Abstract
This monograph endeavours to carry out ‘a dialogue on meaning’ (p. 7) within language theory by ‘look[ing] again at what has been said about meaning in various fields of linguistics, social studies and the philosophy of language’ (p. 4). It calls into question the cognitive viewpoint of language being in the mind that has acquired a prominent position in the field of language studies since the second half of the 20th century. For Teubert, meaning is always social rather than mental, and discourse offers a site for negotiation of previous meaning and construction of new meaning as ‘a collaborative act’ (p. 29) among the members of a discourse community.
The monograph consists of 16 chapters divided into two parts, plus an introduction, a conclusion, a bibliography and a subject index. Part I comprises the first seven chapters, providing an almost exhaustive review of literature on mind and meaning, showing the problem of cognitive approaches to the study of language that ‘disregards entirely the role discourse plays’ (p. 13ff.). Composed of nine chapters, Part II predominantly presents a solution to the problems cognitive approaches cannot work out. It covers three general topics: (i) meaning is temporary and innovative; (ii) meaning is constructed in discourse; and (iii) the discourse community constructs reality. Part I is thus more synthetic, while Part II is more original. While addressing these topics theoretically, Chapters 14 and 16 of Part II notably are so designed to mainly illustrate them by relying on two special examples. Structurally, both the empirically grounded Chapter 14 and Chapter 16 would seem to be better placed together as an additional part rather than in the more theoretical Part II.
The least that could be said about Meaning, Discourse and Society is that it will not be ignored by scholars in the field of discourse studies. The main reason is that, though consistent with the long-established position of meaning being social, it takes an entirely distinctive perspective for examining meaning and discourse. However, closer reading reveals that the discussions made are not without deficiency in illuminating many of the core issues of meaning and language as a social phenomenon. First of all, the argument that cognitive linguistics often neglects or even ignores the social aspect of meaning sounds a bit arbitrary and unfair to cognitive linguists. Cognitive linguistics as a whole is not infrequently argued as more socio-cultural practice due to its being more critically aware of ideology in language. Social functional approaches to language have heavily influenced cognitive approaches in a number of important ways, although this influence is not always overtly acknowledged. To this day, an increasing awareness can be observed among cognitive linguists of social meaning in discourse. Hirsch (1997: 62), for instance, claims that the variation in cognitive understanding among interlocutors leaves much room for negotiation and renegotiation of the meaning of what is said in communication. This point of view on interpretation certainly is not at odds with the theme of social meaning proposed by Teubert.
As opposed to critical discourse analysis (CDA), by viewing ‘society as a discourse construct’ (p. 121), Teubert suggests turning around the relationship between discourse and society. Despite his surface plausibility, unfairness to CDA is also traceable. Claimed long before, discourse to CDA is ‘socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258, italics in the original). The relationship between discourse and society is dialectic. Teubert clearly overemphasizes one aspect and deliberately ignores the other. To me, each aspect of the relationship is complementary and inevitable for discussion and analysis of meaning created inside and through the discourse. Instead of disregarding linguistic data as the evidence of social meaning, CDA practitioners intending to strive for greater strength of linguistic evidence currently often combine socio-critical and cognitive approaches to examining linguistically presented social meaning.
Intentionality is another core issue concerning mind and meaning that has been vigorously discussed. The position held for intentionality is habitually concerned with how human consciousness can be directed at particular objects or states of affairs. What is novel is the replacement of individual minds with collective minds. For Teubert, either experiential or reflective intentionality is internal, and only when they turn into the collective mind expressed in discourse can they be open to examination. By focusing on ‘collective or symbolic intentionality’ (p. 248) and on discourse community, Teubert unsurprisingly avoids discussing another intentionality that is associated with the idea of purposeful action. While an extensive analysis of intentionality cannot be undertaken in the book, it seems indispensable to make a few relevant points of the latter. This is of particular significance considering its prime intention. Equally odd is the entire ignorance of culture as a relevant variable of speaker intention in producing meaning, despite sufficient attention being given to the role played by the discourse community and their cultural differences in meaning construction.
Nevertheless, it is still easy to sense insightfulness and freshness of thinking on meaning and language as a social phenomenon. The monograph provides the reader with an accessible theoretical background to various views of meaning in a diversity of fields.