conflate a wider nexus of attitudes toward populist parties than the welfare offer. Lee Savage showed that expectations for welfare benefits are framed by anti-immigration xenophobic sentiments, with the electorate preferring a restriction of such policies to the majority population.⁸ For a better insight into women’s voting patterns, I turn to feminist literature for answers.

Feminist scholars suggest that women should not be interested in populist ideology because they seek consensus, unity, compromise, and tend to be repelled by violent or ostracizing behaviors.⁹ Kathleen Montgomery observed that women are more concerned with the underprivileged than men, and, therefore, exhibit slightly different patterns of socialization.¹⁰ So far, we have assumed that women who vote for populist parties have similar attitudes to what one would expect drives the populist vote: skepticism about migration, economic insecurity, and a greater willingness to accept authoritarian values.¹¹ Eelco Harteveld, and colleagues put forward an important argument, stating that both women and men may have similar sentiments, yet for women certain issues may be less salient than for men.¹² Given this context, I do not expect a drastic difference in the ideological core of women and men voting for populist parties. However, I do expect the magnitude of certain electoral attitudes to vary depending on voters’ gender. My objective is, therefore, to identify heightened associations between gender and the populist vote.

To ensure clarity, we need to define the fundamental concepts used in this study. First, gender is understood as a signpost of ideology, which usually includes a liberal view of gender equality and sexuality. The anti-gender narrative is an opposition to gender equality and the rights of sexual minorities, which Graff refers to as a dimension of a broader conflict over the future of democracy.¹³ In the context of populism, gender is used by populist movements to draw a line between “us” and “them.” Graff has aptly grasped this nexus stating: “anti-gender discourse is structured as a populist discourse, in that it persistently juxtaposes innocent, gender-conservative people, whom it claims to represent, against corrupt, immoral elites who are accused of spreading ‘gender ideology.’”¹⁴

Second, I understand populism based on Cas Mudde’s thin definition, which provides flexibility. Similarly to Jan Kubik and Marta Kotwas, I follow the thickening argument, which states that populism has different components in different political contexts. Thus, it seems viable to consider the particularities of populism that manifest in Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁵ I also see the importance of institutional vulnerabilities of the region, similarly to Vladimir Tismăneanu. For Tismăneanu, despite their democratic institutional foundations, Central and Eastern European countries are influenced by ethno-national and radical sentiments that result in illiberal traits. In his words,

while most of east European countries appear as established, institutional democratic polities, holding regular, free, and fair elections, there are deep undercurrents that threaten the existing order, and could eventually succeed in bringing to power (via electoral means) illiberal formations.¹⁶

These “undercurrents” have protest-based characteristics, tied to societal sentiments that reemerged in the 1990s. He expects populism to bear characteristics of charismatic protest politics. Tismăneanu similarly identifies a rejection of the status quo political elites and media as a prevalent populist characteristic in the region. The question of how the media influence the demand for populism has been explored in several studies.¹⁷

As such, I anticipate that political participation and media exposure at least partially explain the demand for populism in Bulgaria and Hungary. To reflect that, I include a summative index of three variables on political participation: taking part in political rallies, seeking contact with a political representative, and manifesting political support by wearing a badge. I also measure general interest in the media with an index of three variables capturing the average time spent weekly on watching, reading, and listening to political news outlets. I acknowledge the divergence in political landscapes across the two countries, but controlling for these items provides me with an average trend for how individuals tend to vote.¹⁸ That approach allows including interaction terms on gender to see the electoral gender gap in each case. Exogenous factors, as financial distress, were shown to have an impact on the demand for populism.¹⁹ To control for this characteristic on the individual level, I incorporate an economic insecurity factor that filters down to individuals who recently experienced some form of economic distress: losing a job, earning less, or subjectively feeling financially insecure.

One may ask why should I focus on women’s voting patterns at all? To reiterate Eva Fodor’s argument: democratic backsliding is characterized by a strong anti-gender narrative that serves as an important electoral mobilization tool.²⁰ Populist parties are particularly interested in the position of women in society, and tend to signpost a populist divisionism of “us” versus “them.” The “us” versus “them” in this context is based on a traditional perspective on gender roles.²¹ The populist right parties in Bulgaria and Hungary examined here rely on a traditional view of the gender roles. It is thus important to determine women’s attitudes toward these parties, since they inform us about general electoral trends in the region.

Country Selection

Despite the numerous disparities between the Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ), the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), and ATAKA, scholars tend to categorize these parties as populist right.²² Kiril Avramov posits that ATAKA resorts to an abrasive rhetoric, placing the party at the populist radical right.²³ In the case of Fidesz and GERB, several scholars have observed that both parties endorse autocratic forms of right-wing populism, employ an ethno-nationalist, xenophobic narrative, and offer income redistribution to garner political support.²⁴ Daniel Smilov and Ruzha Smilova note that populist right parties undergo radicalization over time, ultimately advancing toward the extremist radical right.²⁵ For my considerations, the core interest is their stance on women. Agnieszka Graff shows that populist parties in the region claim to be the “last bastion of the natural family, bravely opposing western interference.”²⁶ This resistance to the degenerate West is a source of national pride, and it is a common feature of the anti-gender imaginary in Central and Eastern Europe. That provides me with a common denominator, allowing me to analyze these parties in parallel.

The case selection is subject to inherent limitations. The first is the recent rise of other national far-right parties, such as the Our Homeland Movement in Hungary (Mi Hazánk), which garnered 5 percent of the vote in the 2022 national elections.²⁷ These far-right parties are using a rhetoric akin to the populist parties discussed in this study. Second, other countries in the region such as Slovakia, Czechia, Romania, or Poland may have similar anti-gender narratives that are worth exploring. However, to make a wide-scope comparison of all these countries lies beyond the scope of this study. To make it feasible, I select populist right parties in Bulgaria and Hungary. Let us look at the profiles of these parties in more detail.

The Populist Right in Bulgaria

Citizens for a European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)

The party was established in 2006 by Boyko Borisov, the former mayor of the city of Sofia (2005–2009). The emergence of his governing powers came amid the disruptive political advances of the far-right Simeon II Movement in early 2001. As the head of GERB, he engaged in a vigorous critique of the political establishment of all the major parties. In terms of ideology, the party was placed on the radical right, while in terms of economy, its proposed policies consisted of semi-liberal market-oriented proposals and the harvesting of EU-funds for agricultural production. It turned out to be quite successful. It won GERB 39.7 percent of the vote, allowing the party to form a minority government with ATAKA as its coalition partner.²⁸ Under Borisov, the party reentered parliament in 2013 as an opposition party, and in the subsequent parliamentary victory of 2018 gathered 32.7 percent of the national votes. By entering a coalition with the United Patriots Party, GERB had a governing seat. Yet cracks were already appearing in 2019, and GERB entered another coalition with Union of Democratic Forces (SPS). According to Ralitsa Kovacheva, from that point on the anti-elitist narrative of the party has strengthened.²⁹ The coalition GERB-SPS subsequently won the snap elections in 2024 with 25 percent of the votes, which constituted the best result among its competitors.³⁰

Women’s issues are not the primary focus of the party’s narrative. Borisov was known to have supported women’s political participation under the wing of his former political leader, former King Simeon-II. GERB had a good record of recruiting women in its governing structures, and the second-largest number of women in its ranks.³¹ Its program, however, focused less on women’s issues and more on fighting corruption and criminal activity.³² In early 2018, under public pressure, GERB withdrew the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the Istanbul Convention). According to Shaban Darakchi, the Bulgarian public’s opposition to “gender” came from a lack of understanding the term, and the influence of the country’s Christian organizations, to which GERB succumbed.³³

ATAKA

Volen Siderov founded the right-wing populist party ATAKA in 2005.³⁴ Siderov, a television talk-show host, made himself known for his anti-migration, xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric.³⁵ The party’s political pitch emphasized the principles of Orthodox Christianity, elements of historical revisionism regarding Eastern Thrace, Macedonia and Northern Dobruja, and socio-economic nationalist protectionism.³⁶ The party advocated for renationalization of core industries—telecommunications, technology, or agriculture—to oppose supranational elites “from the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.”³⁷ ATAKA’s leadership frequently resorted to economic chauvinism that alienated ethnic minorities, especially the Roma and the Turks.

ATAKA’s overall gender discourse blends traditionalist understandings of the family with elements of religious fundamentalism. One of the party members, Pavel Shopov, argued that the rise in domestic violence was inversely associated with a decline in traditional Christian values, threatened by secularization coming from the “West.”³⁸ Siderov was against the exploitation of female workers, specifically in the foreign-owned textile industry. The party framed the discussion on social roles as a fight by the “true, patriot, Christian Bulgarians” against the foreign influence of “an enemy.”³⁹ It can be inferred that the party’s steadfast opposition to Western-liberal ideals and externally imposed influences make it apprehensive toward gender equality.⁴⁰

The Populist Right in Hungary

FIDESZ

Victor Orbán founded the Hungarian Civic Alliance in 1988 as a center-left activist movement that became a political party, first entering the parliament in 1990. From then onwards, Fidesz started to consolidate the center-right to win the election in 1998.⁴¹ In 2006, Fidesz lost the election in favor of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).⁴² The consolidation toward the right continued, and Fidesz won a parliamentary majority in 2010, ruling the country ever since. The party campaign emphasized the Hungarian right to national independence, coupled with anti-immigration and anti-institutionalist rhetoric.⁴³

A Hungarian gender studies scholar, Eva Fodor, noted that one of the first laws introduced by the 2010 Orbán government disbanded a policy which aimed at eliminating “gender stereotypes from the national curriculums of kindergartens.”⁴⁴ The Orbán-led parliament had also refused ratification of the Istanbul Convention due to anti-gender sentiments. Fidesz aimed to mobilize the electorate, and justified its need to hold on to power by using anti-gender sentiments. The party proposed a centrist alternative appealing to voters who found the proposals of its principal ideological rival, Jobbik, too extreme. We also have ample evidence that religious beliefs influenced the vote of the women who supported the party. Most of the Hungarian women who vote for the party are conservative, highly religious, with little to no interest in politics.⁴⁵ Fidesz is equally adept at positioning itself as a viable counterweight to the corrupt elites, whose austerity measures weakened the social safety net. Therefore, I expect supporters of Fidesz to have a positive attitude to welfarist positions on social matters, such as tackling income inequality.⁴⁶

Jobbik

Gábor Vona was one of the founders of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) in 2003. Jobbik has a strong anti-immigration stance, and favors “non-native businesses,” thus distancing itself from the national-chauvinist economic proposal of Fidesz.⁴⁷ Yet, Jobbik leaders frequently employ racist and anti-Semitic narratives to uphold the ideals of “a unified Christian national Hungarian identity.”⁴⁸ The party favors a traditional, Christian family as the embodiment of true patriotism, and strongly supports a tighter grip on abortion, and mandatory religious teaching in schools to assure “good moral judgment [. . .] and openness to [. . .] transcendental values.”⁴⁹ Thus some scholars like Nicole Lugosi would see Jobbik and Fidesz as twin parties competing for the same electoral base.

Jobbik’s view of women in society is traditionalist. In Jobbik’s view, the country faces a demographic crisis caused by women not being willing to bear children.⁵⁰ The party also conceptualizes motherhood as the core characteristic of being a woman. Citizenship is frequently intertwined with the significance of women as mothers, who represent the unified “nationally minded ethnic Hungarian women.”⁵¹ Without Hungarian women having children, the country’s population will cease to be “pure.”⁵² In that sense, Jobbik supports the idea of hypermasculinity, and the traditional roles of men and women.

Data

The analysis includes nine waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2018.⁵³ ESS is a bi-annual, multi-country survey conducted by the European Research Infrastructure Institute. The ESS is praised for its high-quality data collection, and relatively low missing response rate.⁵⁴ The descriptive statistics of the sample used in this study are reported in Table 1, with all survey items reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Bulgaria		Hungary		Min	Max
	N		N
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Populist vote	5,232	3,921	6,615	5,150	0	1
Age	6,985	5,289	8,819	6,840	18	95
Religiosity	6,905	5,233	8,753	6,758	0	1
Ethnicity	6,929	5,237	8,746	6,735	0	1
Education	4,639	3,411	6,957	5,451	1	5
Social class	6,615	4,978	7,278	5,658	1	5
Economic Insecurity	6,985	5,289	8,880	6,840	0	1
Gov’t income^a	6,757	5,132	8,717	6,770	1	5
Authoritarian	6,189	4,693	8,297	6,394	1	6
Anti-Immigration	4,929	4,013	7,353	5,952	1	10
Political trust	5,928	4,798	7,103	5,643	1	10
Civic activism	6,985	5,289	8,880	6,840	0	1
Exposure to news	4,518	3,323	6,026	4,774	0	7

Source: European Social Survey, ESS1–8, ESS Cumulative File Rounds 1–8, ed.1.0 Study Documentation.

A measure of welfare expectations: Should government reduce differences in income levels?

The country samples are as follows. For Hungary, the total sample is 15,720. The populist electorate, excluding abstentions and those ineligible to vote, comprises 5,151 male voters and 6,615 female voters. The mean voter age is fifty-one years for women, and forty-nine years for men. For Bulgaria, we have a total of 12,274 observations, with 3,921 male and 5,232 female populist voters. The average age is fifty-four years for both men and women. The dependent variable, the populist vote (Prvtcat), is a binary variable with a numerical value of 1 for votes in favor of populist parties, and 0 otherwise. The variable was coded using the PopuList classification, which relies on expert and journalistic evaluations of European populist rhetoric after 1989.⁵⁵

Methodology

Logistic regression allows me to see the influence of respondents’ traits on a binary-coded dependent variable that captures the populist vote. To verify this, the model equation is as follows:

\Pr (P r v t c a t_{i j}) = β_{0} + β_{1} c o n t r o l s_{i j} + β_{2} d i m e n s i o n s_{i j} + β_{3} i n t e r a c t i o n s_{i j} + f_{t} + u_{j},

where the probability of an individual (i) voting for a populist party, $P r (P r v t c a t_{i j})$ is associated with a set of controls ( $β_{1} c o n t r o l s_{i j}$ )—age, gender, education, religiosity and ethnicity—as well as dimensions ( $β_{2} D i m e n s i o n s_{i j}$ ) that include: receptiveness to authoritarian values, degree of political trust and economic insecurity across the survey waves (j). To find potential gender-driven differences in attitudes toward populist parties, I also include an interaction term with gender. The model is estimated using weights as recommended by the data provider. To account for unobserved heterogeneity across the survey waves, the estimation includes time fixed effects ( $f_{t}$ ), whereas ( $u_{i j})$ denotes the random error term.

It is also important to underline that in this study I take an aggregated average per each of these countries from the 2002–2018 waves of the ESS survey. Since my research questions are not concerned with fluctuations over time, I do not include a time-dimension. Furthermore, the analysis includes separate models for each country, which means that I cannot directly compare the results. However, I identify the underlying factors that drive demand for populism, and thus I can analyze the nature of the electoral gender gap.

Analysis

Before presenting the model results, I verify the inter-item correlations. The correlation matrix revealed a significant association between trust items and satisfaction with governance.⁵⁶ I look at these more closely to see if they can be used as a summative measure, as the literature suggests it might.⁵⁷ The principal component factor analysis retained five factors with satisfactory Eigenvalues⁵⁸— political trust(1), immigration aspects (2), support for authoritarian values (3), civic activism (4), and exposure to political news (5)—to which I will refer to as the model’s dimensions. The chosen vector of explanatory variables includes voters’ age, education, religious belonging, ethnicity, and social class. I code social class variable using the OESCH class scheme.⁵⁹

Findings

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria, as shown in Table 2, a populist voter is a young male who does not belong to an ethnic minority and has a blue-collar job. These statistically significant results replicate previous findings on the demand-side traits of populism.⁶⁰ In Bulgaria, the populist voters are receptive to authoritarian values and have a degree of trust in political institutions.

Table 2

Logistic Regression on Populist Vote in Bulgaria.

Response	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	Control model	Dimensions	Interactions
Age	–0.0194*** (0.00208)	–0.0188*** (0.00290)	–0.0187*** (0.00292)
Gender (yes, female)	–0.148** (0.0648)	–0.158* (0.0824)	–0.590 (0.688)
Religiosity	0.122 (0.0831)	0.0238 (0.103)	0.0315 (0.104)
Ethnicity	–1.434*** (0.105)	–1.497*** (0.148)	–1.526*** (0.149)
Education	–0.00862 (0.0296)	0.0701 (0.0499)	0.0592 (0.0505)
Social class, higher professional baseline category
Lower Professional		0.352** (0.138)	0.308 (0.225)
Petit Bourgeoisie		0.607*** (0.192)	0.712*** (0.262)
Skilled worker		0.522*** (0.144)	0.693*** (0.194)
Unskilled worker		0.469*** (0.160)	0.406* (0.221)
Economic Insecurity		0.0733 (0.116)	0.176 (0.167)
Gov’t stance on income ineq.		0.00288 (0.0430)	–0.0271 (0.0636)
Authoritarian values		0.129** (0.0579)	0.0648 (0.0828)
Anti–Immigration sentiments		–0.0116 (0.0175)	0.0285 (0.0255)
Political trust		0.121*** (0.0234)	0.127*** (0.0342)
Political activism		–0.368*** (0.127)	–0.305* (0.177)
Exposure to political news outlets		0.00978 (0.0293)	–0.0452 (0.0422)
Lower managerial#female			0.0608 (0.282)
Petit bourgeoise#female			–0.202 (0.367)
Skilled worker#female			–0.334 (0.243)
Unskilled worker#female			0.0992 (0.267)
Economic Insecurity#female			–0.189 (0.230)
Gov’t stance#female			0.0532 (0.0857)
Authoritarian#female			0.124 (0.115)
AntiImmigration#female			–0.0755** (0.0349)
PoliticalTrst#female			–0.00785 (0.0467)
PoliticalActivism#female			–0.0781 (0.256)
Exposure to political news#female			0.0942* (0.0554)
Constant	–0.587*** (0.199)	–2.146*** (0.463)	–1.891*** (0.582)
Time Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,820	3,679	3,679

Source: European Social Survey, ESS1–8, ESS Cumulative File Rounds 1–8, ed.1.0 Study Documentation. Own calculations, using (European Social Survey, 2002-2016).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01

Two interaction terms are statistically significant, indicating a difference between voting patterns for men and women. First, the positive trend in predictive margins, depicted on Graph 1, suggests that women who follow political news tend to vote for populist parties more than men. However, the margins have a considerable overlap in confidence intervals.⁶¹ Therefore, it constitutes a preliminary indication of an association from the downward slope for males, and the upward trend for females. The statistically significant margins are marked with a hollow circle.

Graph 1

Exposure to political news, predictive margins on probability to vote for populist party, Bulgaria

The second difference is the anti-immigration factor. Women with strong anti-immigration sentiments have a decreasing propensity to vote for a populist party, in contrast to the positive trend observed for men (Graph 2). As shown, the confidence intervals for these predictive margins overlap, which indicates preliminary evidence for the overall trend. The hollow circles on Graph 2 indicate the values of predictive margins that are statistically significant.⁶²

Graph 2

Anti-immigration sentiments, predictive margins on probability to vote for populist party, Bulgaria

Hungary

Populist voters in Hungary tend to be young religious males with a lower level of education (Table 3). Populist voters are found to favor pro-welfarist policies, be receptive to authoritarian values, and harbor suspicion toward migration. These attributes reaffirm Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris’s findings on the regional level.⁶³

Table 3

Logistic Regression on Populist Vote in Hungary

Response	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	Control model	Dimensions	Interactions
Age	–0.0174*** (0.00175)	–0.0215*** (0.00259)	–0.0214*** (0.00261)
Gender (yes, female)	–0.0541 (0.0562)	–0.0416 (0.0764)	–1.219* (0.670)
Religiosity	0.508*** (0.0594)	0.514*** (0.0803)	0.509*** (0.0807)
Ethnicity	–0.0383 (0.141)	–0.278 (0.201)	–0.271 (0.201)
Education	–0.211*** (0.0273)	–0.193*** (0.0518)	–0.197*** (0.0521)
Social class, higher professional baseline category
Lower Professional		0.0969 (0.153)	–0.204 (0.252)
Petit Bourgeoisie		0.197 (0.191)	0.230 (0.251)
Skilled worker		–0.0513 (0.151)	–0.125 (0.204)
Unskilled worker		–0.00443 (0.179)	–0.0280 (0.238)
Economic Insecurity		0.116 (0.0923)	0.0407 (0.137)
Gov’t stance on income ineq.		0.138*** (0.0453)	0.0188 (0.0649)
Authoritarian values		0.177*** (0.0547)	0.119 (0.0802)
Anti–Immigration sentiments		0.0856*** (0.0199)	0.119*** (0.0291)
Political trust		0.127*** (0.0201)	0.152*** (0.0293)
Political activism		0.237** (0.104)	0.299** (0.148)
Exposure to political news outlets		0.000706 (0.0370)	0.00975 (0.0520)
Lower managerial#female			0.462 (0.318)
Petit bourgeoise#female			–0.146 (0.358)
Skilled worker#female			0.130 (0.259)
Unskilled worker#female			0.0379 (0.298)
Economic Insecurity#female			0.131 (0.184)
Gov’t stance on inc.inq#female			0.240*** (0.0910)
Authoritarian#female			0.112 (0.108)
AntiImmigration#female			–0.0653 (0.0399)
PoliticalTrst#female			–0.0406 (0.0383)
PoliticalActivism#female			–0.126 (0.207)
Exposure to political news#female			–0.0266 (0.0720)
Constant	1.865*** (0.158)	–1.497*** (0.436)	–0.897 (0.545)
Time Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,565	3,153	3,153

Source: Own calculations, data source: European Social Survey, ESS1–8, ESS Cumulative File Rounds 1–8, ed.1.0 Study Documentation.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < 0.01.

There is a significant difference in attitudes toward government policy on income inequality. The interaction term on this dimension is statistically significant. That suggests that women with a positive attitude to welfare policies tend to vote for populist parties more than men. To see that better, I provide an estimate of the marginal probability of this coefficient in Graph 3. What we can see is that despite the absence of a trend for men (a nearly flat line), women are significantly more inclined to support a populist party when they anticipate that the government will address income disparities. This shows an increase in the estimated predicted probability of casting a ballot for populist parties among women who favor governments that address income disparities in Hungary.⁶⁴ Therefore, I expect that a pro-welfarist element of the populist offer in Hungary attracts women voters more than men.

Graph 3

Government policy on income inequality, predictive margins on probability to vote for populist party, Hungary

Discussion

The analysis has provided preliminary insights into differences between voting patterns of men and women. It indicated that an expectation of government policy addressing income inequality, exposure to political news and anti-immigration play a significant yet distinct role among these groups. In Bulgaria, men are found to be skeptical toward migration and vote for populist parties (positive trend on Graph 2), while Bulgarian women have a decreasing marginal probability on this dimension. That, in turn, points toward the socio-economic circumstances and occupational differences between the two groups that may have an influence on the populist voting patterns that contribute to this result. Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, and Tommaso Sonno have argued that anti-immigration sentiments are indeed different among men, because they are more often working and competing with immigrant labor.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the finding on the expectation that the government will tackle income inequality is statistically significant in the case of Hungary. Men who support populist parties in Hungary are less influenced by this factor (see Graph 3, and the insignificant coefficient of the Interaction Model), while women are the driving factor in the populist vote on this dimension.⁶⁶ This shows a positive association between the expectation that inequality will be tackled and a vote for populist parties among Hungarian women. Finally, the finding on exposure to political news, which is a significant factor in the data on Bulgarian voting. As shown on Graph 1, women have a positive trend on this dimension. That provides us with a preliminary intuition that women who follow politics on mass media channels tend to vote for populist parties more than Bulgarian men.

Because we have two separate models, we cannot directly compare the results. However, there are underlying intuitions arising from the data that I am inclined to discuss. First, in Bulgaria, women’s attitudes toward the government’s stance on income inequality were not statistically significant. We therefore have insufficient evidence to support the claim that governmental policy on income inequality is an influential factor in Bulgaria. Yet in the case of Hungary that is precisely the significant determinant of the vote. Policies addressing income inequality are what appeal to women more than men voting for populist parties in Hungary. That fits with the social roles discussed in the theoretical framework that may make women more likely to vote for parties with pro-welfarist offers. Nevertheless, it remains surprising that Bulgarian women do not exhibit a similar association. As a result, we might argue that women in Hungary are particularly underrepresented among populist voters on the economic right, or overrepresented among non-populist voters and non-voters. This suggests the need for further investigation into the composition of the voter base. Furthermore, Bulgarian women voting for populist parties have a degree of interest in politics, yet the data did not indicate a similar association in the case of Hungary. This difference could be attributed to distinct media landscapes in the two countries. In Hungary, the state has tight control over media channels that are supportive of the Orbán regime.⁶⁷ However, in Bulgaria, the media are still relatively trusted by the public.⁶⁸ Or, to follow the argument of Boris Gurov and Emilia Zankina, we expect that the appealing image of a strong, charismatic populist leader widely represented in the media simply appeals more to the women’s electorate.⁶⁹ Finally, in the Bulgarian case, anti-immigration sentiments are not uniformly associated with the populist vote. Given the strong ethno-national character of populism in both Bulgaria and Hungary, it is surprising that the results are not consistently indicative of an anti-immigration attitude among women in both countries.

The study identified an average trend by aggregating the available data for every country case. That allowed me to capture the variation in attitudes of men and women voting for populist parties, to see the magnitude of the associations examined here. However, it has not exhausted all the sources of these differences. Further research is needed to explore these links in more detail. Analysis of the trends identified here would be enhanced by incorporating a dimension that would capture shifts in attitudes over time. Secondly, we should investigate those who abstained from the vote. Access to data is a challenge when analyzing abstainers. However, they should not be overlooked in the debate over populism. Finally, examining other cases—such as Poland—would greatly benefit our understanding of the particularities of demand for populism in the region.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A8

Contrasts of Margins, Media Exposure, Bulgaria.

Contrasts of gender at unit change of media exposure			df	χ²	p > χ²
(Female	vs	Male) 1	1	6.28	0.0122
(Female	vs	Male) 2	1	4.64	0.0312
(Female	vs	Male) 3	1	0.93	0.3342
(Female	vs	Male) 4	1	0.00	0.9579
(Female	vs	Male) 5	1	0.35	0.5531
(Female	vs	Male) 6	1	0.79	0.375
(Female	vs	Male) 7	1	1.13	0.2869
		Joint	4	2630.71	0.000

ORCID iD

Paulina Lenik

Notes

Paulina Lenik is a post-doctoral researcher in the Taube Centre for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Jagiellonian University in Krakow. She holds a PhD in economics from University College London. She also has a Master’s degree (MSt) in Diplomatic Studies from Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford (2018) and Postgraduate Diploma in Foreign Service, Department of Continuing Education, University of Oxford (2017). In 2014 she graduated with honors with a master’s degree in European Studies from the Centre for European Studies, Jagiellonian University in Krakow. In 2012 she obtained her first-cycle degree in International Economic Relations, Cracow University of Economics. In 2017 she was awarded the Oxford University R.G. Feltham Prize for her thesis Energy Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean: Case Studies. Her professional experience includes diplomatic service for the Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York, quality analysis for the Quality Management Team (DG Inte) of the European Parliament in Brussels, as well as work in the corporate financial sector for the StateStreet Corporation, Capgemini, Serco and Shell BPO Krakow. She collaborated briefly with the GMF Brussels Forum in 2012, and the Foundation Institute for Strategic Studies Krakow in 2014. Her current research interests include: illiberalism, democracy, economic determinants of populism, quantitative methods, survey data, attitudinal trends, electoral behavior, Central and Eastern Europe. She is supervised by Julia Korosteleva and Elodie Douarin at UCL and by István Benczes at Corvinus.