Abstract
On 6 April 1967, Adorno gave a lecture entitled Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism at the University of Vienna. For over a half a century, the lecture has been virtually unknown, though with its publication by Suhrkamp Verlag in 2019, it has resurfaced among the German-speaking public. With Wieland Hoban’s English translation, the transcription was published by Polity Press in 2020, and because of this provision, has come to the attention of English-speakers as well. With the recent successes of far-right populist groups, such as Alternative für Deutschland and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Adorno’s words continue to resonate to both the intellectual and common observer today. Although Adorno provides the reader several conditions under which extremism emerges, the central characteristics of his conceptualization of the extremist identity primarily rest in the mechanisms of boundary construction, oppositional identification, and the use of nostalgic symbols.
Adorno begins this lecture by explaining how fascism need not be the present conditions for right-wing extremism to emerge in a society. It is, more precisely, conditions that allow for potential fascism to materialize which function as prerequisites for right-wing extremism to manifest itself. Fascist nationalism could have already collapsed in a society, though it is precisely when nationalism becomes obsolete that it is able to reach its truly destructive character. With the disappearance of ethno-nationalism, seemingly anachronistic sentiments take on a nostalgic meaning, particularly among citizens who perceive a threat to their national identity.
Related to this form of cultural reactivity, Adorno notes that the denigration of national symbols leads to fits of rage among those who most strongly feel that their country must have a period of reconquering. Although blunt, inflated with fury and, at times, violent, these nationalistic reactions could also be understood as a form of cultural vulnerability masquerading underneath the mask of moral outrage, for such reactions are most commonly found among those who feel their identity to be under ideational threat. The vulnerability and likelihood of perceived threat, Adorno notes, can easily be found among those who experienced the collapse of the Reich in 1945. These individuals become attracted to right-wing extremist movements, for they strongly feel that ‘Germany has to be on top again’ (p. 8). Movements fueled by slogans like ‘Make America Great Again’, of course, correspond to a similar political habitus.
Perceived denigration of national symbols, however, is often actually a correction of a past national monstrosity. Regardless, extremists reference these acts as a means to justify the characterization of their ostensibly marginalized position. Doing so allows them to preserve the populist or ‘anti-establishment’ nature of their collective identity. Although such a characterization often appears to be, at best, the result of confusion, the ‘incorrigibles’, Adorno warns, should not be dismissed as a lunatic fringe group. It is a mistake to dismiss extremism on the basis of its lack of intellectualism. Propagandist techniques methodically correspond to mass psychology, particularly when the content of said collective consciousness is mostly concerned with the loss of national and/or symbolic identity. Within these techniques, we find the ‘constellation of rational means and irrational ends’ (p. 13).
Adorno goes on to speak of the competition between the Nazis and the Communist Party during the Weimar Republic. With the virtual disappearance of the Communist Party, the image of communism has taken on a threat at the level of abstraction. The framing of an ideological juxtaposition assigns an antithetical identity to ‘the other’, such as the left-wing intellectual, who from the perspective of the extremist, now embodies and represents the image of communism. Adorno discusses, for example, how a group of right-wing extremists refused to have a discussion with a particular left-wing professor due to ‘a matter of existential opposites’ (p. 22). This lack of communication, of course, further abstracts the ‘other’, making it increasingly difficult to overcome the ‘us versus them’ narrative to which extremists so often cling.
Adorno concludes the lecture on a note that is both quintessential Adorno, though at the same time, arguably uncharacteristic. The closing is typical of Adorno in that he contends that extremists must be counteracted with nonideological reasoning. Dispassionate intellectualism and pure reasoning are often the solutions for which Adorno advocates in response to the great number of problems he identified in his life. On the other hand, a somewhat naive optimism is implied in this prescription, for proposing such a solution appears to imply that non-ideological intellectualism could either speak to the concerns of or convince far-right extremists. Given the conceptualization and fundamental characteristics of right-wing extremists he delineates, however, it would appear that intellectual exchange would fall within the realm of existential opposition to these movements. If, however, it is not that Adorno is suggesting that the aim is to convince the far-right with rationality, but rather to intellectualize the mass culture, then the reader is still left with a rather optimistic note that runs contrary to the general mood of Adorno’s typical theoretical formulations.
It is somewhat understandable for Adorno to wish to leave with more than a comprehensive description of the dispositions that may lead to political turmoil. The intellectualization of society, however, is a somewhat vague means to an end; perhaps not as methodical as the techniques of the extremists that Adorno seeks to counter, as the precise relation between heightened intellectualism and counteracting extremism is left unspecified. Although a concrete solution is not provided, Adorno is successful in his objective of elucidating certain mechanisms that have an ability to pervade country and time. In this lecture, he demonstrates how cultural vulnerability and, in turn, reactivity, are core to understanding the oppositional identity of the far-right extremist.