Abstract
Following the 2020 elections, Montenegro has experienced an upsurge in ‘patriotic’ political activism, largely supported by the party that lost control of the parliament after three decades of uncontested rule. The continuity and uniqueness of the Montenegrin dual identity, where the categories of Serb and Montenegrin are not mutually exclusive, have been undermined by nationalist aspirations to portray such duality as a delusion. This study examined strategies for the construction of otherness in nationalist political discourse following the 2020 elections in Montenegro, based on the assumption that a threatened identity seeks to re-establish itself through the search for difference and otherness. The Discourse Historical Approach provides an analytical framework for examining the explicit and implicit construction of social actors used to reinforce the ingroup-outgroup rift and portray the other as different and pathological.
Introduction
This paper provides a critical discourse analysis of some of the most conspicuous features of the Montenegrin nationalist discourse after the 2020 elections. Following nearly 30 years of unchallenged rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the elections saw a change in political power. Before the elections, the opposition parties formed three factions representing the views of the right, center, and left, respectively. These included ZBCG (For the Future of Montenegro), an alliance led by conservative pro-Serb parties, the centrist Democrats, and a center-left alliance led by United Reform Action. Despite ideological differences, they collaborated to form a parliamentary majority, resulting in a close win. This demonstrated a step forward in creating a majority that transcended ethnopolitical divisions.
However, the then Montenegrin president, whose term would not expire before April 2023, was also the leader of the DPS, which led to hybrid political influences that have fueled the current instability in the country ever since. The winning parties, though ideologically diverse, shared a common goal: to end the DPS regime which was vilified for its nepotistic exercise of power, undermining the independence of the judiciary, manipulating electoral processes, and widespread corruption. On the other hand, the DPS made it clear that they would not give up so easily, and President Đukanović even announced that they would be prepared to defend the country by taking up arms and fighting from the woods if necessary. 1
It is worth noting, however, that one of the principal reasons for the downfall of the DPS regime may have been a controversial law on religious freedom that was intended to nationalize religious property. In December 2019, after more than 100 opposition amendments were rejected, a controversial bill regulating religious property was adopted, targeting exclusively the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), the largest denomination in the country, which resulted in large-scale peaceful protests. 2 The DPS has frequently portrayed the SOC adherents and clergy as enemies of the state. President Đukanović once described the protests as ‘a lunatic movement’, and claimed that the protesters were not opposing the disputed law, but rather the independence and statehood of the country. 3 As a result, the rift between the Montenegrin and Serbian ethnic groups in the country deepened, despite the fact that most Orthodox Montenegrins adhere to the SOC.
Džankić (2013: 416) argues that ‘the DPS’s political survival was only possible by upholding the ethnoreligious cleavages that had emerged across the region during and after the war in the former Yugoslavia’. The 2020 elections marked a departure from the preceding ethno-political blueprint and this shift is expected to precipitate the reconfiguration of diverse positions within the Montenegrin identity framework. Nevertheless, following the 2020 elections, the devoted supporters of the DPS and its coalitional partners, SD (The Social Democrats), and SDP (Social Democratic Party), have made a concerted effort to promote nationalist ideology. Painting a grim picture of reality caused by the political change and often identifying the party’s interests with the survival of the nation itself have been inextricably linked to their political discourse. By exploiting nationalist narratives, they have frequently attempted to depict the present situation as an indication of inevitable doom for the Montenegrin ethnicity, the imminent occupation by the Serbs, and the government’s plans for a ‘final solution’ to the Montenegrin question. 4
An examination of Montenegrin nationalist discourse can provide further insight into the strategies used to promote nationalist ideologies, and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of nationalist rhetoric and propaganda in different contexts. Additionally, by exploring the specific cultural, historical, and political circumstances in which it emerges, we can gain a deeper understanding of the drivers and motivations behind such rhetoric, which can then be applied to broader analyses of nationalist discourse and ideology.
Section 2 outlines the data and methodology that form the basis of the analysis. In section 3, I examine the scholarly research on the significance of Other in defining and transforming national identities. Sections 4 and 5 offer a case study of Montenegrin nationalist discourse. In order to facilitate understanding of the role of a ‘significant other’ (Triandafyllidou, 1998) in Montenegrin politics, section 4 provides the essential political and historical context. Subsequently, an excerpt from a political speech is analyzed to illustrate the strategic use of othering. Section 5 examines the discourse strategies and rhetorical devices employed by the ingroup in the media to underscore its distinctiveness and authenticity. The final section of this paper presents the conclusions drawn from the research findings.
Corpus and methodology
Othering is predominantly driven by politicians and the media. Therefore, I begin my analysis with an examination of an excerpt from a political speech made on the occasion of the celebration of the Montenegrin Independence Day several months after the elections, which I find particularly interesting from the perspective of othering. For the ensuing analysis, the majority of the corpus selected consists of texts published in five online portals: Pobjeda, Portal Analitika, Aktuelno.me, CDM, and Antena M.
The media landscape in Montenegro is highly polarized and reflects political and national divisions within the country. According to the Centre for Monitoring and Research (CeMI), the majority of the media does not support a particular political party but rather endorses a particular ideology. Their content is often shaped by their political and ideological preferences. 5 This type of media polarization contributes to the current state of social polarization in the country. As a result, we often encounter echo chambers, or closed systems, where beliefs are reinforced through communication and repetition, potentially leading to confirmation bias. 6
The abovementioned portals are chosen for their unequivocal support and affiliation with the political parties that lost power in the Montenegrin parliament after the 2020 elections. Their partisan character has been reflected in the discursive construction of the political crisis after the elections, promoting inflammatory rhetoric and publishing highly biased commentaries of like-minded journalists and analysts. The news outlets Pobjeda, CDM, and Portal Analitika are owned by a Greek businessman named Petros Stathis, who is said to be a close friend and business partner of former Montenegrin president Milo Đukanović. It appears that Stathis has profited extensively from the benefits granted by the DPS-led government to his tourism-related businesses at the Adriatic coast in exchange for favorable coverage of the DPS. 7 Aktuelno.me portal, which features tabloid reports, was launched by a company owned by Zoran Bećirović, a controversial businessman, also thought to be a close friend of former Montenegrin president. 8 Lastly, the editor-in-chief of the portal Antena M is the journalist Darko Šuković, who has been criticized by many Montenegrin Serbs for his nationalist views and denigrating the SOC in his popular talk show Živa istina (The Absolute Truth). 9
The texts were collected between the beginning of 2020 and the end of May 2023. It was not necessary to limit the data to a more specific period of time since the discourse of othering in public and in some of the media outlets in Montenegro is still ongoing. The corpus consists of 80 opinion pieces published online, authored by freelance writers and guest contributors.The selection process was guided by a thematic approach that focused on addressing both national identity issues and the perceived role of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The pages of the corpus were downloaded shortly after they appeared online, keeping in mind that the texts that make up the corpus, just like any other type of hypertext, are susceptible to modification. The distribution of texts collected from each of the 5 portals is presented in Table 1. The proportion of texts obtained from each online portal loosely reflects their popularity among readers.
The distribution of texts selected from individual online portals.
In order to provide insight into nationalist or chauvinistic ideologies that have contributed to the most prominent instances of othering and threat construction, my analysis involved a systematic review of the texts to explore the discursive strategies employed to alienate the Other, with emphasis on reference and predication. Two recently coined terms, Posrbice and Crkva Srbije, will be considered as representative examples of the ingroup’s tendency to distance itself from the outgroup. The paper also examines the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations of othering associated with these two umbrella terms. My analysis is primarily qualitative, and is based on the assumption that a study of discourse fragments can provide insights into the scope of the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy and the process of associating outgroup members with negative or threat-connoting cues (Hart, 2010: 55).
The analysis is based on the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). I will examine both the explicit and implicit construction of social actors through reference and predication, the two most important discourse strategies involved in positive Self and negative Other representations (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 44–60). Consequently, the central questions in the analysis are how people, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions are named and referred to linguistically – reference– and what qualities are assigned to social actors, objects, phenomena/events, and processes – predication– (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 14), in an effort to reinforce the ingroup-outgroup rift and isolate and pathologize the Other. In order to examine such mechanisms in the context of current Montenegrin political discourse, I explored the means by which Montenegrin nationalists encode their underlying feelings, attitudes, and judgments (their stance) about the outgroup, as well as about the present political situation in the country, and finally, about the actions and behavior of the members of the ingroup. An analysis of such linguistic choices must take into account the ideological and political context, which highlights the importance of arguments that individuals or social groups use to support their claims as well as their persuasive potential.
The concept of othering in nationalist discourse
Duszak (2002: 1) explains that our affiliations and non-alignments can only be established through comparison with others, and, ‘in order to exercise them in our social life, we must be capable of conveying, and receiving messages of solidarity and of detachment’. According to Hart (2010: 49), cultural inputs (texts) trigger the construction of ingroups and outgroups, whereas cultural transmission (discourse) imparts the boundary between them. Nevertheless, Hart argues that categorizing an individual as an outgroup member does not suffice to promote avoidance, but must also be accompanied by some specific connotative or affective information that links that outgroup and its members (Hart, 2010: 52). Therefore, a negative stereotype must be activated (Schaller and Neuberg, 2008: 405). In the light of the assumption that ethnic stereotypes are ‘a product of coalitional psychology’ (Pinker, 1997: 313, cited in Hart, 2010: 54), as they, partially, originate from ‘mental mechanisms that evolved as adaptations designed to protect early human populations against the particular threats posed by alternative coalitional groups’ (Hart, 2010: 54), it is obvious that the evolved psychology persists even though these threats no longer exist in reality. Rather than posing a realistic threat, discriminatory responses simply need to be associated with the target (Schaller and Neuberg, 2008: 407). This explains the power and effectiveness of referential strategies used in the construction of group boundaries in discourse.
Reisigl and Wodak argue that othering is a common strategy in right-wing populist discourse (Reisigl, 2013; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2015), whereby members attempt to differentiate ‘us’ and ‘them’ by first establishing a positive ‘us’ and demonstrating that ‘they’ are different, usually by assigning negative attributes to ‘them’. Consequently, the Self is reinforced and protected. Therefore, it is not only about the Other, but also about the Self (Dervin, 2012). Right-wing populist discourses and othering frequently coexist in polarized societies, leading to conflicting arguments that are then used as rhetorical weapons to create enemies. Due to a distorted view of reality, political opponents are often labeled as traitors, religious fanatics, or foreign spies when, in reality, they might be human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, or advocates of freedom of expression.
The pursuit of an authentic national identity is closely related to the perception of others. Resistance to Other is considered to be an essential feature of nationalism, since national identity has no meaning per se, but becomes meaningful when contrasted to other nations (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 599). National identity is shaped and perpetuated through a continuous process of crafting and sustaining shared perceptions of a specific identity. It is defined by shared experiences, memories, and narratives ingrained through socialization and often by contrasting with the identities of (significant) others. Wodak et al. (2009) highlight that in envisioning national homogeneity, members of a national community tend to construct distinctions between their own and other nations, especially when similarities exist. This reflects what Freud termed the ‘narcissism of small differences’ (cited in Wodak et al. 2009: 4), which often leads to stereotyping and discord among different groups.
Smith (2009: 25) emphasizes the significance of ‘a distinctive symbolic repertoire’, including language, religion, customs, and institutions in bolstering the identity of the national community and reinforcing its social boundaries from the perspective of both its members and outsiders. However, he argues that a uniform national community or a singular ‘national destiny’ is unattainable, as various ethnic communities may embrace conflicting interpretations of the nation. This divergence could result in ideological conflict, particularly when different elites advocate differing historical narratives and prescriptions for the nation. While one of these narratives may emerge as the predominant version and even the official agenda at a particular point in time, it is commonly contested by alternative ethno-histories and visions (Smith, 2009: 33). Similarly, for almost two decades, the ruling elite in Montenegro, led by the DPS, encouraged a singular view of nationhood, history, and identity, disregarding alternative interpretations.
Othering and identity in the current Montenegrin political context
Historical and political background
The concept of identity in Montenegro has historically been characterized by duality. The categories of Serb and Montenegrin were not mutually exclusive, leading to the creation of the ‘Montenegrin homo duplex’ (Džankić, 2015: 353). Troch (2014: 28) maintains that there is no clear and stable competition between the Montenegrin and Serbian nationalities in modern Montenegro, but rather interference, which can be complementary or exclusive, without mutual incompatibility. According to Džankić, the combination of political and ethnic elements in the Montenegrin identity schema led to a change in the perception of what it means to be a Montenegrin. More precisely, it ‘dismantled the conjoined Montenegrin/Serbian homo duplex construct’ through the nationalizing policies implemented during the last two decades of DPS rule that delineated the Montenegrin and Serb aspects of identity (Džankić, 2015: 371).
Many of the grievances of Montenegrin nationalists today can be traced back to Montenegro’s inclusion into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, resulting in the loss of its independence. Nevertheless, the issue of Montenegrin independence persisted, with the Greens (zelenaši) – armed insurgents opposed to the union – clashing with the Whites (bjelaši) – pro-Serbian unionists. Both sides committed atrocities, leaving lasting divisions in Montenegro even after the Whites faction prevailed in the mid-1920s (Roberts, 2007: 28).
During World War II, Montenegro was embroiled in a civil war with various factions. Montenegrin separatists aligned with the Italian invaders, in their attempt to break free from Serbia (Roberts, 2007: 336). The Chetnik Yugoslav army supported the government in exile, while the Yugoslav Partisans sought to establish a socialist Yugoslavia after the war. In 1941, the Partisans and Chetniks joined forces to stage the first organized uprising in occupied Europe, but diverged in their approach, leading to the Chetniks losing support from the Allies in 1943. Montenegro was eventually liberated by the communist Partisans in 1944.
In the aftermath of World War II, Montenegro became a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Communist Party ruled the country for the next 45 years. As Tito’s Yugoslavia disintegrated and Slobodan Milošević rose to power in Serbia in the early 1990s, the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro was once again brought into focus. Montenegro was the only Yugoslav republic to remain in a joint state with Serbia. The Communist authorities were toppled by the so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ initiated by Milosević’s trusted allies in Montenegro, the leaders of the DPS, Milo Đukanović and Momir Bulatović.
Founded in 1991 as the successor to the League of Communists of Montenegro, the DPS played a dominant role in Montenegrin politics, serving as the bedrock of every coalition government until the 2020 parliamentary elections. In 1997, Prime Minister Đukanović ended his support for Milošević, gradually introducing his aspirations for Montenegrin independence, but the then-president, Bulatović, opposed him. Subsequently, the DPS was divided into two factions of roughly equal size. In 1998, Bulatović established the Socialist People’s Party which was, for a long time, the major opposition party, largely attracting pro-Serb voters. With the fall of the Milošević regime in 2000, the Đukanović-led government intensified its demands for independence. This resulted in the emergence of two opposing political camps in the country: pro-independence and pro-union.
The Montenegrin independence referendum in 2006 narrowly passed the 55% threshold, with 44,50% of the voters opting to remain in the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The most important policies adopted by ruling parties to promote their vision of an independent state, with a distinctive Montenegrin identity, were related to state symbols, language, and religion. However, a significant percentage of those who identified themselves as Montenegrins did not support all the government’s nation-building policies (Džankić, 2014: 362-369), and the response of the population of Montenegro expected by the nationalist corps was not nearly as enthusiastic (Jovanović, 2018). The Serbs revolted against the decision of changing the official language from Serbian to Montenegrin, which implied presenting allophones ś and ź, as ‘intrinsically Montenegrin’, and introducing the corresponding graphemes to the alphabet, as well as hyper-ijekavizations in morphology and certain lexical specificities, thus creating what Greenberg (2004) argues to be ‘an artificial and idealized language for the Montenegrins, which is not native to any of its citizens’ (p. 105). Additionally, the Serb population has expressed concern about the adoption of the new flag and the controversial national anthem, which contains two verses allegedly written by Sekula Drljević, a WWII collaborator with the fascists.
Lemaine (1974: 20) argues that the re-establishment of a threatened identity ‘is achieved by way of the search for difference, for otherness, by the creation and subsequent accentuation of heterogeneity’. One of the first steps in this direction was forming a new church, called the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in 1993. It has claimed property rights against the Serbian Orthodox Church, and accused it of occupying Montenegrin churches and monasteries since 1918. From the nationalist standpoint, ‘contemporary Montenegrins [. . .] were presented with a unique historical mission – to correct the grievances felt by their forefathers who had to bear the loss of Montenegrin independence in 1918’ (Morrison, 2009: 46).
The supporters of the DPS and its partners have seen the change in politics after the 2020 elections as the beginning of slavery to a foreign country, that is, Serbia. According to Nakazawa (2015: 134), ‘Serbia is defined as other in contrast to Montenegrin us’. It became the ‘true enemy of the Montenegrin nation’, or what Triandafyllidou calls a ‘significant other’ that ‘threatens to blur the distinctiveness of the ingroup’ and is culturally associated with the nation, thus challenging its legitimacy and identity (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 600). As part of her classification of potential significant others, Triandafyllidou includes nation-states that are geographically close to the ingroup but do not contest its territorial boundaries, but rather stake a claim to the ingroup’s cultural heritage by asserting that specific myths, symbols, and/or ancestors are part of their national past. The ingroup can claim ownership of contested symbols or myths by redefining its identity. (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 602).
The manifestations of Othering in political speech
The current opposition politicians in Montenegro largely adopted the narrative strategies which Mols and Jetten (2014) attribute to populist right-wing party leaders, who often use temporal narratives about history and identity to persuade their audience that ‘(a) our past is glorious, our future is bleak, (b) we know who brought the country down, (c) we were once glorious because we were tough, (d) we need to be tough once more, and (e) we are the only party prepared to take on “the enemy”’ (Mols and Jetten, 2014: 74). The excerpt below illustrates the use of this particular narrative strategy, which has been a key element of the discourse of ‘patriotic political activists’ in Montenegro.
The following is an excerpt of a speech delivered at the Montenegrin Independence Day celebration held in 2021, near Cetinje, the old capital of Montenegro. The speaker was Nemanja Batrićević, a political scientist and activist. A number of online portals have fully transcribed the speech.
‘Danas i mi znamo kako je živjeti pod vlašću kojoj je Crna Gora samo geografski pojam. Kako je stiđeti se tuđe sramote. Kako je biti rođak, komšija, poznanik, kolega. . . ljudima koji mrze, iz dna duše i duboko, svoju rođenu zemlju. Tuđe su zastave danas na našim školama i bolnicama. Tuđi su popovi u našim crkvama. Tuđe su sluge u Vladi i Skupštini. Sami smo krivi. Zaboravili smo davni nauk – da nema posljednjega boja kad si vječita meta![. . .] “Cijena naše slobode je uvijek bila skupa, ali smo vazda bili voljni da je platimo. Crnogorska je istorija strma, a izdajnička Vlada korača neoprezno”. Tretiraju nas kao strance u sopstvenoj zemlji. Postoji cijena koju nijesmo spremni da platimo. Postoji tačka iza koje nećemo trpjeti poniženje. Narod koji se više plaši opasnosti nego sramote, spreman je za roblje!’ ‘Today we know how it is like to be governed by authorities for whom Montenegro is merely a geographical concept. How it feels to be embarrassed by someone else’s disgrace. What it feels like to be a relative, neighbor or a colleague. . .of people who hate their own country from the bottom of their hearts. Our schools and hospitals display the flag of another country. Our churches are occupied by foreign priests. The government and Parliament are staffed with slaves to a foreign country. . . It’s our fault. We have forgotten the old adage – there can be no last fight when you are a constant target [. . .] The price of our freedom has always been high, but we have always been willing to pay it. The Montenegrin history has been precipitous, and the traitorous government walks recklessly. We are treated as foreigners in our own country. We are unwilling to pay this price. Our suffering from humiliation ends at a certain point. Slaves are prepared to become slaves if they are more afraid of danger than of disgrace!’ Portal Analitika, May 21, 2021
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At the beginning, the speaker emphasizes that the current government officials lack patriotism, which, he believes, is a disgrace and a source of embarrassment from the perspective of the ingroup. As a result, the speaker presupposes a controversial starting point that must be proved as something that has already been proved, committing the fallacy of circular reasoning. His sense of disgust and shame is then exacerbated by the realization that the ingroup appears to be surrounded by enemies within, who regard their own country with disdain. His speech displays almost visceral contempt for such political outcasts, since allegiance to the nation trumps all other loyalties in the minds of nationalists. The speaker uses emotive words and phrases to convey his viewpoint in order to gain the audience’s commitment to act or support actions that are consistent with the viewpoint they have accepted.
The speaker then paints an ominous picture of the current state of affairs. The flag of another country is actually the tricolored flag of Montenegro dating back to the time of the Montenegrin king, Nikola Petrović. Many Serbs in Montenegro prefer this flag to the official one, which was introduced after Montenegro became independent in 2006. However, no tricolored flags have appeared in Montenegrin schools and hospitals since the elections in 2020. The official flag remains, but the speaker has never been challenged regarding the veracity of his claims. His gloomy assessment of the country’s downward trajectory was probably perceived more as a symbolic prediction of a grim future than as a strictly factual argument. Consequently, he uses a propagandist tool that Walton (2007: 110) calls indifference to logical reasoning which allows a proponent to be unrestrained by logical reasoning unless doing so will serve the speaker’s interests. This tool is used abundantly in this particular speech, resulting in fallacies and often appealing to common-sense, intuition, or emotions (Wodak, 2022).
At this point, the speaker starts blaming the ingroup (It’s our fault). He accuses them of not remaining vigilant at all times, since they have been a constant target for many years. A self-victimizing identity narrative, depicting the ingroup as victims of a persecution, triggers the defense mechanisms in the recipients and rebuilds the connective tissue of the ingroup faced with the consequences of repeatedly disregarding threats. Additionally, invoking a sense of belonging can be very powerful in arousing positive emotions toward the ingroup, as the emotional comfort that comes from sharing things with others can be fulfilled by a sense of solidarity, rapport, and safety (Duszak, 2002: 2).
Afterwards, the speaker discusses the high price they have always been prepared to pay for their freedom, regardless of its cost. Although there is no real evidence that Montenegrins, as an ethnicity, have ever been endangered by the change in power after the elections, the speaker makes their fight for freedom a top priority for the ingroup. He is foreshadowing a rapid downfall of the new ‘reckless’ government which is downplaying the injustices they have suffered, albeit not for long. Lastly, he openly calls for a more aggressive resistance, describing their future path as dangerous, but one that would, at the very least, spare them the humiliation of being slaves and the imminent loss of their national identity.
Mols and Jetten (2014: 75) claim that nostalgic reminiscences about a glorious past not only serve to essentialize, antagonize, and mobilize national identity by presenting the past as glorious and positive, and the present as declining, but also convey a sense of urgency, and the necessity to take immediate drastic measures to prevent a break between the past and present. Additionally, these authors point out that perceived identity discontinuity has been shown to increase anxiety, since people lose grounding and security under such circumstances (Mols and Jetten, 2014: 77).
Nostalgic narratives are very common in the texts subjected to this particular study, and references to the glorious past are often exploited to evoke strong emotions of national pride and courage in the face of challenges, in order to emphasize the urgency of the current situation that needs to be addressed resolutely and fearlessly.
Discourse strategies and othering in Montenegrin media
In this section, I examine the discourse strategies and their linguistic realizations that I have identified as most effective in describing social actors as alien and threatening in contemporary politically polarized Montenegrin society, as they permeate nationalist discourse in the Montenegrin media following the 2020 elections.
Referential strategies are used to construct and represent social actors. Hart maintains that these strategies construct ‘a dichotomous conceptualization of an out-group defined with respect to a coalitional in-group which both text-producer and text-consumer are assumed to belong to’ (Hart, 2010: 56). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 45) describe a number of ways to achieve this, including using tropes, biological metaphors, naturalizing and depersonalizing metonymies, and synecdoches, all of which enable people to be treated uniformly as non-individuals on the basis of their sameness and homogeneity. Although Duszak (2002: 6) notes that ‘language has many resources to actualize the us-them distinction’, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48–52) distinguish between several specific referential strategies, some of which are borrowed and adapted from Theo van Leeuwen’s (1993, 1996) system of representation of social actors, such as nationalization, de-spatialization, dissimilation, collectivization, somatization, culturalization, social problematization, etc. These can be linguistically realized in the form of explicit and deictic noun phrases. Specific aspects of identity are highlighted by explicit noun phrases which can simultaneously realize more than one referential strategy (Hart, 2010: 57). Deistic noun phrases, personal pronouns, and possessive determiners, on the other hand, realize only one referential strategy – collectivization.
Different types of labels might be employed to depict a political opponent as a legitimate threat to the real or imagined values of the ingroup. For example, many supporters of the former regime in Montenegro have exploited the tragic war in Ukraine to target and label their political opponents as pro-Russian, anti-European, and generally backward, even though the new government publicly condemned the act of Russian invasion of Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Russia, as other European countries have done. Nevertheless, members of the ruling political parties and the government have been accused of being Russian allies or spies. 11
According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 46), linguistic identification or reference is already related to strategic predication due to the descriptive and evaluative nature of such categorizations. For example, in the following excerpt, the phrase ‘local traitors’ functions both as a reference (as a discursive construction of a social actor) and as a predication (an evaluative attribution of a negative trait).
‘Na sceni je, dakle, krađa tuđe duhovnosti, kulture i istorije, uz žestoku pomoć izdašno plaćenih domaćih izroda (svi znamo ko su oni) što sve predstavlja kulturocid crnogorskog naroda. Ovo je teška optuzba, ali gospodo kriterijum za kulturocid (genocid nad jednim narodom bez ispaljenog metka!) je opšte poznat, i od te se istine ne može pobjeći, ma koliko neki ljudi uporno zatvarali oči kao mala djeca i pretvarali se da će taj problem “magično” da nestane! Neće. Niko nam taj problem neće riješiti do nas samih. Mi kao narod moramo sami sebi priznati da imamo veliki problem pred nama i da moramo da napravimo ozbiljan plan da riješimo taj problem, ili nas kao naroda neće biti za dvije generacije!’ ‘At the moment, our spirituality, culture and our history are being taken away from us, with a substantial help of the well-paid local traitors (we all know who they are), which is a culturocide committed against Montenegrins. This is a serious accusation, but the criterion for culturocide (a genocide of a nation performed without shooting a single bullet!) is commonly known and we cannot escape the truth, although some people keep their eyes closed and pretend that the problem will ‘magically’ disappear! It won’t. No one will solve this problem for us but ourselves. As a nation, we must admit that we have a problem and devise a sound plan for resolving it, or we will cease to exist within two generations!’ CDM August,1st 2022
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Throughout this excerpt, the author makes use of the term culturicide for threat construction, to convey the urgency and gravity of the situation. The boundary between the deictic collectives ‘we’ and ‘they’, ‘us’, and ‘them’ – the local traitors who remain unnamed, but implied – cognitively links the outgroup with a harmful intent. Walton (2007: 107) argues that the main purpose of propaganda is not merely securing assent or commitment to a proposition, but rather to get the respondent to act or assist in the implementation of a particular policy. By adopting an alarmist narrative, the author of the text above claims that the country is on the verge of collapse and that the consequences will be grave, that is, the annihilation of the nation within two generations, unless immediate action is taken. The distinction between what Triandafyllidou (1998: 603) calls external significant other that threatens to ‘wipe out’ a nation from without and internal significant other (‘the local traitors’) that threatens to ‘contaminate’ it is blurred, since the latter is accused of challenging the cultural integrity of the nation and ultimately destroying it. Furthermore, we can find here what Walton (2007) recognizes to be one of the key characteristics of propaganda, that is, justification by results. This implies stating that a particular viewpoint must be adopted to combat or guard against a danger to the ingroup. Walton explains that the costs of engaging in such one-sided or even deceptive arguments are balanced against the potential danger resulting from a rational discussion that might uncover good arguments on the other side (Walton, 2007: 111).
Posrbice and Crkva Srbije
Two examples of linguistic realizations of othering frequently used in Montenegrin nationalist discourse will be discussed in more detail in this paper. I consider these two recently coined terms to be particularly representative examples of othering that has pervaded Montenegrin nationalist discourse over the last 3 years. The label posrbice is highly offensive to Serbs, as it implies that in reality, there are (almost) no real Serbs in Montenegro, but only Montenegrins who have chosen to be Serbified. It is analogous to the much older trope poturice (Turk-converts or Turkified people) which was used to derogatorily describe Slavic converts to Islam during the Ottoman Empire. Regarding posrbice, othering works through presenting the outgroup as morally corrupt by insinuating that their alleged ethnicity is the result of voluntary dissociation from their ‘true’ national identity. Therefore, the ingroup creates difference and problematizes it by defining the outgroup as morally inferior. This was reflected even in the speech of a member of the Montenegrin parliament, Draginja Vuksanović Stanković who declared:
‘I’m most proud. . . of my mother who is an Orthodox Serb from Užička Požega, that is a Serb by origin, not Posrbica.’
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In contemporary Montenegrin nationalist discourse, true Serbs can only be the people who were actually born in Serbia, whereas those who claim to be Serbs but are born in Montenegro are actually ‘professional Serbs’, or ‘false Serbs’ who have betrayed their original Montenegrin identity, blindly serving the interests of the enemy (Serbia) and committed to eliminating Montenegrin identity at all costs. The term Posrbice is an anthroponymic term capable of performing ethnicist slurs on its own, as it connotatively conveys disparaging meaning without any further qualification (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 45).
Apart from Montenegrins declaring themselves Serbs, the people who immigrated into Montenegro during the war in ex-Yugoslavia 20 years ago (primarily from Croatia and Bosnia), and sought refuge in Montenegro at the time, are also held responsible for the imagined demise of the Montenegrin nation. A nationalist narrative might refer to them pejoratively as dođoši or uteklice (derogatory archaic terms for immigrants and refugees) or tuđini (aliens). The following is an excerpt from a commentary published in Aktuelno.me a few days before the presidential elections in April 2023, written in a very archaic language full of derogatory words:
‘Ako prekośutra na predśedničkim izborima pobijedi Jakov – srpski Lažov, tvrdim: Znadite, za takav izborni rezultat – presudnu, prljavu ulogu odigraće desetine tisuća Srbalja-uteklica iz 90-ih, kojima Crna Gora – na velju žalost svih nas njezinih starośedioca-rodoljuba, ishitreno i maloumno – onako nedostojnima državljanstvo crnogorsko dade. To se za Crnu Goru pokaza pogubno i za CRNOGORSTVO pogibeljno.’ ‘If Jakov [Milatović], the Serbian liar, wins elections the day after tomorrow, I say that the dirty job will be done by tens of thousands of Serbs [derogatorily – Srblji instead of Srbi], the runaways [derogatorily – uteklice]
14
from the 90s, to whom Montenegro, regrettably for all of us who are its indigenous patriots, hastily and senselessly granted citizenship, despite the fact that they were not worthy of it. It has turned out to be a devastating decision for Montenegro and a fatal one for the MONTENEGRIN IDENTITY.’
15
The referential strategy of culturalization or, more precisely, its subtypes – ethnification and primitivization, focused on constructing social actors in a discriminatory, ethnicist way by referring to them by the degrading name –Posrbice – is also reflected in the following debasing collective proper names for the same actors in the corpus: kvislinški srpstvujući Crnogoraci (quisling Serb-promoting Montenegrins), crnogorski posrbljenici (Montenegrin Serbified population), patološki velikosrbi (pathological greater-Serbs), or instant Srbi (instant Serbs). In the following instances of evaluations of the same social actors, the discursive strategy of predication coincides with reference: varvarski (barbarian); primitivci (primitive people), divljaci (savages), vandali (vandals), necivilizovani (uncivilized), neznaveni (ignorant), nesposobni (incompetent), and retrogradni (backward).
Interestingly, even the war refugees from the 1990s who acquired Montenegrin citizenship are also blamed for the current national crisis. This is made explicit by means of metaphorical de-spatialization and dissimilation realized in xenonyms such as izvanjac (outsider), dođoš (derogatory-immigrant), tuđin (alien), or drugi (the others). Moreover, the strategy of social problematization is commonly used to define the same social actors. The corpus mostly contains examples of negative ideologization such as anticrnogorci (anti-Montenegrins), klerofašisti (clerical-fascists), četnici (Chetniks), ekstremisti (extremists), šovinisti (chauvinists), nacisti (Nazis), rusofili (Russophils), petokolonaši (fifth columnists), svetosavci (Saint-Sava’s followers), mrzitelji/negatori svega crnogorskog (haters/denialists of all that is considered to be Montenegrin), neonacisti (neo-Nazis), or (pritajeni) neočetnici ((secret) neo-Chetniks).
Another salient example of othering in the recent political discourse in Montenegro is the use of the term Crkva Srbije (the Church of Serbia) instead of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the 2011 census found that 72 percent of people in Montenegro identify as Orthodox Christians of whom 70 percent follow the Serbian Orthodox church. The rest are the followers of the rival Montenegrin Orthodox church. 16 However, Montenegrin nationalists view the SOC as a usurper who seized Montenegrin churches in 1918 when Montenegro became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
In light of the complex history of Montenegro, the interplay between the Church and national identity warrants a variety of interpretations. Orthodox Christianity was historically closely associated with the Serb category in Montenegro. Before the separation of the church from state governance in 1852, Montenegrin rulers, known as ‘prince-bishops’, held influential positions in the national Orthodox Church. The association of religion and state contributed to the historical ambiguity regarding Montenegrin identity (Džankić, 2015: 353). The Petrović prince-bishops, and even king Nikola I Petrović (1860-1910), referred to the populace as ‘Serbs’, giving rise to two distinct interpretations of identity in Montenegro that persist to this day.
There is no doubt that the SOC enjoys the support of a substantial number of Montenegrin Orthodox Christians. In numerous public opinion polls conducted over the years, it has consistently been ranked as one of the most trusted institutions in the country. 17 By referring to the SOC as the Church of Serbia, the nationalist discourse exploits the resources of displacement provided by the referential strategies of de-spatialization and explicit dissimilation, in order to present it as an intrusive foreign entity that has been forcibly imposed on Montenegro, occupying and stealing its religious property.
Nationalists commonly use derogatory collective references to refer to the SOC. For example, calling the Church and its followers ‘Saint-Sava’s sect’ has become quite frequent in this type of discourse, which not only further distances the ingroup from the SOC and its founder, Saint Sava, but also excludes the SOC from Orthodox Christianity. We can find examples of social problematization and criminalization strategies used in describing the SOC as ‘a (warmongering) terrorist organization’, ‘a paramilitary organization’, ‘a destructive organization which incites the most primitive animalistic, rural, and nationalist instincts’, as well as examples of predication realized by attributing the SOC a whole range of criminal activities such as protecting pedophiles and criminals, inciting wars and, finally, stealing Montenegrin history and culture.
Since the party split in 1997, the DPS has disassociated itself from the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was once a distinctive marker of national identity. This decision was partly motivated by the Đukanović camp’s attempt to win elections by appealing to minority voters, but also by a growing desire to break away from the Serb category. In the past 3 years, the term Church of Serbia has become completely normalized in the public discourse of Montenegrin oppositional political parties, DPS, SD, and SDP, and is not merely a label used sporadically by nationalist media columnists and commentators. Although they must have been aware of the fact that redefining the name of the Church might offend the majority of the Montenegrin Orthodox Christians who are adherents of the SOC, and who have many times expressed their indignation over this blatant distortion, the oppositional politicians have been persistent and unapologetic in this regard. This point can be illustrated by a comment made by the DPS president Đukanović, who was still the president of Montenegro at the time.
‘Those who choose a wrong path, such as the Church of Serbia’, said Đukanović, ‘end up in “a bottomless pit’”.
18
Many metaphoric references to the SOC in the corpus are derived from the domain of disease, especially cancer, plague, viruses, or parasites, implying that the SOC contaminates the nation. Metaphors of this nature are intended to evoke fear and revulsion in the audience.
‘Zato bismo djelovanje SPC u Crnoj Gori mogli uporediti s kultnim kinematografskim sci-fi bićem i nazvati ga “Osmi putnik” crnogorskog građanskog društva. Za one koji nijesu gledali film, “osmi putnik” je strano tijelo, koje se predstavlja kao prirodno i naslijeđeno, svojevrsni infektivni agens s dugim, agresivnim i sistematskim djelovanjem, a kojeg je domaćin (pre)dugo ignorisao. Do danas, “osmi putnik” crnogorskoga građanskoga društva zahvatio je nemali broj njegovih ćelija (prije svega moždanih).’ ‘Therefore, we can compare the work of the SOC in Montenegro with the cult cinematographic sci-fi creature and refer to it as the “Alien” of Montenegrin civic society. In case you haven’t seen the movie, the “Alien” is a foreign body that pretends to be natural and inherited, it’s a kind of infectious agent operating aggressively and systematically for a long time, but which has been ignored by the host for so long. As of today, the “Alien” has captured a large number of his cells (particularly, the brain cells).’ Antena M, March 3rd, 2020
19
The dehumanizing aspect of the discourse is realized here by the metaphorical comparison of the Church with an imaginary parasitic space creature, an infectious agent slowly invading its host, debilitating his body and impairing his ability to make intelligent choices. It pretends to be original and inherited, just like the SOC makes Montenegrin Orthodox Christians believe it to be, but, actually, it’s a parasite seeking to gain control over the body of the Montenegrin state and destroy it in the process. Guilt attribution and threat construction (Leader and Benesch, 2016) are equally employed in the excerpt above, along with other disease metaphors realized through predication in the corpus, including the claim that the SOC is ‘a social and political cancer eating the vital tissue of the Montenegrin state and its people’, ‘a Saint-Sava sect whose impact has metastasized to the extent that it has become questionable if the state will be able to deal with this pestilence that destroys the social fabric of prosperity; [. . .] and we don’t know if there is a chemotherapy treatment for this type of Saint-Sava’s sect cancer’. 20 The cancer metaphor is omnipresent in the corpus. According to Sontag (1978), referring to something as a cancer implies that it is ‘unqualifiedly and unredeemably wicked’, and corresponds to an ‘incitation to violence’ since it ‘encourages fatalism’ and ‘justifies severe measures’ (Sontag, 1978: 83–84).
The following example of using a cancer metaphor in nationalist discourse illustrates two other mechanisms of ‘dangerous speech’ discussed by Leader and Benesch (2016), namely, the destruction of alternatives and future-bias:
‘Kad jedan organizam napadne zloćudna bolest on reaguje na dva načina: upregne sve sile da se odbrani ili se preda i nestane.’ ‘When a malignant disease attacks a body, it [the body] reacts in two possible ways: it does its best to defend itself or it surrenders and disappears.’ Pobjeda, November 10th, 2022
21
Presented as a matter of urgency and necessity, such an argument seems to justify even the most extreme measures against a powerful enemy and eliminates alternatives deemed ineffective. After such a temporary transition, which must be difficult and painful, the nation will be restored to health.
Conclusion
While sporadically present in public discourse and the media for more than two decades, the nationalist discourse in Montenegro has grown much stronger and more aggressive over the last 3 years. This study explored the anti-Serb discourse in Montenegro as I find its rapid escalation and extremism concerning, particularly as it originates from politicians and representatives of the Montenegrin ethnicity, which constitutes the majority of the population.
Nationalist discursive practice was examined by evaluating both the immediate context in which the discourse is produced and the underlying ideology that accentuates the dichotomy between the ingroup and the outgroup. In this way, we can determine the evaluative features associated with the outgroup and the ingroup’s perspective on its own values.
In the case of Montenegro, a key aspect of nationalist fervor is the presence of the so-called external significant other, which is culturally related to the nation and consequently challenges its authenticity. Even so, the ingroup’s antagonistic sentiments are largely directed at the Montenegrin population identifying as Serbs, who are perceived as the pillars of the significant other’s hegemonic ambitions. They are considered an internal significant other not only by themselves, but also in light of their relationship to the external significant other. The convergence of internal and external significant others reflects a broader pattern observed in regions where the proximity of neighboring nation-states and cultural contestations gives rise to complex dynamics of identity and belonging.
The case of Montenegro illustrates the complexity of collective self-identification in the context of competing national identities. Troch (2014: 28) points out that historians of the region have compellingly demonstrated that regional and national identities are not mutually exclusive, but rather concurrent, interactive, and interwoven categories within collective identity. In their pursuit of a distinct identity, Montenegrin nationalists have embraced a form of nationalism that revolves around disassociating themselves from the rival Serbian identity and emphasizing their unique historical trajectory and cultural heritage. This approach was furthered by the DPS-led political elites, who sought to reshape Montenegrin identity through political and ethnocultural policies, historical narrative reinterpretation, and active media involvement during their tenure. After the 2020 elections, the same elites, now in the parliamentary opposition, have intensified their efforts to promote the notion that being a ‘true Montenegrin’ entails rejecting the concept of Montenegrin dual identity. This has been met with significant resistance, which is consistent with the observation made by Mylonas and Tudor (2021:117) that while it is not impossible for a nation’s constitutive narrative to be altered, such changes are seldom straightforward as ‘the story tends to become entrenched and difficult to replace’.
Despite the political incompatibility between Serbian and Montenegrin identities in the period leading up to Montenegrin independence, certain elements of hybridity still remain. As evidence of this, many people who identify as Montenegrins and vote for pro-Montenegrin parties still claim to speak Serbian and adhere to the SOC. Thus, language and religion can be viewed as indicators of the ongoing fusion of Serbian and Montenegrin identities. It is not surprising, therefore, that pro-Montenegrin and anti-Serb discourses have increasingly targeted these markers of ongoing Serb-Montenegrin hybridity.
The findings of this study indicate that threat construction and guilt attribution, achieved through different types of referential and predicational strategies, have been used strategically to convey ethnic prejudices and to establish or reinforce ingroup boundaries. These strategies provided the specific cultural input necessary for social categorization of Other as incompatible. In addition, text-producers often engage in coercive behavior by influencing the members of the ingroup to construct new cognitive representations of the outgroup or reinforce the existing ones. The manipulation of representations can be achieved by successfully implementing referential and predicational strategies, with the objective of activating an emotional response in the ingroup, which subsequently affects their cognitive and behavioral responses.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
