Abstract
Paul Ramsey and Stanley Hauerwas are arguably the most prominent United Methodist thinkers to date to write extensively on abortion. This article takes up a ripe and illuminating task neglected by the ethicists themselves and the secondary literature: bringing their views on this issue into conversation. More specifically, this article discusses their considerations on the value of unborn human life, the “hard cases,” the church community’s role, and the place of legal reform. The article concludes by placing their remarks in the context of official Catholic teaching, and contending that despite some shortcomings in the two thinkers’ considerations, Christians on different sides of the abortion debate should incorporate these authors’ insights by expressing a “rational account of fetal development” (as per Ramsey), a charitable approach to hard cases, a “theological idiom” (as per Hauerwas), and an appropriate level of political concern.
Paul Ramsey and Stanley Hauerwas may be the most prominent United Methodist thinkers to date to extensively address the topic of abortion. However, each ethicist seems to be little affected by the other’s work on the issue; Ramsey’s writings never directly address what Hauerwas has to say on the subject, and Hauerwas discusses Ramsey’s specific thoughts on it only once. 1 This mutual omission is particularly curious because their academic careers overlapped for almost two decades and because the two thinkers were quite familiar with each other for most of this time. 2 In fact, the writings of Ramsey and Hauerwas share a deep opposition to abortion, focus on several of the same aspects of (and authors on) the abortion question, and often manifest either strikingly similar or conspicuously different ways of reasoning.
Accordingly, this article will carry out a ripe and illuminating task that neither these thinkers nor the secondary literature on them have undertaken: bringing their views on abortion into conversation. More specifically, this article will engage in a detailed summary, comparison, and critique of the pertinent reflections of Ramsey and Hauerwas on the following topics: (1) the value of unborn human life; (2) the “hard cases”; (3) the church community’s role; and (4) the place of legal reform. The concluding section highlights some helpful insights of these theologians on these issues, and it makes the case that Christians on different sides of the abortion debate ought to draw from these positive aspects (while avoiding the flaws) of Ramsey’s and Hauerwas’s thoughts in order to put forth an effective witness. Because my own academic and spiritual background is Catholic, the final section of this article also explicitly places the authors’ writings in the context of the official teaching of this Church. Although my support of a “rational account of fetal development” (as per Ramsey), a charitable approach to hard cases, a “theological idiom” (as per Hauerwas), and an appropriate level of political concern is consistent with Catholic teaching, I believe that my conclusions throughout rest on reasons that Christians of other denominations can appreciate.
The Value of Unborn Human Life
Ramsey’s Views
In a 1967 article, Ramsey delivered his first comprehensive treatment of the question of abortion. After beginning with some theories about when human life begins and merits protection, he eventually declares that “from an authentic religious point of view none of them matters very much.” Whereas they may be important to a secular standpoint that considers any human worth to be intrinsic, a religious perspective affirms that we have an “alien dignity” that is “ultimately grounded in the value God is placing on it.” And God cherishes every human life; he chose Israel despite the fact that it was “the fewest of all people” (Deut. 7.7) and cared for Jeremiah and the Psalmist in the womb (Jer. 1:5; Ps. 139:13). Ramsey concludes these reflections with an approving reference to Karl Barth, who affirms that the unborn child is someone for whose life Jesus was crucified and that to abort it would be a “monstrous” crime. 3
However, in a talk just two years later, Ramsey abruptly switched gears. After sympathetically presenting the Jewish view that abortion is generally wrong in that it “diminishes God’s image,” Ramsey expresses his wariness of photos of the unborn which are designed to elicit sentiments in their viewers. He concludes: Ethical judgments … are based on the nature of things; not on heightened imagination or feelings … Medical science knows the babies to be present in all essential respects earlier in fetal development than the women who wrote in to Life magazine perceived them in the pictures. It is the rational account of the nature of fetal development that matters most.
4
From this point on, Ramsey’s work on abortion would concentrate on providing such a “rational account.” 5 Ultimately, he seems to support the view that “new life first has a sanctity that claims protection” at the time when segmentation (identical twinning) is no longer possible (up to a couple of weeks after conception). 6 On the one hand, he dismisses the “developmental” approaches of Daniel Callahan and others, because the appearance of major organs and other morphological indicia “seems to be more a development than an arrival on the scene.” On the other hand, Ramsey thinks that the phenomena of identical twinning and chimeras undermine the idea that individuality was present beforehand and thereby refute the “genetic argument” that human life begins at conception. He does consider the contention of the Catholic author Germain Grisez that in the case of chimeras there are two individuals present from conception but that they both cease to exist and are replaced by a third, as in the case of a grafted plant. However, Ramsey finds it wildly implausible that souls could “disappear[] without any fertilized egg having died,” and he asks “[w]ith considerable astonishment whether any such ‘individuality’ is the life we should respect and protect from conception.” 7
Hauerwas’s Views
In some of his earliest published reflections on abortion, Hauerwas disputes the belief of Ramsey and Grisez that “biological research has somehow removed the question [of whether the fetus is human] from doubt.” Rather, Hauerwas claims, “the imputation of human life to the fetus is just … a stipulation, not an empirical deduction” on which everyone can agree. 8 This is because different assumptions about what criteria—genetic or otherwise—make us truly human are not easily changed through argument. In any case, the subject of when life begins historically has been a “side issue” for Christian ethical reflection; even if others accepted their contentions on this question, Christians would still lose because they would not have altered the fundamental methodology of the debate. 9
Instead, Hauerwas proposes a more explicitly theological approach. Against Gnosticism, he suggests that our physical bodies are valuable because they are necessary for us to enter into covenant with God, and that therefore “there are good reasons to consider the conceptus as life.” 10 However, Christians do not consider abortion “unthinkable” on the grounds that human beings have an inherent value or “sanctity,” but rather on the conviction that life is the sovereign God’s gift and that we are obliged to respect it. Approvingly quoting Karl Barth, Hauerwas affirms that the unborn are people “for whose life the Son of God has died … The true light of the world shines already in the darkness of the mother’s womb.” 11 Christians also maintain that God intends his people to “manifest and witness to his providential care”—a charge which requires them “to be part of a historic community that has the task of maintaining faithful continuity.” They fulfill this obligation by welcoming new life, and in doing so more fully meet Jesus’s call to love “those we did not ‘choose’ to love.” For Hauerwas, such positive reflections on children in general inform the Christian proscription of abortion in particular. 12
Although Hauerwas does provide some reasons for believing unborn human life is valuable, he also expresses doubts about the prospects of “rationalistic” approaches to ethics, such as those adopted by Grisez and Callahan. In Hauerwas’s mind, both struggle to articulate a cogent argument for why abortion might be allowed in certain cases but not in all. As an alternative, he suggests that “[i]t may be our hesitancy to have abortion is a good in itself that does not need further justification. Put another way, our notion of human life is not what determines our practices but our practices determine how we come to understand what human life means.” 13 To support this idea, he claims that the moral proscriptions that a community adopts depend on its particular nature and experiences. 14 In the end, he maintains that although we need not forego trying to find intellectual “solution[s]” to abortion, perhaps “our best recourse” when thinking about it is simply to watch how virtuous people act in a situation where such an issue might arise. 15 And Christians in particular should demonstrate to others “by example and then argument” their conviction of the value of unborn human life, for this approach will communicate a sense of “why being a part of God’s creation is such an extraordinary and interesting adventure.” 16
Comparison and Critique
Not only do both Hauerwas and Ramsey address the question of the grounds for the worth of human life in the womb (and some of the same relevant authors), Hauerwas’s thoughts also parallel Ramsey’s (initial) reflections on the subject. For example, both authors comment that unborn human life is precious by virtue of its relationship to God (who as the God of Israel 17 and as the incarnate Christ has valued life himself) and that the question of when human life begins is not very relevant from a Christian standpoint. In particular, both Ramsey and Hauerwas favorably refer to the same passage by Karl Barth in support of their religious understanding of the value of human life. However, after 1967 Ramsey primarily focuses on when exactly life begins and on pertinent biological criteria. Hauerwas briefly criticizes him for concentrating on this issue and places more emphasis than Ramsey on theological references, including the general Christian duty to welcome children.
That said, both authors leave themselves open to criticism on the question of discerning the value of human life. To begin with, the interpretation of Grisez and others of human chimeras seems worthy of more consideration than Ramsey’s curiously abrupt treatment. In particular, it does not seem necessarily implausible for God to arrange things such that a soul (or even two souls) would disappear if its corresponding body has been subsumed into another and its exact DNA has thereby effectively been eliminated, even if we say that this was “without any fertilized egg having died.” Perhaps Ramsey means that the tenuousness of such pre-chimeric life suggests that it would not be truly human or worthy of protection. But the mere fact that early life can be tragically lost need not lead us to this conclusion. Human chimeras are not even known to be that common, 18 and well after the time when they might happen, we know that women have miscarriages and that fragile newborns die in the nursery. Yet Ramsey does not ask “with considerable astonishment” whether life prior to these later points is worthy of respect and protection.
As for Hauerwas’s suggestion that “our notion of human life is not what determines our practices but our practices determine how we come to understand what human life means,” it evokes the strange specter of Christians’ initially and unreflectively prohibiting abortion without really knowing why, and only afterwards coming to appreciate the value of human life. It would be more exact to acknowledge a bilateral process: experiences can certainly shape and reinforce moral understandings (and sometimes even lead to new insights), but practices can also be prompted by ethical principles. In any case, another problem with Hauerwas’s formulation is: how are we to know who is truly virtuous? And even after we have figured that out, how can we tell whether that generally good person to whom we look up has not made a mistake and acted wrongly in the particular kind of situation in which we now find ourselves? Watching how virtuous people act in a given situation is insufficient, although it can be a helpful barometer. The questions of when life begins and when it can be taken are important and should be asked precisely in order to help us discern whether the role models we admire (and the practices which we have taken for granted) are the right ones.
The Hard Cases of Abortion
Ramsey’s Views
For Ramsey, “morally abortion is, or sometimes is, a species of the sin of murder.” 19 In other words, he is willing to make exceptions. According to Ramsey, the distinction that Catholic theology draws between direct and indirect abortion is generally “logical and … charitable,” respecting the dignity of both the mother and her fetus. Under such a framework, Ramsey explains, the direct intent to kill another human being is prohibited. On the other hand, an abortion to save the mother’s life that has the foreseen but unintended side effect of the death of the fetus would be morally permissible. 20
However, Ramsey does seem to countenance direct abortion (in a sense) in an instance where (1) an abortion will save the mother’s physical life and (2) doing nothing will result in the death of both mother and fetus. 21 More specifically, he holds that an abortion would be the right decision as long as it is indirect in terms of the death itself being “unwanted,” even if it is in fact direct in terms of “the action’s physical force or target.” 22 For Ramsey, such an action exhibits charity toward both the mother (for it preserves her life rather than allowing both her and the fetus to die) and the fetus (for there is no direct intent to kill it). 23 In further support of his view, Ramsey proposes a golden-rule test; he contends that if we imagine ourselves as the fetus, we too would rather that our mother be saved than that both of us die. 24
Ramsey adds that “there is no reason for not extending this to encompass mental or personal life as well as physical life ….” In other words, abortion is justified if (1) it will preserve the mother’s psychological life and (2) doing nothing will result in the “destruction of [her] psychological integrity” and the death of the fetus, “provided her unborn child is
Finally, Ramsey proposes that a determination that the fetus is disabled and that the parents would undergo great suffering in raising him or her would not be sufficient grounds for abortion, because they would also be justifications for the clearly inappropriate act of infanticide. 28 In fact, in many such cases the fetus “may be quite normal” after all. 29 In an instance where the mother has rubella, he holds, an abortion would be an unmerciful and uncharitable act illustrating the “American way of death,” when the effects of this disease are less grave than the direct killing of the fetus itself. 30
Hauerwas’s Views
According to Hauerwas, “[t]he fetus should be regarded as human life and the range of exceptions for the possible taking of human life is very narrow.” 31 In line with his aforementioned conviction that practices do and should determine our moral understandings, Hauerwas’s general rule for determining such exceptions is to refer to “the experience and discussion of a community formed by the conviction of God’s sovereignty over life.” 32 Consistent with his reservations about “rationalistic” ethics, Hauerwas has little patience for finely drawn distinctions between direct and indirect abortion. 33 He does address situations where the mother’s life is in danger and does not deny that an abortion here would be permissible, but he adds that it would not necessarily be morally wrong for the woman to decline it and thereby “suffer[] the possibility of her own death in order to be faithful to that commitment which her whole life as wife and mother has expressed to that time.” 34
As for abortion in the case of rape, Hauerwas indicates that although life may not be “inherently sacred,” Christians do have a calling to care for children, and if the church community is truly prepared to help such a woman keep the child, it could encourage her to do so. 35 If it does and the woman agrees, her witness that life is a “precious gift” might outweigh her suffering. He states that in reflecting on such a moral dilemma, one must attend to the interests of the fetus and ask whether it would choose to be born or aborted. Moreover, he suggests that one might question whether a justification for abortion in this instance could be extended to the killing of a one-day-old infant. 36 All of that said, Hauerwas ultimately clarifies that in cases of rape, incest, and abandonment, women “should not be compelled to carry through their pregnancies. That does not mean they should resort to abortion, but they may do so.” 37
In any case, Hauerwas does appear to disapprove of abortion on the basis of “the ‘needs’ of society”; he states that this practice “dangerous[ly]” considers society to be superior to individuals. Rather, the social good “embodies the good for each man,” and abortion undermines the trust that is essential to both goods. 38 And he clearly draws the line at the abortion of severely defective fetuses, calling society’s approval of it “chilling” and criticizing the idea that such children “are somehow less than God’s creatures.” For Hauerwas, the notion that we are valuable by virtue of our ability to reason is faulty because all of us have imperfect thinking abilities. Rather, Christians should adopt a welcoming attitude toward disabled children, even those who will die as a result of their impairments, for true compassion for the sufferer is not compatible with killing him or her. 39
Comparison and Critique
Hauerwas and Ramsey both take up a few of the same hard cases and articulate some similar conclusions and rationales. The two authors agree that abortion to protect the mother’s life or mental health could be acceptable, but are strongly critical of the abortion of disabled fetuses on the grounds that it is uncompassionate and unmerciful. And in expressing their reservations about abortion in certain hard cases, Ramsey and Hauerwas recommend trying to see things from the fetus’s perspective and challenge their readers to ask themselves whether a particular justification of abortion would also warrant infanticide. That said, the two ethicists are not preoccupied with exactly the same issues. Ramsey devotes extensive discussion to the distinction between direct and indirect abortion; Hauerwas concentrates instead on matters that more directly implicate the church community, such as abortion in the case of rape. And even though their conclusions about conflict situations are not obviously opposed, Hauerwas alone stresses that in cases where a woman may abort, she does not have to do so. Finally, the two thinkers generally arrive at their conclusions via different methods; Ramsey stresses the primacy of charity in making difficult decisions, whereas Hauerwas prefers to look to what Christian communities might think and do.
But like their views on the value of human life, both authors’ reflections on hard cases are not necessarily above reproach. Although Ramsey sensibly allows for indirect abortions that save the mother’s life, his justification of abortion in the case of the certain “destruction of psychological integrity” of the mother, as well as his failure to consistently condemn abortion as “a matter of social policy,” are open to some possible objections. First, one cannot help but notice some ambiguity in Ramsey’s psychological criterion; what exactly would constitute a destruction (and not just an impairment) of mental life, and how sure would a doctor have to be in order to be “certain”? In such a morally serious matter, some more specific guidelines would be desirable; Ramsey himself does not elaborate further and indeed points to the difficulty of predicting such an effect. Even if Ramsey (or others) were able to provide the relevant conditions, his stance here would be in tension with his own views on the sanctity of life, as Michael McKenzie has observed. 40 In other words, if life is indeed sacred from the womb, as Ramsey thinks, then it would seem that safeguarding its very existence should ultimately take precedence over preventing serious (but still lesser) psychological harm. We could extend McKenzie’s reasoning to cover Ramsey’s curious reluctance to close the door to abortion in furtherance of “social policy.” And because Hauerwas himself considers unborn human life valuable (albeit not for the same reasons), McKenzie’s point might apply with some force to Hauerwas’s permission of abortion in cases such as rape and incest, where the mother’s physical life is not directly at stake.
Finally, Ramsey’s and Hauerwas’s openness to abortion for psychological and/or social reasons fails their own suggested infanticide test for consistency. In other words, because we can presume that both authors would be against killing infants to promote social well-being or the mother’s psychological health (in cases of rape or otherwise), then they also should be firmly opposed to abortion for such reasons. Moreover, permitting abortions in these cases could fail the authors’ test of putting oneself in the fetus’s position, if the fetus would prefer to survive even after taking into account the relevant costs.
The Church Community and Its Liturgy
Ramsey’s Views
In his earlier thoughts on abortion, Ramsey uses the word “church” in the limited context of addressing the conduct of church spokespersons rather than the actions of the Christian faithful generally. For example, he chides many Protestant denominations and the Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns for capitulating to the world’s values on abortion and breaking with “the common Christian tradition.”
41
Starting in the late 1970s, Ramsey addresses the wider roles of the church community. Noting that a “rite of passage” for many teenagers in a “society without liturgy” is becoming pregnant, he suggests that the most effective way for the church to reach out to them is through its “ritual, festival, liturgy, celebration, and song” rather than its formal teachings: “What we do is more important than what we say.” For example, the church should celebrate and dedicate “[s]ignal turning point[s]” in the lives of young people (such as graduating and embarking on a career) as not “merely steps in a citizen’s progress” but also “part of a pilgrim’s progress.” Also, ministers should preach more on the meaning of Christian marriage (as based on Christ’s love for the whole Church in Eph. 5:25) while children are present.
42
Moreover, Ramsey says, when young mothers do become pregnant, churches can lead the way in ensuring that adoption will be a viable alternative. On this point, he describes one successful adoption program run by a Presbyterian minister and remarks that the government might investigate whether this endeavor could be a model for the whole country.
43
In some of the last few sentences he ever published, Ramsey ties the liturgy to his call to “the Jesus-people” for adoption: I have a dream that we become a church in which couples feel abortion to be a far graver violation of their “parenting” than to give a child … to another couple that desperately wants one … We would develop “adoption liturgies” by which couples who cannot provide for the upbringing of another baby would publicly, “in the presence of God and this congregation,” give their infant to a couple needing and wanting a child of their own.
44
What about would-be mothers who are not sure whether they would like to give their children up? Ramsey proposes that his local church take out newspaper advertisements offering pregnant college and graduate students the opportunity to stay with a nearby Methodist family while they finish school and ponder their options. 45 Note that Ramsey directs his call to a strong witness against abortion toward not just Christian communities but also Jewish ones; he suggests that the two should work more closely together in proclaiming the value of human life in the womb. 46
Hauerwas’s Views
Hauerwas himself strongly accents the relevance of the church community and its liturgy to the issue of abortion. He frets that the doctrine of sola scriptura encourages Protestants who cannot find a clear biblical answer to a moral problem such as abortion to consult only their individual consciences, which along with reason and experience he considers too subjective. According to Hauerwas, Christians should also look to the church community, whose practices can form their conscience. 47 For example, that community’s very use of the word “abortion” (rather than the neutral phrase “termination of pregnancy”) is a reminder of the moral gravity of abortion and the need to be hospitable toward new life. 48
Hauerwas adds that Christians should turn specifically to worship, which itself is moral; here he refers to Jesus’s Great Commission (in Matt. 28:16–20) as implying that Christians should gather together. Worship enables us to come to know God and thereby morally transforms us; for example, Christians are moved by the God they encounter in worship to confess their sins to each other. 49 In particular, he says that the sacrament of baptism ought to affect greatly the way Christians approach the questions of taking life and abortion in particular. For one thing, Christians learn through baptism that life is a gift from God. 50 In addition, baptism charges all Christian adults, even those who are single, to welcome children; in the baptismal vows, “the whole Church promises to be parent.” 51
Finally, because Hauerwas believes that “the Christian prohibition of abortion is but the negative side of their positive commitment to welcome new life into their community,” 52 he frequently urges that community to act accordingly. More specifically, because “the role of parent is one we all share,” if a woman feels abandoned and inclined to abort, an older couple can rear the child or the church community can raise funds to support the woman. 53 The Church also ought to exhort men to not abandon women or be promiscuous, but to accept responsibility for their own children; in doing so, it will have a more “valid voice on abortion” and might even diminish the incidence of the practice. Through witnessing as a hospitable community, Hauerwas indicates, the Church can contest certain “secular presuppositions” regarding abortion, notably the preoccupation with the status of the fetus. 54
Comparison and Critique
In the end, both Ramsey and Hauerwas attend to the connection between the liturgy, the church community, and abortion. It is possible that Hauerwas may even have influenced Ramsey’s awareness of these issues at the end of the latter’s life; Ramsey actually addressed the long excerpt, quoted above in “Ramsey’s Views” section, to Hauerwas. In any case, three specific similarities between their respective thoughts can be articulated here. First, both ethicists maintain that liturgy can form people to think properly about abortion. Second, they state that members of the church should offer to raise unwanted children or otherwise see to it that young mothers have a viable alternative to abortion. Third, the two thinkers contend that in general the church community can witness in such a manner as to change the way that society as a whole approaches the question of abortion. Specifically, Ramsey suggests that the state might follow the example of a successful church adoption program, and Hauerwas indicates that communal Christian witness can challenge the secular premises of the abortion debate.
However, there are also key differences between the two theologians that point to shortcomings in each of their positions. Ramsey’s reflections on the wider communal context of abortion decisions were welcome but long overdue and insufficiently emphasized, at least as compared to Hauerwas’s thought. As for Hauerwas, he is not as explicitly preoccupied as Ramsey is with the important question of what the leaders of Methodist and other Christian communities should say on the issue of abortion. In addition, Hauerwas too narrowly portrays the struggle over abortion as involving two camps: Christians and the world. 55 Although at one point he broadly suggests that the Christian belief that we should love children “for what they are rather than what we want or wish them to be” might “ring true” for some non-Christians as well, 56 unlike Ramsey he overlooks the possibility of working with non-Christian religious communities (such as Judaism) when witnessing on abortion. Hauerwas could respond that he generally does affirm that Christians “can’t tell their story separate from the Jews,” but unfortunately he does not extend this insight to his work on abortion. 57
Abortion and the Law
Ramsey’s Views
Ramsey discusses in depth the question of whether and how the law should regulate abortion. Writing before the Supreme Court legalized abortion nationwide in 1973, Ramsey notes that if abortion on demand were to become the law, it would reverse existing developments in case law which implied that the fetus was a legal person. In such a momentous time, he declares, Christians and others have “an obligation of citizenship to engage in law-making to decide whether feticide upon request shall become a fundamental ingredient in our civilization.” However, he adds that Christians can influence this outcome more through expressing their beliefs about abortion (and thereby influencing societal opinions) than by legislating. If that does not work, Christians must be “prepared to break with at least some civilizations that may come to prevail.” 58 Later, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, Ramsey appeared before the Senate to urge it to pass an amendment to the Constitution that would enable the abortion question to be settled by the state legislatures rather than the private judgment of one court. Ramsey believes that because our government is founded upon various state jurisdictions, “[t]he opponents of a Life Amendment [guarding the rights of the unborn] may finally be correct. The issue is the right of choice or decision … Setting the outer limits of the human community should not be allowed to pass into the hands of private individuals ….” 59
By the late 1970s, any blanket prohibition of abortion seemed implausible, and as an alternative Ramsey endorsed statutory bans of all abortion after viability. 60 Otherwise, he turned his attention to the smaller legal battles being fought at the time, such as those over conscience clauses and spousal/parental consent. 61 However, perhaps frustrated by previous failed attempts, he wonders if even his wish to win some of the more minor debates is a “forlorn hope.” He maintains that with its championing of “atomistic individualism” and without a proper belief in human nature or divine creation, current society is headed toward a future in which the human self-image will become “the image of technological production.” Sourly, Ramsey concludes: “God can take care of that too, the religious might say, but let’s not make it so devilishly difficult for him to save humankind from self-destruction.” 62
Hauerwas’s Views
In his reflections on abortion, Hauerwas tries to steer a middle course for Christians between complete withdrawal from society and thorough involvement with it. Or, as he memorably puts it, “[w]e do not need to bite the hand that feeds us, but we do not need to lick it either,” since the United States is presently more of “a project of Enlightenment rationalism” rather than “a Christian civilization.” 63 On the one hand, he affirms that Christians may work on behalf of children’s rights in general because it is only natural to want to protect our young, 64 and he suggests that public discussion and policy-making regarding abortion can be appropriate because our religious beliefs ought to impact our political ones. 65 On the other hand, he contends that Christians should be wary of the American tendency to commercialize relationships and to prioritize individual rights over duties—a mindset which leads to abortion. Contrary to popular belief, our bodies are not property, and we do not have a divine sanction to do anything we desire with them. 66 When advocating on behalf of children, Christians should not be ashamed of “the substance of our convictions,” because “then our arguments fall silent … for we forget that our most fundamental political task is to be and to point to the truth which we believe to be the necessary basis for any life-enhancing and just society.” 67 And when thinking about abortion, Christians should not be concerned primarily with the law, but rather with who they are called to be and how they can assist others. 68
Hauerwas deflects questions about what all of this means regarding the particular kind of abortion law Christians should presently support. He contends that “the Church is not nearly at the point where it can concern itself” with laws or constitutional amendments prohibiting abortion, for secular society is too preoccupied with personal autonomy. Rather, Christians should focus on witnessing through “welcoming … children” and being cognizant of their duties toward “fellow participants” in society. Hauerwas does allow that this witness can include Christians’ collaboration with pro-choice acquaintances to work toward a sufficient child allowance to alleviate pressures on mothers to abort. 69
Comparison and Critique
Hauerwas and Ramsey agree that individualistic presuppositions within today’s society make it resistant to a pro-life mindset, that Christians can make a more meaningful impact through non-legislative means, and that Christians will want to distance themselves in some way from societies which do definitively sanction violence. 70 That said, Ramsey still proposes a much more robust and wide-ranging involvement in the public arena than does Hauerwas. Ramsey challenges the law to be consistent, argues that the general populace should have a greater say in formulating it, and turns to more peripheral battles when the larger ones become more settled. Although he eventually does become somewhat pessimistic about legal reform, he never retracts his passionate commitment to helping to change the law or his view that Christians in general should follow suit. In contrast, Hauerwas asserts that Christians ought to focus on what kind of people they are called to be. Hauerwas does not dissuade public debate and policy-making, but nor does he strongly encourage any particular policy measures.
Interestingly, Ramsey’s own general ethical methodology provides a basis for critiquing his position that Christians should prefer to leave abortion laws up to the states and accept the possibility that some might keep abortion legal. In Basic Christian Ethics, he asserts that “[m]ere consent does not suffice to determine the nature of political obligation. Since consent itself may be sinful, it is obliged to be right; it ought to agree only to what is just.” And drawing from Rousseau, he argues that laws are lawful and just only when “the conditions are the same for all” and do not “single out persons for special treatment.” For Ramsey, this conception of justice is grounded in our equality before God and in Jesus’s words that “[w]ith whatever judgment you judge, you shall be judged; with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again!” (Matt. 7:2).
71
But if all of this is true, and if “we are all fellow fetuses”
72
and the abortion of those who are unborn is unjust (as Ramsey presumably would agree), then it would seem that the issue is
As for Hauerwas, it is not clear why Christians should just set aside the question of abortion laws for the time being. Why could they not concentrate on appropriate legal reform
Modeling an Effective Christian Witness on Ramsey and Hauerwas
Despite some apparent shortcomings in the thought of Ramsey and Hauerwas on the four aforementioned topics, the two ethicists present valuable insights that complement each other well. Below I make the case that Christians on different sides of the abortion debate today should adhere to four guidelines that incorporate these insights. After explaining each guideline, I place the authors’ pertinent views in the context of official Catholic teaching, especially as provided by Pope John Paul II in Evangelium vitae (the most thorough papal encyclical to date on bioethical questions), and note where the two authors affirm, supplement, and diverge from it.
First, Christians ought to provide a “rational account of fetal development,” like Ramsey, while recognizing its limitations. As John Paul II demonstrates in his encyclical Fides et ratio, the Bible and Christian tradition encourage the exercise of our reason in order to attain truth, but also acknowledge that our human wisdom must be completed by faith. 75 Also, as the evangelical Christian pro-life activist Scott Klusendorf shows, discussions of the morality of abortion cannot ignore the question, “what is the unborn?”, because the answer to this question impacts whether intentionally killing it is gravely wrong or “requires no more justification than having your tooth pulled.” 76 Again, there are limitations of rational accounts; Hauerwas is right to point out that people’s beliefs about abortion are not easily altered by them. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that people’s views on abortion, as on other weighty moral issues, often are affected and sometimes even changed through argument and that therefore it is not a waste of time. At the least, a “rational” conversation between Christians and others on abortion should not prove any less productive than a dialogue that focuses on theological matters. 77 Moreover, although Hauerwas suggests otherwise, the question of when human life begins arguably has received a good deal of attention in Christian ethical reflection throughout history. 78 Therefore, this question has not and need not be decided solely by authorities outside of the Christian community.
What insights do these authors bring to Catholic reflection on these matters? In Evangelium vitae, John Paul II affirms that “modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation” that from the moment of conception, there is a unique individual human being with the “program” of a full-grown adult. The pope adds that whereas empirical data cannot demonstrate the existence of a soul, they do provide reason to think the conceptus is personal: “how could a human individual not be a human person?” Ultimately, he maintains, the “mere probability” of this personhood is sufficient reason to protect human life at all stages. 79 Hauerwas’s resistance to providing any sort of “rational account” stands in contrast to Evangelium vitae and other recent magisterial statements, 80 although his hesitation to affirm when exactly we become fully human is shared to some extent by those statements. As for Ramsey, his own treatment of the question “what is the unborn?” supplements the official Catholic position in his detailed rejection of the “developmental” approach, although his conclusion that life is to be valued only at some point after conception is opposed to that teaching.
Second, Christians would do well to attend to the “hard cases” with charity, attention to the golden rule, and consistency. This is because the first quality is central to Jesus’s moral teaching (as Ramsey shows, even if like Hauerwas we are wary of any “monistic characterization” of it 81 ), the second one encapsulates the “law and the prophets” (according to Matt. 7:12), and the third one is necessary if we are to use our divinely given rational faculties well. More specifically, whatever their position on individual hard cases, like Ramsey Christians ought to manifest a loving attitude toward the woman whose physical or emotional life is at stake, and like Hauerwas they should affirm women who choose to go through with pregnancy in difficult situations. And when considering those with disabilities, Christians should look upon them not dismissively but with mercy and compassion, as Ramsey and Hauerwas do. Furthermore, Christians would do well to follow these authors’ example and consider the golden rule in the context of hard cases, as elsewhere. Finally, Christians should strive to be logically consistent in their position on abortion by keeping in mind the infanticide test that Ramsey and Hauerwas suggest (even if these authors may not always apply it themselves). For example, if one is prepared to accept abortion in the case of defective fetuses, then one should be willing to extend this justification to permit killing them shortly after birth (as philosophers such as Peter Singer suggest), 82 provide a coherent argument as to why valuable human life begins by birth but after conception, or else reconsider one’s original position on abortion. And if one comes to the conclusion (as certainly one must) that we may not kill a toddler whose father is a rapist even to alleviate her mother’s depression, then one should be willing to expand this prohibition to cover abortion in cases of rape (as Klusendorf argues), 83 or else put forth a cogent explanation of why human life is worthy of protection at two years of age but not prior to birth.
Overall, in their caring approach toward women pregnant in difficult situations and toward disabled children, and in their discussion of the connection between arguments regarding abortion and those concerning infanticide, Ramsey and Hauerwas echo official Catholic teaching. 84 In their explicit application of the golden rule to the question of abortion, they also helpfully supplement that teaching. 85 To be sure, their acquiescence to abortion for certain psychological or social reasons is opposed to Catholic doctrine, which does not make these exceptions and condemns all direct abortions. 86
Third, Christians should utilize a “theological idiom,” in Hauerwas’s words. 87 In particular, they ought to refer to both Scripture (because, as noted above, they believe that faith assists reason) and the believing community (because, as per Hauerwas, it can assist us in living well). Both Ramsey and Hauerwas speak this idiom well in their affirmation of religious grounds for human life’s value, of the effectiveness of Christian example in appealing to others, of the role of the liturgy in forming us, and of the responsibility of the faithful to mitigate pressures to abort. Ramsey contributes a few useful theological themes of his own: namely, the contributions of Jewish thought on abortion and the importance of a unified Judeo-Christian witness. And Hauerwas creatively and sensibly places his discussion of abortion within the context of what Christians believe about children in general. That said, both theologians are open to the charge that they give insufficient attention to Scripture. Although Ramsey in his earlier and later reflections on abortion discusses specific biblical passages, 88 his many relevant writings in between neglect them. And of Hauerwas’s five major pieces on abortion, only one provides any pertinent biblical references. 89 In addition, David Haddorff and Nicholas Healy have pointed out that Hauerwas’s ecclesially-based ethics tends to gloss over the potential imperfections of the church’s practices and to the need for God’s grace to guide it. 90
In any case, much of what Ramsey and Hauerwas do say when speaking in a theological idiom aligns with John Paul II’s remarks in Evangelium vitae. 91 But Ramsey’s and Hauerwas’s thoughts also supplement Catholic teaching on abortion in a couple of ways: namely, Ramsey’s specific attention to Judaism, and both authors’ emphasis that human dignity is not quite intrinsic, but ultimately granted to us by God. 92 Of course, the official Catholic position would be that the magisterium and the “supernatural sense of the faith” complement in turn any reliance on Scripture and/or the general Christian community when thinking about abortion. 93 This means that Catholics and Methodists will part ways at least to some extent when addressing moral issues such as abortion, as Hauerwas rightly perceives: “[T]radition has to be construed. That is the reason why you need a magisterium – to understand the tradition. But United Methodists do not have a magisterium. We just have one another.” 94
Fourth and finally, Christians ought to engage in some legal and social reform while not losing sight of their trans-political calling. The reason for this is that human dignity and Christian love call for “ceaseless political action on behalf of human rights” (as Ramsey suggests), 95 although ultimately Jesus’s kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36). As explained above, even in his later writings on abortion, Ramsey continues to advocate for better laws and adoption programs, while still placing emphasis on the progress of Christians as pilgrims and not just as citizens. And although he is not as immersed in political issues as Ramsey is, Hauerwas does not object to Christian involvement in the public square, such as promoting allowances and rights for children. At the same time, he reminds his readers that a compelling Christian witness on abortion must not become so preoccupied with legal questions that Christians forget about the kind of people they are called to be and the responsibilities they owe to others.
Consistent with these individual strands in the respective thoughts of Ramsey and Hauerwas, Evangelium vitae emphasizes that out of charity and respect for human dignity, Christians should fight unjust laws that violate the right to life, and work for social policies that assist children and families, but also keep in mind that eternal life is our “final destiny.” John Paul II also adds to these authors’ thoughts the insight that the law can have a beneficial pedagogical effect. 96 But Ramsey and Hauerwas go further than the encyclical in their concentration on the American context, and Ramsey’s pessimism about abortion legislation and Hauerwas’s resistance to it are not shared by the pope, who is confident that “moral truth cannot fail to make its presence felt in every conscience.” 97
To sum up, just as the apostle Paul endeavored to become all things to all people in order to win them over, and just as many great Christian thinkers since (for example, Augustine, Aquinas, and John Paul II) have skillfully blended the language of the gospel with the idioms of non-Christian philosophers in making an effective case for particular theological and political convictions, 98 so too should contemporary Christians when it comes to the issue of abortion. By preserving a strong sense of Christian identity and charitably attending to important questions with which non-Christians grapple, such a witness would command great respect.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments on different drafts of this article, I would like to thank the following: John Berkman; Susan Frank Parsons; the attendees of my presentation to the annual conference of the Mid-Atlantic Region of the American Academy of Religion in March 2009 in Baltimore, Maryland; and the anonymous reviewers of this article for Studies in Christian Ethics.
1.
Stanley Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” in Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: Fides Publishers, 1974), pp. 135–36.
2.
Hauerwas began teaching at the University of Notre Dame in 1970, and Ramsey taught at Princeton University until his death in 1988. For biographical information on the two thinkers, see William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, “Introduction,” in Paul Ramsey, The Essential Paul Ramsey: A Collection (ed. William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. vii–xxv; John Berkman, “An Introduction to The Hauerwas Reader,” in Stanley Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader (ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright; Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 3–5, 14–15; and William Cavanaugh, “Stan the Man: A Thoroughly Biased Account of a Completely Unobjective Person,” in The Hauerwas Reader, pp. 17–32.
3.
Paul Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life: In the First of It,” Dublin Review 241.511 (1967), pp. 9, 11, 13; and Paul Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” in James Rachels (ed.), Moral Problems: A Collection of Philosophical Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 44–45, 47–48. The latter article is a reprint of the former one, with slight revisions. Whenever I cite to both works, it means the relevant passage occurs in both; if I cite only to the latter work, it indicates that the pertinent excerpt is an addition that was not in the original article.
4.
Paul Ramsey, “Abortion: A Theologian’s View,” in Valerie Vance Dillon (ed.), In Defense of Life: A Handbook for Those who Oppose the Destruction of the Unborn (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Right to Life Committee, 1970), pp. 112–18. For similar affirmations, see his “Feticide/Infanticide upon Request,” Religion in Life 39.2 (1970), pp. 176–77; “Reference Points in Deciding about Abortion,” in John T. Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 75, 85; and Ethics at the Edges of Life: Medical and Legal Intersections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 48.
5.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Theologian’s View,” pp. 118–19; Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” pp. 173–77; Ramsey, “Reference Points,” pp. 64–79; and Paul Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” The Thomist 37.1 (1973), pp. 182–99. To be sure, Ramsey’s later work on abortion does not entirely ignore religious reasons for the value of human life. See Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” pp. 183, 185 (stating that defending dependent fetuses is “a sign of the mercy of God”); and Ramsey, “Reference Points,” p. 75 (arguing that God’s redemptive care for the powerless and alien residents is a reason for protecting life in the womb).
6.
Ramsey, “Reference Points,” pp. 64–65; and Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” pp. 188–94.
7.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” pp. 182–94. The second-to-last quotation is taken by Ramsey from André Hellegers, “Fetal Development,” Theological Studies 31.1 (1970), p. 5.
8.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” pp. 135–37. On this point, see also Stanley Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” in Vision and Virtue, p. 150.
9.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” p. 137; and Stanley Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” in A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 212–14, 228 n. 37.
10.
Stanley Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” pp. 149–52. For confirmation of this conclusion, see also Paul T. Stallsworth, “Table Talk: An Account of the Conference Conversation,” in Paul T. Stallsworth (ed.), The Church and Abortion: In Search of New Ground for Response (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1993), p. 124 (quoting Hauerwas).
11.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” pp. 222, 225–26, 228.
12.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” pp. 225–27; and Stanley Hauerwas, “Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue,” in A Community of Character, p. 210.
13.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” pp. 141–46.
14.
Stanley Hauerwas, “Casuistry as a Narrative Art,” Interpretation 37.4 (1983), pp. 379–80.
15.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” p. 146.
16.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 229. On Hauerwas’s general reluctance to providing reasons for his opposition to abortion, see Paul D. Simmons, “The Narrative Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas: A Question of Method,” in Earl E. Shelp (ed.), Secular Bioethics in Theological Perspective (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 169–72.
17.
For Hauerwas’s view that Israel was called to imitate God’s compassion toward the unfortunate, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Jesus and the Social Embodiment of the Peaceable Kingdom,” in The Hauerwas Reader, pp. 121–27.
18.
Patrick Lee, for example, comments that “[t]he data for such occurrences in humans is sparse.” See his Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2nd edn, 2010), p. 93 n. 35.
19.
Ramsey, “Reference Points,” p. 63.
20.
Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” p. 15; Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” p. 49; and Paul Ramsey, “Some Rejoinders,” Journal of Religious Ethics 4.2 (1976), pp. 192–93. This distinction was accepted by Catholic theologians and official Catholic teaching for a while before Ramsey’s writing, and continues to be reaffirmed by them today, although some revisionist Catholic thinkers question it. See Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., Biomedicine and Beatitude: An Introduction to Catholic Bioethics (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), pp. 47–49, 62–65; and David F. Kelly, Gerard Magill, and Henk ten Have, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2nd edn, 2013), pp. 108–113.
21.
I say “seem” because, as Richard Jones has pointed out, Ramsey’s analysis of this issue is rather difficult to follow. Richard W. Jones, “Rules of Practice in Paul Ramsey’s Medical Ethics,” Perkins Journal 39.1 (1986), pp. 40–41.
22.
Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” p. 17; Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” p. 51; and Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” p. 221. Regarding Ramsey’s general position on this matter, see Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 175–77, 182, 185–86, 190; Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” pp. 15–19; Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” pp. 50–54; Ramsey, “Reference Points,” p. 90 n. 35; Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” pp. 219–22; and Ramsey, “Some Rejoinders,” pp. 192–94, 199–200. The later Ramsey appears to have evolved slightly on this issue; he seems to put more emphasis on the indirect nature of the case at hand, while not clearly retracting his earlier statement that the abortion is still direct in a sense. Ramsey, “Some Rejoinders,” pp. 192, 194, 199.
23.
Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, pp. 182, 185–86; and Ramsey, “Some Rejoinders,” pp. 192, 196.
24.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” p. 222. On considering what the fetus would charitably desire in such a situation, see also Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, p. 182. Ramsey also notes that there is a similarity between aborting a fetus in this instance and killing in war—namely, that the purpose of both is incapacitation of an aggressor, whether innocent or not. Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” pp. 18–19; Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” pp. 52–54; Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” pp. 219–22; and Ramsey, “Some Rejoinders,” pp. 192–93, 195, 199–200. He expresses the hope that “even a tradition-minded Catholic” might agree that the former is as justifiable as the latter; here he points out that Thomas Aquinas believed killing could be permissible if the other’s death is unintended, and that “traditional moralists” were not that concerned with “the physical target of the destructive action.” Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” p. 54. More recently, William May has suggested that at least some traditional Catholic moralists (including himself) would concur that abortion that is direct (in some sense) might be justified, as long as “direct” abortion is understood as “the removal or expulsion of a nonviable fetus” and
25.
Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” pp. 49–50; Ramsey, “Abortion: A Theologian’s View,” pp. 116–17; and Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” pp. 178–79. On this point, see also Paul Ramsey, “The Ethics of a Cottage Industry in an Age of Community and Research Medicine,” New England Journal of Medicine 284.13 (1971), p. 702.
26.
Ramsey, “The Ethics of a Cottage Industry,” pp. 701–702.
27.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Theologian’s View,” pp. 119–20; and Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” p. 179.
28.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Review Article,” pp. 201–203.
29.
Ramsey, “Abortion: A Theologian’s View,” p. 117; and Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” p. 180.
30.
Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” pp. 21–22; and Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” pp. 56–57.
31.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” p. 149. For other affirmations that abortion might occasionally be permissible in certain “hard cases” despite its being a “morally unhappy practice,” see Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” p. 156; Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 226 n. 34; and Hauerwas, “Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue,” pp. 197, 199.
32.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 226 n. 34.
33.
Hauerwas, “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” pp. 144–46.
34.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” p. 155. On this issue, see also Stanley Hauerwas, “Where Would I Be Without Friends?”, in Mark Thiessen Nation and Samuel Wells (eds.), Faithfulness and Fortitude: Conversations with the Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2000), pp. 329–30.
35.
Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” pp. 119–20 (quoting Hauerwas); and Hauerwas, “Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue,” p. 207.
36.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” pp. 158–63; and Stanley Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” in Stallsworth (ed.), The Church and Abortion, p. 64.
37.
Hauerwas, “Where Would I Be Without Friends?”, pp. 329–30. On this point, see also Hauerwas, “Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue,” p. 207 n. 30; and Hauerwas, “Casuistry as a Narrative Art,” p. 383.
38.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” pp. 164–65.
39.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 57–58, 61–62; and Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” pp. 120–21 (quoting Hauerwas).
40.
Michael C. McKenzie, Paul Ramsey’s Ethics: The Power of “Agape” in a Postmodern World (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), pp. 83–84.
41.
Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” pp. 170–72, 186; and Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp. 46–48.
42.
Paul Ramsey, “Do You Know Where Your Children Are?”, Theology Today 36.1 (1979), pp. 12, 16–18, 21.
43.
Paul Ramsey, “Washington Knows …?”, Theology Today 35.4 (1979), pp. 435–36.
44.
Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishops’ Pastoral Letter “In Defense of Creation”, epilogue by Stanley Hauerwas (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), p. 146.
45.
Ramsey, Speak up for Just War or Pacifism, p. 146.
46.
Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp. 46–48.
47.
Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” pp. 107–109 (quoting Hauerwas).
48.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 53–54; and Hauerwas, “Casuistry as a Narrative Art,” p. 378.
49.
Stanley Hauerwas, “The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Christian Ethics as Worship,” in In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 156–58.
50.
Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” pp. 89–90 (quoting Hauerwas); and Hauerwas, “The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life,” pp. 160–61.
51.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 53–55; and Hauerwas, “The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life,” p. 161.
52.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 227. On this point, see also Hauerwas, “Casuistry as a Narrative Art,” p. 378.
53.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 229; and Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 46–49, 63. On the community’s duty to support the woman in such a situation, see also Hauerwas, “Why Abortion is a Religious Issue,” p. 207 n. 30; and Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” p. 120 (quoting Hauerwas).
54.
Hauerwas, “Why Abortion is a Religious Issue,” p. 201; and Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 58–60.
55.
Indeed, as Paul Simmons points out, Hauerwas glosses over the fact that there is no uniformly agreed upon position that Christians themselves have regarding abortion, owing in part to the silence of the Bible on the issue. Simmons, “The Narrative Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas,” pp. 164, 172–75.
56.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 227.
57.
Stanley Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s Not a Religion, It’s an Adventure,” in The Hauerwas Reader, p. 533. Hauerwas does add in a couple of other places that peaceful non-Christians “may provide the conditions for our ability to cooperate with others for securing justice in the world,” and that “Muslims and Christians might discover common work necessary to be at peace.” Hauerwas, “The Servant Community: Christian Social Ethics,” in The Hauerwas Reader, pp. 376–77; and Hauerwas, “Seeing Peace: L’Arche as a Peace Movement,” in Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2008), p. 320. However, collaboration between Christians and members of other particular religious communities on social issues is not a predominant theme in either his recent book with Coles or the several-hundred-page The Hauerwas Reader. In contrast to Hauerwas, one might emphasize that the value of the human person and Jesus’s various exhortations to love and serve our neighbor (for example, in Matthew 25) provide good grounds for collaborating with non-Christians in order to secure that justice.
58.
Ramsey, “Feticide/Infanticide,” pp. 182, 185.
59.
Paul Ramsey, “Protecting the Unborn,” Commonweal 100.13 (1974), pp. 309, 312–14.
60.
Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp. 137–38.
61.
See generally Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp. 3–142.
62.
Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp. 139–42.
63.
Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” p. 127 (quoting Hauerwas).
64.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” pp. 228–29.
65.
Hauerwas, “Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue,” p. 196 and n. 2
66.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 50–52; and Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” p. 127 (quoting Hauerwas).
67.
Hauerwas, “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” p. 229.
68.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 47–50.
69.
Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 62–63, 65; and Hauerwas, “Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” p. 161 n. 21.
70.
In a writing that does not directly focus on abortion, Hauerwas states that Christians should refrain from cooperating in violent governmental acts, but may participate in other state functions. Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the ‘Sectarian Temptation’ is a Misrepresentation: A Response to James Gustafson,” in The Hauerwas Reader, p. 105.
71.
Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 332, 336–37, 347–48.
72.
Ramsey, “The Sanctity of Life,” pp. 4, 10–12; Ramsey, “The Morality of Abortion,” pp. 39, 45–46; and Ramsey, “Reference Points,” p. 67.
73.
Hauerwas, “The Servant Community,” p. 377.
74.
Hauerwas, “Sectarian Temptation,” pp. 102, 104–106. Hauerwas does add here that law should not merely be coercive but also encourage citizens to live virtuously, but we might note that it cannot do the latter without enforcing some basic prohibitions and restrictions.
75.
John Paul II, Fides et ratio [“Faith and Reason”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), §§ 16–23, 36–48.
76.
Scott Klusendorf, The Case for Life: Equipping Christians to Engage the Culture (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2009), pp. 23–24.
77.
For further debate between Hauerwas and Richard McCormick regarding this issue, see Stanley Hauerwas, “On Beginning in the Middle: Nature, Reason, and the Task of Theological Ethics,” in The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 59–60; and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,” Theological Studies 42.1 (1981), pp. 97–98.
78.
For example, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Gregory of Nyssa, Lactantius, Augustine, the fourth-century Apostolic Constitutions, and Thomas Aquinas all speculated on the time of ensoulment, and at least a couple of these sources apparently relied on this timing in condemning abortion after this point as unjust homicide. See David Albert Jones, The Soul of the Embryo: An Enquiry into the Status of the Human Embryo in the Christian Tradition (New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 109–24.
79.
John Paul II, Evangelium vitae [“The Gospel of Life”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995), § 60.
80.
See also Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1974), §§ 12–13; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae [“The Gift of Life”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987); § I.1; and Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas personae [“The Dignity of a Person”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), § 5. Although there might be debate over what precisely is meant by a “rational account of fetal development,” I think it is clear that Catholic teaching does attempt one in that it appeals to science and reason when discussing the unborn.
81.
Ramsey’s Basic Christian Ethics asserts that the “[t]he central ethical notion or ‘category’ in Christian ethics is ‘obedient love,’” and then goes on to make his case by relying on (among other things) Matt. 22:24, 1 Cor. 10:23–24, and Augustine’s and Aquinas’s demonstrations that the virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence are perfected when they are forms of love for God. Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, pp. xi, 63–66, 77–79, 89–90, 206–208. Hauerwas criticizes Ramsey’s “monistic characterization” in Stanley Hauerwas, “On Being a Church Capable of Addressing a World at War: A Pacifist Response to the United Methodist Bishops’ Pastoral In Defense of Creation,” in The Hauerwas Reader, p. 453.
82.
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2011), pp. 151–54, 159–67.
83.
Klusendorf, The Case for Life, pp. 173–74.
84.
See John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, §§ 14, 58, 63, 99.
85.
This connection is not made explicitly in any of the magisterium’s recent major statements on bioethical issues, including the Declaration on Procured Abortion, Donum vitae, Evangelium vitae, and Dignitas personae.
86.
See John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, § 62.
87.
Hauerwas, “On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological,” in The Hauerwas Reader, p. 68.
88.
In addition to the ones mentioned above, see also Ramsey, “Washington Knows … ?”, p. 436 (citing Luke 1:39–44, which refers to the babies in Mary’s and Elizabeth’s wombs, in the context of criticizing “the corruption of language” about abortion in today’s society).
89.
“Abortion: The Agent’s Perspective,” “Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail,” “Abortion and Normative Ethics,” and “Why Abortion is a Religious Issue” bypass specific passages completely (not counting the first footnote in the latter article, which refers to another author’s comment on bribery). The fifth essay does cite the Bible a couple of times. Hauerwas, “Abortion, Theologically Understood,” pp. 44–49. But even then all of these instances are within someone else’s sermon (which is quoted by Hauerwas in full), and are not further discussed by Hauerwas himself.
90.
David Haddorff, Christian Ethics as Witness: Barth’s Ethics for a World at Risk (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), pp. 259, 265–67; and Nicholas Healy, “Three Ways of Engaging Theologically with Modernity,” New Blackfriars 94.1050 (2013), pp. 180, 184.
91.
See John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, §§ 26 (on being open to children), 34–36 (on religious grounds for valuing human life), 63 (on welcoming disabled children in particular), 84 (on liturgy and the sacraments), 90–94 (on collaboration “with the followers of other religions and with all people of good will,” setting a good example, adoption, and caring for children). The encyclical also refers to Scripture throughout.
92.
Evangelium vitae, for example, does not address Jewish views on abortion, and refers to our “intrinsic value of life.” John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, § 55. See also Austriaco, Biomedicine and Beatitude, 45 (commenting that our dignity is intrinsic and “not conferred”).
93.
For appeals to this sense and to magisterial precedent, see John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, §§ 57, 62, 82.
94.
Stallsworth, “Table Talk,” p. 109 (quoting Hauerwas).
95.
Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, pp. 189–90.
96.
John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, §§ 37–38, 87, 90.
97.
John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, § 90.
98.
For an exchange between Hauerwas and McCormick pertaining to this point, see Hauerwas, “On Beginning in the Middle,” p. 59; and McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,” pp. 99–100.