‘Whisky gloss’: The alcohol industry,devolution and policy communities in Scotland

Alcohol policy and the role of public health actors

In 2008 the Scottish government published the discussion paper Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol (Scottish Government, 2008), which set out proposals to legislate for greater restrictions on the sale and marketing of alcoholic beverages and included a proposal to introduce a minimum unit price for alcohol. The recognition of price as a key driver of consumption and alcohol-related harm – which had been strongly endorsed by public health advocates (see Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems, 2008) – marks a decisive shift in Scottish health policy. An analysis of the submissions to this consultation was published the following year (Scottish Government, 2009a) and was followed by a White Paper setting out proposed legislation to introduce these measures. Despite significant opposition from some alcohol industry actors, the White Paper included a commitment to introduce MUP (Scottish Government, 2009b). The Alcohol Etc. (Scotland) Bill (from here on referred to simply as “the Bill”) was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 3 November 2010 and received royal assent on 15 December of that year. Crucially, however, the minority SNP government was unable to garner enough support in parliament from opposition MSPs to secure the adoption of its most controversial proposal. The proposal to introduce MUP had been removed by amendment during the passage of the Bill.

Interview data indicate that representatives of the public health (PH) community were of crucial importance in bringing the issue of pricing onto the political agenda and in changing the framing of the alcohol debate in Scotland. Organisations such as the British Medical Association Scotland (BMA Scotland), Alcohol Focus Scotland (AFS) and Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems (SHAAP) were firm advocates of MUP and helped drive the adoption of this as a policy objective by the SNP. The strategy pursued by PH advocates consisted of both political lobbying and engagement with broader societal debates through the media. Their lobbying strategy centred on meetings with ministers, MSPs and civil servants involved in the development of the legislation, as well as written contact through emails and briefing documents circulated on the rationale behind price-based interventions. In addition, the BMA organised a briefing event for Scottish MPs at Westminster which, it was hoped, would help build support for the proposed policies in Scotland among the wider Scottish political community.

PH respondents argued that, prior to the launch of the 2008 consultation, policy makers in both Scotland and England had paid too much attention to the views of industry actors and too little attention to the existing evidence base on effective interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm. This was reflected in policy documents in which industry actors were afforded the status of key stakeholders in the policy process, and partnership with industry was placed at the heart of alcohol policy strategies (Cabinet Office, 2004; Department of Health, 2007; Scottish Executive, 2007; see also Room, 2004; Anderson, 2007). This gave the industry significant input into the alcohol policy agenda, positioning itself as a key partner in the policy process. From a PH perspective, this approach to the industry was highly problematic and led to policy outcomes for which the evidence base was weak. As a respondent from AFS explained, the key task for public health advocates was to challenge the ‘industry framing’ of the alcohol debate and to advocate for policies which drew on the existing evidence base on both the nature of alcohol-related harm and effective policy interventions.

Industry actors devote extensive resources to lobbying policy makers at the Scottish, UK and European levels in order to present a framing of the alcohol problem and policy interventions which favour their commercial interests. Consequently, a key task for PH advocates was to challenge what they saw as an industry-led agenda amongst both policy makers and the wider public. There is also evidence that interventions on price were initially treated with scepticism by some within the SNP government and so the first task was to get buy in from the politically most influential individuals in that administration before proceeding to ‘sell’ the policy to MSPs and the electorate.

The process of shifting the policy frame involved organisations such as SHAAP and AFS condensing the evidence in support of MUP and presenting it in language that politicians and officials would understand, and which could be easily translated into policy solutions. As a civil servant involved in the development of the Scottish government’s policy explained:

SHAAP at the very early stages were pretty much instrumental in getting it on our radar. […] SHAAP were very, very good at getting us to understand what the problem was in terms of price and what the mechanisms were for potentially dealing with it. They did a fantastic job of getting it on our agenda. Alcohol Focus, SHAAP and BMA Scotland, they’ve had a pretty sustained campaign through the Bill process of arguing for minimum pricing and helping us to establish the evidence, helping us to get the message out there and helping build support for the policy. (Civil Servant, November 2010)

The process of lobbying on the issue of price had begun prior to the 2007 Scottish election and had been an important factor in shaping the policy of the SNP whilst in opposition, and in concrete measures in this area being brought forward once the party entered government. As one MSP – who represents the SNP on the Scottish Parliament’s Health and Sport Committee – explained:

So it started prior to forming a government. But what I would say is after we actually formed the government, it was one of the areas that the health organisations and the NGOs were very keen on pushing the government to say ‘Well you recognised it in opposition, now’s your time to do something about it’. And they were very quick off the mark in actually pushing that. (MSP, September 2010)

The elevated status of the PH lobby reflects also the diminished status of the industry under the SNP administration compared to the previous Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition. This has led to a degree of cynicism and suspicion amongst industry actors and some opposition MSPs. The representatives of one industry association claimed wryly that it was getting ever harder to meet with officials or ministers because they were overwhelmed with doctors demanding to meet with them to discuss alcohol pricing. Whilst it is undeniable that PH actors played a crucial role in advancing the alcohol policy debate in Scotland, and in securing support for price-based interventions from the SNP government, their efforts were unable to convince a sufficient number of opposition MSPs to support the inclusion of MUP in the Bill. It is important, therefore, not to overstate either the resources available to the PH lobby, or the degree of their influence in comparison to other actors. The election of the minority SNP government was the crucial factor that allowed them increased influence in the policy process.

The alcohol industry position

We take the alcohol industry to include not only those organisations involved in the production and marketing of alcoholic beverages, but those involved in the sale and promotion of those products. Thus, Tesco are as much part of the alcohol industry as a pub chain like Enterprise Inns or a producer organisation such as Diageo. Most of these companies are members of trade associations such as the Wine and Spirits Trade Association (WSTA), the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) and the British Beer and Pub Association (BBPA). Given the wide range of actors which it includes, the alcohol industry is highly fragmented between different sectors with competing and often conflicting interests. These cleavages are clearly evident on the issue of MUP, which would affect mainly off-trade sales and those products sold principally through this channel. Consequently, most supermarkets as well as wine and spirit producers and some brewers, who sell the majority of their products through the off trade, were opposed to MUP as it would affect their marketing strategies (Holden et al., in press). On the other hand, representatives of the on-trade as well some brewers opposed to the heavy discounting of their products in the off-trade were more supportive of MUP. In addition, there were some actors who appeared to be opposed to government intervention of this type on ideological grounds, claiming that MUP would constitute an unjustifiable interference in the functioning of the market.

In Scotland, as in England, those who rejected the proposals to introduce MUP became the dominant industry voice, presenting arguments against the policy, challenging the evidence base on which it depends and questioning the potential impact which it would have on reducing alcohol-related harm. This involved framing the nature of alcohol-related harm in very narrow terms, focusing on social order issues and an allegedly small group of hazardous and harmful drinkers. Policies, it is argued, should focus on these groups through targeted interventions and should aim to change the culture around alcohol through public awareness and educational campaigns. MUP, in contrast, is seen as failing to target these problematic drinkers and as unfair since it affects the vast majority of the population who drink normally and responsibly. Furthermore, it may have a detrimental effect on the Scottish economy since whisky is such a vital component of the economy and a provider of employment.

As the debates around MUP continued, and the determination of the Scottish government to address the issue of price became more apparent, some industry actors that initially opposed MUP began to shift on the issue, to the point where they were prepared to consider a ban on sales below the level of Duty plus VAT as an apparent alternative approach. Off-trade retailers, including the largest high street supermarkets – whose business models would be affected by the introduction of MUP – and certain producer organisations came to advocate this approach. Even the SWA, which had voiced strong reservations about price interventions, began to consider a ban on below-cost sales as an alternative to MUP, albeit with some reservations.

The motivation for advocating tax-based interventions over MUP was principally that the former would not significantly impact on corporations’ marketing or pricing strategies, as very few products are currently sold below the level of Duty plus VAT. As one civil servant explained, this alternative was considered as an option by the Scottish government, but was dismissed as a viable alternative to MUP as it is unable to deliver the same levels of harm reduction. A second reason for advocating a tax-based approach over MUP is that taxation falls outside of the competences of the Scottish government and would have to be dealt with at Westminster. This fact was acknowledged by supermarket representatives whose rationale for favouring tax-based responses was precisely because they wanted a single policy covering the whole of the UK. Whilst presenting this as a question of efficiency and uniformity, it could be argued that it was an attempt to shift the location of the debate from Scotland – where there was sympathy amongst the government for price-based interventions and an active PH lobby supporting the policy – to Westminster where there was less vocal support and a Conservative-led government sceptical about the benefits of government intervention in the market. At that time there was little apparent sympathy for MUP at Westminster and outright opposition from key ministers, including the Minister for Health, who promoted instead a partnership approach to industries with public health implications, based on a series of ‘responsibility deals’ (Boseley, 2012). A discreet attempt at venue shift by industry actors therefore seems evident.

The global aspects of the Scottish debate

Whilst devolution had opened up the possibility of policy divergence in the UK, accentuated by the election of an SNP government, the Scottish debate was not without significance for the rest of the UK and for other countries. Although the industry was divided on the issue of MUP, those opposed to the proposed measures on price seemed more vehement in the defence of their interests and more vociferous in their objections than those industry actors that were prepared to accept it. This may reflect in part the stakes at play for the largest producer organisations. As with the ban on smoking in public places which was introduced in Scotland before spreading to the rest of the UK, it was feared that MUP in Scotland may create political pressure for similar policies to be introduced elsewhere, and indeed in March 2012 the Westminster government signalled its intention to introduce a minimum price for alcohol in England and Wales (Home Office, 2012). The introduction of MUP in Scotland, were it to prove successful in reducing alcohol-related harms, would also remove the argument deployed by certain industry actors that there is only weak evidence of the effects of MUP, based on models and projections rather than real-world examples of the policy in action. The potential economic impacts of MUP, it was argued, could not be justified while its impact on health was so poorly understood. As one civil servant commented:

We know that Northern Ireland, Ireland, Wales and places across the world are actually looking at this as a policy option. Yeah, I suspect that’s part of … they had a concern that it would work basically, that we would get it in place and be able to demonstrate after a few years that we were actually achieving the reductions in consumption and harm that our modelling suggested would happen. I think that’s the concern, that it would be seen as successful and therefore it would be copied. (Civil Servant, November 2010)

Alcohol industry lobbying

The lobbying strategy of the UK alcohol industry is often very subtle in nature and focused on the development of strategic, long-term relationships with politicians and key decision makers. This approach reflects the underlying aim of industry actors to establish themselves as partners in the policy process. The success of this strategy in Scotland prior to the elections of 2007 is reflected in the prominence afforded to the industry as a key stakeholder in the Scottish Executive’s alcohol strategy (Scottish Executive, 2002). Not only was the industry referred to at the very outset of the document as making ‘valuable contributions to our economy’, the overall framing of the alcohol problem closely mirrored that of the industry. A partnership-based approach to tackling alcohol-related harm remained at the centre of the Scottish Executive’s updated alcohol strategy until 2007 (Scottish Executive, 2007). The clearest manifestation of this approach to regulation was the establishment of a Partnership Agreement between the Scottish Executive and the Alcohol Industry in parallel with the updated strategy (Scottish Executive et al., 2007; from here on referred to as “the partnership agreement”). The agreement, reflecting the approach to industry by the Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition, effectively formalised the central position of industry actors in the making of alcohol policy as part of a ‘collaborative approach’.

The shift in direction of alcohol policy under the SNP minority government from 2007 presented a threat not simply to the corporate interests of certain industry actors but to their entire corporate affairs strategy. The launch of the consultation on the SNP’s proposed legislation was met with a concerted campaign by industry actors, led by the SWA, to remove MUP from the alcohol Bill. The determination of the SNP to press ahead with MUP, and the reliance of the Scottish government on support from opposition parties in order to pass its legislation, led to a shift in lobbying activities from ministers and civil servants to MSPs and an attempt to shape the broader public perceptions of MUP through the media. Below, we outline industry actors’ activities in lobbying key decision makers and how these shifted from the inner circles of civil servants and ministers to opposition MSPs and attempts to influence the broader public debate.

Conclusions

In relation to debates about policy styles and their relationship to policy communities, it is clear that devolution has opened up new channels of access to policy makers for both public health groups and industry actors. However, the case presented here demonstrates the importance of politics and parties to the policy process, notwithstanding the overall policy style. It also demonstrates that access to policy makers by organised interests does not always equal influence. It was the election of the SNP minority government in 2007 that broke the party-political and policy community equilibrium on alcohol policy that had held since devolution, allowing PH groups to present their case in a fresh way to a willing audience. The presence of an SNP administration with less extensive contacts with the alcohol industry, and prepared to place the industry on an equal footing with other stakeholders such as the PH lobby, created an environment in which new and innovative policy solutions to the enduring problem of alcohol related harm could come on to the agenda. The incoming government was prepared to move away from the partnership-based approaches advocated by industry actors, which had previously been at the centre of alcohol policies both south and north of the border, and adopt price-based interventions supported by PH campaigners and the existing scholarly literature. In this case, Keating et al.’s observation that business links with the Scottish government ‘were not affected by the change of party government’ (2009: 55) in 2007 is not borne out.

It is a bone of contention between industry actors and PH campaigners as to who had the greater input into alcohol policy. Whilst the officials interviewed contend that their open door policy affords equal access to government for all stakeholders, PH campaigners point to the size and resources of the industry, as well as the status afforded to them in the partnership agreement as evidence of the influence they were able to exert over policy. Industry actors, meanwhile, point to the similarities between the policies pursued by the SNP government and those advocated by the PH lobby as evidence of their influence. The results of the present study demonstrate that both groups have played crucial roles in the development of the current government’s alcohol policy and the content of the legislation it passed in late 2010. Whilst PH advocates were instrumental in bringing the issue of pricing onto the political agenda, explaining the rationale behind the policy and providing evidence to the incoming SNP government, alcohol industry actors, especially producer organisations represented through trade bodies such as the SWA and the WSTA, mounted a vigorous and concerted lobbying and media campaign against MUP, which aimed at removing the measures on price from the final legislation.

Although the change of governing party was key to the attempt to introduce MUP, institutions and their respective powers remain central to understanding this process, since they determine what governments can and cannot do and help to shape party competition. As noted above, the decision to introduce MUP was determined in part by the fact that taxation is a reserved competence, precluding the option of pursuing price interventions through that route. Indeed, even in the case of tobacco control, where the introduction of smoking bans across the UK appeared to suggest that this was an ‘idea whose time has come’, Cairney (2009) has argued that significant differences in the development of policy within each territory demonstrate the way in which policy is mediated by political systems. Notwithstanding this, the experience of smoke-free legislation spreading from Scotland to other parts of the UK provides a clear example of the potential for policy transfer to other parts of the UK and beyond, of which alcohol industry actors were acutely aware. This supports the ‘race to the top’ proposition that devolved polities can introduce innovative policies which, if successful and popular, may lead others to emulate them (Keating, 2009: 280). Business is thus wary of the introduction of new regulations that may have the potential to impact it elsewhere, not just in the territory in question.

The key difference between tobacco policy and alcohol policy prior to 2012 was that whilst the influence of the tobacco industry relative to that of public health advocates had considerably diminished across the UK (Cairney, 2009: 480), alcohol industry actors continued to enjoy an influential position, especially at Westminster. In contrast to the policies of the SNP, alcohol policy at Westminster under all governing parties was marked by substantial deference to the views and interests of the industry (Hawkins et al., 2012). This appeared to change somewhat in March 2012, when the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition announced plans to introduce MUP (Home Office, 2012), marking a break with previous policy at Westminster and apparently realising the worst fears of those industry actors opposed to it. What role the Scottish initiative on MUP played in the adoption of the policy at Westminster is hard to assess, but the UK government’s policy turn appears to support the argument that devolved institutions can help set the agenda beyond their own territories. Nevertheless, the Westminster cabinet was far from united on the policy, and industry actors remained at the heart of Westminster policy making through the Department of Health’s so-called ‘responsibility deals’ (Boseley, 2012).

Questions concerning institutional powers and, crucially, which levels of government can take action in a given policy area become central where, as in this case, transnational interests are at stake. The potential ramifications of MUP in Scotland for the global marketing strategies of transnational producer organisations were crucial in explaining the vehemence of the campaign against it, demonstrating the complexity of the interaction between devolved political institutions and processes on the one hand and the global economy on the other (Keating, 2009). Industry actors presented the policy as doing particular harm to Scotland’s iconic whisky industry whilst simultaneously mobilising industry opponents from outside Scotland and the UK. Rather than being ‘territorially bounded’ (Keating et al., 2009), it was the global nature of the industry that led it to seek to prevent a precedent being set in Scotland. Industry actors thus utilised a ‘Scottish frame of reference’ in an instrumental way rather than internalising it, exploiting the ‘shared emotive commitment to the idea of Scotland and the promotion of Scottish interests’ noted by Keating et al. (2009: 56).

The potential for venue shopping was limited to the extent that large companies saw potential Scottish introduction of MUP as impacting on its overseas sales and as a potential domino that could lead to policy change elsewhere. They could not, therefore, escape the implications of a change in Scottish law for their interests elsewhere. However, the willingness of some sections of the industry to accept a ban on sales below Duty plus VAT seems to indicate an attempt to shift responsibility for the policy to Westminster, whilst simultaneously promoting a largely ineffective ‘solution’. Similarly, industry arguments that MUP is contrary to EU competition and trade law signal the possibility of shifting the focus of decision-making to the EU level. Indeed, whilst the election of a majority SNP Scottish government in 2011 allowed the party to reintroduce legislation on MUP and the Westminster government signalled its intention to follow suit in March 2012, the industry subsequently raised the likelihood of a legal challenge to the policy on these very grounds (Carrell, 2011). These findings suggest the need for more research on the impact of multi-level governance structures in this and other policy sectors where industry interests are prominent, particularly on how industry and other actors seek to navigate these different levels and utilise them to their optimum advantage.