Governance Arrangements of Cross-Sector Collaboration and Its Effectiveness

Abstract

Leaders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of their organization’s collaborations are critical as they determine current and future collaboration. This article examines perceived collaboration effectiveness—the extent to which targeted goals are achieved—based on an organization’s role in that collaboration’s governance arrangements (initiation, funding, coordination, and decision-making). Findings suggest that governance arrangements have modest association with perceived effectiveness of collaborations between nonprofits and local governments in Lebanon. Perceived effectiveness increases when an organization is directly engaged in coordinating the collaboration’s work, activities, resources, and partners, but decreases when an organization has the responsibility for decision-making. Perceived effectiveness also appears to be related to trust, relationship effectiveness, service category, and the organization’s sector.

Keywords

collaboration governance arrangements effectiveness local governments nonprofits

Collaboration is a primary means of public service provision in both developed and developing countries (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 2012; O’Leary & Vij, 2012). As such, the effectiveness of a collaboration—that is, improving service delivery and achieving stated goals—matters. Without it, collaboration becomes a means to an end that may be inferior to direct service provision. With effectiveness, collaboration may be justified by improved programs, delivery, and outcomes. In essence, the “perceived link between collaboration and performance is the main catalyst for engaging in collaboration” (Mitchell et al., 2015, p. 706).

This article examines the effectiveness of collaboration, as perceived by organization leaders, by focusing on a range of governance arrangements. These arrangements entail a set of organizing mechanisms used to structure and manage collaboration from its inception through achievement of target goals or intended effects (Nylén, 2007). The arrangements are examined through the lens of decisions and exchanges that construct collaboration as well as the rules and practices that it will adopt. These arrangements, which create the collaboration’s governance framework, include initiation, funding, coordination, and decision-making. To explore this topic, we address the following research question: Do organization leaders’ perceived effectiveness of collaboration vary based on the governance arrangements through which their organizations participate? We answer that question with an analysis of data drawn from original surveys of local government and nonprofit organization leaders in Lebanon.

The article begins with a brief review of scholarship on collaboration and effectiveness in the context of public service delivery. It then transitions to governance strategies that structure collaboration, their theoretical importance, and potential impact on collaboration effectiveness. Next, the data and methodological approach are described, followed by a presentation of the analysis and its results. The article concludes by discussing those results, situating them in the literature, and highlighting key implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

A Theoretical Overview

Scholars define collaborations as reciprocal relationships across organizational boundaries to address a problem or an issue an organization cannot solve alone (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Campbell, 2018; O’Leary et al., 2006; Romzek et al., 2014). These relations take different forms based on the collaboration’s design, intended outcomes, and types and intensity of its activities (Selden et al., 2006; Yang, 2017); these forms complicate the concept of collaboration. Gazley (2008) argued that the type of the collaboration activity affects service delivery outcomes because relationship dynamics evolve based on organizations’ joint purpose and frequency of exchange. That is why when studying collaboration, it is important to examine the existence as well as nature and types of the relationship.

Collaboration also “occurs within or across sectors, with like-minded or diverse partners, [. . . and] among those with shared and different goals” (Bingham et al., 2008, 7). Cross-sector collaboration is not typically an end in itself; it is a means to achieve a targeted goal (Amirkhanyan et al., 2014; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This is where the subject of effectiveness becomes important.

Effectiveness is a multidimensional and complex concept (Amirkhanyan et al., 2014; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Lecy et al., 2012; Nylén, 2007). Because cross-sector collaboration often takes place to achieve common goals that cannot be achieved by single organizations, effectiveness includes the ability to successfully meet collective needs and achieve collective goals (McGuire & Silvia, 2009). Indeed, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) emphasized the creation of mutual goals as evidence of effective collaboration. Effectiveness is also evident when collaboration adds value through the creation of social capital, joint action and learning with altered practice, synergistic outcomes, and improved problem-solving capacity (Bryson et al., 2006; Rogers & Weber, 2010).

In a way, the collaboration “itself is a critical determiner of what constitutes the effectiveness of the collaborative” (Silvia, 2018, p. 473) because actors in the participating organizations make judgments “based on the outcomes of processes in the relation to costs and benefits that are created for the parties involved” (Koppenjan, 2008, p. 701). The participating organizations, therefore, will be most likely to pursue and sustain collaboration when they view the endeavor and its results, in terms of achieving goals, as a net gain (AbouAssi et al., 2021). Without such an assessment, future or continued collaboration will be unlikely and improved service delivery will require some other approach.

However, here it is important to note that the effectiveness can be assessed not only by using objective indicators but also by relying on subjective stakeholder perceptions and values. Scholars (Mitchell et al., 2015; Poocharoen & Wong, 2016) argue that managers’ views are good indicators for assessing collaboration effectiveness regardless of how effectiveness is measured; this is because these managers are in control and their views affect decisions on whether and how to collaborate.

To achieve effectiveness, attention should be paid to the process and structure of collaboration. O’Leary et al. (2006) explained that collaboration is not self-generating but must be actively managed. Collaboration is primarily a process-oriented system (Rhodes & Murray, 2007). It relies on process features, such as “face-to-face dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and understanding” to create “‘small wins’ that deepen trust, commitment, and shared understanding” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543). In turn, the process helps create the added value and synergy that lead to new capacities and public service improvements that would be either impossible or less successful if left to a single organization. Rhodes and Murray (2007) reinforced that the collaboration process “allows for the emergence of structure out of the behavior and interaction of agents, which then influences the next iteration of agent/behavior/interaction” (p. 81). The emphasis here is on “an unfolding series of events . . . constrained by the interdependencies of agents . . . and the conditions that preexisted the system’s coming into being” as well as “observable path-dependencies in agent behavior” (p. 85). Here, we are talking about the governance of collaboration.

Governance Arrangements in the Collaboration

“Governance of collaborations entails the design and use of a structure and processes that enable actors to set the overall direction of the collaboration, and that coordinate and allocate resources for the collaboration as a whole and account for its activities” (Cornforth et al., 2015, p. 778; Vangen et al., 2015). Collaboration governance is based on ongoing exchanges among the involved parties based on common norms and acceptable mechanisms (Vangen et al., 2015). The governance structure is a catalyst for collaboration (Mitchell et al., 2015).

There is evidence that variations in governance arrangements are associated with the effectiveness of collaborative outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Choi & Robertson, 2013; Doberstein, 2016). Scholars suggest that governance arrangements need to align with several contextual factors to sustain high collaborative performance, including structural and environmental characteristics (McGuire, 2002). For instance, Cristofoli et al. (2019) suggested that, in the early stage of collaboration, managers should engage in certain activities that enhance connectivity and trust between actors. McGuire (2002) stressed the influence of goal consensus, resource distribution, relationship between partners, policy, and strategic orientation on setting up the governance arrangements. AbouAssi et al. (2019) found that gender is factored into the governance structures of cross-sectoral collaborations that are driven by social traditions and institutional constraints.

We present the governance of collaboration as four arrangements that influence how well the collaboration comes together, operates, and produces in the long run. Governance arrangements—the establishment of the “ground rules” and “basic protocols” (Ansell & Gash, 2008)—take shape prior to formal negotiations for the collaboration as well as during the negotiation and implementation phases, but may have lasting impacts. We focus first on initiation and funding, which represent the earliest of the governance decisions. We turn then to operational decision-making and coordination, both embedded in the implementation phase, with coordination functioning as an ongoing process.

Initiation

We begin with one of the most consequential governance decisions: the decision to initiate the relationship. We are interested in assessing whether the initiation decision plays a role in leaders’ perceived effectiveness of collaboration. More specifically, the expectation is that when an organization initiates the collaborative partnership, that organization is invested and will be more likely to judge the collaboration as effective.

Sorensen and Torfing (2018) argued that co-initiation of relations may be ideal; co-initiation takes place when one organization approaches another with a nascent proposal to collaborate. The process of considering the proposal and deciding to engage in the relationship requires joint efforts and can be time-consuming and complex, yet co-initiations allow creative and innovative problem-solving and “pave the way for a plus-sum game in which all participants benefit and gradually improve their collaborative capacities” (Sorensen & Torfing, 2018, p. 390). Alternatively, if one of two collaboration partners initiates the relationship, effectiveness may be suboptimal.

Regardless, the motives of the initiating organization are likely key to both initiation and subsequent perceived effectiveness. Although the motives that drive an organization to initiate collaboration are not always clear or observable, it seems plausible that these motives are stronger in the organization that proposes or initiates collaboration. That organization has vested interests and stakes in collaboration that could shape positive views of collaboration effectiveness down the road, if only as a wishful validation of its action. Accordingly, we propose that

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Leaders are more likely to perceive collaboration as effective when their organizations initiate the collaboration.

Funding

Resource dependence is a widely acknowledged driver of collaboration (AbouAssi et al., 2016; Guo & Acar, 2005), under the assumption that the pursuit of collaboration is motivated by an organization’s desire to gain critical resources that will facilitate the achievement of organizational goals across various national contexts (AbouAssi et al., 2021; Doerfel et al., 2017; Stone et al., 2010). Some existing research goes further to illustrate how funding can influence the way collaboration is structured. Guo and Acar (2005) found that a nonprofit organization is more likely to increase the degree of formality of its collaborative activities when it receives funding from government sources compared with organizations that do not receive any funding. Bauer et al. (2020) also found that organizations with limited resources are more likely to opt for more formalized arrangements to shield themselves from opportunism and uncertainty. Accordingly, the responsibility for funding collaboration can give a funding organization an upper hand and therefore may shape the relationship itself and how it is perceived.

In addition, successful collaboration requires resource contributions from all participants. Without such contributions, “some organizations may . . . find themselves excluded from joint efforts” (Gallagher & Ehlman, 2019, p. 1336). Varda and Retrum (2015) further highlighted how the assessment of collaboration depends on these contributions, finding that higher levels of perceived success of collaborative networks can be predicted by greater resource contributions of the collaborators. In other words, the more resources an organization invests, the more it will perceive the outcomes of the relations to be successful. Effectiveness can be assessed as the payoff from sharing scarce resources (Andrews & Entwiske, 2010); that is why an organization’s resource investments are important motivators to sustain collaboration (AbouAssi et al., 2016; Emerson et al., 2012; Guo & Acar, 2005). In light of these arguments, we hypothesize that

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Leaders are more likely to perceive collaboration as effective when their organizations fund the collaboration.

Decision-Making

Much has been written about the distribution of power within and across collaborative systems (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bryson et al., 2006) and the possession of at least some power is typically needed for an organization to willingly continue in a partnership. One form of power in a collaboration, decision-making, relates to setting goals and expectations (Cervone et al., 1991). Successful decision-making outcomes are the results of high-quality choices made in a timely manner and implemented effectively (Garvin & Roberto, 2001). If the goals are not clear due to uncertainty or compromise, as is often the case in collaboration (Gulati et al., 2012; McNamara, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 2012), and if the decision is not articulated and implemented effectively, the leader who is making these decisions is less likely to be satisfied with the outcome of the process, which would in turn yield negative perceptions of collaboration in general (Emerson et al., 2012). On balance, we anticipate that organizations with decision-making responsibility are more likely to perceive higher collaboration effectiveness:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Leaders are more likely to perceive collaboration as effective when their organizations have the primary decision-making responsibility in the collaboration.

Coordination

Finally, coordination is a vital governance mechanism for collaborative relations. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) used “synthesizing” as an analog to coordinating. Scholars (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Selden et al., 2006) argue that coordination, in general, yields a positive effect on collaboration outcomes because it sets the stage to “unify and bring order to partner efforts, and to combine partners’ resources in productive ways [. . . to] yield the desired outcomes with minimal process losses” (Gulati et al., 2012, p. 12). Coordination is also characterized by structure and hierarchical control (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Keast et al., 2004; McNamara, 2012); such a control is typically associated with effective outcomes of the relations (Gazley, 2010).

Coordination is “more adequately understood as the ongoing accomplishment of managing interdependencies in collective work” (Bruns, 2013, p. 63). This means that the coordination responsibility could impose transaction costs on the coordinating partner (Bryson et al., 2006; Romzek et al., 2014) and, from that perspective, could diminish the coordinator organization’s perceptions of effectiveness due to the burdens they bear in this area. However, coordination also should be seen as an ongoing process through which feedback loops allow the correction of any inefficiencies or problems. The organization in charge of coordination manages uncertainties and works with collaborators to make sure that these inefficiencies do not affect the work being done (Bruns, 2013; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). An organization that is leading the efforts of aligning actions and sharing information, planning, organizing, and monitoring (Castañer & Oliveira, 2020; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998) will potentially have a favorable perceived effectiveness of collaboration. Accordingly, we propose that

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Leaders are more likely to perceive collaboration as effective when their organizations coordinate the collaboration.

The collaboration governance arrangements—initiating, funding, decision-making, and coordinating—are expected to exhibit specified relationships with perceived collaboration effectiveness, regardless of the nature of collaboration or the types of activities undertaken. The next section describes the research setting to contextualize hypotheses and variables. We then proceed to a discussion of data and variable operationalizations, and methodological strategy.

Research Setting and Methodology

Cross-sectoral collaboration is undoubtedly shaped by context. Most literature on collaboration focuses on Western settings; this article examines collaboration between local governments and nonprofit organizations in Lebanon, a developing country.

Like other developing nations with limited domestic revenues and high deficits, Lebanon heavily relies on treasury bonds, remittance, loans, and grants from bilateral or multilateral aid organizations (AbouAssi et al., 2021). And like other countries in Africa and the Middle East that were under the French mandate in the 20th century, Lebanon follows an administrative system of limited decentralization (Haase & Antoun, 2015). On paper, local governments enjoy some autonomy but are also constrained, administratively, by the need for approval of the central government or its regional officers and, financially, through reliance on intergovernmental transfers as the main source of revenues (AbouAssi & Bowman, 2018). Yet, the country has been considering and implementing reforms to its decentralization system in response to local demands for better services and distribution of resources.

Furthermore, Lebanon has a dynamic nonprofit sector actively involved in all aspects of public affairs, including advocacy, policy making, and service delivery (Haddad, 2017). These organizations operate with little national government control and limited access to domestic financial resources due to a weak economy and outdated philanthropic incentives. The need for local credibility and legitimacy (AbouAssi & Bowman, 2017) and the involvement in service delivery have opened the door for nonprofits to work—and sometimes to compete—with local governments, despite the abovementioned constraints. Recently, international organizations and donor agencies have championed and incentivized collaboration between local governments and nonprofits in Lebanon (AbouAssi & Bowman, 2018).

Data Collection

To test the abovementioned hypotheses, we relied on survey data from a larger research project designed to study relations between local governments and nonprofits in Lebanon. Two identical surveys were administered in 2017. The first survey—a paper survey—targeted a stratified sample of approximately 1,200 local governments in the country to ensure a representative and proportional distribution based on community size, annual budget, and geography. This approach yielded a response rate of 22.4%. The second survey was administered online and on paper to a list of 650 formally registered nonprofits—compiled from multiple sources in the absence of an official nonprofit database—and yielded a 34% response rate. The organizations in the data set are representative of the total population in terms of budget size, geographical location, and industry of work. Additional data were collected from organizational websites and reports to verify and complete any missing information.

There are several challenges related to our research design and methodology to comment on here. First, we are using perceptual survey data. Although the measures of effectiveness are subjective, the views of those engaged in collaboration can be credible indicators when examining its effectiveness (Mitchell et al., 2015; Poocharoen & Wong, 2016); in essence, “a leader’s perception of their organization undoubtedly affects their decision about whether to collaborate” (Bauer et al., 2020, p.13). We also acknowledge the potential common source bias problem due to self-reported results and address this by defining specific terms and relying on secondary data such as organizational reports and websites. The third challenge is nonresponse bias. To address this, we compared early and late survey responses, following Armstrong and Overton’s (1977) extrapolation method with the assumption that late respondents are similar to nonrespondents (Sheikh & Mattingly, 1981). We find no significant differences between the two groups.

Outcome and Explanatory Variables

The variables of interest were derived from specific survey questions. Each question appeared in a section that asked the respondent to answer based on a current or recent service-specific working relation or collaboration between their organization and one in the other sector. The responses were therefore anchored to a specific collaboration context (e.g., educational services).

The dependent variable measures the respondents’ perception of the effectiveness of the anchored collaboration, in terms of achieving its intended goals, based on a 7-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = not at all effective to 7 = very effective). Although perceived collaboration effectiveness can be measured in myriad ways, basing it on the achievement of intended goals aligns with the dominant perspective that cross-sector collaboration is often initiated to achieve common goals that cannot be achieved by single organizations (see, for example, Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Campbell, 2018; Mitchell et al., 2015; Nylén, 2007; O’Leary et al., 2006; Romzek et al., 2014).

Independent variables

Multiple survey questions, which asked respondents about the governance arrangements used in the service-specific cross-sector collaboration, were used to operationalize variables to test the abovementioned hypotheses.

Initiation

Respondents were asked to identify which organization initiated the cross-sector collaboration. Respondents chose from five options (local government, nonprofit, central government, donors, and others). To test Hypothesis 1, binary initiation variable only considers whether the respondent’s own organization has initiated collaboration (equal to 1 or 0 otherwise).

Funding

Respondents were asked to indicate all funding sources for their cross-sector collaboration. From their responses, we created a binary variable to examine how funding responsibility might relate to perceived effectiveness, equal to 1 when a respondent indicated that their own organization’s funds were used to fund the collaboration, and 0 otherwise.

Decision-making

Respondents were asked to indicate where decision-making authority rests in the collaboration. From their responses, we created a binary variable: the respondent’s own organization has the primary decision-making authority (equal to 1 or 0 otherwise).

Coordination

Respondents were asked to indicate which organization in the cross-sectoral collaboration assumes the main responsibility for coordination. We created a binary variable to indicate that the respondent’s own organization coordinates collaboration (equal to 1 or 0 otherwise).

Control variables

Aside from the variables measuring the governance structure of cross-sector collaboration, we include a set of theoretically relevant control variables commonly used in the literature on cross-sectoral collaboration. These include organization leader gender (whether the leader is female [equal to 1] or male [equal to 0]) (AbouAssi et al., 2021), trust in the other sector (respondent’s trust of the other organization in the collaboration, a Likert-type scale ranging from 5 = strongly agree to 1 = strongly disagree) (Bauer et al., 2020), years collaborating across sectors (a continuous variable measuring the number of years the respondent’s organization has been engaged in cross-sector collaboration) (Gazley, 2008, 2010), effectiveness of relations (respondent’s rank of the effectiveness of relationship with the other sector in general, a Likert-type scale ranging from 7 = very effective to 1 = not at all effective) (Bauer et al., 2020), size (respondent’s organization’s budget size relative to peer organizations; 1 = small, 2 = medium, 3 = large) (AbouAssi et al., 2021; Guo & Acar, 2005), urban scale (type of location in which the respondent’s organization is located; 1 = rural, 2 = suburban, 3 = urban) (Tran & AbouAssi, 2021), whether the organization is in the local government sector (1 = local government and 0 = nonprofit (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Gazley, 2008, 2010), and service category (the collaborative’s type of service delivery, coded with eight binary variables) (Bauer et al., 2020; Romzek et al., 2014).

Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the combined sample and separate local government and nonprofit samples, and t tests to examine whether statistical differences exist between the means of each variable across the samples. Nearly all mean differences are statistically significant, which underscores the decision to include the local government sector as a control variable in the models. These summary statistics suggest that local governments rank their collaborations’ effectiveness higher (5.3) than nonprofit organizations do (4.8) and this difference is statistically significant.

Table 1.

Summary Statistics and T Tests.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Combined	LGs	NPOs
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	T tests
Dependent variable
Collaboration effectiveness	5.133 (1.466)	5.329 (1.418)	4.845 (1.495)	*
Governance arrangements
Initiation	0.433 (0.496)	0.358 (0.481)	0.507 (0.502)	*
Funding	0.282 (0.451)	0.122 (0.328)	0.440 (0.498)	*
Decision-making	0.703 (0.458)	0.753 (0.433)	0.624 (0.487)	*
Coordination	0.632 (0.483)	0.662 (0.475)	0.587 (0.495)
Control variables
Organization leader gender (female)	0.304(0.460)	0.169(0.376)	0.453(0.499)	*
Trust in other sector	3.509(1.168)	3.543(1.027)	3.470(1.311)
Years collaborating across sectors	7.750(6.395)	6.739(5.274)	9.173(7.503)	*
Effectiveness of relations	5.391(1.462)	5.359(1.455)	5.438(1.478)
Organization size	1.532(0.639)	1.456(0.595)	1.618(0.675)	*
Urban scale	1.536(0.752)	1.315(0.615)	1.786(0.814)	*
LG sector	0.527(0.023)	1.000(0.000)	0.000(0.000)
Service category
Community work	0.315(0.465)	0.547(0.499)	0.087(0.282)	*
Culture	0.272(0.446)	0.399(0.491)	0.147(0.355)	*
Development	0.148(0.355)	0.223(0.418)	0.073(0.262)	*
Education	0.181(0.386)	0.324(0.470)	0.040(0.197)	*
Environment	0.255(0.437)	0.318(0.467)	0.193(0.396)	*
Social services	0.362(0.482)	0.486(0.502)	0.240(0.429)	*
Youth	0.218(0.414)	0.365(0.483)	0.073(0.261)	*
Other	0.117(0.322)	0.007(0.082)	0.227(0.420)	*

Note. LGs = local government; NPOs = nonprofit organization.

p < .1.

Three of four differences in means tests across the governance arrangement variables were statistically significant, suggesting distinctions between the local government and nonprofit sectors about how governance arrangements operate. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in the means of local government and nonprofit collaboration coordination responsibilities. This result could imply that coordination is more typically in the purview of organizations in the collaboration that are neither local governments nor nonprofit organizations, that is, third parties such as donors, perhaps.

Results

To examine the effect of governance arrangements on perceived effectiveness of collaboration, we used ordered logistic regression because the dependent variable, collaboration effectiveness, is an ordinal variable. The results in Table 2 indicate minimal support for the four governance hypotheses. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, when a respondent’s organization has the primary decision-making authority, perceived collaboration effectiveness appears to decrease, not increase. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, perceived collaboration effectiveness is higher when the respondent’s organization assumes responsibility for coordinating the collaboration. There is no statistically significant support for the remaining two hypotheses.

Table 2.

Perceived Effectiveness—Full Model.

Variables	(1)
Initiation	0.019(0.387)
Funding	0.031(0.329)
Decision-making	−0.756** (0.314)
Coordination	0.538* (0.299)
Organization leader gender (female)	0.138(0.275)
Trust in other sector	0.435*** (0.162)
Years collaborating across sectors	−0.005(0.021)
Effectiveness of relations	0.519*** (0.119)
Small organization size	Reference
Medium organization size	0.028(0.302)
Large organization size	0.368(0.545)
Urban scale (rural)	Reference
Urban scale (suburban)	0.036(0.367)
Urban scale (urban)	0.146(0.417)
Local government sector	1.787*** (0.512)
Community work	−1.012*** (0.371)
Culture	0.362(0.293)
Development	−0.031(0.353)
Education	−0.602* (0.352)
Environment	0.199(0.361)
Social services	−0.557* (0.288)
Youth	−0.151(0.359)
Other	0.449(0.394)
Observations	214

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Aside from the relationships between governance arrangements and perceived effectiveness, the model produced several other notable statistically significant results. For instance, as one would expect, trust and effective relations significantly increase perceived collaboration effectiveness,¹ which is consistent with prior research (Emerson & Nabatchi 2015; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). These two variables describe elements of collaboration that build bridges and facilitate exchange while also reducing friction and transaction costs. Indeed, in settings such as Lebanon, where government institutions are more fragile, trust and relationship-building might outperform governance arrangements in facilitating collaboration.

Finally, the sector of the collaborating organization appears to affect the perceived effectiveness of collaboration. Leaders of local governments engaged in cross-sector collaboration are more inclined to perceive collaboration as effective, compared with their nonprofit counterparts, aligning with Andrews and Entwistle’s (2010) argument that cross-sectoral collaboration can improve effectiveness, but with variations across sector. Effectiveness is also perceived as lower for collaborations focusing on community work, education, and social services; there are no significant estimates for other service categories.

Next, because collaboration comes in different shapes and forms based on its design and intended outcomes (Selden et al., 2006; Yang, 2017), we take the extra step of examining how the association between governance arrangements and perceived collaboration effectiveness varies depending on (a) the nature of collaboration and (b) the type of collaboration activities.

First, Table 3 restricts the original model by exploring perceived effectiveness based on support, cooperation, and service integration—measures of the collaboration’s nature or intensity. Prior research has found that perceived effectiveness is expected to vary based on the intensity or formality of the collaboration, which ranges from more informal (support) to more formal (service integration) relationships (Bauer et al., 2020; Nylén, 2007). In comparison with Table 2, results in Table 3 imply that decision-making responsibility is the only governance arrangement that affects perceived effectiveness; regardless of the intensity of the collaboration, effectiveness is perceived as lower when the respondent organization has the primary decision-making authority. The other three governance arrangements, including coordination, play no significant role in perceived effectiveness regardless of the nature of collaboration.

Table 3.

Perceived Effectiveness by Nature of Collaboration.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	Support	Cooperation	Partnership
Initiation	0.011(0.541)	0.247(0.483)	−0.447(0.740)
Funding	0.190(0.425)	−0.453(0.424)	−0.013(0.746)
Decision-making	−0.695* (0.392)	−1.072*** (0.385)	−1.016* (0.617)
Coordination	0.361(0.401)	0.703(0.456)	0.134(0.797)
Organization leader gender (female)	0.189(0.411)	−0.093(0.398)	−0.728(0.667)
Trust in other sector	0.398(0.242)	0.631*** (0.202)	0.449(0.283)
Years collaborating across sectors	0.002(0.029)	0.016(0.029)	−0.071(0.054)
Effectiveness of relations	0.785*** (0.160)	0.519*** (0.165)	0.301(0.205)
Small organization size	Reference	Reference	Reference
Medium organization size	0.094(0.411)	−0.262(0.405)	0.572(0.663)
Large organization size	0.428(0.821)	−0.272(0.557)	1.294(0.942)
Urban scale (rural)	Reference	Reference	Reference
Urban scale (suburban)	−0.042(0.442)	0.384(0.495)	0.145(0.756)
Urban scale (urban)	0.680(0.666)	0.608(0.564)	0.280(0.769)
Local government sector	2.033*** (0.726)	1.582*** (0.569)	−0.3550.954)
Community work	2.033*** (0.726)	1.582*** (0.569)	−0.355(0.954)
Culture	−0.610(0.543)	−1.423*** (0.466)	−1.358** (0.638)
Development	0.155(0.383)	0.202(0.387)	1.107* (0.614)
Education	−0.080(0.445)	−0.563(0.453)	−0.246(0.573)
Environment	−1.482*** (0.575)	−0.581(0.414)	−1.228* (0.690)
Social services	0.304(0.400)	0.130(0.446)	0.241(0.650)
Youth	−1.007** (0.408)	−0.367(0.387)	−0.587(0.509)
Other	0.053(0.476)	−0.049(0.448)	−0.502(0.599)
Observations	140	139	85

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 4 restricts the model in Table 2 by using a classification of collaboration type proposed by Gazley (2008)—government provision of resources, interagency communications, shared resources, and joint operations. We examined the relationship between governance arrangement and perceived collaboration effectiveness based on these four types of activities. When examining predictors of perceived collaboration effectiveness across the four activity types in Table 4, we find that some results are consistent with those reported in Table 2. For instance, for two of the four collaboration activities, perceived effectiveness is higher when respondents are responsible for coordination; for one of the four activities, effectiveness is lower when respondents make decisions. Of the four governance arrangements, coordination emerges here as somewhat important to effectiveness, dependent on the type of the activity. We also note that across all four activity types, trust is positively and statistically associated with collaboration effectiveness, and for three of the four activities, the quality of the organizations’ relations is positively associated with perceived effectiveness. Local government respondents are more likely to perceive collaboration as effective than their nonprofit counterparts for three of these four activity categories. Overall, the type of collaboration activity does not appear to generate consistent differences in the relationships between governance arrangements and perceived effectiveness.

Table 4.

Perceived Effectiveness by Type of Collaboration Activity.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables	Govt. provision of resources	Interagency communications	Shared resources	Joint operations
Initiation	0.030(0.780)	0.122(0.540)	−0.256(0.528)	0.025(0.466)
Funding	0.244(0.518)	−0.089(0.567)	0.437(0.446)	0.010(0.506)
Decision-making	−0.661(0.510)	−1.025** (0.422)	−0.415(0.390)	−0.698(0.430)
Coordination	0.452(0.531)	1.280** (0.529)	1.228*** (0.457)	0.563(0.509)
Organization leader gender (female)	0.162(0.458)	0.287(0.505)	−0.034(0.387)	−0.713(0.456)
Trust in other sector	0.601** (0.252)	0.573** (0.224)	0.673*** (0.248)	0.344* (0.206)
Years collaborating across sectors	−0.006(0.035)	0.016(0.035)	−0.055(0.036)	−0.004(0.029)
Effectiveness of relations	0.740*** (0.171)	0.281(0.188)	0.633*** (0.146)	0.542*** (0.170)
Small organization size	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Medium organization size	−0.287(0.517)	−0.544(0.458)	−0.246(0.432)	−0.278(0.443)
Large organization size	1.455(0.913)	0.207(0.770)	−0.098(0.875)	0.343(0.570)
Urban scale (rural)	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Urban scale (suburban)	0.373(0.526)	0.070(0.496)	−0.355(0.466)	−0.200(0.553)
Urban scale (urban)	0.425(0.768)	0.234(1.025)	0.303(0.661)	−0.192(0.573)
Local government sector	1.882** (0.851)	2.196** (0.921)	2.049*** (0.768)	1.046(0.678)
Community work	−0.211(0.975)	−1.679** (0.712)	−1.386** (0.613)	−1.663*** (0.509)
Culture	0.243(0.449)	0.105(0.426)	−0.260(0.445)	0.499(0.428)
Development	−0.141(0.502)	−0.022(0.539)	−0.441(0.489)	−0.416(0.466)
Education	−0.758(0.662)	−0.810(0.493)	−0.830* (0.502)	−0.744* (0.439)
Environment	0.530(0.550)	0.170(0.544)	−0.295(0.510)	0.894* (0.473)
Social services	−1.539*** (0.510)	−0.995** (0.470)	−0.805* (0.450)	−0.590(0.417)
Youth	−0.398(0.715)	−0.251(0.550)	0.005(0.526)	−0.395(0.470)
Other	0.692(0.714)	0.413(0.752)	0.980(0.627)	0.525(0.703)
Observations	103	110	121	129

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Connecting Collaboration Governance Arrangements to Perceived Effectiveness

In general, these findings indicate that the perceived effectiveness of cross-sector collaboration varies only somewhat based on the governance arrangement used to collaborate. The first takeaway is that initiation and funding of collaboration do not seem to affect perceived effectiveness. Initiation and funding occur at the impetus of collaboration when arrangements are being formed and responsibilities assigned. The form and direction of collaborations are shaped by certain drivers (e.g., leadership, interdependence, uncertainty, requirements, and needs for resources; see Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2015; Suárez & Esparza, 2015) and barriers (e.g., financial costs, conflict, and lack of incentive or capacity; see Huxham & Vangen, 2005). It is possible that the exchanges that occur at initiation—galvanizing the drivers and mitigating the barriers to set the collaboration in motion, coalescing participants, and so on—are not conducive to enhancing collaboration effectiveness in the eyes of the organizational leaders.

It appears that leaders perceive collaboration as less effective when their own organizations assume the primary responsibility for decision-making. There are three plausible explanations here. First, scholars (DeLeon & Varda, 2009; Keast et al., 2004) have argued that in collaboration, participating organizations continue to make decisions independently to safeguard autonomy; if so, decisions that foster organizational independence could work against the effectiveness of the collaboration. Second, making and implementing a decision are very different and the links between each, on one hand, and effectiveness, on the other, are not necessarily the same. For instance, the process of implementing decisions requires adequate capacity and accountability mechanisms, which may be more relevant to perceived effectiveness (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Gazley, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Romzek et al., 2014) than the making of a decision. Third, and relatedly, an organization responsible for decision-making in collaboration needs to know and trust that its partners will accept and apply the decisions. We will come back to the subject of trust below, but without that knowledge, perceived effectiveness of collaboration would be at risk. Therefore, each organization should have the capacity to take and implement a decision and be trusted by its collaborators to do so; the mechanisms to hold one another accountable should also be in place.

The control of a leader’s own organization over coordination during collaboration appears to be the one governance arrangement associated with a favorable perception of effectiveness. There are several plausible explanations here. First, there is evidence that coordination generally has a positive effect on performance outcomes (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Selden et al., 2006). Coordination affords an organization some control (Keast et al., 2004; McNamara, 2012), which may boost a leader’s perception of the collaboration’s results. Second, the other governance arrangements—initiation, funding, and decision-making—aim to bring collaborators together, to align their intentions and interests, and to divide labor and credits, while the effectiveness of collaboration is more likely to be detected and influenced during implementation where intentions and interests are tested (Gulati et al., 2012; McNamara, 2012), that is, where coordination takes place. The leader of an organization that takes credit for coordinating the collaboration will plausibly perceive the work being done as effective given implications for the credibility of one’s own organization.

Third, coordination is an ongoing process during implementation (Bruns, 2013; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). It is during that phase when repeated interactions with cyclical feedback might also invoke more of the trust and relationship-building activities described by Ansell and Gash (2008); these activities catalyze increased perceived effectiveness by strengthening interdependencies through dialogue and other process interactions (Rhodes & Murray, 2007). Coordination entails continued, process-focused work that buttresses connections critical to effective relationships, whereas other arrangements such as initiation and funding are comparatively static concepts and decision-making could be construed as a relatively high-risk activity. The implication is that coordinating collaborations generates extra benefits for the respondent organizations—such as streamlined efforts—and also increases trust and stronger relationships.

It is unsurprising that as trust in the other sector increases so does the perceived effectiveness of collaboration. Trust has been a long-recognized sine qua non of collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Keast et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2015). Emerson et al. (2012) considered trust to be a major element of shared motivation, and therefore an integral component of collaboration dynamics. Trust helps in decreasing transaction costs, improving investments and stability in relations, and encouraging mutual exchange and learning (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Trust breeds mutual understanding, which generates legitimacy and finally commitment; these dynamics then reinforce trust. Related to, but independent of trust, good relations with organizations in the other sector could generate similar dynamics that strengthen leaders’ perceived effectiveness of collaboration. However, when we interacted trust with the four governance arrangements as a robustness check, we did not find significant results. The only explanation we can provide at this stage is the multidimensionality and complexity of trust. On one hand, there are different types of trust where one relates to the emotional bonds among those connected and the other relates to a more rational assessment of one’s abilities to get things done (Colombo, 2010; Johnson & Grayson, 2005). On the other hand, trust in collaboration can be at the personal, organizational, or regime level (Getha-Taylor et al., 2019). Using a different type of trust in the analytical models in future research could yield different results.

Finally, the importance of sector and service category in the assessment of collaboration effectiveness is quite consistent across all models. While further exploration is needed, the analysis indicates that local government leaders are predisposed to positive evaluations of collaboration, relative to their nonprofit colleagues. Local governments in Lebanon are hesitant to collaborate with nonprofits, due to their constrained authorities and oversight by the central government; however, when they decide to collaborate, they ensure there are mechanisms in place to safeguard their interests and the fulfillment of their constituents’ needs (Bauer et al., 2020). We also expect that perceived effectiveness varies based on service category (AbouAssi et al., 2021; Lee & Liu, 2012). Service categories vary by the complexity of the issue being addressed, the heterogeneity of stakeholder goals and demands, the nature and frequency of interactions they require, and the benefits they are expected to generate (Head, 2008; Laing, 2003). These factors will undoubtedly affect performance and perceptions of effectiveness.

As these results suggest, governance arrangements are only one piece of the collaboration effectiveness puzzle (Amirkhanyan et al., 2014). Perceived effectiveness, or effectiveness in general, is a multidimensional construct that evolves with the stages of collaboration and is affected by collaboration relationships. It is also important to recognize that collaboration is often assessed through the narrow lens of efficiency and effectiveness (Dickinson & Sullivan, 2013); this is the focus of most public administration literature (Mitchell et al., 2015), but could be a lens through which practitioners might be assessing collaboration, objectively or subjectively. Dickinson and Sullivan (2013) and Conner et al. (2016) argued for more attention to cultural efficacy by focusing on symbolic resonance, emotions, identity, and individual values, “paying attention to the micro level; the situated agency of those charged with making collaboration happen. . .” as that could “. . . explain why particular attempts at collaboration do not work or why unlikely collaborations do work” (Dickinson & Sullivan, 2013, p. 172). This is particularly important in settings where collaboration is not necessarily a common practice (Hermansson, 2016).

Conclusion

This article explores whether and how selected collaboration governance arrangements might explain collaborative leaders’ perceived effectiveness of the relations. The findings indicate that when a participating organization is making the decisions during collaboration, its leader is less likely to perceive the collaboration as effective. Conversely, when an organization is coordinating the collaboration, its leader is more likely to perceive the collaboration as effective. Because of its fundamental role in the processes of implementing, managing, and guiding the collaborative, coordination helps to build and reinforce relationships and implies the presence of some control. These process dynamics, which evolve over time, facilitate perceptions of effectiveness on the part of participating organizational leaders. Here it is important to note that collaboration remains “. . . an ongoing, interactive process between partners that involves negotiation, development, and assessment of commitments, and implementation of those commitments” (Chen, 2008, 360). As collaboration evolves, so do its governance arrangements and their impacts on perceived effectiveness. These temporal dimensions of collaboration and effectiveness should be explored in future research.

We acknowledge several limitations that invite additional exploration. First is the possibility of endogeneity. The data and modeling limitations of this analysis preclude causal conclusions, but future research could use experimental or longitudinal data in an effort to do so. Measurement issues associated with survey data also apply here. The outcome variable measures leader-perceived effectiveness but other possible measures could potentially yield different implications (Sowa et al., 2004). Moreover, the reliance on a self-reported survey to measure both dependent and independent variables might have biased the estimated correlations via common source bias. Although concern about this bias might have been exaggerated in the extant literature (George & Pandey, 2017), future studies should attempt possible remedies through the use of independent data sources. Finally, the focus on a single country limits the generalizability of the findings but still provides insight into cross-sector collaboration in a non-Western, developing country context. Future studies could examine the effectiveness of local government–nonprofit collaboration from a comparative perspective using cross-country data.

Despite these limitations, this research offers several contributions. First, it empirically explores understudied links between governance arrangements and the effectiveness of cross-sector collaboration. Second, its focus on cross-sector collaboration at the local level supplements existing research on national or transnational collaboration. Finally, while most existing research has examined local government–nonprofit relations from the perspective of one sector, this research offers insights into perceptions of leaders from both local governments and nonprofits. Cross-sector differences give credence to the social construction of effectiveness by suggesting how different sectoral viewpoints could lead to different interpretations of effectiveness and its correlates. Informed by these insights, public and nonprofit leaders should be better aware of how different collaboration governance arrangements might influence their own satisfaction with and perceptions of collaboration versus those of their partners, thereby enhancing cross-sector collaborative efforts.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the contribution of Ms. Sarah Neilsen to an earlier draft of this article. We also want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M and American University’s School of Public Affairs’ Excellence with Impact Initiative and Metropolitan Policy Center.

ORCID iD

Khaldoun AbouAssi

Notes

Author Biographies

Zachary Bauer holds a PhD in public administration from American University’s School of Public Affairs. He is a public management scholar and practitioner specializing in collaboration and contracting and has published in premier public administration journals. Bauer is a management consultant for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Khaldoun AbouAssi is Provost Associate Professor of public administration and policy in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at American University. He holds a PhD in public administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. His primary research focuses on public and nonprofit management, examining organizational capacity, resources, and interorganizational relations.

Jocelyn M. Johnston is professor of public administration and policy at American University. She earned MPA and PhD degrees in public administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University after serving for 10 years in local government administering intergovernmental programs. Her research focuses on government contracting and third-party service delivery, cross-boundary service collaboration, and intergovernmental programs and policies.

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