Abstract
This paper argues that race must be a central consideration in understanding migration in Korea, where international migrants are rapidly reshaping the national landscape. While migration scholarship on Korea has analyzed various policy trajectories, it has predominantly focused on three aspects—liberal democracy, ethnicity, and gender—largely overlooking the significance of race. First, it assumes that liberal democracy will eventually supersede xenophobia without critically examining its assumptions that are both racialized and teleological in nature. Second, by prioritizing ethnicity, it interprets discrimination against migrants through the notion of uni-ethnicity and a fear of foreignness without delving into Korea’s deeply rooted fixation on race. Third, it overemphasizes gendered migration, regarding Korea’s demographic crisis as a primary reason for accepting migrant women as biological reproducers. This paper contends that all three aspects are intricately connected to race, including Korea’s aspiration for whiteness and abjection of blackness, which significantly shape migration dynamics.
Introduction
In the field of Korean Studies, migration scholarship on South Korea (Korea, hereafter) has experienced significant growth. In 1990, the number of foreign-born individuals in Korea was less than 50,000. However, this population has now increased to nearly 2 million and is projected to constitute one-tenth of the total population by 2030 (Moon, 2015: 2–3). While the COVID-19 pandemic may have influenced the population of foreign residents in Korea, recent demographic statistics clearly indicate this unforeseen trend (see Figure 1). Unsurprisingly, given the growing presence of foreign population in a predominantly ‘uni-ethnic’ nation, the academic community has responded promptly, as evidenced by the rise in scholarly publications correlating with the demographic trend (see Figure 2). In the midst of widespread appreciation for ‘damunhwa’ (often translated as ‘multiculturalism’) as a symbol of Korea’s global prominence and the esteemed status of liberal democracy, scholarship has highlighted the intricate development of associated social issues.
Number of resident foreigners in Korea.
Number of academic publications.
Nevertheless, migration scholarship on Korea tends to overlook the central role of race in shaping (im)migration in Korea. By conducting a comprehensive review of migration literature in peer-reviewed journals and academic presses, we demonstrate how this oversight for race has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the subject. 1 We initiate our analysis by scrutinizing the ongoing debate on whether Korea is undergoing a liberal shift or not—a topic many scholars persistently revisit and endeavor to elucidate (Chung and Kim, 2012; Kim, 2016a; Seol, 2012; Seol and Skrentny, 2009). Their diverse scholarly interpretations, often conflicting, are primarily influenced by four seemingly contradictory government policies: (1) settlement policy, (2) labor and social rights of migrant laborers, (3) dual citizenship provisions, and (4) welfare initiatives for marriage migrants. Taking this conundrum as a point of departure, we reveal that the cacophony within these policies and governmental apparatus is guided by a particular symbolic order (Bourdieu, 2014). More importantly, we contend that the symbolic order is closely intertwined with race.
In the subsequent section, we illustrate how race serves as a fundamental organizing principle in Korea. Despite the prevailing narrative asserting the absence of race in Korea, rooted in the enduring narrative of ethnic homogeneity, race has significantly influenced their epistemological and ontological frameworks as they grappled with the looming threat of colonialism since the 1880s. Particularly noteworthy is Koreans’ steadfast belief in racial superiority over Black people, even in the absence of their corporeal presence, forming a crucial underpinning of Koreans’ ontological security (Kim, 2017; Kim and Jung, 2019). Furthermore, what is intriguing is that such abjection of blackness was transformed into racism against Southeast Asians as Koreans encountered them during the Japanese Empire’s occupation of the Southeast Asian region (Kim, 2017). Far from withering away after Korea’s independence, this transformation has persistently underpinned racism against Southeast Asians, which is essential for understanding the racial context of contemporary migration in Korea.
Finally, in order to illustrate the complexities introduced by the consideration of race in existing migration scholarship, we identify three major orientations within the field of migration scholarship on Korea: (1) the belief in the ultimate success of liberal democracy, (2) the ethnicization of race, and (3) the focus on migrant women as key agents of biological reproduction. While these orientations have significantly contributed to our understanding of migration trends in Korea, we argue that foregrounding the concept of race calls into question their underlying assumptions.
First, scholars focusing on economic and political aspects have emphasized the overarching impact of liberal democracy, positing that it would ultimately liberalize immigration. Building on early migration scholars in the West who believed in the eventual integration of migrants based on the strong tradition of liberal democracy (Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 1999), many subscribe to the teleological progress of liberal democracy (Kim, 2009a; Lim, 2012; Park, 2017). However, we challenge the overarching narrative of liberal democracy, which often overlooks its nondemocratic components and racial foundation (Gordon, 2010; Mann, 2005; Mills, 1997).
Second, we critique the prevailing notion that prioritizes ethnicity. By solely focusing on cultural differences without critically examining how these differences are intricately linked to the global racial hierarchy, such a perspective replicates the deracialized notion of assimilation prevalent in Western (im)migration studies, which has faced considerable criticism from the field of sociology of race and racism (Bashi Treitler, 2015; Grigolo et al., 2011; Jung, 2009; Sáenz and Douglas, 2015). While acknowledging the strong belief in ethnic homogeneity in Korea and the absence of multicultural contact contributing to exclusivity and a fear of foreignness (Chung and Hosoki, 2017; Kim and Torres-Gil, 2008; Lim, 2010), these explanations fail to account for why such fear demonstrates the global racial hierarchy rather than being directed at foreign individuals in general.
Third, despite widespread recognition of discrimination against foreign brides, attention is often directed toward the relatively privileged status of migrant women in contrast to migrant workers. This emphasis highlights the state’s perception of them as biological reproducers, strategically positioned to address a demographic crisis marked by aging and low fertility (Cheng, 2011; Kim, 2013; Kim and Kilkey, 2018; Lee, 2012a). While the prioritization of gender as the overarching schema of the state has contributed insights into migration dynamics in Korea, we contend that the state’s concern extends beyond merely increasing the number of bodies but is intricately linked to the notion of ‘the right kind of children’, a concept inherently tied to considerations of race (Collins, 2000: 300).
Our goal is not to present empirical findings but to elucidate how the racial unconscious within migration scholarship on Korea has led to distortions and limitations in our understanding of the subject. By moving beyond the three orientations in existing scholarship, we contend that the global racial hierarchy has been reaffirmed and sustained based on the symbolic order of race that unifies ostensibly incongruous and contradictory policies in Korea.
Puzzle of Contradictory Policies
The state, being the primary actor, holds significant power in determining the rights of individuals, as well as the ability to grant or revoke those rights (Arendts, (1951)2004). Citizenship plays a crucial role in establishing legal status and has a profound impact on rights, including those related to migration (Bauböck, 1994, 2001; Somers, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 1997b). Legal citizenship not only defines the boundary between those who belong and those who do not, but also directly shapes the lives of (im)migrants and influences the push factors in sending countries, making it a critical factor to consider. Given its paramount importance, it is understandable that most studies place a strong focus on state policies. However, it is not uncommon to observe different branches of the state pursuing distinct goals, and inconsistencies and contradictions within a single branch are not unheard of. Despite these complexities, scholars often overemphasize the significance of individual policies, which can lead to conflicting findings and opposing conclusions among different groups of scholars. For instance, while some argue that Korea is undergoing a liberal turn, others maintain that it remains a regulatory environment.
Scholars who emphasize the emergence of a liberal turn in Korea highlight specific policies that contribute to this perception. These policies include the legalization of dual or multiple nationalities, government spending on support programs for multicultural families, granting local voting rights to foreign residents, and ensuring the protection of their human rights (Chung, 2010; Chung and Kim, 2012; Kim, 2016a; Lee, 2009; Song, 2016). While these scholars acknowledge that foreign residents, multicultural families, and labor migrants still experience inequalities, they argue that the policies implemented in Korea are comparatively more liberal than those of neighboring countries (see Chung, 2010). One noteworthy policy is the 2010 multiple-nationality bill, enabling marriage migrants to attain dual nationality. Widely regarded as a departure from the long-standing monocultural ideology, many scholars interpret this measure as a sign of Korea adopting ‘one of the most progressive stances on immigration in East Asia’ (Kim, 2016a: 2).
On the contrary, a different group of scholars argue that Korea remains regulative. Despite Korea’s significant economic development and its attainment of a comparable level to many European countries, these scholars point out that the relatively low level of migrant settlement is evidence of an ongoing regulative trend (Nagy, 2014; Seol and Skrentny, 2009). After examining immigration policies, permanent residency and citizenship regulations, and the rights of migrant workers, Seol (2012) concludes that the Departures and Arrivals Control Act and the Nationality Act polarize the Korean labor market by privileging professional workers and foreign investors while discriminating against less-skilled workers who are not allowed to accompany family members.
This does not mean that both groups rigidly adhere to their respective positions without recognizing any negative aspects or progress. However, by giving greater weight to one direction based on specific policies, these two groups arrive at entirely divergent conclusions. Nonetheless, it must be noted that such policies are not always consistent, as different branches of government pursue their own goals, often resulting in contradictory policies. Analyzing individual policies in isolation is insufficient to understand the heterogeneity within the state. For example, a narrow analysis of the Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy under the Obama administration might conclude that the regime protected undocumented migrants, in contrast to the subsequent Trump administration. However, during its two terms, the Obama administration also prioritized immigration enforcement practices and deported a significant number of noncitizens (Golash-Boza, 2017). Far from a unitary entity, as Bourdieu puts, the state ‘is an ensemble of fields (. . .) that are themselves differentiated and in mutual competition’ (Bourdieu, 2014: 310). While the specific rules governing each field cannot be disregarded, it is crucial to examine how the ensemble (or cacophony) sustains a particular symbolic order.
To unveil the symbolic order, an analysis of four facets of migration policy is necessary: (1) settlement policy (comprising visa regulations and naturalization processes), (2) labor and social rights of migrant laborers, (3) dual citizenship provisions, and (4) welfare initiatives for marriage migrants. While the first facet, settlement policy, persists in its efforts to limit migrant settlement, prompting a group of scholars to advocate for a regulatory inclination, the latter three policies have undergone incremental reforms, forming the basis for another group of scholars championing the liberal trajectory. Looking beyond the apparent outcomes and immediate implications for migrants arising from each policy, a deeper exploration is essential to grasp the underlying rationale guiding the trajectory of each. We contend that the symbolic underpinning of divergent logics is fundamentally rooted in race. The state, instead of unconditionally expelling migrants, strategically employs measures that may temporarily encourage their presence. However, these divergent logics are intricately conditioned by the racialized delineation of the national population.
Regarding the settlement policy, a path to naturalization and family reunion does not exist to ‘less-skilled workers’, mostly from Southeast and South Asia, who are under strict restriction of the rotation principle as opposed to professional workers and investors, mostly from wealthy states from the West, with an option for extending residency. 2 According to Korea Immigration Service Statistics, naturalization is rarely allowed, as only 268,975 people either acquired or recovered citizenship between 1945 and 2020. Other than spouses of Koreans, which accounted for 63%, fewer than 5000 people acquire citizenship and most of them have a high level of education and wealth (see Table 1). Hence, the low settlement rates and the strict rotation principle have been the key evidence for those who emphasize the continuity of regulatory trends (Chung and Hosoki, 2017; Nagy, 2014; Seol and Skrentny, 2009).
Naturalization in Korea since 2006.
Source: Korea Immigration Service Statistics.
In contrast, the improvement of the labor and social rights of migrant laborers may reveal a different side based on the introduction of the Employment Permit Program (EPP) in 2004. This program recognizes migrants as legal workers entitled to basic rights, in contrast to the previous Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP), which treated migrant workers as temporary trainees without such protections (Kim, 2011; Lee and Park, 2005; Lim, 2003). While acknowledging the transformative nature of the EPP, it is important to delve into the program’s origins.
The necessity for EPP had been raised much earlier than 2004, as it was one of the major issues covered by newspapers when the Ministry of Labor (MOL) considered its initiation between 1995 and 1997. Through media channels, MOL asserted that EPP was essential to ‘efficiently manage illegal aliens’, as ‘poor management of them resulted not only in various crimes but also in the creation of a labor black market’ (Kim, 1997a: 26; Moon, 1997: 29). Lee Won-deok, Vice Chairman of the Korea Labor Institute, a governmental organization under MOL, further supported EPP by pointing out that ‘the increasing number of illegal aliens’ was not only associated with ‘drug crimes’ but was also causing ‘family and educational problems through their marriage with domestics’ (Lee, 1997: 5). In other words, the necessity for EPP was raised not to grant migrant workers more rights but to control foreign bodies perceived as problematic. MOL eventually abandoned EPP after encountering fierce opposition from corporations and various government ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Construction & Transportation, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Kim, 1997b). Beyond controlling foreign bodies, their priority was to prohibit foreign bodies.
A decade later, as EPP was eventually introduced, the same concern continued to dominate. According to a report commissioned by the MOL, the ITTP rather encouraged migrants to leave the designated training sites, resulting in 64% of trainees departing and seeking employment elsewhere. 3 This led to a surge in the number of ‘unauthorized’ migrants between 2000 and 2002, as highlighted in the report (Im and Seol, 2000). Although the EPP grants basic rights to migrants as workers, the aforementioned report suggests that the underlying objective of implementing the program was to prevent the extended presence of foreigners caused by the ITTP (Im and Seol, 2000).
Furthermore, dual citizenship is lauded as a progressive measure toward fostering a multicultural society, as it permits marriage migrants to obtain Korean citizenship while retaining their citizenship of origin. Nevertheless, government officials did not initially regard foreign brides, who are mostly from Southeast Asia, as the intended beneficiaries. Rather, it was to attract highly skilled workers and foreign investments. In a public hearing held in August 2009, a year before the Nationality Law revision, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) did not contemplate granting dual citizenship to marriage migrants (Hong, 2009; MOJ, 2009a). Furthermore, 3 months later, the Ministry even clarified misinformation from the media that the new law would lower the hurdle for naturalization of marriage migrants (MOJ, 2009b). Nevertheless, in December, the Ministry eventually included marriage migrants under the condition that they were not at fault or the cause of the divorce, as such circumstances would render the woman and her children stateless.
While welfare and education provisions for marriage migrants are often regarded as pillars supporting the liberal turn, the government-funded support, encompassing language education and childrearing programs, may not necessarily be unequivocal signals of such a liberal shift. Instead, these policies were largely driven by national concerns and fears regarding the potential social problems associated with these perceived ‘minority’ groups. According to the first and only volume of Migration and Integration published by the MOJ:
On the other hand, the soaring number of migrants itself has resulted in national resistance and concern for endless crimes by migrants. It is necessary to prevent maladaptation of migrants that can have a lingering impact to the conflicts of the second generations and manage the lack of public order in those areas where migrants densely reside. Integration of foreigners and migrants has become a pan-national issue. Accordingly, we must introduce systemic and effective migration policies. By nurturing their basic capacity to live as one of the members in our society, we can prevent conflict with the majority, such as nationals, and reduce the social cost, which is an important area for planning the future of our nation (Moon, 2017: 2–3).
In a similar context, at the annual meeting of the Association of Korean Sociologists in America, one Korean scholar who closely worked with Korean bureaucrats shared the similar sentiment that many Korean officials and experts have serious concern regarding potential social issues that may arise from the second generation of marriage migrants (Cho, 2016). 4
A cursory look at the heterogeneity of these policies may suggest different and sometimes conflicting directions. However, what holds greater significance beneath the surface is race that delineates and regulates the boundaries of the national population along with the underlying mechanisms that support it. In the subsequent sections, we will delve into the historical significance of race in Korea and how it shapes the contemporary issues regarding migration.
Race in Korea: Enduring Legacy
While the history of race in Korea is understudied, a few historiographical studies reveal that race was pivotal in Korean identity formation and their struggle for sovereignty amid colonialism (Em, 2013; Pai, 2000; Schmid, 2002; Shin, 2005, 2006, 2013; Tikhonov, 2010, 2013). In the face of colonial threats, Koreans viewed the emulation of whiteness as the sole option for civilization and national survival. Their nationalism against Japanese colonialism assumed a racial form, emphasizing a common lineage to underscore national unity (Pai, 2000; Schmid, 2002; Tikhonov, 2010, 2013). Furthermore, beyond racially oriented nationalism and the pursuit of whiteness, antiblackness emerged as a pivotal factor in shaping how Koreans interpreted their vulnerability. This, in turn, influenced their subjugation to colonization and the perceived temporary state of backwardness, as opposed to Black people who are destined to be extinct, on the path to civilization and independence (Kim, 2015; Kim, 2017; Kim and Jung, 2019). According to Koreans, Black people were considered ignorant toin, labeled as ‘unenlightened savages’, and deemed deserving of enslavement (Kim and Jung, 2019: 75). Furthermore, the abjection of blackness took a noteworthy turn when Koreans encountered Southeast Asians during the Japanese Empire’s occupation of the Southeast Asian region (Kim, 2017). Instead of regarding them as fellow colonized sharing a common plight, Koreans constructed the imagined backwardness of Southeast Asians guided by antiblackness. Depicting them as savages in the namyang (southern ocean), Koreans labeled them as namyang toin, signifying savages from the southern ocean. Furthermore, the perception of backwardness attributed to Southeast Asians went beyond merely employing the derogatory term ‘toin’. This perception was deeply intertwined with the broader concept of tropic Africa, which served as a fundamental component of antiblackness in colonial Korea (Kim, 2017). According to ‘Entitled Dream to the South’, a poem written by Choi Jeong-hee, a well-known female writer during colonial Korea:
There, fruits of coffeeweed are ripening like a bunch of grapes under the shadow of forest, African tulip and jasmine are always full-blown exuding their proud red smell, white smell, and yellow smell when the warm wind blows from the sky and spreads through the sea . . . where toin men and women are enjoying dance, song, and banjo under the shadow of coconut trees” (as quoted in Kim, 2017: 129).
The juxtaposition of antiblackness and the perceived backwardness of Southeast Asians persisted after Korea gained independence from Japan. A telling example is found in an article from Gungminbo, a Korean expatriate newspaper in Hawaiʻi in 1957, which, following the commendation of the intellectual prowess of white people in the West, disparaged ‘Africans and natives from the namyang archipelago’. The article asserted that their perceived lack of brain power destined them to succumb to people with greater intelligence (Gungminbo, 1957). Interestingly, this narrative on ‘brain power’ was not new, as it had previously been cited as a justification for the enslavement of Black people in precolonial Korea (Kim and Jung, 2019: 74). The seamless inclusion of Southeast Asians in this derogatory category underscores the enduring significance of antiblackness even after Korea’s independence. As Koreans’ yearning for civilization remains intertwined with whiteness, antiblackness consistently reinforces their sense of racial superiority. In this context, the prohibition of nongak in 1953, a traditional performance of farm music involving wearing a big ribbon-hat while drumming, by Rhee Syngman, the first president of Korea and a former editor of Gungminbo, must be understood through the lens of antiblackness. Rhee regarded ‘nongak as something that namyang toin would do’ (National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), 2009: 41). 5 Contrary to the notion of newly constructed racism stemming from the fear of foreignness amid the recent influx of foreign workers and brides, racism against Southeast Asians has been intricately linked to Koreans’ racial ontology and antiblackness (Kim, 2017).
Certainly, the way in which race has shaped Korea is far from identical with other parts around the world. However, it is critical to recognize that the organic sense of ‘us’ and the supposedly unique Korean context extend beyond mere ethnic distinctions based on deracialized notions of horizontal differences and foreignness. White supremacy and antiblackness have been critical in making sense of ‘us’ and racialized others as they have provided the goal of the nation, ontological security in the treacherous world, and guidance to further racialization. If the organic sense of ‘us’ in Korea were to be solely attributed to ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the lack of ‘foreign’ contacts, such an understanding would overlook the stark contrast between the embrace of whiteness and the marginalization of blackness. This discrepancy cannot be attributed solely to temporary and contextually deracialized xenophobia resulting from historical isolation and can hardly be resolved by increased contact alone. Rather, it is crucial to explore how the local context has been constantly interacting with global white supremacy and antiblackness. Not only has the appearing-to-be-non-racial state racially controlled the flow of migration, citizenship, and policing, but also civil society has been deeply involved with racial practices. Without taking these into account, the current understanding on migration is limited at best. In the subsequent sections, we will explore three primary orientations in migration scholarship on Korea, namely liberal democracy, ethnicity, and gender, and demonstrate how taking race into account can lead to more productive analysis.
Universal Progress of Liberal Democracy
Gary Freeman (1995: 896) argues that while approaches to immigration politics may vary among liberal democratic states, there exists ‘a single model of immigration politics’ that encompasses essential characteristics of all receiving states. According to him, over time, policies tend to normalize, becoming more expansive and inclusive, despite initial public opposition (Freeman, 1995). Similarly, Christian Joppke (1999) notes the dominant trend in Western states toward liberalized citizenship for immigrants.
In the context of migration scholarship on Korea, this perspective raises a conundrum: why do Korea and Japan diverge from the multicultural path taken by industrialized and democratic Western states, despite achieving significant levels of economic prosperity and embracing liberal democracy? While scholars beyond migration studies tend to agree that a transition toward a multicultural and multiethnic society is inevitable in Korea, there remains debate over the factors causing the lag in multiculturalism and the interpretation of early indicators of this transition. 6
Scholarship on (im)migration in the West assumes that European and North American states are more developed, with stronger liberal democratic systems, and therefore more receptive to migrants. Accordingly, most scholars studying Korea, beyond the field of migration studies, tend to agree that a transition toward a multicultural and multiethnic society is inevitable (Kim, 2009a, 2015a; Lim, 2012). Therefore, some scholars investigate the factors causing a lag in multiculturalism, while others celebrate early indicators of this transition.
Regarding the lag, Chung and Hosoki, (2017) question why Korea and Japan seem to defy the prevailing trend among industrial democracies by not moving toward increasingly open immigration and citizenship policies. Similarly, Seol and Skrentny (2009: 578), in their study titled ‘Why is there so little migrant settlement in East Asia?’, seek to explain this variation using comparative analysis of two of the most advanced states in East Asia, South Korea, and Japan, with several states in Europe. Unlike Europe where supranational rights institutions pressure the member states, Korea and Japan can cling to the rhetoric of ‘developmental state’, regardless of their economic achievement, which therefore still silences voices for multiculturalism (Seol and Skrentny, 2009). Beyond economy, Shen (2017) also explores why a high level of education in Korea does not lead Koreans to welcome multicultural practices and social integration.
The idiosyncratic liberal democracy, therefore, may not withstand the universal trend indefinitely, as such obstacles are gradually giving away. Park (2017: 377) argues that the state’s ongoing efforts to emulate liberal democratic norms are transforming Korea, once considered an ‘outlier’ due to the absence of a strong liberal tradition, into a leading proponent of multiculturalism. Similarly, Kim (2009b) highlights the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as key players in civil society pushing for a more democratic society within the framework of liberal democracy. While rejecting the notion of the state as a liberal trailblazer solely under global pressure, she identifies Korea’s trajectory as following three stages of transition: tolerance, the legalization of non-discrimination, and ultimately multiculturalism (Kim, 2009b). Despite its historical context as a developing economy, Lim (2012: 507) also categorizes Korea as an ‘ordinary’ country, meaning a liberal democratic state, and predicts that it will become a country of immigration. 7
Indeed, the normative value of a non-discriminatory society is not up for debate. However, it is crucial to critically examine and problematize the presumed inherent inclusivity of liberal democracy and its teleological realization. As noted by Michael Mann (2005), when the notion of ‘we the people’ is bound by the organic sense of us rather than that of the stratified people, liberal democracy can create enemies that may be cleansed or eliminated. While Mann articulates striking atrocities of settler colonial society, such as the United States and Australia, he treats Northwestern European regimes differently, as the boundaries of citizenship were not unsettled by different interest groups and class conflicts. In this regard, although Mann warns that liberal democracy does not always lead to a rosy future, his argument may not necessarily reject Freeman’s Northwestern European mode of immigration and its teleological trajectory.
However, the history of most Northwestern European states is deeply rooted in colonialism. As Cooper and Stoler (1997) argue, colonialism can be strategically employed by democracies, and the relationships between colony and metropole transcend mere economic interactions. Gordon (2010) further emphasizes that colonial exclusion can coexist with the basic principles of liberal democracy. He challenges Mann’s analysis by suggesting that European states also viewed their own people in an organic manner vis-à-vis the colonized. Thus, it is necessary to move beyond the assumption of teleological normativity in liberal democracy and acknowledge the historical reality of the organic notion of ‘we the people’ as more than just a benign conviction of being different from others.
Far from abstract social contract, Charles W. Mills (1997: 3) articulates that the deracialized notion of liberal democracy, in which people who are equal ‘decide to establish civil society and a government’, is a myth. Mills argues that the philosophical foundation of the social contract, which is the cornerstone of liberal democracy, is deeply rooted in racism. He further exposes a ‘Racial Contract’, where the determination of who counts as equal is racially determined (Mills, 1997). David Theo Goldberg (2009: 180) also argues that the construction of Europe was underpinned by the presumption of Europe as the home of whiteness and Christianity, resulting in the notion that ‘any person of color or non-Christian (at least genealogically) in Europe . . . doesn’t (properly or fully) ever belong’.
Hence, what we need to investigate is something more than mere encounters with transient differences among formerly aracial members of society. It is imperative to scrutinize how the Racial Contract persistently molds and influences the supposedly deracialized concept of liberal democracy. In the Korean context, the complexity goes beyond mere horizontal distinctions grounded in the limited notion of ethnicity.
Ethnicization of Race
Regarding the debate on the liberal turn, both groups of scholars either overlook deeply rooted discrimination or dismiss it as ephemeral, assuming that more liberal and inclusive policies will eventually lead to seamless assimilation. By uncritically embracing the colorblind notion of liberal democracy and its multicultural trajectory, they fail to recognize how the very concept of liberal democracy and its historical construction are inherently entwined with race.
Proposing the significance of East–West migration in Europe, Adrian Favell (2008: 796), a scholar of international migration, heavily denounces ‘post-colonial theories of race, ethnicity and multiculturalism’, as well as ‘ethnic and racial studies’, and claims that arguments from such fields are ineffective and largely irrelevant. Beyond such an extreme statement concerning migration in Europe, while the sociology of (im)migration may utilize the word race, it has been much swayed by the notion of ethnicity and assimilation rather than racialized inequality (Bashi Treitler, 2015; Grigolo et al., 2011; Jung, 2009; Sáenz and Douglas, 2015). By focusing on ethnic difference and similarity, as Moon-Kie Jung (2009) contends, immigration studies regard assimilation as the master process in which differences between ethnic groups become less observable. This is the paramount reason that the sociology of (im)migration based on assimilation theories has diverged from the sociology of race that prioritizes racial inequality and domination (Jung, 2009). Accordingly, it is not an accident that ethnicity has been the dominant term of immigration studies rather than race (Sáenz and Douglas, 2015).
Migration scholarship on Korea often adopts Western European states, rather than the United States, as its primary comparative framework (Kim, 2015b; Seol and Skrentny, 2009; Skrentny et al., 2007). This preference can be attributed to the influence of Freeman’s categorization of liberal democratic states, which offers valuable insight into whether a state can be identified as a ‘settler society’, where immigration is foundational. Freeman’s work, although it does not explicitly discuss race, subtly influences scholarly perspectives, particularly in understanding migration dynamics. In Europe, where ethnicity is emphasized over race in migration studies, this emphasis becomes a significant reference point for scholars examining Korea as a non-settler society. This trend is reinforced by the enduring notion of homogeneity in Korea, contributing to an ethnicity-first perspective. Often, consciously or unconsciously, scholars overlook discussions of race, focusing on the assumption that ‘Koreanness’ is defined by a homogeneous culture and pure blood. While they may use the term ‘race’, they do so without referencing the global racial hierarchy addressing whiteness and blackness.
While differing on certain issues, migration scholarship on Korea often shares a common diagnosis of the challenges posed by multicultural migration, particularly the widespread fear of non-homogeneity. Kim and Torres-Gil (2008: 82) argue that the unique notion of Koreanness fosters ‘a cultural reticence to accept foreigners’, resulting in a ‘national fear of potential cultural clashes’. Similarly, Chung and Hosoki (2017: 100) attribute Korea and Japan’s resistance to multiculturalism to the notion of ‘one [ethno-cultural] nation’, characterizing them as ‘negative’ cases. Lim (2010: 53) also contends that ‘the near-total exclusion of “non-Koreans” from membership in Korean society’ is the direct product of the notion of homogeneity. Kim (2009a: 681) emphasizes that ‘myths of ethnic homogeneity’ create serious obstacles against multiculturalism in addition to strong anti-US sentiment. Granted that some use race instead of ethnicity, the underlying idea revolves around the notion of difference, the key tenet of the sociology of (im)migration. According to this perspective, any ‘foreign’ population faces similar difficulties, not necessarily stemming from racism but from deracialized xenophobia rooted in the fear of difference. However, it may not be necessary to introduce numerous articles that depict how ‘foreigners’ with darker complexion encounter harsher discrimination unlike ones with lighter complexion in Korea. 8 Certainly, many do acknowledge how a certain group of migrants, especially Southeast Asians, encounter more discrimination and utilize terms such as race and racism. What is at stake, however, is that they often frame it as a recent phenomenon resulting from Korea’s encounter with a new multicultural reality. In other words, while they may acknowledge the organic nature of ‘we the people’, the fear of difference, the supposed obstacle to the path to the ideal liberal democracy, is rather influenced by the degree of deracialized difference as those migrants are simply considered more ‘foreign’. However, it’s crucial to challenge the notion that Korea is a non-racial state experiencing transient xenophobia, as this overlooks the enduring influence of the interplay between aspirations for whiteness and abjection of blackness within the global racial hierarchy. Understanding contemporary dynamics in Korea requires recognizing this enduring influence.
Women as Biological Reproducers
A closer examination of migration policies in Korea reveals a distinct gendered pattern, as marriage migrants, who are predominantly women, enjoy relatively lenient citizenship acquisition processes compared to migrant workers who face stricter restrictions. Accordingly, many of the ‘assimilation’ policies implemented in Korea primarily target women who enter through marriage. Indeed, it was the soaring number of marriage migrants that kickstarted migration scholarship on Korea (See Tables 1 and 2).
Marriage migrants and year-over-year growth rate.
Source: Korea Immigration Service Statistics.
In this context, many argue that marriage migrant women are permitted as biological reproducers who can address the rapidly decreasing fertility rates (Cheng, 2011; Kim, 2007, 2013; Lee, 2012a; Shin, 2012; Song, 2016). Despite acknowledging the discrimination and challenges faced by these foreign brides, scholars highlight the selective inclusion of women and the subsequent provision of social services for them, emphasizing the deliberate intent of the Korean government in facilitating the integration of foreign brides. Kim (2013: 464, 468) underscores the state’s involvement in this ‘citizenship project’, positioning marriage migrants as ‘biological and cultural reproducers’ of Koreans, with a specific emphasis on nurturing them to become ‘Korean mothers’. As a part of this effort, the state project supports language classes and childcare services (Kim, 2013). Kim (2007) similarly underscores the role of the state in promoting international marriages in the name of multicultural families. Kim and Kilkey (2018) go further by asserting that government welfare policies regarding marriage migration are strongly motivated by a desire to cultivate the children of multicultural families as valuable human capital, potentially becoming future global leaders. While the extent to which the state views these children as assets of the nation remains a subject of debate, the general consensus has been that the state regards migrant women as child-bearers who can address the issues of plummeting fertility rates and a rapidly aging population.
However, as examined earlier, beneath the surface of welfare policies focused on childrearing and state-sponsored language education programs, a concern emerges about potential crimes that could disrupt social stability (Moon, 2017). In light of this, the provision of social services to these women may not necessarily indicate a state-driven initiative primarily designed to promote biological reproduction. Furthermore, the state’s approach to international marriages lacks encouragement and active orchestration. 9 While certain local governments have been involved, reports commissioned by the government clarified that the private sector predominantly took the lead in catering to bachelors in rural areas (Kim et al., 2010; Seol et al., 2014; Song et al., 2016).
More significantly, when viewed through a long-term lens, the relationship between the state’s stance on marriage migrants and the demographic crisis reveals a contradictory facet. Initially, following the earlier mandate of limiting families to ‘having only two [children]’, the prevalence of the slogan ‘having one and live frugally’ persisted in Korea until the mid-1990s (Jo, 1996). During this period, when the state actively sought to decrease fertility rates, citizenship was readily granted to women upon marriage to Korean men. However, a significant transformation unfolded in the late 1990s, characterized by a heightened awareness of rapidly declining fertility rates as a societal concern, coinciding with an increasing presence of foreigners in Korea. Paradoxically, the revised Nationality Act of 1997 introduced a requirement for a minimum period of residence in Korea after marriage. Since the 2000s, when a series of policies on ‘multiculturalism’ was initiated, the demographic crisis has been further intensified, with Korea grappling with the world’s lowest fertility rates in 2023. However, since 2008, the process of attaining naturalization became more challenging with the initiation of the ‘international marriage consolidation measure’ to ‘consolidate the distorted culture of international marriage’ (MOJ, 2013: 1). Accordingly, the number of naturalizations through marriage has been on a decline since reaching its peak in 2009 (see Table 1). According to a division chief at Vital Statistics of Statistics Korea,
Imprudent international marriages became a social problem and the government came up with the international marriage consolidation measure. After that, examination for nationality acquisition and supervision for international marriage mediating companies have become stricter. . . It is a process of normalization of international marriage (as quoted in Kim, 2016b; italics added).
Similarly, though international matchmaking agencies briefly enjoyed more flexibility in the mid-1990s during a period of deregulation, since 2007, the government has tightened control through permit-based regulations, particularly with the enactment of the Marriage Brokers Business Management Act, which specifically targets international marriages. Contrary to the assumption of a state project seeking biological reproducers as an alternative solution for the demographic crisis, the government, despite the intensified concern, has moved toward regulating marriage migration. The intricate relationship between the demographic crisis and the state’s facilitation of migrant women as biological reproducers remains ambiguous, challenging the notion of a straightforward causal relationship.
While the capability of reproducing may grant some value to women, as Patricia Hill Collins (2000: 230) emphasizes, it is contingent on producing ‘the right kind of children’, who can ‘become the worthy symbols of the nation’. While a direct comparison between the United States and Korea may not reveal the whole picture, the differential encouragement of fertility between middle-class white mothers and the perceived ‘threatening’ fertility of Black mothers and undocumented migrants, whose children are often viewed as potential sources of social problems and financial burden for the nation, highlights a strikingly similar power dynamic. 10 After all, acceptance of women does not necessarily imply reconstructing of the existing hierarchies for greater equality. Historically, as highlighted by Gerda Lerner (1986), women were captured while men were killed after wars. While women may be physically alive, being captured for their perceived value cannot be interpreted as a form of genuine embrace. This pattern can be observed to varying degrees in the context of modern colonialism as well as our contemporary society. For instance, while statistical data for interracial marriage may present the distorted image that Asian American women are more integrated to ‘mainstream’ America than their counterpart, if we follow the logic of Alba and Nee (2003: 90) that regards interracial marriage as ‘the litmus test of assimilation’, soaring violence against Asian American women under the pandemic clearly reveals the multiple dimensions of ‘integration’ (Pillai et al., 2021). 11
Furthermore, even if marriage migrant women fulfill the role of ‘biological reproducers’, beyond their cultural ‘assimilation’, racism still haunts them. Migrant women with darker skin complexion hailing from South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia are consistently under the racial gaze. Instances of local Korean residents reporting them and immigration officers racially targeting them are all too common. According to a story of a Vietnamese Korean who married a Korean man and gave birth to his son, from a study conducted by Choo (2016), she was under constant racial profiling by an undercover immigration officer, asking her to present her visa, which caused her to avoid public spaces when not accompanied by her Korean husband. As Bonilla-Silva and Mayorga (2011) articulate, citizenship does not trump the racial status of individuals, as the political construct of citizenship fails to confer full equality.
Beyond scrutinizing the patterns of gendered migration in Korea, it is essential to raise a more critical question regarding why the institution of ‘multicultural’ marriage and the ensuing multicultural reality, which many consider to be irreversible, give rise to hierarchical subjects, as the construction of hierarchical subjects cannot be separated from aspiration for whiteness and abjection of blackness.
Conclusion
In contemporary Korea, most celebrate damunhwa as the inevitable future even while others may use the term in a derogatory manner, especially toward a child of a multicultural family with darker skin. Affirming Korea’s rising presence on the world stage and the proud status of liberal democracy, one may disregard the latter as accidental ignorance or aracial colorism. However, we would like to call attention to the racial root of the celebratory term.
Two decades ago, in 2003, Hifamily, an activist organization for family, submitted a petition to the National Rights Commission, arguing that the use of the term honhyeol (mixed-blood), was a human rights violation. In its place, they proposed the term ‘the second generation of a multicultural family’ (Kim, 2007: 103; Lee, 2012b). Damunhwa gajok (multicultural family) was soon adapted by the government as issues of migrant women began to take center stage in migration policies since 2005. While many Koreans have come to acknowledge the discriminatory connotations associated with the term ‘mixed-blood’, it is hasty to assume that issues of multiculturalism in Korea exist solely as unique local contexts, separate from global white supremacy and antiblackness. This narrative inadvertently reinforces the prevailing anxiety surrounding non-homogeneity and the ideal of pure lineage in Korea. However, delving into the origins of the mixed-blood issue in Korea reveals the intricate nature of what initially appears to be a strictly local phenomenon.
In 1952, The Seoul Shinmun expressed grave concerns about ‘mixed blood’ and openly emphasized their preoccupation with racial purity, stating,
Furthermore, since our people are uniethnic, sharing the blood of the same ancestor with a deep tradition of unadulterated kin, the issue of mixed-blood children will become even more serious and therefore requires urgent measures against the increasing number of mixed blood.
Although this issue gained significant attention during the Korean War due to the presence of foreign troops, it was not the first instance. In 1946, as the United States Army Military Government occupied the southern part of Korea, a physiology professor expressed racial concerns. While acknowledging the unfair treatment of ‘mixed-blood’ children, as evident in the title ‘mixed blood children born with undeserved mistreatment’, his primary concern was the perceived eugenic inferiority of a child born to a Black man, whose race he associated with ‘low intelligence and criminal tendencies’, and a promiscuous Korean woman. According to him, such a child would be genetically inferior and the negative traits could manifest in future generations (Yi, 1946). The contemporary celebration of damunhwa in Korea is constantly haunted by historical antiblackness, as it perpetuates notions of racial superiority, determining who qualifies as ‘the right kind of children’ (Collins, 2000: 230).
The abundance of migration scholarship on Korea has greatly contributed to our understanding of how dynamics of migration are shaped by factors such as liberal democracy, ethnicity, and gender. However, the prevailing oversight of race in existing scholarship hinders a comprehensive analysis of the intricate ways it intersects with other dimensions in shaping migration policies. We assert that the construction of liberal democracy itself cannot be divorced from considerations of race. Liberal democracy, as a political framework, has been historically intertwined with racialized notions of citizenship and rights, influencing the formulation of migration policies. Accordingly, we argue that Korea’s pursuit of liberal democracy is intricately linked to an aspiration for whiteness and the abjection of blackness. Instead of evaluating Korea’s teleological journey toward liberal democracy, we advocate for an investigation into how race shapes its national vision, and how such a vision manifests through migration. In a related register, we argue that the ethnicization of race within migration scholarship on Korea is influenced by deracialized immigration studies in the West. This critical connection stems from the assumption that Korea is a non-settler society, which, in tandem with the persistent notion of homogeneity, further downplaying the significance of race. However, this assumption, based on horizontal differences and the fear of foreignness, fails to comprehensively explain how Korea’s historical construction of aspiration for whiteness and abjection of blackness manifests through various migration-related issues. Prioritizing race as a significant organizing principle deeply entrenched in Korea allows us to unravel not only the complexities of migration, but also sheds light on the nuanced interplay between historical legacies, contemporary discrimination, and the intricate dynamics of global racial hierarchy. Regarding gender, we acknowledge that a national project is intricately linked with gender and symbolic construction of women as biological reproducers delineates the boundaries of nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997a). In this regard, the patterns of gendered migration in Korea warrant particular attention. However, not only is the causal relationship between plummeting fertility rates and the state’s facilitation of migrant women as biological reproducers unclear, but we also reveal the critical presence of hierarchical subjects that cannot be separated from race beyond gender and citizenship.
