Abstract
Phrenitis is ubiquitous in ancient medicine and philosophy. Galen mentions the disease innumerable times, Patristic authors take it as a favourite allegory of human flaws, and no ancient doctor fails to diagnose it and attempt its cure. Yet the nature of this once famous disease has not been properly understood by scholars. My book provides the first full history of phrenitis. In doing so, it surveys ancient ideas about the interactions between body and soul, both in health and in disease. It also addresses ancient ideas about bodily health, mental soundness and moral ‘goodness’, and their heritage in contemporary psychiatry, offering a chance to reflect critically on contemporary ideas about what it means to be ‘insane’.
Keywords
The project phrenitis
This book (Thumiger, 2023) belongs inter alia to the genre of the ‘biography’ of a disease, or a nosological profile through a historicising lens. Such works usually reflect on the name label and its etymology, trace the chronology and diffusion of its use, and list variations in causes, prognostic and diagnostic features, manifestations and therapies. They also look at patients and medical experiences, professional and less so. Any project of this kind has potential pitfalls. Anachronistic projections and identifications across eras may be illusory, despite shared names (consider the ‘false friends’ typhus, tetanus, phthisis and epilepsies, but also anorexia and boulimia, Greek terms whose ancient meaning is far from what we mean by them today). The incidence, demographics and experience of a disease are largely lost in the transition from one community to another, while patient experience often defies the historian. Also, the common use of a nosological term in popular literature or colloquial speech is subject to generic conventions and dynamics of irony, mockery and hyperbolic exaggeration. Such a biography thus risks turning into a gallery of disconnected episodes, with the guiding thread ultimately lost.
Despite all this, phrenitis proves to be a good example to tackle. Although the concept went through tortuous passages, patterns of branching and rejoining, and apparent discontinuities, it has remained visible from its origin, in fifth-century BCE medicine, to its ‘death’ over the course of the nineteenth century. Moreover, this book shows that phrenitis is not a case of phantom persistence, unlike melancholy or epilepsy, which were immensely influential labels covering illness experiences that varied widely depending on the century or text. Phrenitis is different, for it has a fundamental core: mental disorder, with fever, localised in the body, and strongly connected with the position and processes of cognition and the senses.
As such, phrenitis is deeply connected to a fundamental topic in the history of ancient science, that is, the question of whether the mental faculties are to be located in the heart or the head: cardiocentrism (Aristotle, Praxagoras, the Stoics, as well as much of traditional culture, and several Hippocratic accounts) versus encephalocentrism (the author of De Morbo Sacro, Herophilus and Erasistratus, and of course Galen). The disease name phrenitis in fact evokes the diaphragm, or phrenes, the seat of emotions and reasoning in a number of archaic poetic texts and in tragedy. At the beginning of its history, then, phrenitis is seated in the chest as a winter disease akin to pneumonia, with respiratory affections and fever. As medical theories change and develop, however, it is more and more identified with an inflammatory fever that takes hold of the head and brain, or meninges, causing derangement, delirium and hallucinations. In this way, evolving physiologies of cognition are rendered apparent to our view, while, at the same time, a vast repertoire of clinical experiences can be harvested as part of the disease portrait, allowing for a systematic organisation of symptoms, causes and possible therapies.
Much of this work of conceptualisation begins as a highly technical medical enterprise. Phrenitis was not a common term for the first four to five centuries of its life, and it appears in non-medical texts only at the beginning of our era. Already early on, it establishes itself as a major disease, acute and often mortal, and a challenge for doctors. It also gradually becomes useful material for metaphorical and allegorical elaboration, by moral philosophers and comedians more than anyone else.
By the end of antiquity, phrenitis has established itself as a major, mortal, ‘psychiatric’ disease with fever, (mostly) localised in the brain and meninges, and causing a panoply of mental and neurological impairments. As such, it is transmitted through Syriac, Arabic and then Latin translations and commentaries through the, Mediterranean, imperial and post-imperial and modern worlds, and remains an important resource in nosology and anatomo-pathology until the nineteenth century. After its demise, it disappears in a radical way from medical practice and general culture, as shown by the typical reactions by audiences in 2024: ‘Phrenitis? What is this?’
The book: a synoptic view
What follows is a brief sketch of the book and the historical territory covered in its 10 chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce methodological issues pertaining to the history of mental health: on the one hand, the issue of anachronism and the problem of retrospective diagnosis, and on the other, the importance of maintaining intelligibility across cultures. When it comes to the ancient world, there are specific problems related to the nature of Greek and Latin medical sources and our limited access to the practices underlying them. In addition, the genre ‘biography of disease’ has its own pitfalls, namely those of attributing ‘essence’ to what appears prima facie to be most of all a construct, a disease concept or a label such as phrenitis. Finally, I consider the phrenitis as a term, its etymological significance and the implications of the name vis-à-vis localization (Chest? Lungs? Diaphragm? Heart?) and mental life (Mind? Character? Soul? Mental capacities?). I also discuss the traditional poetic (‘Homeric’) appeal of the phrēn/phrenes, the name of the body part from which the label originates. The poetic archaism of phrēn/phrenes combined with its medical use made it both understandable as a generic term for mental life and specifically a ‘medical’ term to indicate the diaphragm, and contributed to making phrenitis a long-lasting disease concept.
Chapter 2 begins with classical medicine (the ‘Hippocratic Corpus’ and coeval testimonies), exploring the sources of so-called Hippocratic medicine, nosological and clinical, as well as other lesser-known authors from the fourth century BCE, such as Diocles and Praxagoras. The limited material on our topic preserved from Hellenistic medical writers (Herophilus and Erasistratus) is also surveyed. The richest information is found in the Hippocratic writings, where phrenitis first appears and where it is richly described, both in nosological profiles and with reference to specific patients. Its core traits are established by this point: fever, localization in the chest, and an association with winter also apparent in the co-morbidity with, and analogy to, pleuritis and pneumonia. Interestingly, the phrēn/phrenes are seldom mentioned in discussions of phrenitis, and when they are, it is not in their traditional, ‘Homeric’ psychological function or directly as locus affectus, thus signalling a desire to distance the pathological narrative from traditional poetic models.
Localisation is arguably a key move in the history of medicine across cultures. But a parallel, if not alternative, narrative can be seen in the Graeco-Roman tradition (and elsewhere). I call this ‘delocalisation’, an approach to disease, especially mental disease, in terms of ‘holistic’ impact on the patient, and discuss it in Chapter 3. Delocalisation surfaces prominently only in certain authors, but can also be noted in discussions of the locus affectus by thinkers such as Galen. In this particular strand of the history of phrenitis, the key sources preserved for us are the Roman author of De medicina, Celsus; the Atomist philosopher and doctor Asclepiades; and the thinkers of the Methodist tradition, represented most extensively as far as phrenitis is concerned by Caelius Aurelianus. This chapter surveys the relevant texts by Celsus and Caelius and the fragmentary evidence for Asclepiades, in which an important cluster of shared principles emerges: an interest in psychology and in the health of the individual ‘as a whole’; a disregard for the localisation of the disease in a specific body part and of fever as a key pathological indicator; and a strong inclination towards psychotherapeutic and ‘soothing’ measures.
Chapter 4 moves on to the medical texts of the imperial age, first addressing theoretical approaches under the subdivisions ‘localisation’, semiotics, chronology and aetiology. The time frame involved here is the first to sixth centuries CE, with a primary focus on Aretaeus and Galen. These two famous physicians offered powerful accounts of phrenitis in terms of localisation (around the heart, in the first case, and the brain, in the second), and introduced sophisticated discussions regarding ‘sympathy’ and co-affection in the disease. They also addressed symptomatology and, in the case of Galen especially, took phrenitis as an exemplary case for semiotic discussions and the exploration of causes.
Chapter 5 covers the clinical part of the account left by the medical authors of the imperial period: case histories, pathological descriptions and clinical narratives as they appear in Anonymus Parisinus, Aretaeus and Galen, as well as medical developments in the following centuries, which proceed very much along the lines traced by Galen. This is illustrated by the late-antique sources included in the final section of the chapter: Oribasius, Aetius, Alexander of Tralles and Paul of Aegina. The topics analysed include: patient profiling and behaviours; ‘neighbouring diseases’ and ‘similar diseases’ to phrenitis (pleuritis and pneumonia, but especially lethargos as a cold brain fever, symmetrical to the hot brain fever which is phrenitis); and recurring symptoms. By now, these form a clear picture, featuring fever, sensory disturbance, cognitive damage, various ‘neurological’ signs such as (notably) ‘flocillation’ (the compulsive plucking of hair or fluff from one’s clothes or blankets), sleep disturbance, voice alteration, expectoration, a certain quality of the urine and pulse, respiratory issues, and rich and varied psychological disturbances, in which hallucination stands out.
Chapter 6 looks at the construction of the phrenitic patient in wider culture, from non-technical discussions of the disease to its allegorical or hyperbolical honing to a paradigm of folly, ignorance, depravity and moral weakness. In this chapter, I consider the earliest occurrences of the term in Greek in non-medical writings, which are fairly late (Hellenistic, in Menander’s Aspis), and then the bulk of the ancient evidence, which is largely ethical-philosophical and found in theological, prudential and hagiographic contexts. Augustine is the central author here, and his construction of the phreniticus becomes an influential model in the centuries to come.
As the narrative moves beyond the Graeco-Roman medical tradition and enters the post-antique reception and elaboration of this canon, the dynamics of translation and assimilation into different languages and cultural milieus become more relevant. Chapter 7 explores the Byzantine transmission of the ancient material, at first sight faithfully based on Galenic models and their encyclopaedic abridgements, and then the Syriac and Arabic traditions and the problems posed by the translation of a loaded term like phrenitis. The chapter moves on to the medieval medical sources in Latin (translations from the Arabic, as well as original elaborations in Latin, especially those of the school of Salerno) and to the medical writings produced on the Iberian peninsula by Arabic and Jewish authors.
Chapter 8 picks up on Chapter 6 and looks further into the history of the moralisation of mental illness from the late antique period to the end of the Middle Ages, with discourses focusing on the topics of debauchery, wine consumption, sexual excess and general depravity in the case of phrenitis. The lines are those traced by the Church fathers, among whom Augustine stands out as the most prolific source; the moral allegory is then elaborated through adaptation to the themes and concerns of medieval theology and developments in physiological concepts and pathological ideas in medicine. The chapter concludes with the figure of Falstaff, the Shakespearian character who best represents this early-modern outcome of ‘ethical phrenitis’ as a disease of squalor, drunkenness and sexual licentiousness.
In Chapter 9, the focus moves to the afterlife of phrenitis in the early-modern and modern eras, in three main directions: the ‘anatomisation of the past’ and the trajectories of Hellenism in the texts and doctrines of medical doctors in this era; the development of Renaissance anatomy and post-mortem pathological discussion of the localisation of phrenitis; and alternative approaches represented by Paracelsus and Paracelsianism. In the second part of the chapter, the modern era is addressed through a number of episodes or case studies: university medicine; patient reports; an episode of phrenitis contagiosa; the parallel of phrenitis in veterinary studies; and the topics of drunkenness and a lack of moderation in lifestyle, and their role in phrenitis.
Chapter 10, finally, is both a conclusion and an epilogue devoted to the ‘death of phrenitis’. The end of the active life of the disease can be described as taking place through three avenues and producing three outcomes. First, in a somatic sense, phrenitis gives way to meningitis and meningo-encephalitis, the inflammation of the brain and its membranes; second, its symptomatology evolves into what modern pathology defines as a syndrome, ‘delirium’; third, one final, ‘softer’ outcome of phrenitis is the lay concept of stress, classified as ‘stress syndrome’ in contemporary taxonomies. In the conclusion, this story of a specific disease is treated as exemplary of the dynamics behind the ‘birth’, ‘life’ and ‘death’ of biological concepts generally.
Phrenitis as an example in the history of psychiatry
While covering this territory in historical terms, the monograph engages with a number of points which pertain to phrenitis and its specifics as pathology. On the other hand, it offers a general consideration of the history of medicine and body history, the evolution of disease concepts, the creation of psychiatry as a branch of medicine, and the interweaving of technical and non-technical discourses in discussions of mental health and its care. I will now discuss the most salient questions the book raises regarding the methodology of cultural history, the history of medicine and patient history in particular.
Continuity of ‘mind and body’
This study is concerned with the pathology of the mind (the supposed object of modern psychiatry), but at the same time is conspicuously about the body, its physiology, anatomy and histological (‘homeomerous’, to use the Greek term) components and ‘biochemical’ (humoural) material. Phrenitis is central to the development of ancient theories of mind and mental pathology, but it is fundamentally a burning fever, acute and lethal – three aspects that do not sit comfortably with what modern psychology or psychiatry expects under the label ‘mental’. Throughout the long itinerary that takes the discussion from classical Greece to the nineteenth century, this embodied story remains prominent, even if details vary with changes in ideas about the structure of the body and its focal centres, exposing once more how the psychic view of mind, not the physical one, comes late in the history of medicine and mental health.
Taxonomy of disease
A second important theme that historians and philosophers of psychiatry and cultural historians face is classification, the ontology of disease entities as discrete items with a status and almost a life of their own. Much of the importance of phrenitis, in fact, has to do with medical science and the development of nosology as one of its branches. ‘Madness’ and other variations in mental health have not always been a matter of nomenclature and classes, with the tendency to list and organise diseases appearing gradually and becoming a rigid grid only in the last few centuries, for political-institutional reasons: the need to pin a diagnosis on a certain patient to secure the provision of care, public health assistance or pharmaceutical prescriptions. In the ancient world, matters were more flexible and blurred, and while several texts from the Hippocratic Corpus onwards gesture towards classification, only in the imperial era can one speak of a list of recurring diseases with a coherent profile, symptomatology, causation and possible care. Within this group, phrenitis stands out among the most stable and prominent diseases, and its position in nosological treatises is a topic in itself, testifying to its importance as a medical experience and as an umbrella container for a number of psychic and physical ailments. In this way, phrenitis is a nice example of the historicity and constructedness of taxonomies.
Durability of disease
One question that can be generalised to the history of pathology and of biology generally is that of the durability of concepts, or – better – of the requirements or factors that sustain durability. More concisely put: why do some nosological or biological categories disappear? What caused or allows obsolescence and ‘forgetfulness’ of one concept but not another? In another formulation often found in contemporary scholarship, what are the requirements for successful anchorage of (in this case) nosological concepts? Through different chronologies and examples, a number of possibilities and factors emerge: the connection to popular practices and beliefs (e.g. the importance of the chest and diaphragm for perceived mental disturbance); the general connection between heat/fever and pathology; the involvement of the head with mental processes and their alterations; a repertoire of neurological and sensory motor symptoms that appear to be universal, including tremors, hallucinations and compulsory movements. Precisely the combination of traditionality and folk appeal with technicality and exoteric insularity proved, in the case of phrenitis, key to its longue durée.
Localisation
Localisation – the question of ‘where it hurts’ in the body – is a topic in the history of medicine which is so important in contemporary pathology, from university medical books, to atlases, to the way hospital wards are organised, that it often disappears from our awareness as historians of antiquity. Of course, ‘places’ in the body were always named and thematised. But both their identification and the relevance of such mapping to understanding the body and preserving its health vary immensely from time to time. Localisation, in summary, is a logical point of arrival, or rather direction, more than a starting point, and phrenitis is a good illustration of this. The localisation (moving from brain to chest) is a rhetorical instrument and a logical feature for the disease as much as a tangible organ or membrane plagued by inflammation, overheating, overgorging with humours, and pain. An analysis of the epistemology of the locus affectus in phrenitis effectively illustrates the relationship between nosology, clinical activity (recognising diseases, curing actual people) and visualisation of the body.
Key authors, important positioning: the PR of medical notions
Another topic with a general bearing on history, and especially the historiography of medicine, is the interplay between the durability of medical or nosological concepts – nerves, epilepsy, phrenitis – and the appeal and power of charismatic authorities and personalities. Hysteria was boosted by Freud’s interest in it, melancholy by Burton’s long essay, and epilepsy by Hippocrates himself, long before the era of nosological onomastics such as Down’s Syndrome, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s, and so on. The personalistic dimension of phrenitis is a gallery of important characters – Hippocrates, Diocles, Aretaeus, Caelius Aurelianus and other later authors, and, towering among them all, Galen – not to mention the late antique, medieval and early modern personalities who discussed and described it. Outside medicine, Augustine speaks innumerable times of phrenitis as a symbolic, spiritual affliction. This tie to power, fame, fashion and personality as an important feature of Western medical narratives also made phrenitis a stable presence in the cultural mainstream.
The visibility of disease, behaviour
As I argued in my previous monograph, A History of the Mind and Mental Health in Classical Greek Medical Thought (Thumiger, 2017), there is a visual, performative dimension to ancient madness, from which modern psychiatry distances itself as a marker of primitivity, superstitious stigmatisation and superficiality. Madness is of the mind and, by definition, is abstract and invisible. In a sense, however, the opposite is also true, and madness is precisely the illness that desperately needs performance to express itself to doctors and other human beings. For all its medicalisation and technicalism, phrenitis engenders a variety of visible details, such as bodily features and behaviours, and true and proper vignettes, dramatisation of the illness through lifestyle. In the first category are screaming, restlessness, hallucinations and exaggerated behaviour, with eye rolling, tremors and spasms; in the second are a corrupt lifestyle taken by moralists to be symbolic of madness as human folly: debauchery, lust, drinking, aggression and violence, and a lack of respect for authority. We all know what ‘frenetic’, ‘frantic’ and ‘frenzy’ mean: it is this particular form of narrative regarding mental disorder that phrenitis inspired and sustained for centuries through various genres and discourses.
Technicality and metaphor
In the history of medicine and psychiatry – better put, within the large territories these two umbrella labels cover – much sociological and human variation, as well as the existential significance of health and illness beyond the strictly hygienic and bodily, can be placed within the spectrum between the two extremes of metaphor and technicalism. I intend these terms as an ontological gradation intended and understood by those who use a concept or label. Technicalism, in this sense, is a learned, sophisticated use of the term ‘phrenitis’ in as precise a way as possible to professionally and operatively identify patients and care for them with appropriate therapies. Metaphor, on the other hand, is a lay, poetic, invective or religious use of the term to identify the consequences of the disease outside the medical realm, to depict behaviours that resemble it, or to interpret it as a punishment or marker of a metaphysical judgement received by the human sufferer. The difference I am pointing to is the one between, say, the well-known folk idea of a ‘sacred disease’, demonic/divine in kind, and a sober assessment of a brain disorder, complete with encephalograms and other test results. At first glance, these two narratives have nothing to do with one another, and the ironic disparagement and snobbery of the second against the first is a topic in itself in medical history. However, the superstitious narrative sustains the scientific one and provides it with continuity throughout the centuries – not the opposite. While scientific theories and notions undergo astonishing downturns, outbursts of discovery and clamorous retractions, the ‘sacred disease’ remains fundamentally identical to itself. In the same way, the moral, allegorical, existential and theatrical life of phrenitis throughout the centuries sustained its concrete presence as an all too real physical ailment.
Body, mind, morality
Closely linked to metaphor is, more generally, the idea of variation in ethical worth, in quality as a feature of pathology – illness as a matter of virtue, self-control or eudaimonia, to use a Greek term. This element is interlaced with accounts of madness in the history of psychiatry and of mental health in our tradition and others. The idea that madness and badness could be related, even identical, has been exploited to stigmatise minorities or marginalised categories of other kinds, disability, perceived ‘debauchery’ and even dissent, and to turn the latter – or any form of intellectual, political or religious disagreement – into a sickness inscribed in the body, its physiology, functioning, appearance and individual destiny. Phrenitis, and especially its parable as a sickness of heresy, drunkenness or a lack of resistance to temptation or self-control, is first picked up and elaborated by Augustine as a theological-sapiential metaphor: hallucination, aggressiveness, a lack of awareness of disease, false strength and a refusal to be cured are all perfect manifestations of the original sin Christianity locates in all of us. This narrative is maintained and perpetuated by Christian writers, sustaining the longevity and appeal of the disease phrenitis and the elements it lends to modern syndromic constructs such as stress and substance abuse.
History of psychiatry, history of medicine: stories of human bodies
Finally, the individual outcome of this particular story, outlined in Chapter 10, illustrates a general point. In different cultural circumstances, socio-economic and political contexts, and scientific cultures, diseases change or may appear to ‘die’. Of course, they never really do. The human body is one and the same, despite evolving bacteriological surroundings and metabolic conditions, but its ‘stories’ and territories are bound to change. Once a certain balance is tipped, a disease that had survived with reasonable consistency for over 2000 years falls irreparably out of fashion, with a redistribution of its features among other entities (in this particular story, meningitis, stress syndrome and delirium). The example of this case restores the human body in its role as guarantee for the persistence of pathologies, the ideal centre of a story, 95% of which might change, but with a resilient core that resists annihilation. As well as historical and medical knowledge, then, literary appreciation is indispensable if we are to follow these developments in full, since their movements and effects are much like those of poetic genres, artistic representations, literary tricks and conventions, and much less like stable, quantifiable achievements.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Wellcome Trust and by the Cluster of Excellence Roots (CAU, Kiel).
