Abstract
This article examines factors that influence the action repertoires of youth organizations (YOs) across nine European countries and their roles within the nonprofit and voluntary sector. We insist on the connectedness of various forms of engagement, challenging the traditional divide between volunteering/nonprofit activities and political mobilization. Through a theory-driven analysis, we show how organizational structure and outside support impact YOs’ forms of action. We find cross-national variations and demonstrate that YOs’ access to resources and strategic choices are central in explaining their modes of engagement. Those with substantial institutionalized support (notably funding from state authorities and the EU) are less likely to engage in conflictual activities, whereas those with higher levels of autonomy and grassroots activism are more inclined toward unconventional actions. These results call attention to how funding and formalization can steer civil society toward low-conflict engagement, potentially depoliticizing youth activism. They have broader implications for understanding how structural conditions shape civic agency and the democratic potential of the nonprofit and voluntary sector.
Keywords
Introduction
Youth studies have received increasing interest in recent years, with a primary focus on the phenomenon of youth disengagement from institutionalized politics (Dahl et al., 2019; Grasso & Giugni, 2022; Kitanova, 2020; Rammelt et al., 2021). There has, moreover, been more recognition of the multiple avenues through which young people participate in politics. Some scholars, therefore, call for a broader definition of youth engagement, reflecting the diversity through which youth participate in politics (Mosley et al., 2023). This includes engagement in social movements (Earl et al., 2017), market-based advocacy (Zukin et al., 2006), peer-to-peer digital participation (Cohen et al., 2012), involvement in community-based non-profits (Bess et al., 2011), and, more broadly, volunteerism (Gil-Lacruz et al., 2016).
We argue that youth organizations (YOs) represent a pivotal channel for various modes of youth participation, including collective mobilization, individual dedication within non-profit entities, as well as altruistic endeavors and volunteerism across civil society. Building on prior research, we emphasize the interconnected nature of these forms of engagement, calling into question the traditional divide between volunteering/non-profit activities and social movements/political mobilization. At least when focusing on youth activism, this rigid separation (which is largely a result of the way scholarship has evolved into distinct research traditions) constrains the ability to recognize the significant role of organizations in linking volunteerism and non-profit activism with contentious mobilization (della Porta & Steinhilper, 2021). This is of particular interest, as volunteering has been mainly treated as a homogeneous activity (Hustinx et al., 2022). A similar perspective prevails on non-profit organizations, considering them as stable or void of change (Arvidson, 2018). Accordingly, our primary objective is to reveal the multifaceted ways in which YOs function as dynamic platforms for youth engagement. We aim to assess the degree to which these organizations promote civic involvement, while examining the patterns through which they do so. The organizational context in which young people participate represents a microcosm in which participatory dynamics unfold, resulting in different pathways to political engagement. For this reason, we seek to assess how and why youth political engagement varies across different organizations, as these latter provide the milieu within which young people interconnect and mobilize.
Previous research on YOs, mainly case studies of specific organizations, has shown their important role in developing civic spirit and skills, as well as political trust. In particular, research has demonstrated how involvement in YOs can lead to higher levels of participation and trust in political institutions (Homana, 2018; Verba et al., 1995), and can contribute to youth development processes (Lewis-Charp et al., 2006; Mikolajczyk et al., 2020), political learning, and leadership selection (Kirshner, 2007; Sessler Bernstein & Fredette, 2024). For the voluntary and non-profit sector, most studies so far have focused on the individual level, mainly due to a perspective that raises the individual to the main carrier of civic participation (Hustinx et al., 2022).
Less effort has been made, however, to analyze choices made by organizations when engaging youth in political actions. It remains unclear how YOs select their action repertoires, particularly regarding the influence of funding or other resources on these choices. Why do YOs employ specific action repertoires, and what are the factors that lead them to engage, for example, in disruptive protests rather than other forms of mobilization? To date, academic literature has not adequately addressed these issues in a systematic manner.
This article aims to fill this gap using a theory-driven analysis of YOs in nine European countries. Drawing on the academic debate on differences between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, and works that used this framework to map out repertoires of youth participation (Grasso, 2014; Kitanova, 2020; Sloam, 2016), we compare conventional action repertoires of YOs which rely on low conflict (such as launching public initiatives, collecting signatures, open letters), with unconventional action repertoires which rely on direct disruption and violence (such as demonstrations, consumer boycott/buycott, and confrontational activities like strikes, sit-ins, violent attacks). Due to its qualitative differences (Verba et al., 1995), we exclude electoral participation. A nuanced understanding of youth participation (Paschou & Mogollón, 2022) emphasizes the motivations that lead young people toward particular forms of activism and engagement over others. This recognition underscores the importance of conducting analyses that consider a broad range of factors at the level of organizations primarily in terms of structures, resources, and framing.
While the literature on political participation expands, scholars researching bottom-up engagement by civil society and non-profit organizations remain concerned with issues surrounding participation and alternative avenues for involvement in politics (Conner et al., 2023; Feenstra, 2018; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Paschou & Mogollón, 2022). They offer valuable conceptual guidance and methodological tools for analyzing youth participation within YOs and its broader implications for mobilization, voluntarism, and civil society dynamics (della Porta, 2020; Feenstra, 2018). Young people’s integration into relationship networks through volunteerism may serve as a future recruitment source, while the development of civic attitudes in one’s youth often persists into adulthood (McFarland & Thomas, 2006). This interconnectedness highlights the importance of understanding youth participation within YOs as a crucial component of broader civil society dynamics.
Our analysis is primarily guided by hypotheses rooted in social movement research, particularly drawing on the two major approaches of ‘Resource Mobilization’ and ‘Framing’ that help focus the analysis on the significant factors influencing the action repertoires of YOs. Yet, we question the extent to which these action repertoires are specific to social movements. Indeed, a growing number of youth studies find that youth activism is not declining but rather taking on different forms, notably volunteering engagement (Bečević & Dahlstedt, 2022; Chironi et al., 2024; Earl et al., 2017; Knapp & Waechter, 2021; Morgan et al., 2024; Terriquez & Milkman, 2021). At the same time, we consider factors that have not received sufficient attention within social movement research but are significant in volunteerism and the non-profit sector literature.
The way organizations fund their activities is crucial to gaining a more detailed understanding of how YOs function. If volunteer and nonprofit organizations must secure external funding (Chen, 2022; Prentice, 2016), social movements may proliferate even in contexts of limited financial resources, possibly due to mass involvement or innovative protest strategies (Doherty & Hayes, 2018). Thus, what may not have been sufficiently explored is the importance of a differentiating balance between independence and reliance on funding for volunteerism and collective mobilization, respectively. This challenge must be taken seriously when dealing with YOs, given their existence within a broader political context that tends to marginalize them as passive entities rather than as protagonists with their own voice (cf. Cinalli & Giugni, 2014, for a similar approach to the field of unemployment).
Although there is no official and standardized definition of ‘youth’ across the countries we analyze, institutions usually refer to individuals aged 15 to 29 as the target population of youth policies, with some policy exceptions in Italy extending up to age 34 (Youth Partnership, 2016). In turn, our definition of YOs refers to all organizations run by or targeting young people aged from 15 to 29, or otherwise engaging with policy issues that are relevant to this age cohort. We employ logistic regression and descriptive statistics using organizational data from 4,500 YOs across nine European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). This approach enables us to closely examine the determinants shaping the action repertoires adopted by YOs.
The following sections are structured as follows. We first construct our hypotheses on the basis of relevant studies on youth participation that consider the main literature on social movements and volunteerism. We then present the data, methods, and results of our regression model. Finally, we discuss our findings and situate them within the broader context of volunteering, civil society, and the non-profit sector. We also sum up the main contributions and limitations of our arguments.
Building a Theoretical Framework for the Study of YOs
Despite a high level of interest in young people’s involvement in politics, most studies focus on the individual, rather than the organizational level. Previous research demonstrates how the presence of young people in politics as engaged active citizens is declining across Europe (Dahl et al., 2019; Grasso, 2016; Kitanova, 2020; Zani & Cicognani, 2019).
Three Strands of Literature on Youth Participation
Three main lines of argument can be identified. First, economic arguments referring to the impact of increasing socio-economic inequalities as a starting point (Bessant et al., 2017; Grasso, 2013); second, arguments drawn on changing patterns of public life, mainly caused by technological changes (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013; Earl et al., 2017); third, arguments focused on changing patterns of political participation (van der Brug, 2010).
A first strand of literature underlines the declining socio-economic status of young people and growing generational inequalities (Bessant et al., 2017; Conner et al., 2024). Since the early 1980s, young people have been significantly worse off than prior generations. They have been particularly affected by the financial crises of the late 2000s, have earned less money than their parents, and have faced higher levels of youth unemployment and precarious jobs (European Commission, 2019; Gale et al., 2021).
A second strand of literature claims that young people do not engage with public life in the same way as previous ‘dutiful’ generations (Dalton, 2009; Hooghe & Boonen, 2015). In particular, technological innovations and the expanding reach of social networking sites and social media strongly impact the daily lives of young people. Some scholars even argue (Ekström & Sveningsson, 2017) that online activism is the main mobilizing tool of young cohorts, given their natural socialization in the digital era. This is relevant when considering ongoing discussions about the increasing intertwining of online and offline activism (Theocharis et al., 2019).
The strong technological content of youth’s everyday life is linked to a third strand of literature, which focuses on changing patterns of political participation. Scholars have put some strong emphasis on a new ‘engaged citizenship’ model, which combines volunteering (Bečević & Dahlstedt, 2022) with protesting, and hence, embeds politics in the daily lives of youths (Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020; Zukin et al., 2006).
In addition, scholars have observed that young people tend to participate in actions based on their interests, rather than on previous drivers of political participation such as class belonging (della Porta et al., 2015). They are more likely to participate when political actions address practical issues in personal ways (Bang, 2005; Theocharis et al., 2019), through movement and community-oriented activities (Conner et al., 2023; Guarino et al., 2020; Knapp & Waechter, 2021), and when dealing with migration, unemployment precariousness, and climate justice (de Moor et al., 2021; Gazley & Prakash, 2023; Giugni et al., 2020; Grasso & Giugni, 2022; Kagan & Dodge, 2023; Winkler, 2021). From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, community-oriented movements are mobilizing social, rather than financial, resources, making unconventional repertoires more likely (McCarthy & Walker, 2004). They are also more likely to be embedded in local activist networks, facilitating the diffusion of disruptive or direct-action tactics (Tarrow, 2011).
Finally, scholars have observed a notable push for radical political change, on the occasion of alter-globalization mobilization, the Arab Spring, and anti-austerity mobilization in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Bessant & Watts, 2020; Cammaerts et al., 2014; Grinin & Korotayev, 2022). Overall, in this body of works, young people often seem to be the driving forces of political participation that aims to change societies and political systems (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013)
Drawing on the aforementioned arguments, we propose the following hypotheses. Based on scholarship that describes youth as agents of radical change, we formulate H1.
Drawing on resource mobilization theory and literature on the gravitation of youth toward community-oriented, we formulate H2.
Explaining Youth Participation Through Social Movement Theory
Social movement theory is well-suited to analyze youth political participation (Chironi et al., 2024), especially if its scope is broadened to include youth volunteerism (della Porta, 2020). McCarthy and Zald (1977) have argued that social movement organizations (SMOs) are key players for the political socialization of members, facilitating their recruitment with similar preferences for change, as well as contributing to structuring the activities of social movements. SMOs provide channels for engaging in advocacy, protest, and broader mobilization (Elliott & Earl, 2018). In particular, the resource mobilization approach underlines the rational components of collective mobilization and thus the role that material resources and formal organizations play in the emergence of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The most important material resources that SMOs mobilize consist of money, technological resources, and privileged access to information (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Other less material resources include participants’ time, reputation, and knowledge of sound strategies (della Porta & Diani, 1999). In the non-profit sector, a wealth of studies suggests that dependence on funding compromises the activities of NGOs or fully co-opts organizations (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014; Rammelt & Kołczyńska, 2025; Yaziji & Doh, 2013).
Funding is, hence, a good indicator of patronage and control over an organization (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004), while further organizational features, such as the level of professionalization, the decision-making structure, and the degree of involvement, are equally expected to be relevant predictors of action repertoires. Visible and efficient leadership is also expected to be beneficial for the mobilization efforts of movements. In addition, this relationship between resources and professionalization on one side and repertoires and claims on the other has been widely debated within social movement studies. While some see the rise of professional and well-funded organizations as positive developments (McCarthy & Zald, 1973), others contend that organizations lose sight of their objectives and that insurgency and disruption are the keys to provoking change (Piven & Cloward, 1977, p. 37). In particular, weakly resourced groups need to make use of more radical (and certainly unconventional) repertoires. It is noticeable that in less organized and professionalized SMOs, there has been a more frequent recourse to direct actions (Staggenborg, 1988); while in the less contentious field of non-profit research, more formalized organizations provide support for less formalized ones, which, in turn, act as the main provider of community support (Kim et al., 2022).
However, for SMO mobilization to be successful, the claims and issues they raise must convince people to join their cause (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson & Meyer, 1996). In this case, the framing approach is helpful to focus on the symbolic and discursive dimension of the activity of social movements. Frames are ‘action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of SMOs’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Framing allows for transforming individual political orientations, values, and beliefs into collective mobilization. Movements must pay close attention to whether their frames resonate with the audiences they target, to ensure that individual preferences correspond to the movement goals, activities, and ideology (Snow et al., 1986). This process of ‘frame resonance’ (Snow & Benford, 1988) involves deliberately ensuring compatibility and alignment between the preferences of the movement and those of activists. There is also a need for an agreement between mobilized frames, tactics, and methods employed by movements (Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow & Benford, 1992). Given that left-leaning frames of movements have been associated with more radical repertoires of action (Uba & Bosi, 2021; Wennerhag et al., 2017), our analysis engages with the distinction between left-wing and right-wing strands. Obviously ‘left-wing’ frames are useful to deal with interpretive schema and shared meaning among a large array of socialist, green, and anarchist actors, while ‘right-wing’ allows for focusing on a combination of actors praising individual initiative, supporting free market and opposition to public sector intervention, as well as giving a neo-nationalist twist to their interpretive schema (e.g., ‘la France d’abord’ in France, ‘Prima gli Italiani’ in Italy, ‘Take back control’ in the United Kingdom, etc.).
Based on the interaction between professionalization and repertoire of action (Piven & Cloward, 1977; Staggenborg, 1988), we formulate H3.
Based on scholarship on funding dependency of organizations (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014; Yaziji & Doh, 2013), we formulate H4.
Based on the accounts of the predominance of radical repertoires employed by left-leaning movements (Uba & Bosi, 2021; Wennerhag et al., 2017) and on the need for resonance between frames and repertoires (Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow & Benford, 1992), we formulate H5 and H6.
Data and Methodology
Data were collected in 2019 within the framework of the EURYKA project – Reinventing Democracy in Europe: Youth Doing Politics in Times of Increasing Inequalities, an EU-funded research project which provided systematic knowledge on the impact of inequalities on youth political participation. The EURYKA consortium comprised researchers from nine European countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Structure of Data and Data Retrieval
Drawing on previous studies (Baglioni & Giugni, 2014; Cinalli & Füglister, 2008), data on the networks of youth-led and youth-related organizations were gathered. In particular, the data collection method followed the Action Organization Analysis approach (Kousis et al., 2018). In the framework of the EURYKA project, a slightly adapted version of Action Organization Analysis was used – also including website retrieval through Facebook pages – with the purpose of studying youth involvement in YOs. Given our previous discussion about the relationship between information and communication technology, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the potential for mobilization by young people, YO websites and Facebook pages stand out as a suitable locus for data retrieval. The aim of using this method was to ‘identify and encompass a “population” of unmediated online digital activism; include formal and informal groups; offer sufficient information for systematic analysis following political events and protest case analysis’ (EURYKA, 2020). Accordingly, the sample of formal and informal organizations was located via hub-websites (e.g., http://www.youthforum.org/about/memberorganisations, https://europa.eu/youth/evs_database) and website retrieval through Facebook.
Hub websites were identified as follows: Each participating team collected information on the organizational landscape specific to each country. This involved sourcing data from various outlets such as public documents, academic literature, and interviews with experts and practitioners. Subsequently, we conducted a systematic retrieval of active organizations to establish a comprehensive body of relevant entities. This process included utilizing 12 hubs, such as European umbrella organizations (e.g., http://www.youthforum.org/about/memberorganisations), databases (e.g., https://europa.eu/youth/evs_database), official information from governments and institutions (e.g., the U.K. charity registry), and national umbrella organizations like the Bundesjugendring (Federal Youth Ring) in Germany. In addition, we employed keyword searches on Facebook (using terms like youth, young, student, and their permutations in various languages) to identify organizational pages and diversify our dataset with a range of organizations, groups, and initiatives. Both data sources were automatically crawled using scripts developed by a subcontractor with expertise in data mining. The hub websites were scrutinized for links to partner organizations, and YO Facebook pages were identified and compiled into lists for each country. These hubs and Facebook were then automatically crawled for data. They provided links to organizational websites, enabling us to map and systematically analyze comparable cross-national data of a variety of organizations. The resulting national ‘populations’ were carefully assessed for adequacy in representing the organizational landscape. Consequently, the dataset is composed of an unmediated population of organizations that are both influential in public discourse and informal, marginal, or grassroots groups. The only limitation is that the organizations have a certain online presence and are discoverable.
In a second step, a cleaned and randomized sample of organizational websites was coded. In total, 4,500 websites of organizations, groups and networks were coded across nine countries (approximately 500 websites per country). Websites were coded if they belonged to Youth-related or Youth-led Organizations (YO), defined as ‘a collective body/unit which organizes youth and their voices around one or various issues and forms of activity, as depicted through the organization’s website’ (reference removed for peer review). Our inclusion criteria encompass both youth-led organizations (with young people in leadership roles) and youth-related organizations (professionally managed by adults, providing services/activities for youth). Hence, a YO is coded if it meets the following criteria: (a) It centers its goals, activities, and/or constituencies on youth in general or specific youth groups, or is led by youth. (b) It engages in social or political topics, aims, and repertoires of actions broadly, even if its primary objectives are cultural or leisure-related (e.g., sports clubs, cultural groups, refugee assistance groups, etc.). Excluded cases include: (a) State entities acting as leaders/sole organizers (e.g., municipalities, schools, universities) or organizations integrated into local administrations. (b) Profit-oriented economic entities acting as leaders/sole organizers (e.g., companies run by youth or selling products to/for youth).
The coding was accomplished by each national team of the consortium, with knowledge of the specific context, as well as the relevant language skills. An integrated methodological approach was adopted in all countries with respect to sampling and coding, enabling cross-national comparisons. The coding itself was preceded by intensive coder training, adaptation of the initial codebook based on experiences during the training period, and feedback from the national teams. The training resulted in an improved and intuitive codebook, as well as satisfactory levels of inter-coder reliability. According to the reliability test, agreement across websites, coders, and all variables reached 83.3%, with some variables (e.g., ORGSTRCT; ORGAIM) reaching higher agreement levels (Reference removed for peer review). Data was collected between May and December 2019.
Our dependent variable is based on the distinction between conventional and unconventional forms of action. On the one hand, conventional action is based on the assessment of lobbying and participation in meetings with officials, as well as voting-related activities (getting young people to vote) and conventional/soft protest actions (e.g., launching public initiatives, collecting signatures for initiative/referendum, verbal and written statements, etc.). However, unconventional action pertains to assessing disruptive protest actions such as public protests and public rallies, but also includes symbolic actions, consumer boycott/buycott, as well as confrontational and violent protest activities such as strikes, occupation of public buildings, squares, sit-ins, and violent attacks. Regarding explanatory factors, these include variables referring to funding, organizational formalization, the way youth are involved in or targeted by different organizations, the type of organization, as well as variables referring to main ideology and aims (cf. Appendix). Altogether, these variables allow for moving beyond cross-national descriptive statistics to search for the main determinants of both conventional and unconventional participation.
We estimated binary logistic regression models to assess the relationship between organizational characteristics and participation in conventional and unconventional political repertoires. The models assume a linear relationship between predictors and the log-odds of the outcome, independence of observations, and absence of multicollinearity. All variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were below 2.5, indicating no multicollinearity problems. The large sample size for our logistic regression (N = 4,437) supports stable coefficient estimation. Model diagnostics and standard errors confirm robustness, and significance is assessed at the p < .05, .01, and .001 levels.
Using Organizational Data to Analyze YOs
Based on our theoretical framework, we investigate two types of YO mobilization:
conventional repertoires, including voting-related activities (but not electoral participation), collecting signatures, and open letters;
unconventional repertoires, including demonstrative, disruptive, and violent protest activities.
To do so, we employed descriptive statistics and developed a logistic regression model. For the dependent variables, the classification of an activity as contentious or non-contentious is based on the description of the organization’s activities found on its website. We created a dummy variable by aggregating different types of forms of contentious actions, encompassing the following categories: demonstrative protest actions (e.g., demonstration/public protest/public rally, symbolic actions, public assemblies, consumer boycott/buycott, etc.) and disruptive protest activities (e.g., strikes, occupation of public buildings, squares, sit-ins, violent attacks, etc.). Non-contentious activities included lobbying and participation in meetings with officials and voting-related activities (getting young people to vote), and conventional/soft protest actions (launching public initiatives, collecting signatures for initiatives/referendums, verbal and written statements, etc.).
Drawing on the Resource Mobilization approach, we focus on aspects regarding the formalization of YOs (variable: ‘Formalization’ with the attributes ‘Annual reports’, ‘Board’, ‘Spokesperson’, and ‘Written Constitution’), as well as leadership (attribute: ‘President leadership’) and funding sources (variable: ‘Funding’ with the attributes ‘Private donations’, ‘Services’, ‘Fundraising’, ‘Cooperative’, ‘EU funding’, and ‘State funding’). Indicators of less formal organizations, networks, or groups are covered via movement-related forms of organization (variable: ‘Formalization’ with the attributes ‘General assembly’, and ‘Neighborhood assembly’). In addition, we analyze how young people are involved in the organization (variable: ‘Forms of engagement’ with the attributes ‘Youth-led’, ‘Youth-involved’, ‘Youth-engaged’, and ‘Youth-targeted’). The Framing approach informs our analysis of the type of YO (variable ‘YOTP’ with the attributes ‘University students’, ‘Unions’, ‘Political party students’, ‘Anti-fascist’, ‘Anti-capitalist’, ‘Secondary school’, ‘LGBTQ+’, ‘Labor rights’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Human rights’, ‘State youth club’, and ‘Political party youth’), as well as their aim (variable: ‘aim’ with the attributes ‘Change society’, ‘Defend nation’, ‘Environment’, ‘Reduce poverty’, ‘Promote democracy’, ‘Political equality’, ‘Combat racism’, ‘Promote human rights’, and ‘Insertion in the job market’) and ideology (variable: ‘ideology’ with the attributes ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’).
Findings
We applied descriptive statistics to analyze how YOs use different action repertoires. We then perform a set of logistic regressions to explain variations in action repertoires.
Country-Specific Findings
We examined the distribution of organizations throughout the countries included in the study (Table 1).
Cross-National Descriptive Statistics: Types of Participation.
As Table 1 shows that both conventional and unconventional are far from being the dominant repertoires of action of YOs. The three most common activities of YOs are ‘Sports/recreational (outdoor) activities’, 25.32%; ‘Counseling’, 13,24%; and ‘Education (e.g., school tutoring, language lessons for migrants), 12.59%. For the analysis, we zoom in on our two dependent variables, namely, the level and type of political actions. We observe sharp differences in the share of YOs that engage in political actions across countries. Moreover, a higher percentage of YOs engage in conventional, rather than unconventional, repertoires: in the majority of countries, the percentage of YOs making use of conventional repertoires is double the proportion of those using unconventional repertoires: this is true even in France, which is usually considered an emblematic example of a contentious country (Cinalli & Van Hauwaert, 2021). More rarely, unconventional repertoires are closer in level to conventional repertoires. For example, Greek YOs are particularly involved in political action, with 35.6% of organizations engaging in conventional, and 28% in unconventional actions.
Polish YOs engaging in conventional repertoires, by contrast, account only for 1.4% of the Polish sample. A mere 0.2% of YOs participate in demonstrations and more disruptive forms of action. Polish YOs, consequently, seem to be rather apolitical. Greece is followed by France and Germany in its higher levels of activism, where around 30% of YOs engage in forms of political action. More specifically, more than one-fifth of YOs in France and Germany engage in conventional political action, and 11.6% (France) and 7.7% (Germany) in unconventional action. A second group of countries comprises Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. While the overall percentage of YOs engaging in political action is lower than in Greece, France, and Germany, the distribution between conventional and unconventional repertoires is roughly the same, with YOs making use of unconventional forms of action being proportionally half of those using conventional forms. A third group consists of Sweden and the United Kingdom, where, surprisingly, few YOs are involved in political action.
YOs and Their Action Repertoires
Moving on to explanatory analyses, Tables 2 and 3 report the results of our logistic regression models for two dependent variables. Our analysis includes 36 explanatory variables and 2 dependent variables selected to test our hypotheses. They are all bivariate variables, allowing for running of logistic regression.
Results of Logistic Regression: Conventional Repertoires.
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Results of Logistic Regression: Unconventional Repertoires.
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Drawing on the Resource Mobilization approach, we tested the relationship between the formalization of YOs and their choice of repertoire (H3). We found that movement-related forms of organization such as general assembly and neighborhood assembly, positively impact conventional forms of action, with the latter form having a strong impact on conventional actions. We also discovered a positive relationship between ‘public ambassadors’ and YOs that engage in conventional forms of action. We hypothesized that the way youth are involved in YOs impacts the action repertoires chosen by these organizations (H1). Contrary to our expectations, ‘youth-led’ only has an effect on conventional forms of action. In the full model, the impact of this effect is significantly reduced. Those YOs who use conventional repertoires are led by the youth or involve them in an active capacity. Regarding Framing, we tested the link between ideological orientation and choice of repertoire (H5), finding that right-wing ideology is statistically significant for conventional mobilization. Democracy as an aim strongly affects conventional actions. Defending the nation, an aim associated usually with right-wing ideology, has the same positive effect.
Based on Resource Mobilization (variables ‘Funding’, ‘Formalization’, ‘Forms of engaging’), we hypothesized that dependence on institutional funding decreases the likelihood of unconventional forms of action. We found that EU funding reduces the likelihood of both conventional and unconventional repertoires among YOs. The effect is nearly three times larger for unconventional repertoires compared to conventional ones. In the second step (Model 2 in Table 3), after incorporating variables related to the framing perspective, this effect is further amplified.
Testing the influence of formalization on repertoires (H3), we found that the variable ‘President’ has a negative influence on both repertoires. In line with our predictions, this variable has a greater impact on the reduction of the likelihood of unconventional actions (Table 3). Overall, indicators of formalization and professionalization, such as ‘annual reports’ and ‘president’, have a negative influence on the odds of YOs implementing unconventional forms of action. More movement-related aspects of organization, such as ‘spokesperson’ (rather than an elected president) and ‘neighborhood assembly’, had a positive influence. Addressing H1, ‘youth engaging’ has the greatest positive effect among this group of variables on unconventional forms. Thus, YOs engaging youth are inclined to mobilize unconventional repertoires. Finally, the aim of changing society has a stronger positive effect on unconventional forms, but it also has an effect on conventional forms.
Our findings confirm our hypotheses based on the resource mobilization theory (H3, H4). YOs engaging in unconventional repertoires rely on closer network structures and are not strongly institutionalized. Indicators of formalization and professionalization negatively influence the odds of YOs making use of unconventional forms of action. We observed a negative relationship between having a president, annual reports, or receiving EU funding and unconventional political participation. By contrast, more movement-related aspects of organizations have a positive influence. Our research also shows that EU financing decreases the chances for both types of political action.
Furthermore, the type of organization, the aims, and the ideology of YOs impact the choice of repertoire, providing strong evidence for the usefulness of the framing perspective, in line with H5 and H6. Indeed, more radical groups, such as anti-fascists and anti-capitalists, more frequently mobilize unconventional forms of political participation, while groups affiliated with political parties tend to privilege conventional forms. In addition, YOs identifying as adhering to a left-wing ideology have a higher chance of engaging in unconventional repertoires.
Finally, the two hypotheses based on scholarship on youth political participation (H1, H2) are partially invalidated. While the level of youth involvement in YOs influences their action repertoires (H1), it does so in a manner contrary to our expectations. It is not the YOs led by young people, or where young people actively organize activities, that are more likely to engage in unconventional forms of action. Rather, it is the YOs where young people regularly participate in activities that have a higher propensity for unconventional action. This is consistent with the effect of political parties on youth mobilization. Furthermore, there is compelling evidence that YOs with a stronger focus on community engagement are more likely to participate in unconventional repertoires (H2). However, while neighborhood assemblies increase the likelihood of unconventional political participation, general assemblies are not significant.
Discussion
In line with Hustinx et al. (2022) – who emphasize a broader understanding of volunteering, including informal and symbolic aspects, and call for analyzing structural and collective processes – our article bridges the domains of volunteering and non-profit activities, civic participation, and contentious mobilization. By so doing, the article’s explanatory power derives from its focus on the meso-level, referring to both organizational aspects and group processes.
The first point of discussion pertains to the insights gained from the systematic cross-national comparison. Notably, Greece emerges as the country with the highest number of YOs engaged in various forms of political participation, while Poland stands out as having the least politically active YOs. Sweden and the United Kingdom exhibit relatively low levels of YO activity. The findings for France challenge previous studies, indicating a ‘post-contentious’ turning point that particularly impacts young people (Chabanet et al., 2018; Rammelt et al., 2021).
Second, our investigations emphasize the interconnectedness and fluidity among various avenues through which young people participate. We underscore the vital role of YOs in nurturing civic, political trust, and leadership among young individuals. By providing platforms for collective mobilization, skill development, and political learning, YOs contribute to the broader process of youth engagement with societal issues. We challenge the prevailing idea that youth disengagement from traditional politics equates to disinterest in civic affairs. Instead, we highlight the dynamic ways in which young people channel their activism, whether through market-based advocacy, digital participation, volunteerism, or community-based initiatives. In doing so, we simultaneously considered variables of political engagement, which are central to different research fields, typically studied by scholars working on social movements and collective mobilization, or alternatively, on volunteerism and non-profit action.
Our results suggest that YOs led or organized by young people privilege conventional means of political participation over unconventional, thereby complementing works by scholars who have singled out the importance of unconventional mobilization, but only at the individual level (Grasso, 2018). Interestingly, our research suggests that when young people are involved in YOs but do not hold leadership positions, there is a greater recourse to unconventional repertoires of political engagement. This exemplifies the nuanced relationship between youth agency and organizational dynamics in shaping modes of political activism. At the same time, our findings highlight the substantial influence of financial resources on the priorities and strategies of YOs. State funding for YOs emerges as a potential mechanism for mitigating social conflicts and promoting less confrontational modes of engagement (Chabanet et al., 2018).
Third, our findings demonstrate the importance of positioning research at the intersection of social movement analysis and the voluntary sector. The latter is characterized by minor engagement with forms of direct action, while the former is less concerned with funding, especially in the specific case of YOs. Research on organized European civil society suggests the emergence of two relatively dissociated spheres of action: one heavily institutionalized and funded by national and European public authorities – rather moderate, partnership-oriented in its attitude, and sometimes even docile – the other, more independent, autonomous, social movement-oriented, and positioned in a relationship of mistrust or even hostility – worse, indifference – with traditional forms of political participation and institutions in general (Lahusen, 2014). We confirm that the EU funding/financing reinforces this trend. Concerning YOs, this means that the expectations and demands of grassroots actors are not relayed and are sometimes even made invisible by actors from higher levels. The discussions on funding, professionalization, and internal structure are some of the classic dilemmas in social movement studies (Staggenborg, 1988). For weakly resourced groups, radicalization and, ultimately, ‘mass unrest’ can become the strategy to obtain different advantages, such as an expansion of the welfare system (Piven & Cloward, 1977). Forbrig (2005) observes for youth participation that, once the group of interest in question is integrated into democratic politics, through one institutional mechanism or another, participation wanes, whether because the public perceived the issue as henceforth taken care of by institutions, or because institutions bureaucratise, professionalise and monopolise the issue and consequently restrict participation by citizens. (p. 13)
Yet, an alternative reading suggests that we may be witnessing a renewal of youth engagement in public affairs: This prompts reflection on the changing nature of public policy in the youth field, from government to governance, from purely state action to negotiated coproduction of public policies in cooperation with civil society, in other words non-profit organizations, including youth associations. [. . .] All this has to do with being able to involve young people in public affairs. (Lauritzen, 2005, p. 5)
In any case, as Comeau and Turcotte (2002) suggested regarding the funding of organizations, it is necessary to study ‘the permeability of an association and its integration into the dynamics of social movements’ (p. 74). Regarding the financing of actors in civil society and more precisely of YOs by the EU, perhaps it is time to dispel the illusion that it has no influence on the forms of action which those who benefit from it will develop. Previous research has cautioned against integrating volunteerism and non-profits within political mobilization, particularly when non-profit organizations rely financially on donors and undergo increased formalization that makes them ineffective in fostering political change (Chahim & Prakash, 2014). However, our findings address the analytical deficit identified by Hustinx et al. (2022): current research has indeed reified volunteering, treating it as a stable, homogeneous activity for which resources function in a standard way in terms of both access and experience [. . .]. The dominant theories of volunteering thus neglect the variety of volunteering dynamics that may characterize specific sectors and forms of volunteering. (p. 2)
Our research demonstrates that participation within YOs remains highly heterogeneous across countries, varying in scope, form, and content. This suggests that the post-war model of the ‘Trente Glorieuses’, which portrayed a relatively continuous, homogeneous, and integrated logic of engagement – particularly between volunteering and protest mobilizations – has been replaced by a much more discontinuous and heterogeneous situation. Our research highlights that YOs supported by public authorities seem to overshadow more oppositional forms of youth action. Therefore, the question of young people’s participation in YOs raises concerns about their ability to connect with segments of youth who prefer to use non-conventional means of action. This brings up the issue of the fragmentation of European youth – which is affected by dynamics of engagement that may be consensual, radicalized, or even violent – and the integration of these diverse youth groups into society. However, Hustinx et al. lament that, as revealed by a quick glance over research conducted in recent decades, the preferred unit of analysis tends to be individual volunteers [. . .]. This methodological focus implicitly relies on a liberal positioning of the individual as the main carrier of civic participation, as on a more recent neoliberal ‘responsibilization’ of the individual. (Hustinx et al., 2022)
Our approach avoids this pitfall, focusing on YOs rather than individuals themselves. Our aim is therefore not to debate the issue of young people’s responsibility but to show that the repertoires of action they use depend on variables such as structures, resources, and framing.
Fourth, while some research suggests a relationship between involvement in non-profit organizations and an increased propensity for protest and raising issues with government officials (Brass, 2022), our study of YOs cautions against the risk that the European project may itself become the main problem. New frontiers and divisive lines may come forward as an unintended effect of developments that the EU incentivizes, namely, a more flexible labor market. As the global economy increasingly shapes social dynamics, neoliberal ideologies, labor market pressures, and consumerism may play a significant role in framing the practices of YOs. For instance, financial precarity and the gig economy might push YOs toward pragmatic forms of engagement, such as partnerships with corporate sponsors or an overreliance on market-oriented solutions to public issues (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015). These dynamics could further entrench depoliticization, discourage systemic critiques, or diminish the potential for reform and innovation that young people usually nurture.
Several limitations of our research should be acknowledged. First, while the data encompasses a breadth of organizations, groups, networks, or entities not publicly identified through hub-websites and Facebook searches are not included. When trying to generalize our results, we must admit that other universes might have somewhat different characteristics or different compositions. Second, quantifying data from qualitative analysis involves a degree of simplification, potentially obscuring subtle differences in the visions of the organizations. A third limitation relates to measurement: Organizations may present their mission and activities on their websites in a certain manner, often to comply with funding requirements, while their real-world actions may differ based on different motivations. A fourth limitation involves the focus on funding as the main external factor, neglecting other exogenous variables such as the type of political regime, veto players, or allies.
Our findings also warrant the need for further research in a number of areas relevant to both the study of volunteering and the non-profit sector, and youth activism. While past studies have been analyzing different levels of youth volunteering within the EU (Gil-Lacruz et al., 2016), we still need to discern the underlying reasons why certain countries boast robust and politically active YO sectors, while in others, such sectors appear almost non-existent. The oftentimes sharp differences in the distribution of action repertoires across countries warrant more investigation on the relationship between cultural values, political configurations, and media discourses, regarding what repertoire is socially sanctioned and historically rooted, through the lens of protest cultures (Rucht, 2016). What motivations drive people to volunteer or join organizations, ranging from career to altruistic motivations (Grönlund et al., 2011) to what support state authorities offer to youth (Chevalier, 2016), are questions scholarship has to answer. Furthermore, a deeper exploration of how global market forces constrain or enable forms of activism would provide valuable insights to link our work to current research (Schiavo, 2017). In addition, while our findings confirm the established association between left-wing ideological frames and the use of unconventional repertoires, recent developments, notably during the COVID-19 crisis, and, hence, postdating our data, suggest that some radical right-wing youth organizations have increasingly incorporated disruptive or protest-based forms of action into their repertoires. These evolving patterns challenge conventional assumptions about the ideological alignment of action forms and merit closer investigation. Another critical avenue for research pertains to how youth organizations define and prioritize issues related to social inequalities, in particular in reference to identity, race, gender, and connected topics, and how these shape collective action. Some scholars suggest that differing emphases on different aspects of social inequality within movements can lead to strategic fragmentation or internal tensions (Gardner & Henry, 2024). It is important, therefore, to understand how these dynamics influence the cohesion, purpose, and long-term viability of YOs as key protagonists for meaningful change.
Conclusion
This article contributes to a more nuanced understanding of youth political participation by foregrounding the role of youth organizations as key intermediaries between volunteerism, civic engagement, and collective mobilization. Through a cross-national, comparative lens, we demonstrate how organizational structures, funding mechanisms, and ideological frames shape youth repertoires of action. In doing so, the article bridges scholarly silos between social movement studies and research on the nonprofit and voluntary sector. By moving beyond the individualist framing that dominates liberal theories of volunteering and focusing on the level of organizations, this study demonstrates how contextual, organizational, and structural factors shape youth activism.
Our findings show that YOs led by young people tend to favor conventional repertoires of participation, while those involving youth without formal leadership roles display a greater propensity for unconventional action. Formalization and professionalization, often closely linked to EU funding, reduce the likelihood of disruptive repertoires, reinforcing a broader trend toward institutionalized, low-conflict engagement. Future research should continue to explore how transformations in organizational leadership, funding structures, and action repertoires shape the capacity of youth organizations to sustain engagement and contribute meaningfully to democratic life. These questions are relevant for the non-profit and voluntary sector, where issues of agency and accountability remain pressing.
Footnotes
Appendix
List of Variables (Description and Operationalization).
| Variable | Description | Operationalization |
|---|---|---|
| Conventional (dependent) | Repertoires used by organizations to struggle for their goals are less conflictual, less disruptive, non-violent, and more advocacy-oriented | Combination of the following variables: lobbying and participation in meetings with officials and voting-related activities (getting young people to vote), and conventional/soft protest actions (e.g., launching of public initiative, collection of signatures for initiative/referendum, verbal and written statements, etc.) |
| Unconventional (dependent) | Repertoires used by organizations to struggle for their goals. More conflictual, disruptive, violent | Combination of the following variables: demonstrative protest actions (e.g., demonstration / public protest / public rally, symbolic actions, public assemblies, consumer boycott/buycott, etc.) and confrontational and violent protest activities (e.g., strikes, occupation of public buildings, squares, sit-ins, violent attacks, etc.) |
| Funding | Where is the money coming from? | Combination of variables for different funding sources |
| Private donations and fundraising | Private donations (e.g., calls for donations, thanks donors on website, including company funding) Fundraising activities (e.g., concerts, parties, etc.) |
|
| State and municipality | Municipality (local government) |
|
| Cooperation and services | Formal (cooperative) and informal (self-supporting social centers) ways of self-financing / self-reliance |
|
| EU financing | EU (incl. ESF, ERDF, project grants, etc.) | |
| Formalization | What structural features are on the website? | Presence or absence of a feature on the website |
| (Annual) General assembly / general body | ||
| Neighborhood / open assembly | ||
| President/leader/chairperson/coordinator/CEO | ||
| Celebrities, etc., as public supporters/ambassadors | ||
| Annual reports / periodical reporting on activities or funding | ||
| Board (any appointed/elected / trustees/supervisory board) | ||
| Spokesperson/PR-representative | ||
| Written constitution | ||
| Forms of engaging | How are young people involved in the YO? | Presence or absence of a certain characteristic of the organization on the website |
| Young led | YLED – young people lead the YO (president, chair, main persons are young people)– Do not tick if organization is professionally run by adults, offering services / activities for youth and there is no indication for being youth-led | |
| Young involved | YORG – young people are actively involved in organizing activities (YO may or may not be youth-led, but young people are organizing sport events, protests, etc., themselves) | |
| Young engaging | YENG – young people are regularly engaging in youth-related activities (in sports teams, music groups, join protesting, etc.) | |
| Young targeted | YPAS – young people are regularly and directly targeted, passive beneficiaries of activities (e.g., of soup kitchens, advocacy for youth, counseling, educational programs, protests for better education on behalf of youth, etc.) | |
| Aims | Aim / goal of organization as stated explicitly on the website | Presence or absence of a certain characteristic of the organization on the website |
| Change society | To fight for a different society / political system | |
| Defend nation | To support/defend the nation | |
| Environment | To protect the environment | |
| Political equality | To facilitate political equality for specific groups (ethnic minorities, women, other groups) | |
| Combat racism | To combat racism/sexism/antisemitism (discrimination) | |
| Human rights | To promote human rights | |
| Ideology | Political orientation | |
| Left | A combination of socialism, green-alternative, anarchism, and communism | |
| Right | Combination of neoliberalism, nationalism and fascism / ultra-right | |
| Type of organization | Types of YOs | |
| University students | Student organizations, university student organizations, student unions, fraternities, party-affiliated student organizations, secondary school student organizations | A combination of different forms of organization |
| Unions | Unions, labor YOs | |
| Political party Students | Youth groups directly linked to political parties | For example, Debout les Jeunes, Génération nation, Giovani Comunisti, Giovani Democratici, etc. |
| Anti-fascist | Anti-fascist/anti-racist/migrant, refugee rights groups | |
| Anti-capitalist | Anti-capitalist/Occupy/anti-austerity protest groups | |
| Secondary school | Secondary school student organizations | |
| LGBTQ+ | LGBTQ+ rights groups | |
| Labor rights | Labor rights groups | |
| Environmental | Environmental groups | |
| Human rights | Civil/human rights groups |
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Data Availability Statement
The datasets analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on request.