Debating the 2015 Islam law in Austrian Parliament: Between legal recognition and Islamophobic populism

Abstract

This article analyses the two national parliamentary debates on the new Islam law of 2015 using a Viennese School of Critical Discourse Analysis. It asks how the new Islam law was framed from the perspectives of the political parties in power and of those in opposition. It also shows in detail which arguments were raised to defend, alter or support the proposed law by identifying the list of topoi used. It asks especially how racist arguments were debated between on one side a comparably tolerant Austrian system of laws on religion, and on the other, the dominant right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria, which aimed to foster Islamophobia.

Keywords

Austria Critical Discourse Analysis Islam law Islamophobia parliamentary debates racism

Introduction

Austria was known for a long time for its tolerant policies regarding the Muslim community. In contrast to other Western European countries, there have been no restrictions or (national) parliamentary debates with the purpose of limiting Muslims’ freedom of religion (Gresch and Hadj-Abdou, 2009). This is very much due to the legal status Muslims enjoy. Since 1912 Islam has been legally recognized by law (Kalb et al., 2003), which guarantees Muslims a number of rights as one of currently 17 privileged, legally recognized churches and religious communities (Heine et al., 2012). But this longstanding consensus on the integration of Islam and its inclusion in a constructed ‘us’ of national identity within the ruling political elite (Hafez, 2014) came under question when the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) split from the ruling centre-right coalition of the Conservatives (ÖVP) and Jörg Haider founded his right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ) (Hödl, 2010). This initiated a race to be the most Islamophobic group, radicalizing people not only on the far right but also parts of the political centre and left to adopt Islamophobic discourse strategies (Hafez, 2010). For example, in 2008 a ban on the construction of mosques and minarets was implemented in Carinthia and Vorarlberg by a centrist party (Hafez, 2010). Although the far right saw a thematic shift, now concentrating on opposing Muslims specifically and no longer foreigners in general, these discourses seem to be consistent with previous racist discourses in parliament as evaluated by discourse analysts, such as Wodak and Van Dijk (2000). The Islamic Council tried to push the government to amend the current version of the Islam law to adapt to the new circumstances of a growing Muslim community, an aim dating back to 2005 (Hafez, 2012).

After national elections in 2013, when the coalition of Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Conservatives (ÖVP) returned to power, the intention to amend the Islam law of 1912 became part of the new government’s programme of work. According to the deputy undersecretary of the Minister of Cultural Affairs, this issue was widely accepted without contestation or party rivalry (Interview with Brian Schmidt, 17 March 2015). The programme of work states that the Islam law of 1912 would be updated and amended ‘according to the principles of parity, state-neutrality, autonomy, and cost-neutrality’ (BR, 2013: 28). Although the Austrian Islamic Council – represented by its president – had initiated this process and was part of the negotiations, a massive protest from Muslim organizations, civil society, legal scholars and others followed the initial presentation of the new law on 2 October 2014. The draft law received more than 160 reviews, of which a majority were very critical, especially from legal scholars (Potz and Schinkele 2014; Schima, 2014).

Following a few months of public debate, the law was accepted on 25 February 2015 by the Austrian National Council (Nationalrat) with few amendments and on 12 March by the Federal Council (Bundesrat). These two chambers constitute the bicameral Austrian parliamentary system, the legislative organs of the Republic, and thus I will primarily analyse debates in these two chambers. The most authoritative of the two chambers is the directly voted National Council, while the Federal Council is indirectly elected by nine provincial assemblies (Altwanger and Zögernitz, 2006). They constitute the core institutions of Austria’ democracy, since ‘parliaments are democratically constituted fora for a political deliberation, legislation, problem solving and decision making’ (Ilie, 2010: 1).

While the SPÖ Minister of Cultural Affairs, whose portfolio includes religion, was nearly absent from the political stage, the ÖVP Minister of Foreign and Integration Affairs dominated the public debate on the Islam law in public. The ÖVP is more inclined to deal with religion because ideologically religion plays a more important role for a Christian-Democratic party. At the same time, this initiative can be interpreted in light of recent findings on the ÖVP’s general strategy of setting the agenda on emotionally loaded topics like the ‘integration’ issue, in which the ÖVP took the leadership from the FPÖ, while the SPÖ remains quite silent on these issues (Rosenberger, 2013: 64–65). Hence, taking action in this area can also be interpreted as a strategic maintenance of thematic leadership.

Research question and hypotheses

In view of the massive criticism by legal scholars who criticized the law as unconstitutional and discriminatory against Muslims, this article asks how the new Islam law was interpreted by the political parties in power and by those in opposition. It also elaborates on the arguments marshalled to defend, alter or support the proposed law. As Van Dijk (2000) has shown, racism in parliamentary debates is about the ‘reproduction of […] prejudices or ideologies’ (p. 88) and thus may contribute to marginalization and exclusion. Analysis gives insight into the ways in which politicians speak (a) about ‘the Other’, (b) about their social representation of ‘the Other’, (c) about the possible effects on the representation of recipients and (d) ‘within a socio-political context of legislation and public opinion formation’ (Van Dijk, 2000). This analysis builds on much of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) research on racism (Van Dijk, 2000, 2002, 2004; Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000) and Islamophobic populism (Hafez, 2010) in parliamentary debates, and attempts to contribute to long neglected analyses of parliamentary debates (Ilie, 2010: 5, 2015; Ilie et al., 2016).

The article asks whether the debate in fact followed the guidelines of the government’s programme of work, which emphasized the principles of parity, state neutrality, autonomy and cost neutrality and was contested by many critics. At the backdrop of the existing criticism, it therefore asks how racist and anti-racist arguments were produced, reproduced and countered between the poles of a comparably tolerant Austrian system of including religious organizations on one side, and the -right FPÖ’s dominant position in setting the agenda of public debates on Islam on the other. Thus, it looks back historically at the wide arsenal of the FPÖ’s racist and Islamophobic discourse strategies. The research corpus consists of two parliamentary debates, one each in the Federal and the National Council. Methodologically, I will draw on the Viennese School of CDA, the discourse-historical approach (DHA) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016) by focusing on the framework of argumentation analysis, discourse strategies and the list of topoi (Reisigl, 2014).

Based on findings in the analysis of Islamophobic populism on a federal level (Hafez, 2010) and discriminatory and exclusionary discourse in the national parliament in general (Sedlak, 2000), I hypothesize that Members of Parliament (MPs) from ÖVP, in its position as a ruling party, will embody ambivalent positions. Based on the findings of earlier studies, it can be assumed that ÖVP MPs reproduce many Islamophobic topoi that are likewise used – in a more aggressive and explicit way – by the far-right FPÖ (Hafez, 2010) also to gain thematic leadership. On the other hand, as a responsible party in power, it is bound by the constitution and its self-imposed principles. While the SPÖ – even in opposition – was ambivalent in its discourse on a federal level (Hafez, 2010) and hesitant to discuss these emotionally freighted issues on a national level (Rosenberger, 2013), the more secular SPÖ, which was nearly absent during the public debate, is anticipated to take a similarly ambivalent stance towards the issue in parliamentary debates. The Greens, as a centre-left party with a strong anti-racist tradition, are expected to be anti-racist in opposition at the national level. At the same time, well-known MPs who reproduce Islamophobic discourses (Hafez, 2009a) may consider the Greens to be similarly ambivalent to the SPÖ. At the same time, both coalition parties will avoid positioning themselves as openly Islamophobic in order to maintain Austria’s position as a headquarters of international institutions and as a ‘European role model’ of religions’ peaceful coexistence, as it had been in the past (Hafez, 2014). The thesis is that this will be especially true of the ÖVP, which has recently endorsed a more progressive rhetoric on integration issues while holding on to restrictive integration policies (Gruber and Rosenberger, 2015: 13). While we can assume that the FPÖ, as the strongest proponent of racist discourses, will use the Islam law debate to support its Islamophobic programme, the socially and economically liberal NEOS (The New Austria, a party represented only on the National Council) and the socially farther-right Team Stronach are two new parties that have not yet been researched.

The next section gives a short overview on the DHA as the central method used in this analysis, focusing especially on argumentation analysis and a list of topoi (Reisigl, 2014). It also presents the theoretical framework for analysing the far right’s discourse on Islam (Islamophobic Populism). Following this I give an overview of the context and the general role of Islamophobic populism within centrist parties in the years before 2015, after which the detailed findings of the analysis of parliamentary debates are presented. The last section concludes with the central findings of this research.

The DHA and racism in parliament

The method I use in this article is the DHA. This method has been successfully used to analyse discriminatory and racist discourse in politics (Hafez, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2014; Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1989; Wodak and Pelinka, 2003; Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000) and has been constantly developed (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The DHA defines discourse as ‘a complex of context-dependent semiotic practices […]; socially constituted and socially constitutive; related to a macro-topic and to the argumentation about validity of claims’ (Reisigl, 2014: 69). DHA assumes that language is a ‘social practice’ (Wodak, 2005). The DHA thus considers ‘extra-lingusitic factors’, such as culture, society and ideology. It depends on ‘who speaks to whom, when, where and with which motives’. Language is understood as ‘a means to gain and maintain power via the use that powerful people make of it, and an expression of power relations’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 26). Hence one of the aims of the DHA is to deconstruct ideologies that serve to establish, perpetuate or resist dominance (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 25). Power here relates to an asymmetric relationship among social actors and is seen as socially ubiquitous (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 26). The DHA examines the relationship between power and language (Wodak, 2005) and sees texts as ‘sites of social struggle, in that they manifest traces of a range of ideological struggles for dominance and hegemony’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 26).

The DHA, on which I rely here, is primarily focused on the field of politics. According to studies conducted by Martin Reisigl, eight fields of action can be differentiated. Our field is the one of law making, which intersects with the field of formation of public attitudes and opinions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 29), since a central function of a parliament is also the so-called soapbox function that aims at speaking not only to MPs but also to potential listeners and to news media (Schefbeck, 2006: 161). Reisigl and Wodak recommend conducting DHA in eight steps: (1) consulting preceding theoretical knowledge, (2) systematic collection of data, (3) selection and preparation of data for specific analyses, (4) specification of the research questions, (5) qualitative pilot analysis, (6) detailed case studies, (7) formulation of critique and (8) practical application of analytical results (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 34).

For the DHA, the argumentation theory is one of its fundamentals, a crucial element of discourse itself (Reisigl, 2014). Argumentation in the DHA is conceptualized as ‘an abstract pattern of text formation […] or discourse formation’ (Reisigl, 2014: 72). DHA tries to distinguish between sound and fallacious argumentation by proposing 10 rules for rational dispute (Reisigl, 2014: 79–80). Central to the formal analysis as well as the content-related analysis of argumentation is topoi. They are conceived of as argumentation analytical categories (Reisigl, 2014: 68) and are defined as ‘central parts of argumentation that belong to the premises. They justify the transition from the argument(s) to the conclusion’ (Reisigl, 2014: 75). In this sense they are also functional, for ‘a topos serves as a conclusion rule (warrant) that connects an argument with a claim’ (Reisigl, 2014: 86). In the DHA, the topos is an argumentation-related category and not a literary topos (Reisigl, 2014: 88). In regard to our topic of Islam and right-wing populism, discourse-specific topoi have been identified in empirical analyses (Hafez, 2010; Reisigl, 2008) on which we can rely for our case study. We will especially focus on the specific discourse strategies used in the formulation of the identified topoi (Meyer and Wodak, 2005: 27).

Drawing on Teun A. Van Dijk’s (2000) analysis of racism in parliamentary debates, anti-Muslim racism in our case can be understood as a ‘system of social inequality in which ethnic minority groups are dominated by a white (European) majority’ (p. 87). The dominant group (here MPs) abuses power to illegitimately control others in their actions and resources (p. 87). Van Dijk (2004) differentiates between racist discourse directed at (the racialized; see Meer, 2013) ‘Others’ and about (the racialized) ‘Others’ (p. 351). Our case of parliamentary debates fits into the second category. This is where a dominant group of parliamentarians discusses issues about and for a religious minority. Political scientist Farid Hafez introduced ‘Islamophobic Populism’ (Hafez, 2010) to analyse discourses on Islam, which – in Europe – often intermingle with discourses on security, integration and immigration (Halm and Jäger, 2007). ‘Islamophobic populism’ is a synthesis of the term Islamophobia and the notion of populism. Hafez draws a parallel between the classical features of populism and those of Islamophobia. Populism and Islamophobia are about simplification, dichotomization and a dual worldview that divides the world into good and evil: ‘evil Islam’ and the ‘good West’. This ‘confrontation and antagonism’ is possible because ‘the West’ is seen as the palladium of democracy, human rights and civilization, whereas ‘Islam’ stands for dogmatism, fanaticism, misogyny and so on. Populism and Islamophobia homogenize a monolithic nation, a Volk, and place it in confrontation with the other, ‘Islam’. Populism and Islamophobia play a role in the production of anti-elitist, vertical and xenophobic, horizontal affects. Drawing on psychoanalytical theories of anti-Semitism, the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ within the notion of Islamophobia are understood as imaginations and constructions, not as a religion or social subjects (Hafez, 2016).

Conflation of the characteristics of the terms populism and Islamophobia – Islamophobic populism.

	Populism	Islamophobia
Common characteristics	Amalgamation of ‘we groups’ the imagined ‘Volk’	Perception of Islam as a homogenous body
	Simplification	Perception of Islam as static and monolithic
	Dichotomy	Perception of Islam as ‘evil’ vs West/Occident as ‘good’
	Stereotypes	Perception of Islam as reactionary, hostile, etc.
	In- and out-groups	An exclusionary project

Source: Hafez (2010).

The context: Islamophobia in dominant society

Since Haider’s leadership starting in 1986, the FPÖ has advocated a nationalist discourse that creates a collective identity by drawing borders and mobilizing people. While Islamophobia did not play a major role during the coalition of the FPÖ and the ÖVP from 2000 to 2005 (Heinisch, 2003), a shift came with Haider’s split from the FPÖ and the creation of a new party, the BZÖ. When the FPÖ went into opposition again in 2005 it became dominated by its far-right camp, while the ‘liberal’ camp had shrunk enormously (Luther, 2007). The thematic focus on Islamophobia in election campaigns can be seen by looking at various slogans of regional, national and supranational elections using blatantly racist speech (Hafez, 2010).

This constant attention placed on Islam in election campaigns made a lasting impression on other parties, especially the ‘centrist’ Conservatives (ÖVP) and Social Democrats (SPÖ). Among others, the FPÖ already claimed, in 2008, to reconsider the legal status of Islam. The argument runs that ‘the Islam of immigration cannot receive the same rights as autochthonous Bosnian Muslims during the times of the Habsburg Monarchy’ (Hafez, 2009b; 122) and thus challenges the political culture of the inclusion of Muslims. The Christian-democratic ÖVP relies on a narrow image of Austrian culture that simultaneously embraces Muslims in an ambivalent way. Some programmes already reveal the impact of Islamophobic discourse strategies. Terms such as Parallelgesellschaft (‘parallel society’) or ‘hate preacher’ that originate from FPÖ discourses on Islam had already found their way to the election manifesto by 2008. Sebastian Kurz, who was head of the Young Conservatives (JVP) at the time and would later become a central figure in creating the new 2015 Islam law, demanded that German be the basis of Austrian society and taken for granted in everyday life, that Islamic belief become more transparent and more open, that the Austrian Islamic Council (IGGiÖ) stop considering mosques with minarets in every capital city, that imams speak German and understand their situation in Austria and that integration be enhanced. All of these Islamophobic claims were openly stated by the FPÖ before (Hafez, 2009b).

Programmatically, the SPÖ seems to oscillate between its anti-religious tradition on one side and a desire to protect minorities on the other (Hafez, 2010). In contrast to the ÖVP, no Islamophobic programme has been adopted in any of its election programmes. Anti-racist positions in regard to Islamophobia can be found alongside Islamophobic positions, in keeping with its historically critical stance towards religion in general. In 2007, the president of the SPÖ women’s caucus, Barbara Prammer, called the headscarf ‘a symbol of women’s subordination’ (Dannhauser, 2007). In the same interview she argued for acceptance of mosques with minarets in the public space. Similarly, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Hannes Swoboda not only argued against a headscarf ban in Turkey, but also argued that state personnel in Austria and Turkey should not wear any religious symbols, including headscarves (Austria Press Agency, 2008). In 2010, Laura Rudas, the executive secretary of the SPÖ, publicly declared that the headscarf was a ‘symbol of oppression’, and that although it could not be forbidden, ‘it must be a goal to drop the headscarf’ (Nowak, 2010). This clearly shows the difficulty for Social Democrats in dealing with difference and including Islam in the public sphere against the backdrop of a conflict between secularity on one side and anti-racist positions on the other.

This discourse gradually affected policies. In 2008 and 2009, bans on mosques and minarets were introduced in Carinthia with the votes of the far-right BZÖ and in Vorarlberg with the votes of the ÖVP and the FPÖ. The SPÖ took no clear stance towards the issue and oscillated between the two poles described above. Only the Greens clearly followed their programmatic anti-racist position (Hafez, 2010). Nevertheless, single Green politicians also adopt an Islamophobic discourse, as studies have shown (Hafez, 2009a). To sum up, we can say that Islamophobic discourse has moved from the far-right opposition to dominant society and has thus become normalized.

Debating the 2015 Islam law

After the draft of the Islam law was presented on 2 October 2014 by two ministers (SPÖ and ÖVP), the draft was passed on 3 December 2014 by the meeting of ministers with the constitutional affairs committee. The Islam law was debated on 25 February 2015 by the National Council and on 12 March 2015 by the Federal Council. The transcripts of both debates (stenographic protocols) serve as my primary data. Next to the two coalition parties (SPÖ and ÖVP), the opposition parties holding seats in both chambers were the (left-leaning) Greens, the FPÖ and Team Stronach. The (more economically liberal) NEOS was only represented on the National Council. While only the two parties in government supported the law, the opposition parties had different reasons for voting against the law, according to their strategic and programmatic stance, which had no effect on the law-making process, however. Hence, Austrian parliamentary discourses can be said to have not so much function of influencing the decision (Ilie, 2010: 8–9), but rather that of talking to the broader public. The law was signed on 30 March 2015.

Setting the agenda

Parliamentary discourse ‘displays particular institutionalised discursive features and complies with a number of specific rules and conventions’ (Ilie, 2010: 8). According to the rules of operation on the National and Federal Councils, the strongest opposition party by number of seats is entitled to open the debate (Altwanger and Zögernitz, 2006). Hence the far-right FPÖ started the debates in both parliamentary chambers. This is important in that the FPÖ implicated a number of issues with the Islam law, and nearly all MPs responded to them in their statements and paid attention to them throughout their contribution to the discussion. Hence the FPÖ clearly set the agenda in both debates. This observation supports findings of earlier studies that show that the FPÖ has the thematic leadership in immigrant and asylum policy (e.g. Sedlak, 2000). But more than that it also shows us how the structure of Austrian parliamentarianism impacts parliamentary practices (Ilie, 2010: 3) and how this confrontation affects the dynamics of parliamentary agenda setting (Ilie, 2010: 10).

According to FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache, the Islam law should have been an ‘Anti-Islamism law’ to counter ‘radical Islam’ and ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ (NR 2015, 144). He regrets that although there are ‘threatening developments’ in Islamism, the Islam law fails to provide an answer to these ‘radicalisms’ (NR 144). ‘Dangerous radicalisms’ and ‘dangerous Islamization’ (NR 145) are two phrases repeatedly used by Strache. While he stated that ‘not all Muslims are to be put under general suspicion […] when radical Islamism refers to Islam, then it has something to do with Islam’ (NR 145). Compounds like these have the effect of transferring the meaning of one term (radical) to the other (Islam) and vice versa. This vagueness of meaning occludes the real relationship between the two terms and keeps the reader in a state of uncertainty as to whether the problem lies with Islam or with a political and radical interpretation of it (Schiffer, 2007). This was apparent when another MP (ÖVP) referred to ‘500,000 Islamists living in Austria’, clearly meaning ‘Muslims’ and not ‘Islamists’ (NR 170). With this argument, Strache attempted not to generalize about all Muslims, while softening the same argument by referring to the Islamic core of ‘Islamic radicalism’ and thus essentializing Islam.

For Strache, it was important to say what the Islam law was not. For him, it lacked a ban on minarets and a ban on burqas (NR 145). He argues,

The Islam law is half-hearted, incomplete, and cements privileges that unfortunately play into the hands of radical Islam, and prevent the integration of Muslims into society. (NR 145)

Because of this, Strache concludes that the Islam law would ‘foster the Islamization of Austria’ (NR 146). Since Muslims are allowed to teach their religious rites to children, this was interpreted by Strache as ‘a license for radical Islamists to pass on culturally alien behaviour patterns with the state’s help’ (NR 146). This goes hand in hand with earlier referential strategies, where the FPÖ saw a conspiracy between Marxist elites and the SPÖ as supporters of Islamization (Hafez, 2011).

While the FPÖ shaped the debate as a whole, socially more progressive arguments were generally fewer and farther between. Among them are the statements by MPs from the ruling and opposition parties from the leftist and socially progressive spectrum, arguing that the law had to be renewed to meet today’s challenges (NR 150, 165, BR 2015, 35). They were not so much targeting the law, but rather the FPÖ discourse. Hence, at the beginning, the ruling parties were able to present their new Islam law as a progressive and tolerant initiative in the face of the extremely Islamophobic discourse of the FPÖ. For example, party whip Reinhold Lopatka (ÖVP) argued that all churches and religious societies should have the possibility of blossoming because he advocates a ‘liberal, open state, an open society’ (153). Similarly, Conservative MP Asdin El-Habbassi argued that the Islam law was an offshoot of freedom of religion (NR 199). With the help of the strategy of predication (qualifying the law as part of a liberal and fundamental rights agenda), the Conservative MPs attempted to frame the Islam law as purely positive.

Topos of belonging

At the very beginning, Strache introduces a debate which was referenced by many MPs. The question raised was whether Islam should be seen as belonging to Austria or not. This symbolized the central question of inclusion versus exclusion of Islam and Muslims in the discursive construction of national identity. Strache criticized the ÖVP leadership for affirming this statement and negated it using the strategy of intensification:

I say: No! [Islam] does not belong to Austria, neither culturally, nor historically. (NR 144)

He then went on to state that Bosnia used to be part of the Austrian monarchy but stopped being so after World War I. This is consistent with the FPÖ’s programmatic differentiation between ‘immigration-Islam’ and the historical ‘autochthonous Bosnian Islam’ and the subsequent position that ‘the legal status of Islam in Austria shall be reconsidered’ (Hafez, 2009b). MP Kickl (FPÖ) used the strategy of representation by quoting a liberal philosopher, who criticized the German Chancellor Merkel for arguing that Islam was part of Germany. Kickl argued that it was right to say that Muslims were part of Austria as citizens, but underscored that this was due to the government’s misguided immigration policy (NR 196f.), implying that if the FPÖ had been in power, Muslims would not have become Austrian citizens and would thus not be granted similar rights as other citizens. MP Monika Mühlwerth (FPÖ) went a step beyond her party members and argued using the strategy of intensification:

Why have I said at the beginning that Islam does not belong to Austria? This is because Islam is not a religion like other religions […] but a political system. (BR 29)

She presents her ‘knowledge’, which is nothing but her perception (Van Dijk, 2011), as truth. By that she reframes the religion of Islam to create an antagonism between ‘Islam’ on one side and the Austrian political system on the other. This exclusion of Islam from the construction of Austria is clearly countered by MPs in the ÖVP. In keeping with his own party, Minister Kurz argued,

In my opinion, Islam belongs to Austria. We were the first country in Europe to recognize Islam in 1912 […] we have to be cautious not to deny reality. […] It doesn’t help us to act as if there was no Islam in Austria, although we have 500,000 Muslims. (NR 164)

The reactions of SPÖ MPs differed. Wittmann (SPÖ) argued that Muslims were part of Austria, since they had been living here as citizens for three generations (NR 149f.). Josef Cap (SPÖ) disagreed with the German chancellor that Islam was part of Germany (or in this case, Austria; NR 157). For the Green MP Alev Korun, Muslims are

part of Austrian society as much as Jews […] atheists […] Buddhists […] and Christians. (NR 150)

Topos of radical Islamism

While Strache criticizes the fact that there is no minaret ban or burqa ban in the Islam law, MP Peter Wittmann replies that the Islam law is not a construction regulation or a clothing regulation (NR 148). Many MPs from the coalition parties as well as from the (non-right-wing) opposition argued that the Islam law was not a security law or an anti-terrorism law, but a law of religion – although to different ends (NR 148, 161, 162, 165, 169, 172, 199; BR 36). In seeming contradiction, many of the MPs from the government parties argued that the Islam law ‘gives leverage against radical preachers’, because they have to subordinate themselves to the Islamic Council or the Alevi (NR 149). Wittmann, for example, argued that the Ministry of the Interior would have the ability to ‘intervene in associations who provide space to preachers of hate’ (NR 149). MP Harald Stefan (FPÖ) questioned not Wittmann’s statement itself, but only the possibility of putting this law into practice because in his view, state officials are not scholars of religion (NR 166). His Conservative counterpart, Reinhold Lopatka (ÖVP), used the strategy of intensification: ‘We will do everything to act against radicals, we will do everything, I tell you, we won’t allow anything’ (NR 153). Hence radical Islamism was openly recognized by coalition MPs as a challenge that would be tackled by the Islam law. Again, this topos was used to argue for as well as against the Islam law depending on whether MPs frame it partly as a law tackling security issues (ÖVP and FPÖ) or not (SPÖ, Greens and NEOS).

Topos of people

The topos of people (Argumentum ad populum ) is a frequently used populistic topos (Reisigl, 2014: 78). According to this, politicians have to do something they perceive the people want them to do. In our case, this is acting upon fears. MPs from the ruling parties like Lopatka (ÖVP) argued that ‘we have to quell the fears of the people. We want to suppress the radicals’ influence’ (NR 153). MPs El-Habbassi (ÖVP) and Lopatka agreed with the FPÖ that the people’s fears must not be ignored (NR 144, 146, 152, 199). While MPs from the opposition (FPÖ) argued that the law would not help to solve these problems (BR 43), Conservative MPs argued that this law would help to quell fears.

Topos of precedence of national law

One of the most central arguments, which was actively brought forward by the two ministers, was the topos of precedence of national law over religious law, which reminds us of the general topos of law and order that is frequently found in populist discourse (Reisigl, 2014: 79). The topos of precedence of national law is based on the assumption that Muslims follow a ‘shariah law’ which is contrary to national law. This topos was strongly challenged throughout the public debate on the law. Many actors protested that no other law of religion would contain such a clause, and the fact that this statement occurs more than once clearly points to Muslims as people not to be trusted (Schinkele and Potz, 2014). Lopatka argued why removing this clause would not have made sense:

If we had not kept it, this may have increased people’s fear. Why? Because there are people on the street who fan fear. They would have taken this as an opportunity and said: Now that the law no longer invokes national law’s precedence, Islam has essentially gained the upper hand. Some may have said that sharia was now at centre stage. (NR 153–154)

This topos meant that the parties in power would provide law and order for the people. It was connected with the topos of people and became challenged by the topos of general suspicion (see later) used by the opposition. The topos of precedence of national law was emphasized regularly by MPs in the coalition parties (BR 30). A similar topos, which is frequently stressed by representatives of the coalition (NR 148, 172, BR 36) and Minister Kurz (NR 163), was that the law would bring ‘rights and duties’, implying that Muslims would now have to abide by the law more than before, bringing duties that were not defined before.

Topos of the German language

Strache also demanded that the German language should be obligatory in mosques, Islam classes at public schools (which is already the case) and prisons, and criticized that this would not be the case under the new Islam law (NR 145). The centrality of the German language in the FPÖ is strongly linked to the ideological character of Nationalists, who conceptualize Austria as an ethnically German nation and not as a civic nation. The focus on the German language as an indicator of Austrian identity has also become central to the ÖVP (Hafez, 2010: 101), even after the topic of ‘integration’ was included and subsequently institutionalized in a government ministry (Rosenberger, 2013: 62–63). An implication of this argument is that Muslims have to be transparent, and that they may have a hidden agenda that can be stopped by forcing them to use German as their language of communication. When ‘sermons and religious instructions are not done in German […] hate-preachers can only hardly be convicted’ (NR 146, emphasis added), says Strache. Therefore, ‘public authorities have to be able to understand what is being preached’ (NR 147). Using the strategy of intensification, ‘holy warriors’ for Strache are ‘devil warriors’ (NR 146). MP Jessi Lintl (Stronach) supported Strache’s arguments and called upon Islamic religious societies

[to] openly declare their articles of faith, traditions and rituals […] in German, because only then are they verifiable. (NR 154)

implying a conspiracy. According to Strache, the law would even prevent integration because the German language was not enforced in Muslim religious life (NR 145), as was already demanded in 2007. (Hafez, 2010: 23)

MPs in the coalition government reacted to these argumentations in different ways. MP Wittmann (SPÖ) argued that Christian denominations also preached in other languages (NR 149), which for him represented ‘the diversity of our state […] living integration’ (NR 149). MP Michaela Steinacker (ÖVP) claimed that in the future, imams would teach and be taught in German (NR 197), thus affirming the importance of German as does Strache. Steinacker replied that religious instructions had to be in German anyway and that hence ‘one can hear and see what is taught’ (NR 197). This was strongly countered by Minister Josef Ostermayer (SPÖ), who argued that the only reason the articles of faith had to be published in German was formal (BR 40). So while some MPs – from the governing and the opposition parties – use the topos of German language to foster nationalist feelings and securitize Islam, the minister formally in charge of this law refuses these topoi with a sound argumentation.

Topos of an Austrian strain of Islam

A major rhetorical device that is strongly connected to the issue of language is the topos of an Austrian strain of Islam (Islam österreichischer Prägung). Minister Kurz has published short commentaries on this issue (Kurz, 2015) and organized a conference on 15 June 2015 to promote this concept. It is an Austrian version of a European-wide trend of creating institutional conditions for the emergence of a national Islam to ‘gradually take “ownership” of their Muslim populations’ (Laurence, 2012: 12–13). The new Islam law was presented as an initiative to give Islam a home in Austria, as if an Islam law had not already existed for 103 years. The law would resolve the construed ‘contradiction’ between being a believing Muslim and a self-identified Austrian at the same time, a concept repeated by other Conservative MPs (NR 197). This boilerplate was also repeated during the parliamentary debates. Kurz argued that the Islam law ‘is an opportunity for Islam to develop in Austria on its own, without dictation and pressure from foreign countries’ (NR 162). This was supported by Conservative MPs (BR 36). Only a single MP from the Greens, Efgani Dönmez, backed this argument (BR 34). According to MP Stefan Schennach (SPÖ), the 1912 Islam law had already ‘laid the foundation for a modern European Islam’ (BR 37), whereas for MPs like Gerd Krusche (FPÖ), a ‘European Islam’ was impossible. Using the strategy of perspectivation by citing the Islamophobe Henryk Broder (Schneiders 2015), he asserted that Islam and Islamism could not be divided (BR 42).

In contrast to that, MP Wittmann (SPÖ) argued that Muslims would now have a place at the university where it could train personnel ‘in Austria […] within the scope of Austrian traditions and the Austrian legal system’ (NR 148), hence valuing ‘Austria’ with a strategy of nomination as a location for positively influencing the future understanding of Islam.

It is interesting that Katharina Kucharowits was the only member of the coalition (SPÖ) who questioned the phrase – ‘Austrian strain of Islam’ – although she did not really explain why (NR 172). The phrase ‘Austrian strain of Islam’ was not used by the opposition parties either, while institutionalizing Islamic theology at an Austrian university was welcomed by some opposition MPs but many more in the governing parties (NR 172). MPs from both the governing SPÖ (NR 173) and the Greens (Korun) welcomed ‘a high-level education, transparent for training Austrian Imams’ (NR 150). According to these strategies, Islam becomes civilized by becoming ‘Austrianized’, an argumentation that goes back to the colonial era (Hafez, 2014).

Topos of prevention of foreign funding

According to Wittmann, the law would prevent foreign funding (NR 148), which was one of the dominant reasons in the public debate to support the law. Minister Kurz argued that continuous foreign funding would not only let foreign forces have an impact on religion, but would also enable them to have ‘a socio-political influence in Austria’ (NR 163). The opposition (Korun, Greens, Mühlwerth, FPÖ and Lintl, Stronach) criticized that the law would not really make such a ban possible, because foreign funding could be maintained through religious institutions (NR 154, BR 29). From another angle, Korun used the strategy of perspectivation, citing two legal experts to legitimate her general criticism that churches and religious denominations should make their international cash flow transparent to make it possible to measure potential influence from abroad (NR 151). Kurz’s argumentation strategy in defending this ban was to explain that it was

legitimate to say we don’t want to have imams from other governments abroad preaching and working in Austria. (NR 163)

This was also supported by MP Stefan Schennach’s membership categorization: ‘Yes, we want a religious society to develop in a European way, far from orders coming from Turkey’ (BR 39), framing a superior ‘European way’ in contrast to a devalued ‘Turkish way’. The only voice that explicitly questions this topos is Green MP Wolfgang Zinggl, who argued,

We are not of the opinion that 500,000 Muslims can do without having their houses of worship, their mosques and their Imams. The question must be raised as to who will pay for them. (NR 198)

He also mentioned that the Mormons and the Greek Orthodox are also financed by foreign funders. If they did not receive any money from them, they would have to stop offering religious sermons. For MP Dönmez (Greens), the ban on foreign funding was a sign for a ‘dramatic change for the worse’ in the Islam law (BR 32).

Topos of law and order

Strongly connected to the topos of the German language was the idea of being able to control and discipline the Muslim subject. The topos of ‘law and order’ is central to populist discourses (Reisigl, 2014: 79) and can also be found in the argumentation of MP Cap (SPÖ):

We want this order and this transparency so that no material is disseminated in individual mosques resembling the material of the Islamic State. […] We have to be attentive und we have to look closely at how things develop. And that is what makes the law. That is exactly followed by the law when it comes to exercise of religion. (NR 157–8)

This idea of legitimate surveillance is realized with the help of different strategies. The strategy of nomination, identifying ‘material of the Islamic State’, allows surveillance of generally suspicious and mistrusted Muslims. With ‘we have to be attentive’ the speaker does not speak on his behalf, but on behalf of a group based on justified claims of truth (strategy of argumentation).

The topos of general suspicion (see below) feeds into this topos. And the topos of the German language is part and parcel of the idea to create a civilized European Islam (topos of Austrian Strain of Islam), which is the consequence of this central idea of surveilling the suspected Muslim subject, which is at the core of the topos of law and order. For the Green MP Harald Walser, one of the main reasons not to support the law was that it did not govern religious instruction in public schools, over which he wanted more control (NR 169). A Conservative MP reacted by arguing that ‘one can listen and see what is taught’ (NR 197) in religious instruction (since according to the law this must be given in German anyway, which is not the case).

MP Wolfgang Zinggl (Greens) criticized that this debate resembled more of a debate on a ‘Police Security Law’ (NR 198). Minister Ostermayer also challenged this topos by saying,

It is not the job of the cultural affairs office (Kultusamt), to be a religion police. A religion police […] only exists in absolutist dictatorships, in dictatorial states. (BR 40)

He also argued that although he considered it ‘important to train preachers in Austria’, it would be a ‘radical intervention in a democratic constitutional state’ to ‘listen to what a chaplain says to his believer’ (BR 40–1). But obviously, Conservative MPs rather supported the topos of law and order to a wide extent, while only an MP of the Greens and the minister in charge challenged it fundamentally by using a strategy of predication, marking this argument as one of dictatorial political system.

Topos of unrepresentativeness

For Strache, this law deals with the wrong institutions. He criticized the Islamic Council for not having presented their articles of faith, hence not being transparent, and called it only a small organization without members or legitimacy (NR 147). Kickl (FPÖ) backed his party leader and argued that ‘in truth the Islamic Council represents organized political Islam’ (NR 196), referring to participation of Avrupa Türk-İslam Birliği (ATIB), Milli Görüs, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Islamic Council’s highest board, actors which according to him represented the ‘interests of Saudi Arabia and Turkey’ (NR 196). This was supported by other FPÖ members such as MP Mühlwerth, who used the strategy of citation to delegitimize the Islamic Council (BR 27). It is interesting to see that the first social democratic speaker, MP Wittmann, legitimated the law’s implementation by stating that

moderate forces of the Islamic Council had been involved substantially in this law – substantially! […] The fact that there are more radical and more moderate forces within the Islamic Council must be noted because the more radical forces also disapproved of the law. (NR 148)

Hence, MPs from both the government party and the opposition use the strategy of predication (by using evaluative adjectives like ‘moderate’ vs ‘radical’) to argue for different ends. Strache delegitimized an institution that has had legal recognition since 1979 by evaluating it ‘radical’. Wittmann partly agrees to win the argument that the law is against the radicals within the Islamic Council and hence does not support any of Strache’s theories that the Islam law would allegedly support ‘radical Islamists’. Similarly, MP Schennach argued that ‘if the Alevis are doing well with the law, then we are doing well’ (BR 39). Similar to discourse strategies of the far-right politician Jörg Haider, this populist argument draws on an image of the bad versus good Muslim, where the construed ‘good Muslim’ is used to justify a discriminatory law (Hafez, 2015: 42). Another MP from the left opposition, Green MP Efgani Dönmez, framed the Islamic Council’s internal disputes as a struggle between Arabic- and Turkish-dominated groups. He even argued that opposition to the law would represent an environment creating a ‘state within a state’ (an old anti-semitic conspiracy that is revived in Islamophobic discourses; see Schiffer and Wagner, 2009) by way of religious freedom (BR 33). Also, Minister Ostermayer argued with the help of the topos of (Muslim) people. Since both legally recognized Muslim institutions – the Islamic Council and the Alevi – had accepted the law, it must be good (NR 160f.). Conservative MPs (BR 36, NR 197) shared this view.

Topos of general suspicion

The topos of general suspicion is the reverse side of the topos of precedence of national law. MPs for the Greens and NEOS (NR 151, NR 159) criticized that the Islam law would communicate a ‘general suspicion’ of Muslims. MP Walser (Greens) used the strategy of perspectivization, citing a scholar of law of religion:

Stefan Schima – I think a recognized person in this context – criticized (the law) saying: ‘The explicit mention that Muslims must adhere to the Austrian legal regulations is […] a sign of an expectation of the state that there are more legal violations among Muslims than with other religious communities.’ (NR 170)

Minister Kurz and Conservative MPs rejected the accusation that the law would represent a general suspicion against Muslims (NR 163, NR 200).

Topos of unequal treatment

The topos of general suspicion towards Muslims is connected to the topos of unequal treatment. MP Nikolaus Alm (NEOS) argues using the strategy of predication by evaluating the law as unequal:

[…] there is also a very fundamental reason to reject this law, and this is indeed the unequal treatment of a recognized religious community. (NR 171)

He refers to the French principle of laïcité, under which the state must be neutral to all religions and hence may not discriminate or privilege one above another. Alm also criticizes Lopatka (ÖVP) for positioning the Islam law as the best answer to the Islamic State. In his argumentation, he frames the Islam law as ‘domesticating a religion and at the same time isolating it from abroad. This is in contradiction to the constitutional principle of equal treatment’ (NR 172). MP Scherak (NEOS) argued that there was no ban on foreign funding for any other church or religious society except for the Muslims. He criticized that ‘different religious societies are treated differently’ (NR 159). For him, ‘Islam is treated differently, that is to say more strictly, than other religions’ (NR 160). For Minister Kurz, there was ‘no unequal treatment’ (NR 163). Rather, the ban on foreign funding would first be in line with the separation of state and religion, and second was consistent with religious societies’ capacity for self-preservation (Selbsterhaltungsfähigkeit; NR 163). MP Zinggl (Greens) questioned this by arguing that other churches and religious societies were also funded by foreign entities (NR 198). Likewise, MP Dönmez generally criticized the law as contradicting the Austrian constitution as well as the principle of laïcité (BR 34). On the other side, MP Elisabeth Grimling (SPÖ) defended the new restriction, in order to underscore the consequence that imams would now have to be trained in Austria (BR 30).

Topos of the model for Europe

A traditional topos used by political elites in the past and developed during the years of the centre-right coalition (2000–2007) is the topos of Austria being a model for Europe. The 1912 Islam law had been framed as a unique prototype to be exported to other European countries by state officials and representatives of the Islamic Council (Hafez, 2014; Sticker, 2008). This topos was introduced in the parliamentary debates by many MPs from the government party (NR 197f., BR 37, BR 39). MP Wolfgang Gerstl (ÖVP) says,

[…] we can go out with pride because we have succeeded, thanks to the initiative of our Foreign Minister […] Sebastian Kurz. […] We have come to a bill that is really recognizes in Europe. (NR 164)

MP Gerstl uses strategies of predication (‘pride’), intensification (‘we have succeeded’) and argumentation (‘recognized in Europe’) to argue that the Islam law was a correct decision. Minister Ostermayer (SPÖ) was the only one from the coalition parties to openly question this argument (BR 40).

Conclusion

The formal structure of the parliamentary debates (opposition MPs speak first) had a huge impact on dynamics of the debates. The centrist coalition government sought to contrast with the far right, which clearly dominated both debates. A vivid example is the framing of the Islam law as a law of religion and not as a law on terrorism, security or the like. This far-right framing was partly countered, but also implicitly confirmed by stating that the law was a tool against hate preachers, hence the responses of the coalition parties’ MPs were quite ambivalent. The adaptation of many Islamophobic populist arguments is revealing when looking at MPs of the FPÖ, who argued that ‘the intention [of the law] is right, but the implementation is unfortunately incomplete’ (BR 29). This also pertains to the leftist parties. The topos of order, for example, was argued by some MPs in the Greens and in the ruling SPÖ as well.

In regard to the topos of the ‘German language’, here we can observe the greatest gap between the coalition parties. Social democratic MPs defended the right to preach in any language, while for the Conservative MPs, speaking German was to be central to the clergy’s adaptation to Austria, which goes hand in hand with the ÖVP’s general integration policy (Rosenberger, 2013). This clearly reflects the ÖVP’s more identitarian ideology compared to the leftist ideology of embracing a more diverse concept of coexistence. Regarding the topos of an Austrian strain of Islam, it is also interesting to see the variety of positions taken. While this topos, again very culturalist and identitarian, is central to Conservative MPs, it gets openly challenged by the coalition partner.

Oppositional MPs across political lines shared the topoi of ‘general suspicion’ and ‘unequal treatment’. Besides that, even in the opposition and the SPÖ, as a member of the coalition, there were many differences within the parties. While usually positions are taken alongside ideological or party lines (Ilie, 2010: 9), MP Dönmez (Greens) and MP Cap (SPÖ) shared many of the far-right topoi justifying the law and Cap was consequently countered by his own minister. This may be explained both by more leftist parties not having developed a sufficient programmatic stance on how to deal with issues of integration in general and ‘Islam’ in particular, and by generally more rightist positions (within their own parties) being held by these two MPs (Hafez, 2009a). In addition, it can be assumed that the minister felt obliged to correct MPs from both coalition parties, who challenged the government’s official position of not discriminating Muslims.

While the references to ‘human rights’, ‘tolerance’ and the ‘law as a model for Europe’ were rarely used to defend the 2015 Islam law, restrictive topoi like the topos of people, of ‘precedence of national law’, ‘law and order’ and ‘forbidding foreign funding’ as well as culturalist topoi like ‘creating an Austrian strain of Islam’, ‘fostering the German language’ and ‘belonging’ all served as a warrant to argue for a new restrictive Islam law. While the far-right opposition parties (FPÖ and Stronach) used the same topoi to argue that the law was unable to implement these intentions and also added the topos of ‘unrepresentativity’, the liberal and leftist opposition criticized the law using the topoi of ‘general suspicion’ and ‘unequal treatment’.

As stated at the beginning, the far right’s opening statement in both debates informed the statements of most subsequent MPs. Yet not all MPs followed suit, and thus the question of why some MPs react to the far right, while others ignore the far right remains to be explained. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses regarding these dynamics within parliamentary debates would be of great value to further investigate and examine reasons behind these dynamics. This lacuna could be filled by conducting qualitative expert interviews with MPs. It would also be interesting to see in a comparative study whether MPs demonstrate this tendency to react to the far right for every topic or only regarding social issues (migration, religion, culture and labour).

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author did this research within the frame of the research project “Muslim Youth Movements in Europe: Mobilization and Identity Construction” at the University of Salzburg.

Author biography

Farid Hafez, PhD (political science, University of Vienna) is currently Botstiber-Fulbright visiting professor of Austrian-American Studies at University of California, Berkeley. He is lecturer and researcher at the University of Salzburg, Department of Political Science. Since 2010 he has been the editor of the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2016 the co-editor of the European Islamophobia Report. Hafez serves as an advisor and reviewer for a number of boards and journals. He has received the Bruno Kreisky Award for the political book of the year for his anthology Islamophobie in Österreich (Studienverlag, 2009) co-edited with John Bunzl.

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