What distinguishes radical right welfare chauvinism? Excluding different migrant groups from the welfare state

Abstract

Literature posits that mainstream right-wing parties have adopted restrictive positions on immigrants’ entitlements to social rights to avoid losing votes to populist radical right-wing parties (PRRPs). Although studies recognize that this co-option is only partial, we know little about the remaining differences between PRRPs’ and mainstream right-wing parties’ welfare chauvinism strategies. This article fills this knowledge gap by comparing how mainstream and populist right-wing governments approach different migrant groups’ entitlements to social rights. The article combines an event history analysis of the Determinants of International Migration Policy database with a qualitative examination of the indexation of family benefits in selected European Countries to compare PRRPs’ and mainstream parties’ impact on the social rights of different migrant groups. The results reveal that the main difference between PRRPs and mainstream right-wing parties in Western Europe is the formers’ support for restrictions on intra-EU migrants’ entitlements to social benefits. This finding has important implications for the study of the European social policy agenda, as PRRPs’ increasing politicization of intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights may compromise the future of intra-European solidarity.

Keywords

Welfare state deservingness migration integration policy DEMIG asylum seekers populist radical right intra-EU migrants welfare chauvinism

Introduction

Scholars have invested considerable effort in determining the welfare state preferences of Western European populist radical right-wing parties (PRRPs). In recent decades, such parties have abandoned their traditional right-wing positions on distributive issues, embracing instead a defence of the welfare state (Afonso and Rennwald, 2018; Betz, 1994; Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2018; Röth et al., 2018). However, this defence differs from that of the mainstream left-wing parties, as it is characterized by a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). Centrally, PRRPs’ platforms are what scholars refer to as ‘welfare chauvinist’: they prioritize community members in accessing welfare, while restricting access for immigrants (Afonso and Rennwald, 2018; Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; de Koster et al., 2013; Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2018; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Rydgren, 2004).

Empirical analyses have suggested that welfare chauvinism has become a crucial component of PRRPs’ anti-immigrant agendas (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; Rydgren, 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2008; de Koster et al., 2013; Afonso and Rennwald, 2018; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018) and an important variable in their electoral success (Rydgren, 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2008; de Koster et al., 2013). This is not merely a question of rhetoric. Studies have shown that when PRRPs form governments with mainstream parties, they are able to shape integration policies and implement restrictions on migrants’ entitlements to social rights (Careja et al., 2016; Chueri, 2021 Koning, 2013; Rathgeb, 2021).

While the academic literature considers welfare chauvinism to be a distinctive feature of PRRPs, recent studies have revealed that mainstream parties have responded to PRRPs’ electoral successes by co-opting their exclusionary position on migrants’ access to the welfare state (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2017). As Chueri (2019) has shown, the electoral success of PRRPs drives mainstream right-wing parties to adopt restrictive measures on immigrants’ access to social benefits. Much of the actual policy impact of PRRPs is in fact realized via such indirect effects (Alonso et al., 2012; Bale, 2008; Norris, 2005; Van Spange, 2010; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016). In other words, mainstream right-wing parties have begun to incorporate many of the PRRPs’ positions on immigration and integration.

Studies have however shown that the mainstream right-wing parties’ stances on migrants’ access to benefits appear relatively more moderate than those of PRRPs (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016; Chueri, 2019), which has been taken to imply that right-wing parties are pursuing a ‘light’ version of PRRPs’ pledges. However, these studies treat migrants as a homogeneous category (Careja and Harris, 2021). In this article, we argue that party families’ ideologies filter public perception of migrant groups deservingness differently, creating their own hierarchies of migrant deservingness. Moreover, political parties have a particular relation to norms that regulate migrants’ access to social rights, being unequally prone to contest existing rules. For instance, the mainstream right-wing parties are constrained by their economic liberalism and support of the international liberal order, factors that make them less likely to target labour migrants or to go against international norms (Boswell and Hough, 2008; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008, Hadj Hadj Abdou et al., 2022). By comparison, PRRPs’ nativism and populism give them more flexibility to oppose international institutions and to restrict labour migrants’ entitlements. This would suggest that the differences are not only restricted to the level of welfare chauvinism but also the differentiated targeting of migrant groups. To examine this, this article adopts a more fine-grained approach to migrants’ entitlements to social rights and asks what distinguishes PRRPs’ exclusionary welfare position. More specifically, the article aims to contribute to the literature on welfare chauvinism by (1) analysing how different migrant groups are targeted by restrictive measures and (2) comparing PRRPs’ and mainstream governments’ influence on different migrant groups’ access to social rights. This study combines an event history analysis of the data on changes in migrants’ entitlements to social rights, collected from the Determinants of International Migration Policy database (DEMIG POLICY) for 17 Western European countries between 1990 and 2014 with a qualitative examination of the indexation of family benefits aiming at restricting those benefits for intra-EU migrants.

The results show that asylum seekers bear most of the brunt of the restrictive measures and that right-wing governments, with and without PRRPs, are equally likely to restrict asylum seekers’ entitlements to social rights. However, the participation of a PRRP in a government is particularly harmful to intra-EU migrants. To examine the effect of PRRPs on intra-EU migrants’ entitlements to rights, we employed an inductive approach to examine PRRPs’ roles in enacting restrictive measures against this group’s access to family benefits. Our analysis suggests that the distinction between mainstream right-wing parties and PRRPs’ impact on intra-EU access to social rights occurs in part because of PRRPs’ populist and Eurosceptic appeals. Such parties have incentives to challenge EU institutions’ decisions and enforce restrictions on intra-EU migrants’ social rights, as this strategy allows them to simultaneously pursue both their anti-European and anti-migrant stances.

Hierarchy of deservingness and institutional framework

The literature describes welfare chauvinism as the application of identity criteria for welfare deservingness (Keskinen, 2016; Abts et al., 2021), reserving welfare benefits for ‘members of the community’ (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990) or for individuals who are ‘culturally close’ to the natives (Nielsen et al., 2020). However, studies have shown that the public perception of migrants’ deservingness goes beyond identity to include elements such as need, control, attitude, and reciprocity (for an overview of these criteria, see Van Oorschot, 2000; 2006). Dimensions such as the reasons for migration and perceptions of ‘worth’, vulnerability, and cultural background create a hierarchy of migrant groups’ deservingness of social rights (Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2019).

Accordingly, the literature shows that EU citizens have relatively higher solidarity towards intra-EU migrants, as this group is associated with labour migration and is considered culturally similar to the nationals (the reciprocity and identity criteria) (Wright and Reeskens, 2013; Cappelen and Midtbø, 2016; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2019). Refugees have also been generally perceived as deserving of social benefits, in recognition of their necessity to emigrate (the control and need criteria). We can furthermore expect third-country workers (TCWs) to be in a relatively lower position in the hierarchy of deservingness, due to being seen as culturally different (identity criterium) (Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2019), despite TCWs being perceived as contributing to society (the reciprocity criterion), especially those who are in the country for the long term (Nielsen et al., 2020).

The hierarchy of deservingness has however been shifting in recent years. The influx of asylum seekers in the 1990s provoked a change in the public discourse on this group, which resulted in a strong distinction between asylum seekers and refugees (Cholewinski, 2000; Liedtke, 2002). Asylum seekers were often described as ‘bogus’ (Sales, 2002: 454) and stereotyped as being attracted by generous welfare benefits without wishing to contribute to society (Bloch and Schuster, 2002; Sales, 2002). Moreover, the increased intra-EU migration due to the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 has reduced the positive appraisal of intra-EU migrants, who were accused of being ‘welfare tourists’ (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014). The increase in migration from Eastern Europe to Western European countries has challenged the perception of shared identity in the EU (Cappelen and Peters, 2018; Martinsen and Werner, 2019; Schmidt et al., 2018).

This shift in the public perception of migrant groups’ welfare deservingness has created opportunities for policy changes and the shifting of party positions. However, governments are not completely free to change their integration policies, as they are constrained by international and regional institutions (Table 1). These constraints, however, differ significantly across migrant category. Refugees are granted the same level of social protection as nationals by international law, leaving virtually no space for governments to restrict refugees’ access to social rights (Duke et al., 1999). Asylum seekers are however only guaranteed residual social protection, allowing states to reduce their social benefits to vouchers and in-kind provisions (Levy, 1999; Sales, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2018). EU law guarantees that intra-EU migrants receive the same social rights as nationals (Kramer et al., 2018), but EU member states are allowed to adopt restrictions to prevent intra-EU migrants from becoming an ‘unreasonable burden’ to its welfare system during their initial period of relocation. Such restrictions are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the European Court of Justice (Bruzelius et al., 2015).

Table 1.

International and regional institutions on migrant groups’ access to social rights (adopted until 2014).

Migrant group	International and regional regulation	Level of protection
Asylum seekers	1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees	Countries are required to provide minimal social protection
	1967 New York protocol on the status of refugees
	1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
	1998 EXCOM conclusion under the institution of asylum
Refugees	1951 Geneva convention relating to the status of refugees	Equal treatment with nationals of the host member state applies. Virtually no possible exception is allowed
	1967 New York protocol on the status of refugees
	1997 treaty of Amsterdam
	1998 EXCOM conclusion under the institution of asylum
Temporary third-country workers	1993 Maastricht treaty	Equal treatment with nationals of the host member state applies. However, exceptions are granted to the host state
	1997 treaty of amsterdam
	Directive 2009/50/EC
	Directive 2011/98/EU
	1993 Maastricht treaty
Long-term third-country workers	1997 treaty of amsterdam	Equal treatment with nationals of the host member state applies
	Directive 2003/109/EC
	Directive 2011/98/EU
Intra-EU migrants	1997 treaty of amsterdam	Equal treatment with nationals of the host member state. However, host states can adopt restrictions to prevent an ‘unreasonable burden’
	1997 treaty of amsterdam
	Directive 2004/38/EU

During recent decades, the EU has regulated the status of subcategories of TCW and their access to social benefits in the host country. TCW’s entitlement to social benefits varies depending on migrants’ skills, length of stay, and the main purpose of migration (see Wollenschläger et al., 2018). However, the law grants a considerable amount of discretion to the host State to limit TCW access to social benefits (Guiraudon, 1998; Beduschi, 2015; Eisele, 2018; Wollenschläger et al., 2018). As long-term TCWs generally have similar access to social protection as natives (della Torre and de Lange, 2018), we consider this group separately from temporary TCWs in the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the national and regional institutions that regulate migrant groups’ access to the welfare state and their level of social protection.

Parties’ ideology filters

The combination of different legislative frameworks and varying popular views on different migrant groups’ deservingness creates opportunities for parties to shape integration policies. However, parties need to be coherent in their views, which means that their policy responses will be filtered by their overall ideology. Scholars have argued that mainstream parties have responded to PRRPs’ welfare chauvinism by adding a restrictive approach to migrants’ entitlements to social rights to their traditional retrenchment rhetoric (Chueri, 2021). Nonetheless, previous studies on immigration policies suggest that this co-option of PRRPs’ welfare chauvinism might be risky because it contradicts mainstream right-wing parties’ core values, in particular their economic liberalism (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). Accordingly, mainstream right wing-parties prioritize economic performance, and are aligned with business elites’ interests (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018, Hadj Hadj Abdou et al., 2022). Moreover, mainstream right-wing parties are committed to the liberal order and tend to comply with international agreements on migrants’ integration.

Meanwhile, PRRPs have the freedom to restrict migrants’ social rights more broadly. The importance of nativism to PRRPs’ distributive platforms (Keskinen, 2016; Abts et al., 2021) means that all migrants are potential targets of restrictive measures, especially those considered culturally different (Kuisma, 2013; Jø rgensen and Thomsen, 2016; Abts et al., 2021). Moreover, PRRPs oppose economic liberalism and are not committed to the liberal order (Burgoon, 2009). In particular, PRRPs’ populist rhetoric makes them prone to challenging existing norms to signal anti-elitism and mobilize their electorate.

Based on these insights, we developed three hypotheses to compare PRRPs’ and mainstream right-wing parties’ impact on migrant groups’ entitlements to social rights. The deterioration of the public perception of asylum seekers makes them the main targets of restrictions by both PRRPs and mainstream parties. PRRPs perceive asylum seekers as culturally different and, to a lesser extent, as not contributing to society (Kuisma, 2013; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Jø rgensen and Thomsen, 2016; Abts et al., 2021). Moreover, mainstream parties also restrict asylum seekers’ access to social rights, as asylum seekers are a group that is poorly protected under international agreements and regarded as economically inactive (Han, 2013; Odmalm and Bale, 2015). By doing so, mainstream right-wing parties can respond to the increasing welfare chauvinist sentiments without contradicting their economic interests (Boswell and Hough, 2008; Jø rgensen and Thomsen, 2016). Therefore, we expect that asylum seekers will be equally targeted by mainstream right-wing parties and PRRPs.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): In comparison to mainstream right-wing administrations, the participation of PRRPs in governments does not increase the probability of such governments adopting restrictions on asylum seekers’ entitlements to social rights.

PRRPs are likely to restrict the social rights of temporary TCWs, as the latter are regarded as culturally different. However, mainstream right-wing parties are less likely to target temporary TCWs to the same extent because this group is primarily associated with labour migration and restrictions would thus go against their economic concerns and business elites’ interests.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): In comparison to mainstream right-wing administrations, the participation of PRRPs in governments increases the probability of such governments adopting restrictions on temporary TCWs’ entitlements to social rights.

Prima facie, intra-EU migrants are not the main targets of PRRPs’ restrictions, as the former are relatively culturally similar to nationals. However, PRRPs have incentives to frame their Euroscepticism in terms of the protection of national identity and emphasize the cultural differences between nationals and migrants from the enlarged Europe (Meijers, 2017). Moreover, PRRPs’ populist appeals make them inclined to explore the lacunas of European regulations and to attempt to politicize intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights. At the same time, mainstream right-wing governments have low incentives to target this migrant group, as it is considered to primarily consist of labour migrants. Moreover, mainstream parties are unlikely to challenge EU directives and tend to comply with EC’s decisions to avoid legal challenges by the European Court of Justice (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014).

Hypothesis 3 (H3): In comparison to mainstream right-wing administrations, the participation of PRRPs in governments increases the probability of such governments adopting restrictions on intra-EU migrants’ entitlements to social rights.

Irrespective of ideology, due to extensive legal protection, parties have minimal space to restrict refugees’ and long-term TWCs’ entitlements to social rights (della Torre and de Lange, 2018; Duke et al., 1999; Sales, 2002). Therefore, we will not formulate hypotheses regarding party families’ influence on these groups’ access to social rights. However, this group is included in the analyses to illustrate that the institutional framework hinders governments from adopting restrictive measures on those immigrants.

Research design

To assess parties’ impact on migrant groups’ entitlements to social rights, this study uses an event history analysis, or survival analysis, with robust estimation of standard errors for clustered observations. This statistical method is traditionally employed to measure the time until the occurrence of a specific event or the duration of a certain state (Mills, 2011), such as the time in between jobs or the duration of a government.¹ Nonetheless, the method is also suitable for responding to a broader set of questions regarding the causes of an event for which time is not of primary concern (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). Compared to traditional cross-section and panel models with binary dependent variables, event history analysis has two distinctive features. First, it allows researchers to deal with censored data.² Second, it enables a dynamic analysis of the data. A panel data analysis with lagged variables also offers insights into time dependencies, but the spacing of the intervals can lead to inaccuracy (see Blossfeld et al., 2012; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). In our study, we applied the Cox proportional-hazard model with the possibility of repeated events. Here, the event was a restriction of migrants’ entitlements to social rights, which could occur more than once for each country in the study.

The data on migrants’ entitlements to social rights comes from Oxford University’s DEMIG POLICY (DEMIG, 2015), a database that provides information on the legislation that affects migrants’ entitlements to social rights.³ Data were collected from the following 17 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The data were annual and covered the period from 1990 to 2014. These years correspond to the period in which PRRPs emerged in the political system of most of the aforementioned countries.

Dependent variable

The decision to use DEMIG POLICY over other databases was four-fold. First, it appropriately differentiates the various policy areas related to immigration, allowing an analysis of transformation in integration policies. Second, it focuses exclusively on policy outputs and catalogues legislation changes,⁴ which is the focus of this study. Third, it includes the countries of this study and has broad temporal coverage. Finally, it informs the migrant group targeted by the policy, and includes intra-EU migrants as a possible target group.

As bills usually aim at more than one migrant group, we opted for a more granular construction of the database. Instead of a traditional panel data structure that has yearly data for each country, we adopted a combination of migrant group and country as the unit of analysis. The entitlements of the five migrant categories (intra-EU migrants, temporary TCWs,⁵ long-term TCWs, asylum seekers, and refugees) were examined separately.⁶ This distinction is essential because entitlements to social rights are linked to status of entrance, and legislation addresses the entitlements of each migrant category separately (Bommes et al., 1999).

Data on intra-EU migrants, temporary TCWs and long-term TCWs are censored before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which established free movement inside the EU and regulated TCWs’ entrance into the EU. Also, countries that joined the EU or signed a free movement agreement with the EU after 1992 have their data censored until the year of the agreement.⁷ As a result, this article employed a database with 2,007 inputs. The dependent variable was binary, with a value of one if an event had occurred and 0 if it had not. It is important to note that we considered nationals’ entitlements to social rights as the baseline, which means that a decrease in migrants’ social rights represented an increase in the gap between nationals’ and migrants’ entitlements to social rights. Therefore, general welfare state retrenchment that targeted both nationals’ and migrants’ rights was not taken into account.

Independent variables

This study used seven explanatory variables. The main variable of interest was government orientation and was operationalized via the following four categories: left-wing, grand-coalition, right-wing, and right-wing with a PRRP.⁸ This article considered both the formal participation of PRRPs in governments and the stable support of a PRRP for a winning coalition despite not receiving portfolios, also known as informal participation.⁹

Resource pressures can also influence migrants’ entitlements to social rights (Römer, 2017): recession, budget deficits, and unemployment increase the likelihood of welfare state retrenchment and may disproportionately impact migrants (Pontusson, 1995). Also, some studies have concluded that ethnic homogeneity is essential to building trust in society, which, in turn, is critical to getting citizens to support the welfare state (Putnam, 2007; Soroka et al., 2006). Therefore, an influx of migrants may have a negative impact on solidarity toward migrants. Demographic factors can also play a role, as a high elderly-dependency rate may negatively affect welfare-state sustainability and may lead to the adoption of restrictive measures. Finally, we included public social expenditure as a control variable. Literature shows that generous welfare states foster welfare solidarity, which makes the exclusion of migrants less likely (Römer, 2017). Nonetheless, migration may represent financial pressure to generous welfare states, opening space for welfare chauvinist actors to politicize migrants’ access to social rights (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). Table 2 summarizes the independent variables of the study.

Table 2.

Independent variables.

Variable name	Explanation	Source
Old-age ratio	Ratio between population over 65 years and population between 20 and 64 years	Organization for economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
GDP	Yearly GDP variation	OECD
Government orientation	Grand-coalition, left-wing government, and a coalition between right-wing parties and PRRPs (right-wing government is the baseline)	ParlGov and author
Migrant influx	Ratio between migrant influx and total population	OECD
Public debt	Ratio between total central government debt and GDP	OECD
Unemployment	Unemployment rate	International Monetary Fund
Public social expenditure	Ratio between total government public social expenditure and GDP	OECD

Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses

The contingency table (Table 3) confirms that governments with PRRPs are the most restrictive in terms of migrants’ access to social benefits. Moreover, in line with our expectations, asylum seekers are the most targeted group, whereas long-term TCWs, and refugees are the least targeted. Nonetheless, there are differences across government orientations. Mainstream governments’ restrictions focus on asylum seekers, whereas governments that involve PRRPs target all migrant groups. Although the following point is beyond the scope of this study, the table reveals that left-wing governments also restrict immigrants’ entitlements to social rights and that those restrictions are different in breadth compared to those of mainstream right-wing governments.

Table 3.

Association between the restriction of migrants’ entitlement to social rights and government orientation (17 countries from 1990 to 2014).

Government orientation	Left-wing	Grand coalition	Right-wing	Right-wing with PRRPs	Total
Years in government	111	160	110	44	425
Number of restrictions by migrant group
Asylum seekers	4	7	4	6	21
Row (%)	19.0	33.30	19.00	28.60	—
Column (%)	50.00	87.50	50.00	31.58	48.83
Intra-EU migrants	2	1	1	4	8
Row (%)	25.00	12.50	12.50	50.00	—
Column (%)	25.00	12.50	12.50	21.05	18.60
Temporary TCWs	1	0	2	5	8
Row (%)	12.50	0.00	25.00	62.50	—
Column (%)	12.50	0.00	25.00	26.32	18.60
Refugees	1	0	0	3	4
Row (%)	25.00	0.00	0.00	75.00	—
Column (%)	12.50	0.00	0.00	15.79	9.30
Long-term TCWs	0	0	1	1	2
Row (%)	0.00	0.00	50.00	50.00	—
Column (%)	0.00	0.00	12.5	5.26	4.65
Total	—	8	8	8	19
Column (%)	19.51	19.51	17.07	43.90	—

To test the proposed hypotheses, we ran five models. Table 4 shows the coefficients and their exponential transformations (exp (βi)), which are hazard ratios (HRs), or relative hazard. An HR is a relative measure that compares the risk of an event for two groups whose levels of the explanatory variable of interest differ marginally, with all other covariates being equal. For dichotomous and nominal variables, the HR compares the risk of two groups that have different levels of the categorical variable. As a general rule, an HR above one implies that a marginal increase of the explanatory variable increases the hazard of an event, whereas an HR below one implies that a marginal increase of the dependent variable reduces this hazard. The calculation HR-1 indicates a change in the risk of occurrence of an event given a marginal increase in the predictor variable.¹⁰

Table 4.

Cox Proportional Hazard models with robust standard errors. The table reports coefficients (β). Hazard ratios (HR). and standard deviation in parentheses.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
	All migrant groups		Asylum seekers		Asylum seekers		Intra-EU migrants		Temporary TCWs
	β	HR	β	HR	β	HR	β	HR	β	HR
Government orientation (right-wing is the baseline)
Left-wing government	—		−2.46***	0.09	1.08	2.96	1.69	5.44	−1.28	0.28
Left-wing government	—		(1.45)	0.09	(1.24)	2.96	(1.54)	5.44	(1.72)	0.28
Grand coalition	—		−4.46**	0.01	1.33	3.77	−0.36	0.70	—
Grand coalition	—		(1.86)	0.01	(1.14)	3.77	(1.96)	0.70	—
PRRP government participation	—		−0.56	0.57	1.46	4.32	2.68***	14.66	0.39	1.47
PRRP government participation	—		(1.66)	0.57	(1.19)	4.32	(1.66)	14.66	(1.16)	1.47
Government debt	0.00	1.00	0.02	1.02	0.01	1.01	0.04**	1.04	0.61	1.84
Government debt	(0.01)	1.00	(0.02)	1.02	(1.19)	1.01	(0.03)	1.04	(0.38)	1.84
Government debt × log-time	—								−0.21	0.81
Government debt × log-time	—								(0.13)	0.81
Migration influx	−0.30	0.74	0.00	1.02	0.01	1.01	−0.04	0.96	−0.01	0.99
Migration influx	(0.27)	0.74	(0.11)	1.02	(0.05)	1.01	(0.15)	0.96	(0.12)	0.99
Migration influx × log-time	0.10	1.10	—
Migration influx × log-time	(0.10)	1.10	—
Old age ratio	−0.14**	0.87	−0.17	0.84	−0.17***	0.84	−0.24*	0.79	−0.55**	0.58
Old age ratio	(0.06)	0.87	(0.22)	0.84	(0.11)	0.84	(0.23)	0.79	(0.28)	0.58
GDP	−0.04	0.96	2.16**	8.68	0.13	1.14	0.12	1.13	−0.41	0.66
GDP	(0.12)	0.96	(1.20)	8.68	(0.22)	1.14	(0.34)	1.13	(0.44)	0.66
GDP × log-time	—		−1.12**	0.33	—
GDP × log-time	—		(0.63)	0.33	—
Unemployment rate	−0.20**	0.82	−0.25**	0.78	−0.10	0.90	−0.45***	0.64	0.06	1.06
Unemployment rate	(0.08)	0.82	(0.19)	0.78	(0.15)	0.90	(0.27)	0.64	(0.15)	1.06
Expenditure	0.13	1.13	0.06	1.06	0.11	1.12	−4.10*	0.02	0.14	1.15
Expenditure	(0.05)	1.13	(0.11)	1.06	(0.11)	1.12	(1.97)	0.02	(0.16)	1.15
Expenditure × log-time	—						1.47**	4.35	—
Expenditure × log-time	—						(0.70)	4.35	—
Migrant groups (asylum seekers is the baseline)
Intra-EU migrants	−0.99***	0.37	—
Intra-EU migrants	(0.42)	0.37	—
Temporary TCWs	−0.99***	0.37	—
Temporary TCWs	(0.42)	0.37	—
Long-term TCWs	−2.41	0.10	—
Refugees	(0.74)	0.10	—
	0.18	—
	(0.55)	—
Time frame	1990–2014		1990–2002		2003–2014		1992–2014		1992–2014
Observations	2007		221		204		375		391
Events	43		8		13		8		8

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table 4 compares how exclusionary policies affect different migrant groups and shows the influence of government orientation on the adoption of restrictions on asylum seekers’, intra-EU migrants’, and temporary TCWs’ social rights, controlled by GDP, old-age ratio, migrant influx, public debt, unemployment, and public social expenditure. Model 1 confirms that temporary TCWs and asylum seekers are the group most targeted by restrictions, while refugees are the least targeted group.

Models 2 and 3 analyse the restrictions on asylum seekers’ entitlements to social rights. To comply with the model’s proportional hazard assumption and ensure a constant effect of the variable government orientation over time, the time frame was segmented (1990–2002 and 2003–2014). This method is preferable to introducing a time interaction (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997), as it avoids having to manipulate the main interdependent variable and ensures the models’ comparability. An alternative approach based on the introduction of a log-time interaction to the variable government participation is available in Appendix IV. Models 3 and 4 deal with non-proportional hazards by adding a log-time interaction to the variables that do not comply with the assumption.¹¹

The models showed no statistical difference between right-wing governments with and without PRRPs when it comes to restricting asylum seekers’ rights, thus confirming H1. Conversely, Model 2 showed that between 1990 and 2002, in the period prior to PRRPs’ participation in governments in most countries, right-wing governments were more restrictive than left-wing governments and grand coalitions. This result suggests that prior to the acceptance of PRRPs as coalition partners, mainstream parties had co-opted PRRPs’ restrictive positions toward asylum seekers’ access to social rights.

Model 4 addressed the impact of government orientation on intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights. Here, the results are remarkable: compared to mainstream right-wing administrations, the participation of PRRPs in governments increases the odds of a reduction in migrants’ entitlements to social rights by approximately 14 times, thus confirming H3. Even with small statistical power, the magnitude of the coefficient and its significance beg further exploration. Additionally, government debt was associated with a higher hazard of a reduction of intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights. Higher old-age ratio, unemployment rate, and public social expenditure were associated with lower likelihood of restrictions. However, over time, public social expenditure was associated with an increased chance of exclusionary measures.

Model 5 showed no association between government orientation and temporary TCWs’ access to social rights, thus disproving H2. A possible reason for this result is the reduced statistical power of the analysis due to the few legislations adopted. The model also showed that an increased old-age ratio is associated with a decreased chance of reductions of temporary TCWs’ social rights, which indicates that aging countries are likely to be dependent on migrant labour and are less likely to restrict temporary TCWs’ social rights.

We conducted alternative models without control for clustered observations and with random effects (frailty) (Hougaard, 1995) (Appendix IV). As frailty is not significant in most of the analysis, models with robust standard errors were discussed in the main text. In the alternative models, the sign and the coefficients’ magnitudes were similar to the results presented in Table 4.

Figure 1 complements the models with the plot of the hazard function of the models above.¹² The hazard function is an estimate of the expected number of events at a given time, and the area below the curve is the cumulative hazard. Plot A shows the hazard of an adoption of a restrictive measure, stratified by migrant groups. This plot confirms that asylum seekers are the most targeted group and shows that this group faces an increased risk of exclusion over time. The figure also reveals that the hazard of reducing intra-EU migrants’ and temporary TCWs’ rights increased substantially over the last 10 years of the analysis (1995–2014), coinciding with the period when PRRPs started to participate in governments.

Plots B, C, and D show the hazard of the adoption of a restrictive measure on asylum seekers’, intra-EU migrants’, and temporary TCWs’ social rights. The figure shows that right-wing governments with and without PRRPs reduce asylum seekers’ entitlements to social rights (B). Moreover, over the last 15 years (2000–2014), governments with PRRPs have become increasingly restrictive. However, this difference is not statistically significant, as shown by model 3. Plot C confirms that governments with PRRPs’ participation are associated with a significantly higher chance of restrictions than mainstream right-wing governments. This hazard has increased sharply in the last 8 years of the studied period (2008–2014), which illustrates PRRPs’ responses to the eastern enlargements. Temporary TCWs also became targets of restrictions in the last 10 years of the studied period. The plot D shows that right-wing governments with and without PRRPs are associated with restrictions. Nonetheless, by the end of the period, PRRPs’ participation in governments increases the chance of restrictions by four times. However, this result is not statistically significant, as shown by model 5.

PRRPs and intra-EU migrants

The statistical study showed that the restriction of intra-EU migrants’ entitlements to social rights is the distinctive element of PRRPs’ exclusionary agendas. The argument developed in this article is that due to the shift in the public perception of intra-EU migrants’ deservingness of social benefits, PRRPs have incentives to politicize intra-EU migrants’ entitlements to social rights by emphasizing their cultural differences compared to the nationals. Using this strategy, PRRPs are also challenging EU institutions, thus signalling both their welfare chauvinism and their anti-elitist Eurosceptic positions. To complement the findings of the quantitative study, we looked at the indexation of family benefits, which was aimed at regulating the exportability of family benefits inside of the EU bloc. This event occurred after the time frame of the statistical study, thus, corresponding to a sequential mixed-method design (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007).

The governments of Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom worked with the EC to reform the legislation on the exportability of family benefits inside the EU. The amendment was supposed to allow national states to adjust the benefit according to the cost of living in the country where the child resides (when the child does not live with the parent who applied for the benefit). The EC refused the measure, claiming that the bureaucratic costs of the reform would be higher than the savings it would generate. Germany and the United Kingdom, which, at the time, were governed by EU-critical mainstream right-wing parties (the Christian Democratic Union in Germany and the British Conservatives, respectively) (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2016), backed down (The Guardian, 2016). Austria, meanwhile, disregarded the guidelines and approved, in October 2018, the indexation of family benefits. The coalition government, formed by the PRRP Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the mainstream right-wing Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), treated this law as a priority. Importantly, FPÖ can be held responsible for the politicization of this matter, as it had defended the measure since 2006.

Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP), the Austrian prime minister at the time, justified the restriction by its potential annual savings, which were estimated to be €100 million (Wiener Zeitung, 2018). The somewhat more nativist Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ’s leader, confirmed that the new scheme would guarantee that most of the benefits would be granted to Austrian families and not to ‘large migrant families’ (Die Presse, 2018). As expected, in May 2020, the EC designated the measure as discriminatory and referred Austria to the EJC. The restriction on intra-EU migrants’ entitlement to minimal income is another illustration of the Austrian government’s intentions to restrict intra-EU migrants’ access to social benefits and to challenge European agreements. The legislation approved in 2018 determined a 5-year waiting period for intra-EU migrants before becoming eligible for this benefit (Der Standard, 2018a). Austrian media highlighted the fact that this measure could be considered inconsistent with EU regulations and could be revoked by the ECJ (European Court of Justice) (Der Standard, 2018b).

Conclusion

This article has sought to examine how different migrant groups are affected by exclusionary social policies and how right-wing governments impact different migrant groups’ entitlements to social rights depending on whether such governments govern in coalition with PRRPs. The article applied an event history analysis to DEMIG data for 17 Western European countries from 1990 to 2014. This study was innovative because it adopted a fine-grained approach, which revealed how government orientations impact different migrant groups. The results showed that asylum seekers were the most targeted group during the period, being the primary target of all governments. Furthermore, the statistical analysis suggested that governments with PRRP participation did not have a significantly higher negative effect on asylum seekers nor temporary TCWs’ entitlements to welfare benefits compared to mainstream right-wing parties’ administrations.

The analysis, however, showed that governments involving PRRPs are distinctive in their impact on intra-EU migrants’ access to social benefits. To complement the quantitative analysis, the article examined cases in which the participation of PRRPs in governments led to restrictions on intra-EU migrants’ rights. The results showed that PRRPs’ EU-sceptical positions shaped their distributive preferences: compared to mainstream right-wing parties, PRRPs were more prone to exploiting ambiguities in the EU legislation on intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights and to adopting an antagonistic position in relation to the EC’s decisions on the matter.

Although these findings are supported by statistical and qualitative analyses, they should be interpreted with some caution. The study relied on the few existing cases of PRRPs’ participation in governments, which means that the results are case-sensitive. Therefore, further research with new data is necessary to confirm these findings. Importantly, a follow-up study that includes data from the so-called ‘refugee crises’ is necessary to evaluate the responses of governments with different government orientations. Nonetheless, this article opens up the discussion on the differential targeting of migrant groups and has important implications for studies on intra-European solidarity and the EU’s social policy. The article has shown that intra-EU migrants’ access to social rights is a politicized issue in national politics rather than a matter of technical legal adjustments. This finding is of critical importance when we consider PRRPs’ increasing success in national politics as well as the contagious effect that such parties have on other parties’ political platforms and the perceived legitimacy of EU institutions.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - What distinguishes radical right welfare chauvinism? Excluding different migrant groups from the welfare state

Supplemental Material for What distinguishes radical right welfare chauvinism? Excluding different migrant groups from the welfare state by Juliana Chueri in Journal of European Social Policy

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Wouter Schakel for his comments on this paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung.

ORCID iD

Juliana Chueri

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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