Deconstituting al-Qa’ida

CCO and the Four Flows Model

This study draws upon McPhee’s four flows model (for a discussion of the commonalities and differences among the three major “schools” of CCO theorizing, see Schoeneborn et al., 2014). The Montreal and Luhmannian schools of CCO have been used to study terrorist organizations (Schoeneborn & Scherer, 2010, 2012; Stohl & Stohl, 2011), but the contributions of the four flows model have heretofore not been explored. The model maintains that organizations are constituted within and through four types of distinct yet interdependent message flows or interaction processes related to four audiences. Specifically, organizations must maintain relations with (a) their members through membership negotiation, (b) themselves through self-structuring, (c) their internal subgroups through activity coordination, and (d) outside stakeholders through institutional positioning. For example, in negotiating members and nonmembers, an organization is simultaneously framed as having prior existence. Organizations engage in self-structuring when members communicate about and perform internal relations and organizing processes. Organizations engage in activity coordination as internal subgroups decide on how to perform various tasks. Finally, organizations communicate with outside entities, such as funders, suppliers, collaborators, and the media (McPhee & Zaug, 2000).

Criticisms of the four flows model center on its imprecision concerning when, exactly, an organization has been constituted in communication (Brummans, Cooren, Robichaud, & Taylor, 2013). Koschmann (2012) has noted that empirical investigations using the four flows model are rare. We nevertheless argue that the model is useful for studying organizational decline and dissolution because it identifies communicative phenomena that are central to organizational existence. In a comparative analysis of CCO theories, McPhee stated that “structuration rests on the activity of organizational members,” a claim that appears to privilege membership negotiation as the critical flow (Schoeneborn et al., 2014, p. 297). McPhee and Zaug (2000) and McPhee and Iverson (2009) have emphasized, however, that organizational constitution requires all four flows to be interrelated and mutually influential. We demonstrate in this study that al-Qa’ida has constituted itself using all four flows, and simultaneously occluding them all is necessary for organizational dissolution. Yet, each of the four flows may not possess the same influence in its association with decline at a given point in time. In some situations thwarting one flow may be quicker or easier than another but that does not necessarily make it the most effective means of deconstituting an organization.

Along these lines, Schoeneborn and Scherer (2010) called for a “reparadoxification” of mass media reports about terrorism to create ambiguities that might destabilize terrorist organizations (p. 4). Reparadoxification reintroduces ambiguity to communicative events. Although the authors did not invoke the four flows model, they encouraged media commentators to undermine the institutional positioning flow by “referring to single groups or small organizations rather than to label them as all belonging to an overarching organization named al Qaeda” (p. 4). How the concept of reparadoxification might be applied to the other three flows is a question explored in this study. CCO theory is concerned with “how large-scale, purposefully-controlled organizations are constituted” (McPhee & Zaug, 2000, p. 1). We argue that CCO possesses untapped potential for understanding and accelerating the decline and dissolution of terrorist organizations and similar types of hidden collectives. Although conflict or ambiguity might characterize the flows at various times without necessarily obviating organizational existence (McPhee & Iverson, 2009), organizational decline is usefully understood as entailing significant, persistent losses of control over the four flows of communication.

Commentators have long called for al-Qa’ida to be dismantled or destroyed. From a CCO perspective, “organizations cease to exist” only in the absence of communication (Schoeneborn & Scherer, 2012, p. 964). The significance of this study lies in its exploration of whether and how such conditions are possible. Our primary research question is as follows:

Our secondary research question is as follows:

Answers to these two questions contribute to our understanding of the decline and dissolution of similar types of hidden organizations.

Complicating Membership Negotiation

Membership negotiation is the communication flow that establishes, maintains, or transforms the relationship between the organization and its members. McPhee and Zaug (2000) noted that this flow is constitutive because one must be a member of something. Stohl and Stohl (2011) argued that al-Qa’ida’s recruitment centered upon new members’ silent evocation of past texts and their willingness to risk themselves to demonstrate their commitment. Similarly, Schoeneborn and Scherer (2010) argued that terrorist organizations were “able to draw on a latent pool of potential organizational members which do not become actual organizational members until they commit to a communicative act of terrorism” (p. 2). However, the Abbottabad documents indicate that al-Qa’ida’s leadership was actively concerned with membership and struggled to control it.

Leaders could not agree on which individuals and organizations should be granted formal membership status. One leader (likely Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to the CTC) wrote to Bin Laden,

The problem is that al-Qa’ida has become a broad field; each can enter . . . to declare his allegiance, does not wait to see whether he was accepted or not, even though the pledge is a contract between contractors (SOCOM-2012-0000006, p. 2; all “SOCOM” references denote Special Operations Command documents found as appendices in Lahoud et al., 2012).

The letter writer elaborated,

Anyways, the important thing, honorable sir, is that the issue [of membership] needs to be controlled, to know who is member of al-Qa’ida, what his function is, what side he follows, what is the way to impeach him . . . (SOCOM-2012-0000006, p. 2)

Bin Laden was vested with the power to attribute or withhold formal membership, but the letter writer sought a more objective system: “Therefore, starting from now please think about controlling the matter with a system that deals with people, each according to his religion, piety and contribution” (p. 3). Other al-Qa’ida leaders also displayed concern for stabilizing membership. In one letter, Mahmud al-Hasan and Abu Yahya al-Libi rebuked Hakimullah Mahsud, the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, for attempting to poach members, “Badr Mansur and other members of our group [al-Qa’ida] are not to be approached to join another organization or to deploy to other locations” (p. 2). In another letter, drafted in 2007, a writer describes to Atiyah Abd al-Rahman the member negotiation practices of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI; formerly al-Qa’ida in Iraq). Having located a supply of potential members within the ranks of Iraq’s religious students, ISI leaders were warned “to be very wary of newly-joined members” (SOCOM-2012-0000014-HT, pp. 8-9). The writer elaborated,

No matter their status or capabilities, they must not be placed in leadership positions in the shura council, as there are many dangers lurking. Victory lies ahead, so one must remain on the lookout for penetrations and be extremely wary of newcomers. (p. 9)

Whether and how al-Qa’ida or its affiliates monitored new or potential members for infiltrators is unclear from the documents. Spies aside, nonmembers have helped to erode al-Qa’ida’s control over membership negotiation by imputing al-Qa’ida membership or affiliation to a range of individuals and groups (Stohl & Stohl, 2011). While membership and affiliation are, conceptually speaking, different phenomena, they are similar in their constitutive force in evoking organizational existence. CCO’s emphasis on the multisite character of organizational constitution underscores that even if the leaders of al-Qa’ida suppress formal membership, the act of outsiders imputing membership and affiliation to other groups can extend al-Qa’ida to other sites. When individuals and groups declare or are imputed affiliation with al-Qa’ida, that speech act simultaneously affirms the continued existence of al-Qa’ida. Authorities should not inadvertently entrench organizational existence by perpetuating erroneous images of widespread membership or affiliation. There is no indication in the Abbottabad documents that an inscribed record of organizational arrangements adequately stabilized the organization’s membership negotiation flow.

Impeding Self-Structuring

As communicative constructions, organizations are brought into existence as people make decisions about membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011). McPhee and Zaug (2000) state that it is through the process of self-structuring that an organization “takes control of and influences itself” in order to address both routine and unanticipated problems (p. 9). By developing this organizational sense of self, a collective can “avoid problems of over-adaptation, incoherence, and confusion” (p. 9). The authors claim that reflexive self-structuring distinguishes organizations from informal groupings. In transparent organizations, written and verbal interactions mediated by relatively stable organizational charts, directives, orders, or authoritative decision-making bodies are primary mechanisms of self-structuring. References to similar mechanisms of self-structuring are found in the Abbottabad documents, but some of al-Qa’ida’s leaders lamented that they had failed to adequately control this constitutive flow.

Bin Laden generally did not seek to formally unify various jihadi groups under al-Qa’ida’s umbrella. As a result, Saudi militants unilaterally adopted the name “al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula” in 2003, but Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s “al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia” (or “al-Qa’ida in Iraq”) was the only affiliate that Bin Laden publicly acknowledged as formally united with al-Qa’ida (this group later broke with al-Qa’ida to form “ISIS” or the so-called “Islamic State”). Bin Laden’s reluctance to inscribe a formal record of organizational arrangements is understandable because self-structuring relies upon an illocutionary act of declaration. The flow is a double-edged sword for hidden organizations. On one hand, a declaration, “We are al-Qa’ida,” performs a constitutive function. Indeed, one al-Qa’ida leader (probably al-Zawahiri, according to the CTC) encouraged accession of affiliates into al-Qa’ida despite Bin Laden’s misgivings, “I see it to be very essential for al-Qa’ida to confirm and declare its linkage with its branches, in order to become a reported fact, there is no use in denying it” (SOCOM-2012-0000006, p. 1). On the other hand, any public declaration is potentially suicidal. Bin Laden understood this situation, and in a letter to al-Shabab’s leader, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, who sought formal union with al-Qa’ida, Bin Laden stated, “It would be better for them [Somali jihadists] to say that there is a relationship with al-Qa’ida which is simply a brotherly Islamic connection and nothing more, which would neither deny nor prove” (SOCOM-2012-0000005, p. 2).

al-Qa’ida’s ambiguous self-structuring can also be seen in al-Qa’ida spokesman Adam Gadahn’s reference to an internal debate about whether or not al-Qa’ida should establish an Islamic state, “I would like to emphasize that I was at ease with declaring the State for a long time . . . ” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 6). Gadahn indicated that other leaders, however, preferred a different arrangement, “My stand is not a new one, but I followed the official stand of the organization, being afraid not to create a seduction . . .” (p. 6). Gadahn also advised Bin Laden that al-Qa’ida should take public measures to dissociate itself from “criminal” jihadi groups that routinely slaughtered Muslims (p. 23). While some of the affiliates sought to acquire the al-Qa’ida brand, operationally, the affiliates did not regularly consult with al-Qa’ida’s leaders nor follow their directives regarding the killing of innocents. This situation complicated self-structuring. Gadahn claimed that al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s “improvised decision has caused a split in the Mujahidin ranks and their supporters inside and outside Iraq” (p. 11). Other letter writers, including Bin Laden, express similar sentiments regarding the activities of affiliates.

Given this situation, the CTC argues that “the framing of an ‘AQC’ [al-Qa’ida Central] as an organization in control of regional ‘affiliates’ reflects a conceptual construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of insiders” (Lahoud et al., 2012, p. 12). Illustrating how outsiders can influence self-structuring, Bin Laden appropriated the expression al-Qa’ida Central (“AQC”) from the media, “This term [AQC] was coined in the media to distinguish between al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qa’ida in the other territories. In my opinion, there is no problem with using this term in principle in order to clarify the intended meaning” (SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT, 2012, p. 13). In an effort to control self-structuring processes, Bin Laden asked al-Zawahiri to prepare a memorandum of understanding that would require regional jihadi groups to consult with “AQC” before acting. The symbiotic nature of self-structuring thus rendered outside descriptions of al-Qa’ida’s organizational structure as influential as members’ independent constructions. McPhee and Iverson (2009) anticipated this situation, claiming that organizational members initiate, but do not wholly control, the process of self-structuring. In the context of terrorism, law enforcement organizations, intelligence services, defense institutions, media organizations, and a myriad of other stakeholders can impute structure to otherwise ambiguous self-structuring phenomena associated with hidden organizations.

al-Qa’ida’s self-structuring created asymmetrical power relations. Through self-structuring, some organizational members became responsible for scrutinizing the actions of other members to ensure the latter’s commitment to organizational rules. McPhee and Iverson (2009) pointed out that such surveillance activities are also a form of constitutive self-structuring. The Abbottabad documents show that Bin Laden was concerned about the loss of control over al-Qa’ida’s structure, and he spent much time in his letters fretting over possible leaders within al-Qa’ida and the affiliates, as well as asking for reports from the field about activities and individuals, instructing subordinates to try to influence organizational processes.

Obstructing Activity Coordination

Activity coordination coincides with self-structuring and can include the processes of task representation, focusing group attention, and negotiating the division of labor. McPhee and Zaug (2000) stated that activity coordination is the process of adjusting work processes and solving immediate practical problems. CCO views activity coordination as derivative of self-structuring, yet reinforcing of self-structuring via routine and repetition. Activity coordination’s main constitutive contribution is to allow practices to simultaneously endure and adapt to contingencies. In the Abbottabad documents, activity coordination revolved primarily around the planning and execution of terrorist attacks and the generating of publicity in support of al-Qa’ida’s stated goals, namely, the driving of Western influence from Muslim nations, the eventual creation of an Islamic state, and the strict imposition of Sharia law.

al-Qa’ida’s leaders struggled to control the activity coordination flow. Leaders’ isolation and the infrequency of communication hindered operations. In one letter, Bin Laden stated,

Also, I hope that he [Anwar al-Awlaqi] be informed of us still needing more information from the battlefield in Yemen, so that it is feasible for us, with the help of God, to make the most appropriate decision to either escalate or calm down. (SOCOM-2012-0000003-HT, p. 2)

In another letter, Bin Laden urged Atiyah Abd al-Rahman:

Pay attention to explaining the importance of coordination, as well as the dangers of neglecting it, to all the brothers in all the regions. In general, it would be good to clarify the wisdom or the reason behind this in most of what we ask the brothers for, unless it exposes operational secrets. (SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT, p. 26)

In late 2010, Bin Laden believed that the organization’s decline could best be forestalled by having affiliates pledge commitment to policies and strategies outlined in a memorandum. Bin Laden wrote:

Once the memorandum is prepared, we shall discuss it and send it to all the regions, along with sending the general policy in the military work. We shall then inform you of he committee that we are in the process of forming … that committee will have the privilege of reviewing and postponing any publications assessed to be outside the general policy…. (SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT, 2012, p. 7)

Importantly, organizational leaders from outside the local context usually impose the shape of activity coordination. The Abbottabad documents illustrate that Bin Laden and other leaders repeatedly urged affiliates to abort domestic attacks and instead focus on the United States. One unknown writer implored Bin Laden, “Issue a clear and unequivocal statement to anyone who listens to you and accepts your opinion to direct the work and focus it on the head of the snake [the United States]” (SOCOM-2012-0000018-HT, p. 11). Gadahn even went as far as to draft text that could be disseminated to Islamic scholars, urging them to condemn domestic attacks to influence the activities of regional jihadists. Gadahn wrote,

What we need is direct speeches, defined and specialized on that subject [the objectionableness of domestic attacks]. This is the suggested text: Acquittal and Warning[:] In the name of God the merciful the compassionate God almighty has stated: “And fight those who are fighting you and do not be aggressive as God does not like the aggressors.” Qa’ida al-Jihad Organization has denounced, more than once, and on the tongue of its Emirs and scholars and symbols and those who speak in favor, any armed operation that targets the Muslims in the places of their gathering, and any operation that does not account for the sanctity of their blood, souls, bodies, belongings or money . . . (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 22).

Gadahn’s statement, with its “suggested text,” illustrates how textual control was a central issue for al-Qa’ida. Although texts (letters) attempted to control activity coordination, counterterrorism authorities have instead focused on the disruption of plots through surveillance and killing the purported leaders of al-Qa’ida through “decapitation” strikes. al-Qa’ida’s leaders obviously recognized the danger and therefore attempted to control the movement of personnel. Bin Laden wrote in one letter,

Regarding the brothers in Waziristan in general . . . I am leaning toward getting most of the brothers out of the area . . . The brothers who can keep a low profile and take the necessary precautions should stay, but move to new houses on a cloudy day [due to the possibility of lethal drone strikes]. (SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT, 2012, p. 1)

Bin Laden warned, “Remind your deputies that all communication with others should be done through letters” (p. 2). From attempting to coordinate and control activities ranging from financial matters, to media relations, to movements of personnel, Bin Laden sought a span of control that was remarkable for any organization with complicated managerial, financial, and international activities. However, because activity coordination can never be completely managed from afar, it is open to manipulation—the implications of which we explore later in this study.

Undermining Institutional Positioning

McPhee and Zaug (2000) explain that institutional positioning involves communication outside the organization. Key to institutional positioning is what the authors refer to as face presentation, giving external parties a sense of the nature of the organization, what it is trying to accomplish, and its character. Organizational leaders try to coordinate and control the self-representations of the organization because they are vital for helping to secure resources and legitimacy. The Abbottabad documents show that al-Qa’ida’s leaders were frustrated by their inability to control the institutional positioning flow, especially among international audiences. In one letter, Gadahn expressed his dismay, “To rely only on Al Jazeera and the Jihadi forums on the internet is not useful [for communicating with international audiences]” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 5). Gadahn thus proposed an experiment. He wrote that in the lead up to the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa’ida should send publicity materials to a group of 30 writers and independent journalists “who have shown interest in al-Qa’ida issues, from different [Western] countries” (p. 4). Gadahn elaborated,

Suppose that one-third of those corresponded with are interested, then we would have 10 international journalists that will display our mission in the newspapers and channels. If the experiment works, then I suggest to repeat it on every important occasion, and any instant we want to increase the number of those informed about some message or statement. (p. 4)

Most of the institutional positioning discourse in the Abbottabad documents concerns al-Qa’ida’s inability to coordinate and control interactions with international media. For example, in one letter, Bin Laden declared to a colleague:

I hope that brother Basir be informed that the media appearance is his task [not subordinates’], and in general, they should reduce the appearance during this period unless necessary, and if necessity calls for one of the brothers to issue a speech, thus Basir should review it before it’s broadcasted in the media. (SOCOM-2012-0000003-HT, pp. 2-3)

Bin Laden sought better management of media activities. In another letter, he stated,

It seems that there is a misunderstanding regarding the issue of Jihadi media. It is a main piece of the war and I did not mean that it should be abandoned. I just wanted to point out that the level of interviews did not reach the desired level and I called on you to do better. (SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT, p. 3)

The Abbottabad documents are striking in that al-Qa’ida’s concern for control over institutional positioning would be familiar to any student of public relations. Gadahn even evaluated major media outlets in terms of al-Qa’ida’s ability to control its message. For example, he wrote,

As for the neutrality of CNN in English, it seems to be in cooperation with the government more than the others (except Fox News of course). Its Arabic version brings good and detailed reports about al-Sahab releases, with a lot of quotations from the original text. That means they copy directly from the releases or its gist. (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 3)

Nevertheless, Gadahn noted the inability of al-Qa’ida to adequately control positioning among U.S. audiences:

In conclusion, we can say that there is no single [television] channel that we could rely on for our messages … and even the channel that broadcast them, probably it would distort them somehow. This is accomplished by bringing analysts and experts that would interpret its meaning in the way they want it to be. Or they may ignore the message and conduct a smearing of the individuals, to the end of the list of what you know about their cunning methods. (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, pp. 3-4)

As McPhee and Zaug (2000) note, any relationship requires a flow of communication—even a relationship based on enmity. To the extent that authorities elide recognition of al-Qa’ida as an organization, it undermines the constitutive flow of institutional positioning. Of course, al-Qa’ida could potentially sustain its institutional positioning flow via other interlocutors, but authorities should not inadvertently facilitate this constitutive relationship.

In sum, the Abbottabad documents provide a unique view of al-Qa’ida’s decline. The Director of the CIA, John Brennan, has stated, “We’re on a path to al Qaeda’s destruction, and the president has committed that we’re not going to rest until al Qaeda is destroyed as an organization . . .” (CNN Wire Staff, 2012, para. 2). A CCO perspective maintains that organizational destruction occurs when the communication that constitutes organizing ceases (Schoeneborn & Scherer, 2012). Our analysis of al-Qa’ida’s four flows underscores, however, that communicative processes of organizational decline and dissolution are neither simple nor straightforward because both organizational members and nonmembers generate, control, or thwart constitutive communication in complex ways. We next discuss the implications of this condition.

Implications for Counterterrorism Strategy

Our analysis indicates that undermining a terrorist organization’s control of the flows of membership negotiation, self-structuring, activity coordination, and institutional positioning might be accomplished through what the Schoeneborn and Scherer call reparadoxification, that is, reintroducing ambiguity to communicative events. The Abbottabad documents confirm that creating ambiguity around al-Qa’ida’s mass media messages has been an effective strategy for degrading the organization’s institutional positioning flow, and it is a strategy that should continue. Extending Schoeneborn and Scherer’s concept of reparadoxification beyond mass media and institutional positioning, however, there are several types of communication that might encourage the destabilization of the other three flows of membership negotiation, self-structuring, and activity coordination. Because the Abbottabad documents show that vague and contradictory communication both reflected and exacerbated al-Qa’ida’s decline, we advance obstruction, deception, falsification, and fabrication as communicative interventions that might intensify and accelerate decline to the point of organizational dissolution. Authorities could use these interventions against other terrorist organizations that resemble al-Qa’ida in terms of their communicative flows—especially those that seek centralized command and control. While these kinds of interventions could be anticipated from CCO theory alone, our analysis reveals the crucial role that certain types of texts have played in al-Qa’ida’s constitution, thus offering specific guidance for counterterrorism authorities.

Thwarting al-Qa’ida’s membership negotiation flow could take multiple forms because, as the Abbottabad documents indicate, organizational boundaries, members, and recruiting processes are often unclear. Stohl and Stohl (2011) stated, “clandestinity creates a situation where many people can position themselves as speaking for this organization . . .” (p. 1207). Given this dynamic, to further undermine coordination and control, authorities could masquerade as al-Qa’ida leaders, members, or neutral commentators and saturate communication channels, especially online media and jihadi message boards, with “false” messages regarding the membership status of various figures or groups. For example, Gadahn noted that jihadi message boards created problems by “distort[ing] the face of al-Qa’ida, due to what you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants in these forums” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 5). Authorities could use message boards to further distort and undermine al-Qa’ida’s image and allure, as well as generate online articles and statements to complicate the recruitment of new members by providing misleading information about membership practices and procedures. Identifying certain behaviors or utterances as denoting membership could generate confusion among potential recruits, forcing organizational members to expend resources clarifying genuine recruitment processes or correcting false information about boundaries. False declarations of membership revocation could also generate disorder.

However, McPhee and Iverson (2009) described new member negotiation as a process of crossing organizational boundaries, and communication that invokes these boundaries simultaneously constitutes the organization. As illustrated in our analysis, speaking in the organization’s name still establishes the organization as an absent third party. It therefore may be productive to disseminate narratives that obfuscate or deny organizational boundaries and identities. For example, in 2011, authorities and commentators could have referenced the Abbottabad documents to assert that formal membership in al-Qa’ida required the approval of its founder, Bin Laden. With the leader’s death, formal membership was no longer technically possible. Under Islamic law, renewed pledges of bayat or fealty to a new leader are required, so that leader could not realistically claim organizational continuity.

al-Qa’ida’s self-structuring and activity coordination are also open to multiple interventions that can facilitate decline. The Abbottabad documents demonstrate that contestation over organizational relationships hindered al-Qa’ida’s planning and operations. Authorities could therefore disseminate to would-be or existing members misleading organizational directives, orders, or decisions. Once assented to or legitimated by members, nonmembers, or commentators, misleading directives could complicate organizational leaders’ control over self-structuring processes. Although there may be unintended consequences associated with such a strategy, authorities could, at a minimum, better account for the constitutive force of their public declarations regarding organizational relationships. Declarations that intensify decline by destabilizing control may be more valuable in comparison with those that simply report facts. Interventions targeting activity coordination could be similar to those designed to stymie self-structuring: dissemination of misleading organizational objectives, plans, procedures, directives, orders, or decisions. Flooding known and suspected al-Qa’ida members and affiliates with falsified messages related to financial requests, personnel matters, and operational planning (all of which are instances of organizational communication evident in the Abbottabad documents) could potentially consume the time and resources of al-Qa’ida leadership in clarifying genuine communication.

The clearest illustration of our argument comes from Bin Laden’s own hand. In one letter, Bin Laden tells Atiyah Abd al-Rahman that it is not permitted for al-Qa’ida operatives to break the oath of U.S. citizenship (SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT), and in another letter, Bin Laden calls for operatives “to conduct operations inside America as long as they have not given their promises not to harm America” (SOCOM-2012-0000016-HT, p. 2). Bin Laden’s specific guidance shows how texts can promote or impede activity coordination in ways that significantly influence the ability of al-Qa’ida to meet its objectives. In this case, Bin Laden’s instructions, if followed, constrain who is permitted to carry out terrorism operations within the United States. Bin Laden’s instructions thus indicate that specific texts (letters, statements, directives, etc.) could be fabricated and attributed to a terrorist organization, its affiliates and supporters, leaders, or neutral commentators in ways that limit or redirect activities, blur boundaries, contradict public pronouncements, sow confusion, and thwart control. These fabricated texts could hinder membership negotiation (through false recruitment practices), self-structuring (through the dissemination of misleading organizational arrangements), activity coordination (through distorted directives), and institutional positioning (through fictitious public declarations). The point is to imitate organizational communication flows in ways that lead to different forms of knowledge and action that radically undermine coordination and control, thereby contributing to organizational decline and eventual dissolution. However, using CCO flows to dissolve terrorist organizations still requires knowledge of how organizational decisions are made and how those decisions are communicated—no easy task. While forms of reparadoxification might be useful across multiple flows, the practical challenges associated with intercepting and thwarting a given flow may make some interventions more viable than others at any given time.

The U.S. government relies on its own hidden organizations (e.g., clandestine agencies and counterterrorism units) to defeat terrorist organizations. The U.S. military’s principal counterterrorism policy document, “Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism” (U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 2014b), makes two unelaborated references to the use of military deception, but references to the other strategies described herein (or similar strategies) are only vaguely alluded to or absent. Although the document does not explicitly address constitutive phenomena in the ways we have described, it is unclear how and/or to what extent covert counterterrorism campaigns directed at al-Qa’ida already target the four flows in the ways that we have suggested. However, it is unlikely that constitutive processes are an explicit focus of authorities’ attention due to the U.S. government’s overwhelming reliance on the message influence model of communication, which generally takes organizational existence and boundaries for granted (Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall, 2008). We have argued that a CCO-informed strategy would instead leverage the metaphor of fluidity inherent in the idea of “flows” to engage in forms of mimesis that promote organizational decline and dissolution. In other words, our analysis demonstrates how CCO provides a framework for developing specific communicative interventions that use imitation and subterfuge to complicate organizing processes.

Implications for the Study of Hidden Organizations

CCO also holds implications for the study of hidden organizations in general. The four flows model helps to account for why and how instances of relatively visible communication occur within otherwise “dark” or “shadowed” organizations. In Scott’s (2013) typology, al-Qa’ida and similar terrorist organizations are positioned as “mostly shadowed” in that their visibility is described as relatively anonymous, their members relatively silent, and their audience relatively mass/public. Scott argued that organizational visibility was the most critical dimension in establishing the hiddenness of an organization. However, the Abbottabad documents indicate that al-Qa’ida sought to display many visibility elements that, theoretically speaking, it should have kept anonymous as a “mostly shadowed” organization. These visibility elements included the use of media spokespersons, a demonstrated concern for organizational image, a seeking of name recognition, and the distribution of press releases and talking points, among others. al-Qa’ida’s categorization as a mostly shadowed entity could therefore be reconsidered based on our analysis. However, because Scott’s model allowed for substantial variation within categories, we propose that a more precise examination of the communicative flows of an organization can help to explain why a particular mix of anonymous and recognizable activities is in evidence at any given time, thereby enabling more specific comparisons of hidden organizations. In al-Qa’ida’s case, focusing on its institutional positioning helps to explain why it promoted certain visibility activities. Similar visibility activities should be in evidence in dark or shadowed organizations that have comparable institutional positioning objectives (e.g., Anonymous) but less likely to occur in dark or shadowed organizations whose institutional positioning goals are more modest (e.g., the Continuity Irish Republican Army, New York City men’s bathhouses, or U.S. Special Operations units). A focus on communicative flows may help analysts understand why and how dark and shadowed organizations attempt to enact various configurations of organizational visibility.

A lack of control over the four flows certainly could affect transparent organization as well; however, the strategies of reparadoxification that we suggest might accelerate al-Qa’ida’s dissolution would not be well suited to organizations that do not share similar characteristics in terms of the communicative flows related to their visibility, member identification, and audience. Nevertheless, to the extent that one or more of the communicative flows that help to constitute various “shadowed” and “shaded” organizations share similarities with their “dark” cousins, those flows would be candidates for the types of interventions that we have described. Transparent organizations are not as easily susceptible to obstruction, deception, falsification, and fabrication because those organizations usually have recourse to multiple communication channels and legal protections. Lawful, transparent organizations are by no means completely immune to such interventions, however, as recent high-profile cases of phishing scams that involve deception indicate (e.g., hacks of Apple and Twitter). Opportunities for de-constituting organizations are therefore facilitated or constrained by the relative hiddenness of their communicative flows.