Abstract
A photo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China decorates the cover of Kai He’s book. This suggests that the book centres on the work of officials in this building. Yet, the main message that the book seeks to bring home is how dynamics among China’s highest-ranking party leaders impact the country’s behaviour during foreign policy crises. These party leaders, however, do not mingle with ordinary bureaucrats. In the period that the book covers (1990–2014), none of China’s foreign ministers were part of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. As a member of the Politburo, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen held the highest party office; he headed the ministry from 1988 until 1998. No doubt it is the party leaders who decide on sensitive issues and respond to foreign policy crises.
He’s book is a well-reasoned study of this party-led foreign policymaking process. The book is highly topical and provides a helpful tool for analysing China’s foreign policy moves in crisis situations. The purpose of He’s book is to discern under which conditions Chinese leaders escalate foreign policy crises and when they would rather choose an accommodative approach. They consistently weigh both options against their own position within the party leadership. The author hopes that ‘the findings will help scholars and policy makers better understand and predict China’s crisis behaviour in the future’. However, the use of the word ‘predict’ in this context is unfortunate. The author implicitly admits this in the final chapter when he states that it is difficult ‘to test the validity of the model’ concerning Xi Jinping’s and any future leader’s foreign policy crisis decisions ‘due to the lack of reliable resources’ (p. 143). Hence, it will remain an impossible task to predict China’s policy responses, mainly because of its rather secretive style of decision-making and the lack of information on the part of outside observers as crises unfold. Nevertheless, reading China’s Crisis Behavior is a useful exercise because the book sensitizes readers to the policymaking environment of Chinese leaders and reveals factors that shape China’s crisis response options.
He’s analysis of eight crisis situations that took place in the period after 1990 is based on the political survival-prospect theory inspired by neoclassical realism. Three factors shape the political survival of Chinese leaders, namely, the severity of the crisis, leaders’ domestic authority, and international pressure (p. 17). Four possible responses are considered likely in a crisis situation: military coercion, diplomatic coercion, conditional accommodation, and full accommodation (p. 18). He’s theoretical approach thus links a leader’s political survival status with the risk propensity of different forms of behaviour. The author justifies and explains in detail the use of this theoretical approach in Chapter 2.
Chapters 3 to 6 apply this theory to crises that occurred during the period from the early 1990s to 2012 when Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were in charge of high-level foreign policy decisions. Interestingly, the majority of the crises concern activities in or above Chinese-claimed maritime territory, either as a trigger of or response to a conflict. He’s examination of China’s response to the crises is clear and insightful. He provides sufficient information to help the reader understand the intra-party dynamics that shape Chinese leaders’ room for manoeuvre in foreign affairs. The seventh and concluding chapter applies the findings of his analysis to two recent crises – a conflict between China and Vietnam over an oil rig in contested waters and an interception of US Navy planes above the South China Sea. Both events occurred under Xi Jinping’s leadership in 2014.
Ending the book with these two crisis situations is thought-provoking for two reasons. First, the fact that Xi Jinping was able to respond to both crises in an accommodative way hints at his strong position within China’s political and military elite. Kai He acknowledges that Xi’s power consolidation is an exception in Chinese politics (p. 139). In this sense, Xi can pursue different approaches to crises compared to his direct predecessor Hu Jintao, whose leadership was constantly affected by continuous power struggles. Jiang Zemin was also forced to rely on Deng Xiaoping’s leverage during his early years as general-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Second, the discussion of the 2014 crises shows that China’s foreign policymaking has clearly become more assertive under Xi’s leadership (p. 148). By including these crises, the author highlights the need to further elaborate this research topic. For sinologists and international relations scholars who do take up this task, He’s book will prove an invaluable tool for examining the political environment from which China’s foreign policy decisions emerge in crisis situations. Recent events in China confirm that Xi Jinping wields much more power than any post-Tian’anmen leader. For the time being, foreign policymaking continues to take place beyond the locale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.