Abstract
This study examines how harm is discursively constructed and politically managed in U.S. foreign policy press briefings on the Gaza war. Drawing on van Dijk’s discourse semantics and its account of how semantic mechanisms encode and legitimize ideological positions, alongside Billig’s notion of ideological dilemmas, it analyzes 55 question–answer exchanges across three cases: Palestinian civilian casualties, the World Central Kitchen killings, and the killing of Hind Rajab. Through analysis of lexicalization, propositional structure, presupposition, implication, and the selective management of information relevance and completeness, the study identifies a structured interactional dynamic in which journalists’ questions maximize harm visibility while official responses systematically contain its accountability implications. Across the three cases, harm is differentially managed through abstraction and de-agentization, moralization with procedural deferral, and constrained recognition with delayed accountability. This pattern of calibration is argued to be not rhetorical flexibility but a structural response to the ideological requirement that alliance commitments remain stable—producing a discursive condition in which harm is publicly acknowledged yet politically inert. The findings contribute to critical discourse semantics and the study of how semantic organization serves ideological functions in institutional responses to allied violence.
Introduction
Harm is commonly understood as injury, suffering, or loss inflicted through physical violence, structural deprivation, or psychological damage (Butler, 2009; Hearn et al., 2022; Linklater, 2011; Weinthal and Sowers, 2019). Yet harm, suffering, and violence are not interchangeable. Violence refers to the act or force through which injury is inflicted; suffering names the subjective, lived experience of that injury; harm, by contrast, is a categorization of injury, translating what is suffered into forms that can be assessed, managed, and adjudicated. Because harm is classificatory rather than experiential, it is subject to contestation: who counts as harmed, how severely, and by whose agency are questions that states and institutions answer differently than those who suffer.
In political theory, harm is central to moral and political judgment (Bandura, 2002; Butler, 2009; Kuttab, 2007; Linklater, 2011). Butler (2009) argues that violence becomes intelligible as harm only when populations are recognized as grievable and injurable—a recognition that is never politically neutral, as some lives are rendered more grievable than others through ideological and institutional processes. Existing research has mainly examined harm through militarized violence and war where civilian deaths are frequently framed as accidental, unintentional and unavoidable, obscuring agency and responsibility (Cherkaoui, 2025; Daniele, 2024; Mueller, 2003; Rubaii, 2024; Sultany, 2024; Utych, 2022; Wheeler, 2002). While studies have explored how violence is represented and normalized in discourse (Bandura, 2002; Hearn et al., 2022; Kuttab, 2007; Matar, 2026), less attention has been given to how states strategically manage harm produced by allied violence ; that is, harm that cannot be denied, attributed to an enemy, or absorbed into a narrative of legitimate force, and that therefore requires more subtle and sustained discursive work.
This research addresses harm as discursive work in the context of the Gaza war, where U.S. foreign policy discourse has been particularly exposed to the tension between humanitarian norms and alliance obligations. Within the sociocognitive approach, ideologies are socially shared frameworks of cognition organized around evaluative schemas that structure group identity, judgment, and action (van Dijk, 1995). In U.S. foreign policy, these frameworks crystallize around assumptions of global indispensability, moral exceptionalism, and the necessity of a U.S.-led international order (Jervis, 2013; Kennan, 1967; Nye, 2004). U.S. leadership is framed as moral necessity rather than domination, while sovereignty and legality are applied asymmetrically—selectively foregrounded for allies, subordinated to security and strategic necessity when evaluating U.S. actions (Hunt, 1987). This framework allows departures from humanitarian or legal norms to be framed as regrettable necessities rather than violations, normalizing apparent contradictions between democratic ideals and coercive interventions (Battle, 2002; Hunt, 1987). These assumptions also shape the context models through which policymakers define situations, assign responsibility, and evaluate legitimacy in concrete discursive events.
In the case of Gaza, Israel is constructed ideologically as an extension of American values whose actions are presumed legitimate by default, an alignment reinforced through lobbying structures and extensive military, political, and economic support (Rynhold, 2020; Sehar, 2024; Thomas, 2007). This reflects broader patterns of ideological polarization whereby allied violence is framed as defensive or necessary while opposing parties are constructed as threatening or irrational (O’Reilly et al., 2024; van Dijk, 2008), thus sustaining moral asymmetry and normalizing differential recognition of civilian suffering. Yet this ideological formation is neither closed nor self-resolving; it is, as the following analysis will show, fundamentally dilemmatic.
This study examines these dilemmas as they unfold in U.S. foreign policy press briefings during the Gaza war. Press briefings constitute a central mechanism through which governments communicate policy positions during international crises while managing legitimacy, transparency, and public accountability, shaping domestic and international perceptions of foreign policy, and generating pressures for policy consistency through publicly articulated commitments (Betzold et al., 2016; Riccio, 2009; Tomz, 2007). They also function as important information conduits through which governments disseminate official narratives and respond to public concerns (De Candia et al., 2013; Kumar, 2007). At the same time, press briefings are inherently adversarial interactional settings in which government spokespersons and journalists engage in what Partington (2006, p. 16) characterizes as a ‘wrestling match’, as journalists challenge official accounts and spokespersons seek to defend, justify, or manage institutional positions.
Following Billig (1991) and Billig et al. (1988), the ideological space of U.S. foreign policy discourse is not unified or institutionally sealed but contains contrary themes that coexist within socially shared knowledge, providing the resources through which people argue, reason, and contest meaning (Billig et al., 1988). Humanitarian concern, alliance loyalty, legal accountability, and strategic necessity therefore do not resolve into a single institutional voice but operate as genuinely competing commitments requiring continuous discursive management. Harm cannot be fully denied without undermining credibility, yet it cannot always be fully acknowledged without threatening alliance cohesion or strategic interests.
Press briefings are therefore conceptualized here as contested interactional spaces in which competing constructions of harm are publicly negotiated across an asymmetric dyad. On one side, journalists are not neutral participants; they represent a distinct and ideologically positioned public space, bringing morally infused, evidence-focused, and critically oriented questions that foreground civilian suffering, proportionality, and accountability. Yet journalists’ interventions are also epistemically unstable; questions are not assertions, and they project moral pressure without institutional authority, leaving them structurally vulnerable to reformulation, evidential deflection, procedural deferral, or strategic containment. On the other side, spokespersons operate within constraints shaped by alliance obligations and strategic imperatives, responding through graduated containment by calibrating how harm is acknowledged, how its severity is qualified, and how accountability is deferred, displaced, or contained according to the political and interactional pressures each exchange presents.
To examine these processes, the study draws on van Dijk’s (1995, 2013) discourse semantics, analyzing five mechanisms through which harm is constructed, qualified, and contested in press briefing exchanges: lexicalization, propositional structure, presupposition, implication, and the selective management of information relevance and descriptive completeness. These mechanisms are examined across three cases drawn from U.S. press briefings on the Gaza war: Palestinian civilian harm broadly, the killing of World Central Kitchen aid workers, and the killing of Hind Rajab. Together, the cases demonstrate that harm is not treated uniformly but is differentially managed according to the moral visibility of the victims, the evidential pressure of the exchange, and the proximity of the case to questions of alliance accountability.
Ideology and discourse semantics
Within the socio-cognitive approach, ideology consists of socially shared systems of attitudes discursively enacted through opinions and evaluations shaped by collective belief structures and situated experience (van Dijk, 1995, 2014). While mental and context models provide the broader cognitive framework through which discourse is produced and interpreted (van Dijk, 1997, 2014), the present study focuses primarily on discourse semantics as the principal mechanism through which ideological positions are textually organized and publicly managed.
From this perspective, meaning does not reside in isolated words or sentences, but emerges through coherent sequences of propositions linked through causal, explanatory, contrastive, and functional relations (van Dijk, 1995). Coherence depends on shared background knowledge, scripts, and situational assumptions, allowing ideological meanings to appear naturalized as ‘common sense’ (Hall et al., 1978; van Dijk, 1995). Discourse semantics therefore provides the formal mechanisms through which ideological attitudes are encoded, negotiated, and legitimized in political discourse (Sykes, 1985; van Dijk, 1995, 2014).
Several semantic mechanisms are particularly relevant to the representation of harm in press briefings. Lexicalization is the selection of particular words or expressions to represent people, actions, or events in ways that encode specific evaluations, attitudes, or ideological perspectives
At the macro-semantic level, such processes are organized through strategies of polarization that emphasize positive representations of the in-group and negative representations of the out-group while downplaying contradictory information (van Dijk, 2013). However, political discourse in press briefings also reflects deeper ideological dilemmas (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988). Officials must simultaneously maintain accountability and credibility while protecting alliances and strategic interests. Press briefings therefore become discursive sites where humanitarian concern is acknowledged yet strategically managed, allowing institutional actors to regulate contradiction under conditions of public and moral scrutiny (Billig et al., 1988; van Dijk, 1995).
Overview of the cases examined
The data for this study consist of publicly available press briefings and official statements issued by U.S. administration personnel and accessed through the White House Briefing Room and the U.S. Department of State archives. The study is based on a qualitative discourse analysis of 55 question-and-answer pairs selected from official U.S. government briefing transcripts. The dataset focuses primarily on briefings involving National Security Council Coordinator John Kirby and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller. The selected interactions were drawn from periods immediately following highly publicized events during the Gaza war that generated widespread international condemnation and legal scrutiny. These include the Al-Ahli Arab Hospital explosion on October 17, 2023, developments surrounding Al-Shifa Hospital in November 2023, the killing of World Central Kitchen aid workers in April 2024, and the killing of 6-year-old Hind Rajab and her family, reported in 2024. Questions were selected where journalists explicitly referenced these incidents, challenged U.S. policy or complicity, or highlighted contradictions between declared American values and unfolding events on the ground.
Discussion
The discussion proceeds from a general analysis of journalists’ discourse to a case-based examination of official responses across the three cases of harm mentioned above. First, journalists’ questions are analyzed as a collective discourse of harm maximization, through which civilian suffering is rendered visible, morally salient, and politically consequential. The analysis then examines the three cases in order to explore how spokespersons calibrate acknowledgment, responsibility, and accountability.
The journalists’ discourse: A discourse of the maximization of harm
Across the journalists’ questions, a clear representation is that the Gaza events are treated as established, morally consequential harm to civilians. The presuppositions observable in journalists’ questions are the outcome of a cumulative socio-cognitive process through which particular representations of events become stabilized as shared mental models (van Dijk, 1995, 2008); that is, presuppositions are possible only when speakers assume sufficient overlap between their own mental models and those of their interlocutors. Continuous reporting on airstrikes, refugee camps, hospitals, and civilian casualties gradually consolidates a dominant interpretation of harm. Once such representations are repeatedly confirmed across contexts, they transition from being presupposed to being asserted. This marks a shift from information that requires justification to information that is stored in long-term memory as socially shared knowledge (van Dijk, 1995). Journalists can therefore presuppose large-scale civilian harm because such harm has already been cognitively sedimented as common ground (e.g. you know, babies on ventilators and those kinds of things? Given the airstrikes in — on the refugee camps near Gaza City, would now be the time for a humanitarian pause?) through prior discourse (e.g. you said, the president stressed), visual evidence (we can see, people seeing, numbers (e.g. 220 killed in West Bank), and repetitive framing across media and institutional sources (e.g. A massive blast has been reported, According to Haaretz).
In the questions examined, lexical choices such as ‘horrible’, ‘massive’, ‘widespread’, ‘exacerbating’, ‘outraging’, ‘serious’, and ‘deliberately targeted’ operate as lexicalized expressions of the evaluative core of the situation. These items foreground the moral and humanitarian significance of the events. They presuppose multiple, layered propositions about the situation in Gaza. Terms such as ‘horrible, ‘massive’, and ‘widespread’ presuppose that harm has already occurred and that it is extensive, reflecting a shared mental model in which civilian suffering is treated as an established and morally salient fact rather than a contingent or disputable claim. At the same time, evaluative expressions like ‘outraging’ and ‘exacerbating’ introduce a presupposition of moral urgency, signal that the events carry ethical weight, and demand recognition or response from the spokespersons that the consequences of violence are cumulative and politically consequential. Finally, formulations such as ‘deliberately targeted’ presuppose a degree of intentionality or preventability, foregrounding an ethical evaluation.
The presuppositions and lexical choices featured above are shaped by context models, which regulate what is interactionally appropriate and relevant in a press briefing addressed to state officials. Journalists orient to an institutional setting in which outright accusations may be constrained, yet accusations, questioning credibility, and complicacy are implied rather than explicitly stated. For example:
For people who are seeing the numbers—and you’ve also said it’s been thousands—is there anything more you can say besides ‘indications’? What evidence do you have. . .?
This question frames the interaction around epistemic credibility. By invoking ‘seeing the numbers’ and casualty figures in the ‘thousands’, the journalist constructs the harm as visible and already established, while the reliance on ‘indications’ frames official claims as weak and under-specified. The request for justification—‘what evidence do you have’—positions credibility as something that must be demonstrably earned. The question does not accuse the spokesperson of lying, but it implies that epistemic caution is no longer adequate given the scale of harm, thereby placing pressure on the official to reconcile uncertainty with observable reality.
2. Given the airstrikes. . . on the refugee camps near Gaza City, would now be the time for a humanitarian pause? I know you’ve said the U.S. position is no ceasefire. . .
This question escalates the interaction by linking concrete harm to policy stance. By opening with ‘given the airstrikes’ and specifying ‘refugee camps’, the journalist treats civilian suffering as an established premise. The temporal framing—‘would now be the time’—constructs the moment as morally decisive, implying that the harm has crossed an intolerable threshold. The explicit acknowledgment of the U.S. position of ‘no ceasefire’ situates continued refusal alongside ongoing violence, while the proposal of a ‘humanitarian pause’ is framed as minimal and pragmatic. In doing so, the question implies complicity without stating it, positioning policy persistence as alignment with continued harm.
Hospitals explosion: Minimized harm versus suspended accountability
As a matter of fact, defending against accusations of the Gaza genocide is a difficult task due to the large-scale civilian casualties and the live broadcasts showing the bombing of hospitals and schools. Answers to such questions cannot be easily misguided or fabricated, as the overwhelming evidence challenges attempts to defend against. When confronted with questions that directly implicate Israel in mass killings and genocide in Gaza, spokespersons attempt to downplay the severity of harm, re-contextualizing the violence in ways that reduce harm inflicted on civilians. By shifting the discourse from factual knowledge to belief-based interpretations, spokespersons create room for doubt and, in doing so, facilitate harm minimization.
For example (Press Briefing by National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby, October 31, 2023):
. . . Admiral, I—I believe you have, the President has, a lot of people have said that the information coming from the Gaza Health Ministry is not reliable because it’s controlled by Hamas. We can see on social media just terrible things happening, presumably, to civilians, children in Gaza. So, does the United States have its own estimate of what’s happening and h-—and how many people in Gaza? And where should the rest of us get accurate information on that count?
We are doing the best we can to try to get an assessment of the scope of the casualties. And you can imagine, we’re pulling from multiple different sources. We certainly are not taking the Ministry of Health’s numbers at face value. You know, we’re talking to partners on the ground. Now that we have a direct linkage with aid organizations on the ground as these trucks are getting in, we are getting a little bit more fidelity on the situation. So, we are pulling from multiple sources. And without spouting a whole number here, I can tell you: We are convinced that there have been many thousands of civilian deaths in Gaza thus far in the conflict.
At the semantic level, the journalist’s question combines attribution, presupposition, evidential contrast, and constructs civilian harm as both established and morally consequential. By attributing the claim about data unreliability to ‘you, the President, a lot of people’, the journalist invokes socially circulating positions rather than personal opinion, allowing the association between Hamas and informational unreliability to function as backgrounded common knowledge. The question then shifts evidential footing through a contrast between institutional discourse (‘said’) and perceptual experience (‘we can see’). This move establishes two epistemic regimes: belief-based institutional knowledge and public-based experiential verification. Lexical choices such as ‘see’ index immediacy and perceptual access, implicitly positioning visual evidence as less mediated and therefore more resistant to dismissal. The evaluative adjective ‘terrible’, together with references to ‘civilians’ and ‘children’, foregrounds moral salience and activates humanitarian schemas that anticipate and constrain a purely security-oriented response.
Pronoun use further organizes epistemic relations. The inclusive ‘we’ constructs a collective of witnessing publics, while ‘you’ marks institutional authority as responsible for validating knowledge. The focus on quantification—‘how many’—presupposes large-scale harm and frames casualty numbers as contested. The follow-up question—‘where should the rest of us get accurate information?’—extends this move by constructing a boundary between those who control authoritative narratives and those excluded from them.
Kirby’s response is best understood as a semantic strategy of relevance control realized through level of description and degree of completeness. Civilian deaths are treated as mentionable, but only in a thin and abstract way. Quantification is present yet imprecise—‘many thousands’, ‘many’, ‘multiple sources’—and the description remains incomplete: there is no elaboration of location, causal sequence, or responsible actors. By withholding the kinds of details that would enable moral and legal interpretation, the discourse prevents casualty information from acquiring explanatory force.
This abstraction is reinforced by agency management. Passive or agentless constructions such as ‘there have been many thousands of civilian deaths’ foreground outcomes while backgrounding the actor and the causal chain that would connect deaths to responsibility. The result is a semantic representation in which harm is acknowledged as an outcome but not as an action attributable to an agent. Civilian harm is thus linguistically present yet structurally deactivated.
A further semantic mechanism is evidential framing. Kirby explicitly devalues one source by stating the figures are not taken ‘at face value’, while simultaneously dispersing evidential responsibility across an unspecified verification process. The progressive forms ‘we are doing’ and ‘we are pulling’ encode knowledge as ongoing and provisional, delaying closure and keeping the issue in a permanent state of assessment. Epistemic markers such as ‘certainly’ and ‘we are convinced’ then reassert institutional authority without granting the specificity that would make the acknowledgment politically consequential. Certainty is attached to the general proposition that harm exists while minimized, not to the particulars that would anchor accountability.
At the level of context models, the response constructs the press briefing as an arena of epistemic management rather than accountability adjudication. The procedural emphasis on verification and ‘multiple sources’ defines what is interactionally appropriate: the spokesperson’s role is framed as safeguarding institutional credibility through methodological caution. Within this context model, specificity becomes risky because it would increase the inferential load of the discourse—moving the audience from recognition of harm to questions of responsibility, complicity, and policy consequences.
The ideological work of these semantic and cognitive operations is to protect institutional legitimacy while maintaining a minimal humanitarian posture. By allowing harm into the discourse only as an abstract and procedurally managed fact, the response avoids the ideological danger that harm might reorganize the policy narrative. In other words, civilian deaths are acknowledged just enough to sustain the appearance of moral concern, but not enough to permit the inference that alliance practices require constraint, sanction, or reversal. The asymmetry in completeness—generic treatment of civilian harm versus greater specificity and certainty when dealing with institutionally salient concerns—signals a hierarchy of relevance guided by political interests. What is described in detail becomes cognitively central and actionable; what is described abstractly becomes morally regrettable but politically inert. The institution thus retains control over which propositions can function as premises for decision-making.
WCK: Maximized harm versus minimized accountability
This section examines how official discourse manages a tension between the heightened moral visibility of the incident and the institutional need to protect alliance coherence, allowing harm to be strongly acknowledged while simultaneously containing its implications for responsibility and policy. The following excerpt is drawn from the April 2, 2024, White House press briefing featuring National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby, addressing the World Central Kitchen incident.
Now, if I could just—as Karine noted, just turn briefly to events in the Middle East. We were outraged to learn of an IDF strike that killed a number of civilian humanitarian workers yesterday from the World Central Kitchen, which has been relentless in working to get food to those who are hungry in Gaza and, quite frankly, around the world.
We send our deepest condolences to their families and loved ones.
We’ve seen the comments from Prime Minister Netanyahu and from the Israeli Defense Forces about their commitment to conduct an investigation. As we understand it, a preliminary investigation has been completed today and presented to the Army Chief of Staff, and we’ll—we’ll obviously look to see what they—what they discover in this preliminary one.
But we expect a broader investigation to be conducted and to be done so in a swift and comprehensive manner. We hope that those findings will be made public and that there is appropriate accountability held.
But—I’m sorry. More than 200 aid workers have been killed in this conflict, making it one of the worst for aid workers in recent history. This incident is emblematic of a larger problem and evidence of why distribution of aid in Gaza has been so challenging.
But what—beyond the strike, what is clear is that the IDF must do much more—must do—must do much more to improve deconfliction processes so that civilians and humanitarian aid workers are protected.
The U.S. will continue to press Israel to do more as well to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers. And we’ll continue to do all we can to deliver this assistance to Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
Thanks, Admiral. On the death of those World Central Kitchen aid workers, which includes one American who was killed, Netanyahu’s reaction was, quote, “It happens in war.” What is your reaction to that comment from Netanyahu?
I don’t think it’d be useful for me to get into a tit for tat here with the Prime Minister of Israel from the podium. We’ve been very clear about our expectations for this investigation. We noted that the Prime Minister said himself there will be an investigation. So has his military said that.
We look forward to that investigation being thorough and qui-—and swiftly done and, as I said, that—that it’ll be transparent, the results of it, and that if there’s accountability that needs to be had, that it will be had.
Kirby’s statement constructs the World Central Kitchen (WCK) incident through a carefully organized semantic hierarchy in which harm is made maximally visible while accountability is systematically constrained. This pattern can be explained using a discourse in which ideology operates through the regulation of prominence, relevance, and the inferential space available to recipients (van Dijk, 1988, 1995).
At the level of prominence, the killing of WCK workers is strongly foregrounded through multiple surface-structural devices. The incident is introduced as a deliberate agenda shift (‘turn briefly to events in the Middle East’), followed immediately by explicit evaluation (‘we were outraged’) and moral categorization (‘civilian humanitarian workers’). Such foregrounding functions as a surface marker of informational importance, signaling to recipients that this event should be processed as central to the discourse (van Dijk, 1988). The WCK incident is constructed as highly important because it activates a dense inferential network. The evaluation ‘outraged’ invites inferences of norm violation, moral exceptionality, and illegitimacy of the act. The positive characterization of the victims as ‘relentless’ humanitarian workers delivering food activates shared cultural knowledge about innocence, altruism, and protected status. Together, these elements allow recipients to infer that a serious moral boundary has been crossed and that the event warrants concern and response.
In contrast, the broader humanitarian catastrophe affecting Gaza’s population is represented in ways that sharply restrict inference. Civilians are described as ‘those who are hungry’, and their situation is generalized as occurring ‘in Gaza and, quite frankly, around the world’. These formulations abstract away from political and military causation and instead activate a generic humanitarian schema of global need. According to van Dijk (1977), information that is less relevant to the speaker’s ideological goals is often presented at a higher level of abstraction and with reduced descriptive completeness, thereby limiting the inferences recipients can draw. Here, abstraction blocks inferences about siege, responsibility, or structural violence, reducing the cognitive importance of mass civilian suffering relative to the WCK incident. This asymmetry produces an implicit hierarchy of victims grounded in ideological relevance.
Responsibility is further constrained through proceduralization, Israeli actors are introduced not as possible perpetrators but as institutional agents committed to self-regulation: they ‘will conduct an investigation’, have completed a ‘preliminary investigation’, and are expected to carry out a ‘broader’ and ‘transparent’ one. This categorization shifts Israel from the role of responsible agent to that of accountability manager. Such mitigation of in-group wrongdoing is a well-documented ideological pattern in van Dijk’s (1993) work, especially in elite and institutional discourse, where allies are discursively protected through re-framing.
This mitigation is reinforced through local semantic moves involving expectation and futurity. Expressions such as ‘we expect’, ‘we hope’, and ‘we’ll look to see’ function as normative presuppositions, assuming compliance and moral alignment without asserting enforceable obligations (Domaneschi, 2011). These constructions also allow recipients to infer concern and moral stance while blocking stronger conclusions about sanctions, conditionality, or independent action. Accountability is thus made discursively present but inferentially weak, visible as rhetoric, absent as power.
The reference to ‘more than 200 aid workers’ increases the seriousness of the situation and supports an inference of systemic danger. Yet the passive formulation ‘have been killed’ suppresses agency, preventing direct causal attribution. van Dijk (1991) notes that agency concealment is a common ideological strategy when responsibility is sensitive or politically inconvenient. The subsequent recontextualization of the incident as ‘emblematic of a larger problem’ explaining why ‘distribution of aid in Gaza has been so challenging’ introduces a macro-semantic shift. At the level of topics and macrostructures, the discourse moves from violence and culpability to logistics and operational difficulty. Because macrotopics guide top-down interpretation (van Dijk, 1988), this shift constrains how recipients integrate subsequent information, steering understanding away from accountability and toward technical obstacles.
When challenged with the normalization claim by Netanyahu that such deaths ‘happen in war’, Kirby intensifies accountability language but immediately reinscribes limitation through conditional futurity: ‘if there’s accountability that needs to be had, that it will be had’. This construction defers responsibility temporally and conditions its necessity, transforming accountability from an immediate obligation into a hypothetical outcome. Such deferral reflects the context model governing the interaction: an institutional press briefing in which humanitarian concern must be expressed without disrupting alliance relations. This context model thus constrains what kinds of inferences—especially conflictual ones—can be allowed to emerge.
Taken together, these discourse-semantic choices produce a coherent ideological pattern. Harm is maximized by expanding its moral visibility and inferential richness through prominence, evaluation, and victim elevation. Accountability is minimized by restricting inferential pathways through abstraction, passivization, proceduralization, macro-topic displacement, and temporal deferral. In van Dijk’s (1988, 1991) terms, ideology operates here not through denial of facts, but through the strategic regulation of what conclusions recipients are enabled to draw about those facts. The result demonstrates that elite institutional language can acknowledge harm while containing its consequences.
Hind Rajab: Constrained harm and delayed accountability
This section situates the Hind Rajab case within a broader theoretical pattern in which harm is publicly recognized yet discursively constrained, and accountability is invoked but indefinitely delayed. The excerpt analyzed in this section is drawn from a U.S. Department of State press briefing delivered by Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson, in Washington, D.C., on October 9, 2024.
It’s now 254 days since Israeli forces killed Hind Rajab. While the IDF claim – they maintain this claim that they weren’t in the area, our colleagues at Sky News said it’s, quote, “undeniable that they were,” affirming a string of reporting that we’ve seen saying as much. The IDF then disputed that report and also said there’s no misconduct investigation into that incident. So what’s going on here? It’s nearly been nine months of the U.S. saying it’s waiting for Israel to investigate itself, at one point Israel even reportedly lying.
That’s not what we said with respect to this particular investigation. With respect to this particular incident, we encouraged the Government of Israel to work with parties on the ground that said that they had information. The Government of Israel said to us and it’s said publicly that none of those parties came and gave them the information that they have said publicly.
Right. And then there—
This—it’s a different matter.
Yes. Thank you for clarifying. And then the Red Crescent, they claimed that Israeli forces never reached out to them on the investigation.
Correct.
But all to say this has been nearly nine months of this. This case is, of course, just illustrative of tens of thousands of kids killed. So how exactly is the U.S. approaching this, if on this case nine months later Israel is now saying there’s no investigation into this incident? And how can the U.S. keep unconditionally sending more weapons if this is how Israel is dealing with investigations of potential violations?
So let’s separate a couple of different things. This is, as I’ve said, a little bit of a different matter than other investigations into potential violations, which the Government of Israel has said that they are conducting. You should go to them for questions about what they may or may not be doing. And with this one, where they’ve said – and I know the Red Crescent has said something different; we’re not in a position to ultimately adjudicate which bit of information is accurate and which is not. I can tell you what we are doing on behalf of the United States Government, which is conducting our own assessments of a variety of incidents that raise questions about violations of international humanitarian law, and those assessments are ongoing.
Is this one of them?
I’m not going speak to individual assessments. I’ve always made clear that’s not something I’m going to do. There are number of incidents that are under review and continue to be under review.
Yes. No, no, yes. There’s Hind Rajab. There’s all these hundreds of journalists that have been killed, the medical workers. Over and over again, despite the conflict being complicated, the question is to send more weapons or not to send more weapons. There’s no notion of conditioning weapons on just completing investigations, respecting human rights, let alone stopping illegal settlements or the occupation. Why is that the case?
We continue to make clear that we are committed to the defense of Israel. That is a position that is not going to change. We – they are a country that are under threat from a terrorist organization in Gaza, Hamas, that we saw what horrible brutality they were willing to inflict on October 7th. And they continue to be under threat from a terrorist organization in the north, Hizballah, that has launched rockets for a year targeting Israeli civilians. They continue to be under threat by Iran that has launched ballistic missiles on two separate occasions at the state of Israel. So we’re going to continue to come to their defense. But at the same we come to their defense, we’re going to continue to insist that they conduct their military operations in a way that minimizes civilian casualties.
The exchange surrounding the killing of Hind Rajab occupies a distinct discursive position within U.S. official discourse on civilian harm in Gaza. Unlike references to generalized civilian casualties or even the killing of humanitarian workers, this case is defined not by scale but by singularity and narrative closure. Hind Rajab was a named child whose recorded emergency phone call circulated globally, producing a temporally and morally complete sequence of events.
In this exchange, the journalist’s questions maximize harm by building an event model in which Hind Rajab’s killing is treated as an established, morally urgent act that has been left unresolved for an unacceptably long time. The opening formulation, ‘It’s now 254 days since Israeli forces killed Hind Rajab’, compresses the case into a time–harm linkage: the duration itself becomes part of the meaning, indexing delay as morally consequential. The question then installs an evidential contrast that intensifies that model: the IDF ‘maintain this claim’ that they ‘weren’t in the area’, whereas Sky News is quoted as saying it is ‘undeniable that they were’, and this is said to ‘affirm’ ‘a string of reporting’. By moving between ‘claim’, ‘undeniable’, and ‘a string of reporting’, the journalist constructs a semantic field in which denial is positioned as rhetorically defensive, while third-party evidence is positioned as cumulatively stabilizing. The next move—‘Israel even reportedly lying’—does further harm maximization by framing the evidential dispute not as uncertainty but as potential deception, which raises the accountability stakes.
Crucially, the journalist frames Hind Rajab’s killing as a test case for policy relevance. By stating that the case is ‘illustrative of tens of thousands of kids killed’ and linking it to journalists and medical workers, the question attempts upward generalization, proposing that a singular, morally saturated event should reorganize the macrostructure of policy reasoning—specifically arms transfers and conditions of support. The underlying logic is that when harm is both clear and unresolved, it should exert pressure on strategic commitments.
Miller’s response systematically resists this macrostructural elevation. Categorical segmentation plays a central role: phrases such as ‘this particular incident’, ‘a different matter’, and ‘let’s separate a couple of different things’ function to detach Hind Rajab’s case from both earlier investigative commitments and from broader patterns of civilian harm. Instead of allowing the case to stabilize as a representative instance, it is repeatedly reclassified as administratively exceptional, preventing it from functioning as precedent or trigger.
There is an inferential chain in the question and it can be reconstructed as follows: (1) a harmful event occurred; (2) the event is sufficiently documented and temporally unresolved; (3) therefore, responsibility should be determined; and (4) such determination should inform policy decisions, including investigations, conditionality, or changes in support. Miller’s response interrupts this chain at the transition between evidence and institutional conclusion. Statements such as ‘we’re not in a position to ultimately adjudicate which bit of information is accurate’ reintroduce epistemic contingency at the level of institutional entitlement, relocating the authority to draw conclusions to a domain that remains procedurally deferred. The disruption occurs at the level of context-model control; that is who is authorized to decide and under what conditions (van Dijk, 2006). The effect is that evidence accumulates without progressing to the next inferential step—attribution, closure, or policy consequence—allowing acknowledgment and non-closure to coexist.
The journalist’s follow-up names a specific, authoritative actor: ‘the Red Crescent . . . claimed that Israeli forces never reached out to them’. The spokesperson’s reply—‘Correct’—constitutes a moment of discursive rupture. What is analytically striking is what does not follow. There is no repair move, no reassessment of prior claims, and no evaluation of what this contradiction implies for the credibility of the investigative process. The acknowledgment is absorbed without consequence. From a discourse-semantic perspective, the proposition enters the common ground but is prevented from functioning as a premise for further inference (van Dijk, 1977).
This interaction reveals a broader ideological mechanism: facts that should advance accountability are allowed into discourse while being stripped of explanatory or normative force. Knowledge accumulation does not lead toward closure; instead, it coexists with indefinite deferral. The more specific the evidence becomes, the less it appears to matter. By contrast, threats to Israel are narrated with high descriptive density, temporal extension, and explicit moral evaluation: Hamas’s ‘horrible brutality’, Hizballah’s year-long rocket attacks, and Iran’s ballistic missiles. As van Dijk (1977) argues, such asymmetries in descriptive detail signal ideological relevance. What is richly described is treated as decisive; what is thinly referenced is rendered marginal, regardless of its moral gravity.
Ideology, dilemma, and press briefings
Billig et al. (1988) argue that common sense is not a coherent body of beliefs but is fundamentally dilemmatic, because it contains ‘contrary themes’ that coexist within socially shared knowledge and provide the resources through which people argue and think. As they note, ‘common sense will be ‘dilemmatic’, in that it contains contrary themes’, and these opposing elements are precisely what make social argument and deliberation possible. Press briefings institutionalize this condition: spokespersons must speak in ways that keep competing themes—humanitarian responsibility and strategic obligation—simultaneously available under conditions of public scrutiny.
Within this dilemmatic field, harm does not function as a single ideological signal but appears in differentiated forms depending on who is harmed and how the case interacts with institutional priorities. The variation across the hospital explosion, World Central Kitchen, and Hind Rajab cases reflects what Billig (1991) describes as the selective organization of attention shaped by prior evaluative orientations. He observes that a person holding a strong evaluation is liable to pay especial attention to information that fits that orientation while overlooking instances that do not. At the institutional level, a similar process is visible: harms that can be accommodated within existing interpretive priorities receive fuller moral articulation, whereas harms that would intensify pressure for alliance-related accountability are treated through abstraction, evidential caution, or epistemic deferral. The issue, therefore, is not the absence of concern, but the selective foregrounding and backgrounding of events in line with established evaluative commitments.
For spokespersons, accountability itself constitutes a dilemmatic condition. They must sustain two opposing but socially legitimate commonplaces: that civilian suffering demands moral and legal concern, and that responsible statecraft requires prudence, caution, and alliance reliability. Billig (1991) emphasizes that ideological reasoning does not eliminate such tensions but operates through them, as speakers draw upon different elements of common sense ‘to make their cases appear persuasive’ (Billig, 1991: 21). The recurring pattern in the briefings—expressions of concern and references to international humanitarian law alongside epistemic limitation, procedural delay, or refusal of case-specific judgment—reflects the rhetorical maintenance of these competing themes rather than their resolution. Press briefings therefore operate as a space of discursive stabilization rather than resolution. Civilian harm becomes the point at which the ‘contrary themes’ of common sense intersect, while institutional discourse works to preserve coherence by selectively organizing attention and relevance. In line with Billig’s account, ideology appears here not as a consistent doctrine but as an ongoing rhetorical practice through which the dilemmatic character of shared values is managed in public argument (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988).
This dilemmatic management is anchored in broader evaluative orientations that structure U.S. foreign policy. Assumptions such as U.S. global indispensability privilege order and stability, framing leadership as a moral necessity (Jervis, 2013; Nye, 2004). Similarly, asymmetrical applications of sovereignty and legality reflect a hierarchy in which security considerations dominate evaluations of U.S. conduct (Hunt, 1987). Most centrally, moral exceptionalism sustains a national self-image grounded in justice while allowing departures from humanitarian norms to be interpreted as context-bound necessities rather than violations (Kennan, 1967). These orientations shape what counts as relevant, credible, or actionable within the briefing context.
Concluding remarks
What the three cases demonstrate is that officials respond to these competing pressures not through a fixed communicative position but through calibration. In the hospital explosion case, harm is abstracted and de-agentized, acknowledged as outcome while severed from causation. In the WCK case, harm is morally elevated but procedurally deferred, its visibility expanded precisely because its accountability implications can be displaced onto an investigative process. In the Hind Rajab case, harm is singularly documented yet institutionally quarantined, with accumulating evidence systematically prevented from advancing toward closure or policy consequence. These are not variations in tone but variations in the inferential space made available to recipients—which propositions are allowed to function as premises for further reasoning, and which are absorbed into discourse without consequence.
Within the context of strategic alliance, harm is transformed from a direct material reality into a discursively regulated political object. This transformation is structurally necessary within an ideological formation that must simultaneously uphold humanitarian norms and protect alliance commitments. The moment harm becomes linked to questions of responsibility or policy change, it enters a zone of ideological sensitivity where its meaning must be carefully managed. The central tension in U.S. foreign policy communication lies in what that recognition is permitted to imply. Spokespersons cannot deny harm without losing credibility, yet cannot fully acknowledge it without generating pressure for policy constraint. The discourse therefore does not resolve the dilemma but operates through it, drawing selectively on competing commonplaces to maintain the appearance of moral seriousness while foreclosing the inferences that would make accountability politically actionable.
Footnotes
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
