The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia

Introduction

Islamophobia refers to stereotypical generalizations about Islam and/or Muslims that can result in Muslims being discriminated against or harassed. Over the last decade there has been much discussion about the growth of Islamophobia in ‘Western’ societies (Allen, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Kundnani, 2007; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Sayyid and Vakil, 2011). However, this has not been accompanied by as much empirical analysis of Islamophobia as one might expect. In this article, I discuss British Muslim converts’ perceptions and experiences of Islamophobia. The findings indicate some significant observations about how Islamophobia operates in converts’ lives and potentially in lifelong Muslims’ lives too. I begin by arguing that upon converting to Islam, ‘white’ ¹ converts experience a re-racialization whereby they are no longer able to access white privilege in a way they once were, thus showing the links that Islamophobia has to racism. This process of re-racialization is a crucial prerequisite for the appearance of Islamophobia because it ensures converts are considered as Other, thus allowing them to be targeted with Islamophobia. Indeed, it is after they are re-racialized as ‘not-quite-white’ that they experience persistent Islamophobia which typically appears in a nuanced and discreet manner, thus exposing the most common manifestation of Islamophobia, a subtle and discreet form.

Methodology

This article is based on extensive research that was conducted in 2008 and 2009. My focus on Muslim converts was primarily because they are a neglected cohort of Muslims whose unique circumstances I envisaged would enable me to explore some of the most pressing issues relating to the study of Muslims in Britain. I chose in-depth interviews as my primary research method because I knew that ‘[i]nterviews yield rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings’ (May, 2001: 120). Although I am aware that interviews do not perfectly reflect reality or capture the full context in which events and interactions unfold (Rapley, 2007: 16), the conversations I had were rich enough to synthesize into broader theoretical themes. This was amplified by the fact that there was consistency in different interviews which led to a renewed confidence that the accounts likely had some resemblance to the lives of a broader Muslim convert population, and perhaps even lifelong Muslims.

The empirical research involved interviewing 37 Muslim converts who lived in Greater Manchester. The interviewees had varied backgrounds, each of whom enriched the research by providing their own unique contributions. More specifically, I interviewed 15 men and 22 women, with ages ranging from 18 to 74 years old. Thirteen of the interviewees were single and 24 were married, 19 of the interviewees had children and 18 did not have any children. The interviewees came from a wide spectrum of socio-economic categories including five who had no school qualifications, eight who had postgraduate qualifications and the rest with qualifications somewhere in-between. Twenty-one of the interviewees were employed in various sectors as nurses, teachers, office workers, manual workers, or were self-employed; six were unemployed, seven were students and three were retired. In total, 27 of the converts I interviewed identified as ‘white’, four identified as ‘black’ and six as ‘mixed race’.

The diversity amongst the interviewees was because of the multifaceted recruitment strategy that I employed which included advertising the research via the internet, mosques, Islamic organizations, and word of mouth. Without such an extensive effort to locate a diverse set of converts it may have been difficult to recruit interviewees because converts are dispersed and do not live in enclaves like other Muslims in Britain (Al-Qwidi, 2002: 105; Kose, 1996: 3). However, there was an overwhelming response to participate in the research, resulting in me having to turn away several potential interviewees due to time and resource limitations. Having said that, on some occasions there was a sense of reluctance to participate amongst some converts which I sensed was either because a) they were bored with participating in research or b) they were suspicious of whether there was a political agenda behind the research (Moosavi 2014). Both of these reservations are ones that researchers studying Muslims may encounter due to the increased attention that Muslims have received from academics, journalists and politicians since 9/11. In most cases, though, I felt able to generate rapport with the interviewees, who seemed to trust me as a fellow Mancunian and Muslim who wanted to conduct rigorous and beneficial research.

The Loss of Whiteness

People from all ‘races’ convert to Islam, but here I am concerned with the experiences of ‘white’ converts since their experiences are particularly illuminating in relation to Islamophobia. I have argued extensively elsewhere (Moosavi, 2011) that ‘white’ converts are both privileged and disadvantaged by being racialized as ‘white’ after converting to Islam. This paradox exists because ‘whiteness’ can be venerated in Muslim communities but it can also be perceived in negative terms. Yet, here I am less concerned with the way in which ‘whiteness’ shapes ‘white’ converts’ conversion to Islam, and more with how their conversion to Islam shapes their ‘whiteness’. The starting point of such a discussion is to recognize that their conversion to Islam can signal the end of them being racialized as ‘white’, and rather, they can begin to be considered as ‘non-white’. This process can be thought of as a ‘re-racializing’ because a body which was previously inscribed with ‘whiteness’ is reconsidered as now being ‘non-white’, even though there has been no change in their skin, hair or other bio-physical features.

Conversion to Islam can entail being ‘Pakistanised’ (Kose, 1996: 135) and ‘crossing the borders of whiteness’ (Franks, 2000). This re-racialization means convert’s access to white privilege is disrupted and they begin to be discriminated against as marked subjects. For Islamophobia to manifest, this racializing process must be at play, just as it must for racism to operate. It is their previous status as unmarked subjects, racialized as ‘white’ and therefore ‘normal’, which is eventually replaced with them being ‘re-racialized’ as ‘non-white’, that reveals how significant racialization as a process is for allowing Islamophobia to emerge. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, without this process of (re-)racialization, Islamophobia would not have any basis to develop since ‘white’ converts, like Muslims in general, would not be marked out as having an inherent difference that leaves them vulnerable to being targeted with a specific prejudice which we term Islamophobia.

One of the starkest ways in which ‘white’ converts can be re-racialized as ‘non-white’ is when they are called ‘Paki’ or ‘(dirty) Arab’. Several of the ‘white’ converts had been subjected to these comments by strangers and even by family and friends. For instance, Zach, a 25-year-old trainee teacher, was told by his lifelong Muslim friends ‘“You’re turning into a Paki now” and stuff like that’, showing how his religious conversion was understood to entail a ‘racial’ conversion too. Similarly, Abd-ur-Rahman, a 29-year-old primary school teacher, said: ‘When you become a Muslim and you’re white then you might get people saying for example: “Oh you have just become a Paki”’. These types of insults go hand in hand with the infrequent but hurtful instances when converts are told they are ‘traitors’ for converting to Islam. They are imagined as abandoning the nation and joining ‘the enemy’ by those who view Muslims as Other. During the re-racialization of ‘white’ converts, they are not only seen as traitors to the nation but another dimension of the betrayal trope is in operation: ‘white’ converts are seen as ‘race traitors’ (Franks, 2000: 923–4; McDonald, 2005: 142; Van Nieuwkerk, 2006a: 1). Another way in which ‘white’ converts are re-racialized is when they are assumed to be ‘foreign’, perhaps through being told to ‘go back home’. They are asked frequently which country they are ‘originally from’ and are spoken to as if they cannot speak English fluently. People assume they cannot be ‘white’ British, but must be from a Muslim-majority country. Even when the ‘white’ converts explain that they are ‘white’ English, they find some people insisting that they must be a ‘non-white’ foreigner. This experience was well explained by a ‘white’ convert called Elizabeth in a BBC Radio 4 documentary:

The first time I got shouted at was September 12th 2001. They said: ‘It was you that bombed America! Go back to your own country!’, and I thought: ‘If I had somewhere else to go, I might consider it! This is the only place I’ve got!’ Pre-September 11th, people treated me like I was stupid. They’d slow down their speech, assume I don’t speak English and that I’m pretty uneducated … Since then I’ve been called: ‘Paki’ a number of times, I can’t even count how many times, ‘white Paki’, which is quite a funny version, ‘Iraqi’, ‘Afghani’ … (Twin Sisters, Two Faiths, 2009)

For Elizabeth, being treated as foreign and ‘non-white’ are mutually reinforcing, and she explains this in a way that captures the experiences of other ‘white’ converts (Badran, 2006: 198–9; Franks, 2000: 922; Jensen, 2008: 390; Van Nieuwkerk, 2006b: 106). It is clear that there is a significant link between being re-racialized as ‘non-white’ and then being discriminated against because the highlighting of an essentialized difference is proceeded by hurtful, exclusionary comments. Elizabeth’s mention of ‘white Paki’, a term several of the ‘white’ converts I interviewed had also encountered, and one that Laura Zahra McDonald observed (2005: 143), is particularly remarkable. This term shows that, on occasion, ‘white’ converts are not totally re-racialized as ‘non-white’, but are only partially re-racialized, whereby they are still considered as ‘white’ to some extent but as having a tarnished ‘whiteness’ or being ‘not-quite-white’. This is similar to the way in which poor ‘whites’ (‘white trash’ in the USA and ‘chavs’ in the UK) have also been considered to have a contaminated or polluted ‘whiteness’ (Garner, 2007: 11, 65–6, 111; Nayak, 2004: 76–103; Tyler, 2008; Wray, 2006). ‘Whiteness’ here is not a monolithic state but rather based on degrees, which means some ‘whites’ are ‘whiter’ than others (Garner, 2007: 9–10, 175; 2010: 121; López, 2005: 18). For ‘white’ converts, ‘white trash’ and ‘chavs’, their ‘not-quite-white’ status means they find it almost as difficult to benefit from white privilege as those who are considered as ‘non-white’ do, because their ‘whiteness’ is tainted to such an extent that they are ‘not white enough’.

The re-racialization of ‘white’ converts occurs because of a conflation between religious and ‘racial’ identity, where Muslims in the British context are imagined as ‘non-white’. Margot Badran has explained the implications of this for Muslim converts:

Islam and Muslims are still widely perceived in Europe and the rest of the West as foreign, or in need of ‘naturalization’. This thinking marks, or marks off, Muslim immigrants and their descendants in Europe, thus foreignizing that which has become part of the polity. Native European or Western converts are also foreignized to a degree by their conversion to Islam. (Badran, 2006: 198–9)

Since the majority of Muslims in Britain are Pakistani, Bengali and Indian, and since South Asian culture and politics has had a large bearing on the development of Islam in Britain, Muslims in Britain are often specifically racialized as South Asian to the extent where Islam is even thought of as a ‘Pakistani religion’ or part of South Asian culture (Geaves, 1996; Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 84–111; Meer, 2010: 91; Peach, 2006: 354–5). In other countries, Muslims are racialized quite differently. For example, in Malaysia, Muslims are racialized as Malay (Brown, 2010; Szajkowski et al., 1996: 27–8); in Nigeria, Muslims are racialized as Hausa (Anthony, 2000; Uchendu, 2010); in the USA, Muslims are racialized as Arab (Salaita, 2006); in Germany, Muslims are racialized as Turkish (Allen, 2005: 63; Nielsen, 1995: ix); and in France, Muslims are racialized as Maghrebian (Allen, 2005: 63; Nielsen, 1995: ix). Clearly, Muslims are racialized in different ways depending on the context because ‘[s]pecific ethnicities become associated with particular religions in distinct locations’ (Franks, 2000: 924–5). Moreover, the re-racializing of ‘white’ converts is commonplace because we live in a ‘rigid discursive system … one that conflates “ethnicity” and “race” with religion, and that forces [people] to be either English-Christian or Pakistani-Muslim … white and Muslim don’t quite add up’ (Fortier, 2008: 83–4). It is because Muslims are imagined to be ‘non-white’ that some people find a ‘white’ Muslim unfathomable, as the experience of Bakri, a 44-year-old holistic therapist, showed:

It’s like I’m white but they can’t believe it. I was at a wedding once and there was a guy sat next to me and about twenty times he must have said: ‘You’re Muslim but you’re a white man?’, and I’m shaking my head [to indicate yes] and he’s like: ‘You’re a white man and you’re a Muslim!?’, and he wasn’t even saying it to me, he was just shocked and couldn’t believe it … He was like: ‘So you’re English?’, and I’m like: ‘Yeah!’, and he asked: ‘So you’re born in England and your parents are English; but you’re a Muslim?’.

The man Bakri encountered found it difficult to accept a ‘white’ person as Muslim, the type of thinking that makes it likely for ‘white’ converts to be re-racialized as ‘non-white’. The choice appears to be between a ‘white’ or a Muslim identity, as the two are constructed as mutually exclusive. On numerous occasions, those responding to ‘white’ converts are unsure how to categorize them because they are outside the simplistic existing categories that they are familiar with. Too often it has been assumed that one who is ‘white’ in one instance, or even one who has been treated as ‘white’ all of their life, will forever and in all circumstances retain their ‘whiteness’ and their white privilege. Rather, ‘white’ converts show how ‘white’ people can be re-racialized and lose their white privilege because ‘race’ can be an unstable and fickle social attribute. ‘White’ converts are re-racialized in a similar way to how Jews, Irish, and Italians have all been racialized as ‘non-white’ in the past, but are more typically racialized as ‘white’ today (Gilman, 2000: 231–5; McClintock, 1995: 52–3; Sullivan, 2006: 3). They are also similar to those individuals who are initially racialized as ‘non-white’ but become ‘honorary English’ or ‘honorary whites’ (Nayak, 2004: 157–9).

However, unlike these examples, ‘white’ converts are demoted to ‘non-white’ as opposed to promoted to ‘white’. They thus expose the way in which ‘[w]ho is visibly “black” or “white” changes over time and in different contexts’ (Byrne, 2006: 74). To be labelled as ‘non-white’ effectively makes one ‘non-white’ and therefore the privileges one may have had on account of being considered as ‘white’ may no longer serve that individual. That is because it is after ‘white’ converts lose their ‘whiteness’ that they then become open to experiencing Islamophobia. Karen Brodkin Sacks (2010) has demonstrated the relationship that exists between the increase in the racialization of Jews as ‘white’ and the decrease in the amount of anti-Semitism Jews experienced. Conversely, with Islamophobia, as ‘white’ converts have their ‘whiteness’ confiscated, they become a more likely target of Islamophobia. Thus, Islamophobia is predicated on a process of (re-)racialization, reminding us that Islamophobia should rightly be considered a form of racism that singles out a category of people as having innate attributes, stereotypes them and treats them as legitimate targets of hostility. ‘White’ converts show how the racializing of Muslims as Other is the premise of all Islamophobic manifestations.

Concern about Islamophobia

There have been numerous high-profile cases that show that Islamophobia can have very serious consequences. For example, in recent years, Yasir Abdelmouttalib was attacked on the way to Friday prayers in north-west London and left blinded, paralysed and brain damaged (Martin, 2004), Ekram Haque was beaten to death outside a mosque in Tooting (Daily Mail, 2009), and an anonymous Muslim student in Leicester was beaten into unconsciousness by a gang (Versi, 2009). Although unsuccessful so far, there have also been far-right plots to bomb Muslim targets such as those planned by Martyn Gilleard in Yorkshire (Stokes, 2008), Neil MacGregor in Scotland (Howie, 2009), and Neil Lewington in London (Dodd, 2009). Following the murder of Lee Rigby in London in May 2013, at least three mosques in the West Midlands were targeted with explosive devices, but failed to cause injury or death due to the ineptitude of the campaign. Violent intent was present in all of these cases, and the July 2011 Norway attacks conducted by a far-right terrorist with an anti-Muslim and xenophobic agenda serve as a reminder of how devastating far-right violence can be. These examples, and many others, highlight that Islamophobia can have tangible and tragic consequences. These are also the examples that are drawn upon by the numerous commentators who suggest that, since 9/11, levels of Islamophobia have increased so dramatically that Britain is now engulfed in extensive Islamophobia. Deep concern about Islamophobia is a perception common amongst Muslims in general, who often express a belief that they are under siege. This is why Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain have commented that ‘Islamophobia, racism and discrimination, thus remain an important influence on how British Muslims understand their lives’ (2005: 219). Indeed, the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s ‘How Fair Is Britain?’ report (EHRC, 2010: 243) found that out of all faith groups, Muslims felt the most unsafe alone at home after dark or walking alone in their local area. Muslims, then, tend to have a great deal of concern about soaring levels of Islamophobia.

This perception of Muslims as victims living in an era where Islamophobia is prevalent was shared by the converts I interviewed. Many of them believed Islamophobia is rife and that it is a part of life they have to bear. They suggested that Islam is perceived with considerable contempt by non-Muslims and that discrimination is something that Muslims constantly have to overcome. Laura, a 35-year-old mental health nurse, captured this when she said: ‘So many people have a problem with Muslims … So many people don’t like Muslims, hate Muslims’. What was striking about the converts’ perception of Islamophobia as widespread is that it appears to have little relationship to their actual experiences of Islamophobia. Despite their belief that Islamophobia is pervasive, when asked if they had experienced Islamophobia they reported experiencing very few incidents. For example, there were no reports of experiencing Islamophobia in the form of physical attacks and there were no clear-cut reports of discrimination in services or employment for being a Muslim. There were some reports involving verbal insults, such as being heckled with words like ‘Taliban’, ‘terrorist’, and ‘Bin Laden’. My findings therefore correspond with other studies that have found that verbal Islamophobia is much more common than outright attacks (Larsson, 2005; Sheridan, 2004, 2006). Significantly, the converts seemed to understand these verbal insults as teasing rather than threatening. Verbal Islamophobia can be aggressive, but the converts explained that they are only exposed to Islamophobic slurs occasionally from either teenagers who think it is funny to shout them out or from people who are intoxicated. Thomas, a 38-year-old university lecturer, provided a typical example:

I’ve [only] encountered things like that [Islamophobic slurs], whispers and … I can remember some lads driving past and shouting: ‘Osama Bin Laden!’ at us and shaking his fist. And I quite liked that! I shouted: ‘Takbir’! ² They were louts, white kids in a battered car in York. This was after 9/11. It was great fun! They weren’t threatening, they were having a laugh. But no, Alhamdulillah, ³ I’ve never been threatened or subject to violence or anything like that.

Thomas dismisses the incident as rather mundane and even ‘fun’ in a similar manner to which other interviewees laughed off the verbal insults they had received. Thomas also points out that he has never felt threatened, even after this incident. The interviewees typically conveyed their experiences of such Islamophobic slurs as a nuisance that arose every now and then rather than a persistent problem. Although the converts fear widespread Islamophobia, then, it does not appear to regularly confront them in their everyday lives. This corresponds with a large European-wide survey which found that 51 per cent of Muslims believe religious discrimination is ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ widespread (FRA, 2009: 10) even though only around 30 per cent of them experienced discrimination in the whole of the previous 12 months (FRA, 2009: 3).

Based on the converts’ experiences, it appears to be the case that Islamophobia in Britain is less prevalent than some may believe. This is supported by the fact that Muslims in Britain receive some degree of protection from Islamophobia because religious discrimination has been made illegal and is often condemned. This account that suggests that Islamophobia is not so severe that it constantly appears in Muslims’ lives is somewhat refreshing given that there are numerous sensationalized claims that cause Muslims to panic about violent aggression and hostile treatment. It appears that such blatant forms of Islamophobia only arise on a minimal number of occasions and, in fact, many non-Muslims are respectful and courteous towards Muslims. Two of the only commentators to recognize this are Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert: ‘The overwhelming majority of Londoners display courtesy and respect to their neighbours irrespective of religion or race … Racist violence was always a fringe minority activity just as anti-Muslim violence has become’ (2010: 43). Regardless, the converts I interviewed were persistent in their fear of Islamophobia. Significantly, this concern is not fleeting but instead has lasting consequences on how the converts feel about themselves and others around them. It can lead to low self-esteem, depression, suspicion, lowering of ambition and dislike of others. Several of the converts spoke about curtailing their mobility and shutting themselves away from society because of their expectation of being targeted with Islamophobia. There is no reason why a similar sentiment cannot be said to also be experienced by lifelong Muslims. This is a reminder of how far-reaching the consequences of Islamophobia can be for society.

Where is the Islamophobia?

The crucial question is: Why do the converts not appear to experience Islamophobia? One answer to this question is that it is because converts are not always identifiable as Muslims due to an absence of ‘Islamic markers’. It is well established that there is a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiencing Islamophobia (Allen, 2010: 104; Allievi, 2006: 138–9; Meer, 2010: 102). Suzanne, a 32-year-old PhD student who does not display any outward signs of being a Muslim, understood her lack of Islamophobic experiences in such terms: ‘For a lot of converts, they’re not visible as Muslims so they’re less likely to experience anything [Islamophobic]’. While this is important to note, many of the converts I interviewed were ‘visible’ as Muslims because of wearing headscarves, having beards or donning ‘Muslim clothing’. As explained earlier, they are typically re-racialized as Muslims, meaning they are visible as Muslims because they are considered to be in possession of that inherent Muslim essence. Yet, despite many of them being re-racialized as ‘not-quite-white’ Muslims, they still reported only a handful of Islamophobic encounters. Future research could assess whether a lack of Islamophobic experiences also resonates with lifelong Muslims’ experiences, meaning that the absence of Islamophobia is not specific to converts’ lives. I envisage that lifelong Muslims would also have a strong fear of Islamophobia, even though they would have little direct experience of Islamophobia. It is therefore insufficient to suggest that the reason why the converts do not appear to encounter Islamophobia is because they are not seen as Muslims.

An alternative answer to the crucial question of why the converts do not appear to experience much Islamophobia could be that it is because Islamophobia is virtually non-existent in Britain. Some have argued this by dismissing Islamophobia as largely exaggerated and claiming that it is not as much of a problem as some claim it is. This viewpoint is similar to the claims that concern about racism is ‘political correctness gone mad’ – a perspective that has been classified as ‘anti-anti-racist discourse’ (Fortier, 2008: 26). A report by the European Commission entitled Discrimination in the EU in 2009 highlights this perspective, as they observed that 53 per cent of people believe religious discrimination is ‘rare’ and it is ‘considered to be the least widespread form of discrimination in the EU’ (European Commission, 2009: 17). Clearly, then, ‘many are far from convinced of Islamophobia as a distinct and viable phenomenon’ (Allen, 2010: 129). In order to assess the possibility that Islamophobia does not exist, it is helpful to reflect on Kenan Malik’s article entitled ‘Islamophobia Myth’ (2005), in which he writes: ‘But does Islamophobia really exist? … So pervasive is the acceptance of Islamophobia, that no-one even bothers to check if it is true’. Malik concludes as follows: ‘The charge of “Islamophobia” is all too often used not to highlight racism but to stifle criticism. And in reality discrimination against Muslims is not as great as is often perceived’ (Malik, 2005). This provocative argument that Islamophobia is merely a ‘myth’ may appear to be a tangible explanation as to why the converts seem to have had few encounters with Islamophobia. However, I want to emphatically challenge Malik’s premise that Islamophobia is a ‘myth’ or that my findings support his proposition. Malik’s error is to dismiss Islamophobia because it is rare for Muslims to be subjected to routine violence and because the majority of Muslims are not stopped and searched by the police. His position is flawed because not only do the horrific examples I mentioned earlier prove that violent attacks do happen, but more crucially, this perspective is based on a crude understanding of what constitutes Islamophobia. Malik assumes that Islamophobia is only expressed explicitly and aggressively, a mistake he is not alone in making. This common way of regarding Islamophobia as involving physical violence, assault or overt hostility also appears to be how those I interviewed understood Islamophobia. This crucial point is why Islamophobia cannot be dismissed as just a myth. As I will go on to argue, the converts are subjected to Islamophobia, but they are unable to recount it because they do not identify it as Islamophobia.

Subtle Islamophobia

Islamophobia only rarely materializes in the form of violent attacks or transparent animosity, but surfaces more frequently on a mundane and discreet level. A ‘subtle Islamophobia’ must be considered whereby Muslims are confronted by latent hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives without it being obvious. In order to justify this claim, it is helpful to consider how racisms of all kinds have become less blatant than they were in previous eras, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1986: 125) have explained: ‘The new [political] right generally does not display overt racism. It has gained political currency by rearticulating racial ideology. As we have argued, rearticulation does not require an explicitly racial discourse, and would in fact be severely limited by any direct advocacy of racial inequality’. Philomena Essed (1991) has developed a theory concerning this ‘rearticulation of racial ideology’ that is pertinent for understanding subtle Islamophobia. She argues that despite widespread beliefs in North America and Europe that racism is no longer a major issue (‘the myth of tolerance’ as Essed puts it [1991: 115]), racism has merely taken on a new guise in the form of ‘everyday racism’, a type of racism which frequently appears in routine interactions but is not always so strikingly prejudiced. She explains it as follows: ‘[E]veryday racism has been defined as a process in which socialized racist notions are integrated into everyday practices and thereby actualize and reinforce underlying “racial” and ethnic relations. Furthermore racist practices in themselves become familiar, repetitive, and part of the “normal” routine in everyday life’ (Essed, 1991: 145). Essed’s discussion of Rosa N. captures how ‘everyday racism’ operates:

Rosa N. has never been physically molested, her life has not been threatened. She hardly has to deal with blatant ‘bigots’. She has not been fired. She has been called a Black ‘whore’ only once. She is gifted, she has a job, and she is pursuing a promising career. She is a ‘successful Black’. So one might ask: What is the problem? The problem is exactly that which is at the heart of everyday racism: the invisibility of oppression and the imperceptibility of Rosa N.’s extraordinary perseverance, despite multiple forms of oppression. Rejection, exclusion, problematization, underestimation, and other inequities and impediments are regularly infused into ‘normal’ life, so that they appear unquestionable. This is a story of oppression in the fabric of everyday life. Some of her experiences are obvious indications of racism. Many others are concealed and subtle. (Essed, 1991: 146)

This story of Rosa N. resonates with the lives of the converts I interviewed who appeared to live comfortable lives but nonetheless are exposed to subtle Islamophobia in various ways, some examples of which I will discuss shortly. They may only rarely see prejudice around them like Rosa N., but this does not mean that they are not regularly excluded, marginalized, and disadvantaged. It does not mean they do not have to overcome hurdles for being Muslim, as Rosa N. does for being ‘black’. For Essed, whether it is made visible or not, ‘everyday racism’ is ever-present and will continue to manifest in subtle ways regardless of our hopes that ‘race’ no longer matters. The same is true for Islamophobia, which is persistent in less blatant ways.

One contention that must be confronted is how one can be sure Islamophobia is present if it is so subtle. Essed addresses this issue by arguing that ‘black’ people can identify subtle forms of racism because, over time, they generate an understanding of what behaviour is normal and abnormal in given situations and, combined with an awareness of racist beliefs and practices, they acquire an ability to detect racism (Essed, 1991: 73–5, 126). I would suggest this applies to other minorities as well, meaning that it is common for minorities to hypothesize about the presence of prejudice and become skilled at detecting when it is in operation. This is why the converts’ concern over Islamophobia is understandable, because it is not based on empty sentiment but is rooted in intuition and insight. In this regard, Muslims may be said to have what W.E.B. Du Bois described as a ‘double consciousness’, whereby as a minority they are able to perceive themselves through the eyes of the majority, and therefore grasp the negative impressions that are held about them (Essed, 1991: 1–2; Meer, 2010: 39–40). However, as well as converts being able to sense Islamophobia due to living their daily lives as Muslims, they are also well placed to identify Islamophobia because of having previously lived their daily lives as non-Muslims.

This means they can draw upon memories to understand how non-Muslims perceive Muslims because they lived as non-Muslims themselves. Alessandra, a 27-year-old PhD student, recalled her memories of Muslims from before she converted to Islam:

It was very hard for me to understand [hijab] because I always tended to see it as a way to keep women in their place so to say … I remember how I used to feel when I was still a Christian towards women wearing hijab. I was a bit, ‘Aww, poor thing, your husband makes you do that’.

The converts’ ‘double-consciousness’ is therefore informed by having lived as a non-Muslim, which gives them even greater reason to believe Islamophobia is present. There is a more obvious way than relying on intuition or personal knowledge to identify the presence of Islamophobia though. One can also observe the instances when subtle Islamophobia bubbles to the brink of being overt. Again, Muslim converts in particular are well placed to highlight this because they face numerous instances when their religious identity is openly scrutinized.

The Appearance of Subtle Islamophobia

Subtle Islamophobia surfaces in the negative reactions that converts’ relatives have to their conversion. It is well established that some people may be so disgruntled with their relative’s conversion to Islam that they may disown them (Al-Qwidi, 2002: 219–20; Haddad, 2006: 31; Jensen, 2008: 398; Van Nieuwkerk, 2006a: 4; Zebiri, 2008: 71). The seriousness of these negative reactions is well reflected in the following passage, written by a Muslim convert:

For when a person raised in the West first becomes a Muslim, he or she often feels like crawling into a corner somewhere. Suddenly one has to face the incredulity, the shock, even sometimes the rejection, of family, friends, and colleagues. While this is no doubt due to centuries of Western misunderstanding and antagonism toward Islam and the generally negative image presented by the media, it is by far one of the most difficult challenges for a new convert. (Lang, 1994: 60–1)

It is because of such reactions that Ali Kose has observed that ‘[c]onverting to Islam in a non-Muslim society may mean social suicide and boycott for some converts … Some [parents] treated their son/daughter’s acceptance of Islam as a “social death”’ (1996: 137). The negative reaction to conversion to Islam may be partly explained by the idea that all religious belief is somewhat out of fashion and often considered as superstition. However, the negative reaction is not just about becoming religious in an alternative direction, but specifically about becoming Muslim. Anthony Johns and Abdullah Saeed have considered this in Australia, although their point also applies to Britain:

There is a pecking order in the popular assessment of religions in Australia. Buddhism is intellectually chic, and there is a broad appreciation in educated circles of the sacred sites and spirits and reverence for land and nature of Aboriginal spirituality. Islam, on the other hand, is widely viewed through stereotypical lenses, and conversion to Islam (as opposed to Buddhism, for example) is regarded as an aberration. (Johns and Saeed, 2002: 209)

Similarly, while a parent might express concern about their child converting to Christianity, they may be even more uncomfortable if their child converts to Islam, as was admitted in a BBC Radio 4 documentary by an agnostic mother of two twins, one of whom converted to Christianity and one of whom converted to Islam: ‘When [one of my daughters] started to convert to Islam and started to wear hijab, I found that quite difficult because it felt very foreign. It is very foreign. You know, Christianity, even though I don’t share it, is part of our culture’ (Twin Sisters, Two Faiths, 2009). Islam is here labelled as ‘foreign’, meaning different and unfamiliar, something that is specifically located as strange and inaccessible. Thus, re-racializing becomes apparent once again. Converting to Islam arouses feelings that do not arise when other religions are converted into, and this relates to racism and Islamophobia.

The converts I interviewed also largely reported that their families were overwhelmingly opposed to their conversion to Islam. Some anticipated the hostility and so kept their conversion private. Those who managed to announce their conversion spoke of feeling they had to subdue their Muslim identity in front of their family. One of the interviewees whose family reacted particularly negatively was Zach, who explained his family’s reaction as follows: ‘They were aggrieved … they burst into tears – my mum and my sister – when I told them’. He continued with a more descriptive account:

I was just like ‘Look, I’ve got something to tell you … I’ve been thinking about religion … I’ve become Muslim’. And then there was … everyone was quiet. You know, and I got looked at … I went on defending myself for maybe 10 minutes or so. I remember looking up and my mum was just balling, you know, tears running down her cheeks and everything and my dad was just … he was just err … very angry … I hadn’t expected it to be so severe a reaction … I thought it would be negative but I didn’t think it would be like this scale man. They were just utterly, like, shocked … So it was like: ‘What’s happening!? What’s happened to our son!?’.

Reactions such as the one described by Zach are not uncommon for converts. Converts’ relatives do not only respond to the conversion with displeasure, but even with disgust, as was the case with Zach’s family. Several years after telling his family he has converted to Islam, Zach is still trying to mend relations with his parents. Even though converting to Islam is often about becoming a ‘better person’ or a ‘decent citizen’ for converts, for their relatives, it is more of a tragedy. Relatives of converts may feel injured and mournful over their relative’s conversion to Islam. None of the converts reported that their family had congratulated them on their conversion or admired their decision. Conversion to Islam is often undermined as a counter-intuitive anomaly that requires an ulterior motive instead. This is why Lauren Booth, the sister-in-law of Tony Blair, wrote an article for The Guardian after she converted to Islam in October 2010 entitled ‘I’m Now a Muslim. Why All the Shock and Horror?’ (Booth, 2010) and also why her conversion prompted The Daily Mail to produce its own article with the revealing headline ‘Why Are So Many Modern British Career Women Converting to Islam?’ (Ahmed, 2010). An inability to comprehend any goodness in conversion to Islam and the deep regret about conversion is testament to the workings of a subtle Islamophobia that is less subtle and more apparent when closely examined.

Some of the converts reported that their relatives were tolerant of their new religious identity but only on the proviso that they kept their faith private. These relatives claim they do not mind their relative being a Muslim but are worried about how others might respond. Tina Gudrun Jensen also observed a toleration of conversion to Islam, but not the displaying of it, in her study on Danish converts:

The [family] conflict peaks when the son or daughter begins to mark their Muslim identity in public, especially in the case of Danish women who start wearing the hijab (veil). These incidences of staging difference, not the conversion in itself, may result in the family choosing to cut ties to the convert for a while. (Jensen, 2008: 398)

This issue also appeared in a BBC documentary about conversion to Islam when a Muslim convert called Omer explained his father’s reaction to his conversion: ‘I think there was a little bit of concern that I had been captured by a cult or something and my dad was like: “Just don’t come home dressing in any funny little white hats on your head or something like that” because I think he was a bit concerned with what the neighbours would think’ (Gingell, 2009). The converts I interviewed mentioned this issue most in relation to the headscarf, which even the most supportive of relatives objected to, not on the basis that they dislike it but on the basis that others will dislike it. For example, Laura explained the following: ‘My sister doesn’t mind so much about me becoming a Muslim up to a point … [But] when I told her over the phone I was starting wearing the scarf, she got borderline hysterical and thought I’d get sacked from my job’. Similarly, Julie, a 26-year-old mother, spoke about her mother’s reaction to her wearing a headscarf:

She’s not too happy with me wearing it but she’s kinda accepted it. My mum was just like: ‘Oh I don’t wanna be walking out with you with that on your head’. And she was worried about her friends and what her friends thought … When I first started wearing hijab, my mum said something like: ‘People are just gonna call you a white Paki … but if my mum’s thinking that, you can imagine what other people are probably thinking can’t you?

Several other researchers have also noted that relatives object to headscarves in particular (Allievi, 2006: 134; Jawad, 2006: 156; Zebiri, 2008: 75, 105–6). Yvonne Haddad, for instance, writes: ‘Consistently the hijab seemed to be a bigger issue for families and friends than the conversion itself. This visible display of Islam was seen as too radical. Family members were often concerned about what neighbours and other people would think about the change in wardrobe’ (Haddad, 2006: 31). Proximity to Islam seems to beget shame, and so relatives attempt to distance themselves from the conversion by masking it into obscurity, thus preventing people knowing their relative is a Muslim. They defer Islamophobic prejudice to others, which allows them to appear forbearing even though they may just be projecting their own discomfort onto ‘neighbours’ and ‘strangers’. In requesting that the convert conceal their Muslim identity, the relative is actually complicit in yielding to an Islamophobic climate. In these acts of evading responsibility, subtle Islamophobia manifests again. The Islamophobia here is subtle because the relatives do not claim they have a problem with the Muslim identity of their relative, but rather claim wider society does, thus shifting the prejudice elsewhere.

Most of the converts still have amicable relations with their relatives, or have rebuilt them after much effort. This allows them to interact with their family, whereby subtle Islamophobia still appears but in another guise. Several of the converts discussed the way in which their friends and family made teasing comments towards them about being Muslim. These jokes may appear innocent but their content often has an Islamophobic undertone. For example, some of the converts’ friends and family made jokes about them being terrorists or instigating violence. Amira, a retired 59-year-old, had encountered this:

[My adult sons] didn’t know that I was going to do my shahaadah. ⁴ I just sort of landed it on them. Then Ramadan came and I left my hijab on, they walked in and just grinned at me, then my youngest son said: ‘Have you got any bombs underneath that?’ [Amira laughs]. I had a meeting with some Muslim sisters last week and he said: ‘Are you doing a jihad? ⁵ [Amira laughs]. I get a lot of skitting, teasing.

Jokes like these are worthy of examination because, as has been explained by Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (2000: 82–4), they can represent subconscious ideas that cannot be easily articulated, such as those concerning ‘race’. Following Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic approach, Seshadri-Crooks sees jokes as similar to dreams in that they operate as outlets for one’s innermost thoughts and feelings. Essed also considered jokes as a site where there can be a ‘ventilation of racism’ (Essed, 1991: 257). Understanding jokes as more than just jokes, the jokes that Muslims are subjected to may say more about the presence of Islamophobia than about good humour. They show that Islam is associated with stereotypical and negative ideas. While people may find it awkward to express these sentiments overtly, they find through declaring them humorously that they can convey their understanding of Islam and Muslims. Making such jokes may be framed as harmless but they actually contribute towards the perpetuation of an Islamophobic discourse that fixes Islam in a similar way that other racist jokes naturalize ideas about ‘race’ (Goldberg, 1993: 226; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 92). Muslim converts have encounters that reveal an undercurrent of subtle Islamophobia which may even be concealed as good humour.

Conclusion

In this article I have explored the re-racialization of ‘white’ Muslim converts to a status of ‘non-white’ or ‘not-quite-white’ which leads to them being recipients of Islamophobia. After losing their access to white privilege, ‘white’ convertsfind themselves marked out as an Other. This racializing process is crucial facilitating the apperance of Islamophobia. While that Islamophobia might not be overt in the majority of instances, it is nonetheless incessant and causes injury. The re-racialization reflects an inability to comprehend a ‘white’ Muslim, and a distinct understanding of Islam as a ‘non-white’ religion. Rather than suggesting the few reports of Islamophobia is because Islamophobia is a ‘myth’, I showed that converts encounter ‘subtle Islamophobia’ which is indicative of a wider Islamophobic climate. This is best reflected in the negative connotations associated with conversion to Islam that are brought forth in families’ reactions to a relative converting to Islam and in the jokes that converts are exposed to about being Muslim. These observations have broader implications because subtle Islamophobia could just as likely manifest in lifelong Muslims’ lives.

Islamophobia can therefore be said to be based on a process of racialization which marks Muslims out as Other, even if they once had membership to the dominant ‘white’ majority. It is more often than not latent rather than overt, unspoken and faint in character. Therefore, rather than just understanding Islamophobia through clichés about Muslim women having their headscarves torn from their heads by thugs, we need to highlight the more common and everyday forms that Islamophobia takes as it is this type of Islamophobia that affects Muslims’ lives more than the rare instances of physical violence or petty verbal insults. This is not to suggest that horrendous and unashamed Islamophobic attacks do not occur – as examples mentioned earlier show that they do – but to recognize that they are uncommon, and that there are several layers of Islamophobia, all of which must be recognized. The more pervasive subtle Islamophobia may even form the basis for the more aggressive and overt attacks. Arguing against those who exaggerate the presence of Islamophobia as well as others who undermine it, in this article I have sought to provide an awareness of its more common form, which is subtle, but still present, with the potential to escalate into more troubling levels if not challenged in its more tolerated semblance. Muslim converts are particularly well placed to highlight this unique form of persistent Islamophobia as they undergo a re-racialization where they are marked out as Other and are then subjected to rather blatant, but still subtle, Islamophobia in their everyday lives.