Synthesizing individualistic and collectivistic perspectives on environmental and collective action through a relational perspective

Abstract

Theorizing about environmental or collective action relies on individualistic or collectivistic assumptions, respectively. Thus, a unified explanation for lowering one’s thermostat (a form of environmental action) and participating in mass protest (a form of collective action) is lacking. Building on a broad literature that views humans as relational beings, I aim to show that (a) a relational perspective synthesizes these two perspectives by reconceptualizing environmental and collective action as types of social interaction that regulate social relationships and (b) therefore, environmental and collective action have a similar motivational profile. This implies that both collective and environmental action are ultimately relational phenomena; that any assumption that environmental action is motivated by individualistic concerns and collective action by collectivistic concerns, limits our understanding of either type of action; and that future theorizing and research on environmental and collective action will benefit from adopting a relational perspective.

Keywords

environmental action collective action motivation meta-theory social relationships

No man is an island, entire of itself.

John Donne, Meditation #17, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (1923, p. 98)

Man is a knot into which relationships are tied.

Antoine de St. Exupery, Flight to Arras (1942/2000, p. 50)

Social change can arise from putting the thermostat at a lower level or participating in mass protest. However, in isolated niches of the psychological literature these actions are often viewed as quite different. Environmental action is typically associated with individualistic motivation whereas collective action is typically associated with collectivistic motivation.¹ Unsurprisingly, the specific environmental and collective action literatures (for summaries see Klandermans, 1997; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Vlek & Steg, 2007) suggest quite different portrayals of human motivation. In the former, individuals are viewed as driven by individualistic motivations that juxtapose “selfish” and “moral” tendencies. Yet in the latter, individuals are viewed as individuals who define themselves as group members and thus have the values and interests of the group at heart and in mind.

Building on a broader literature that is critical of reductionist individualism (e.g., Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978) and views humans as relational beings (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Slife, 2004; Van Zomeren, 2014), I suggest that individualistic and collectivistic portrayals of human motivation are unnecessary and actually limit our understanding of either type of action. Indeed, from a relational perspective (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Van Zomeren, 2014), environmental and collective action should have a similar motivational profile because both types of social interaction regulate social relationships (defined here as generating or maintaining social relationships; Rai & Fiske, 2011). As such, individuals do not necessarily act in their self-interest when they lower the thermostat (as is the dominant perspective in the environmental action literature), nor do they necessarily act in their group’s interest when they protest together in the streets (as is the dominant perspective in the collective action literature). Rather, a relational approach suggests that both perspectives focus on social relationships that are regulated through social interaction (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Van Zomeren, 2014). Thus, in line with the opening quotes by Donne and de St. Exupery, I propose that environmental and collective action can be parsimoniously understood as different forms of relationship regulation.

Aims

In this article, I aim to show that (a) a relational perspective synthesizes these two meta-theoretical perspectives by reconceptualizing environmental and collective action as types of social interaction that regulate social relationships and that (b) for this very reason, undertaking environmental and collective action should have a similar motivational profile. Although the more general notion of a relational perspective in psychology is certainly not new (e.g., Fiske, 1991, 1992; Gergen, 2009; Slife, 2004; Slife & Richardson, 2008), there is novelty and added value in applying this perspective to the specific domains of psychological theorizing about environmental and collective action.

The current analysis is indebted to a much broader theoretical tradition that rejects a reductionist individualist perspective on human motivation (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Gilligan, 1982, 1986; Goffman, 1971; Mead, 1934; Slife, 2004; Slife & Richardson, 2008; Vygotsky, 1978). Echoes of this critique have reverberated even within individualist strongholds such as (experimental) social psychology, although these have focused mainly on empirical rather than conceptual limitations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Sears, 1986). For instance, Henrich et al. (2010) observed that many psychological studies rely on samples that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (abbreviated as WEIRD), which restricts research to test individualistic theories and hypotheses (Van Zomeren, 2014). Furthermore, recent developments in (cross-)cultural psychology suggest a move away from reductionist individualism (e.g., Adams, 2005; Adams, Bruckmuller, & Decker, 2012; Fiske, 1992; Heine, 2005), and an embrace of viewing humans as relational beings (Adams & Markus, 2004; Becker et al., 2014; Fiske, 1992; Markus & Kityama, 1991, 2004; Rai & Fiske, 2011).

Such a relational view is certainly not the entrenched view in the environmental and collective action literatures (for summaries see Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Klandermans, 1997; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren, 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In the collective action literature, it is assumed that individuals act on behalf of groups and thus have the interests of the group at heart and in mind when they engage in collective action (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Ellemers, 1993; Simon et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Indeed, collective action has been typically defined as any action that the individual engages in on behalf of the group to achieve group goals (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; see also Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; Wright, 2009). Typical manifestations of collective action, in this view, range from signing petitions to joining protest demonstrations or even riots. This focus on the group, and the collectivistic assumptions about motivation that accompany it, effectively exclude individualistic motives for such action from the equation.

By contrast, the entrenched view in the literature on environmental action is an individualistic one (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Environmental action (used here as synonymous to terms such as pro-environmental behavior) is defined as “behavior that harms the environment as little as possible, or even benefits the environment” (Steg & Vlek, 2009, p. 309). Although this definition does not restrict theoretical analysis to the individual realm, it is assumed that individuals are individual actors that carefully consider the costs and benefits of environmental action. Because acting selflessly (e.g., for a “greater good”) does not fit an individualistic view of motivation (e.g., Batson, 1990), the typical line of thought juxtaposes selfish and moral motivations to act for the environment. Thus, key questions are how individuals weigh personal values and norms about the environment against the costs of acting for the environment (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; De Groot & Steg, 2008; Diekmann & Preissendörfer, 2003; Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Typical manifestations of environmental action, in this view, range from lowering the thermostat to choosing trains over cars or making “green” consumer choices. This focus on the individual, and the individualistic assumptions about motivation that accompany it, effectively exclude collectivistic motives from the equation.

Adopting a relational perspective suggests that this juxtaposition of individualistic and collectivistic views is unnecessary and in fact limits our understanding of environmental and collective action. Although lowering the thermostat is thought by some to reflect individualistic motivation and engaging in mass protest is thought by others to reflect collectivistic motivation, a relational perspective suggests that both types of action reflect social interaction that regulates social relationships (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Van Zomeren, 2014). For instance, individuals’ participation in a Greenpeace action regulates their relationship with that social entity as much as lowering the thermostat may do for individuals’ relationship with fellow “greenies.” As such, a relational perspective invites the generation of novel hypotheses within those literatures and the exploration of bridges between them.

In the remainder of this paper, I first identify individualistic and collectivistic meta-theoretical assumptions and synthesize them into a relational perspective (the first aim). I then apply this relational perspective to the environmental and collective action literatures to show that these have a similar motivational profile based in relationship regulation (the second aim). Finally, I discuss key implications of adopting a relational perspective for theory and research on environmental and collective action.

Assumptions

Individualistic assumptions

Mainstream psychological theories of motivation are often based on individualistic assumptions (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1997; Cialdini, 1991; Heckhausen, 1991). In such a perspective, individuals engage in groups, for instance, in order to satisfy individual needs and thus leave the group when they no longer do or when the costs of being in the group become too high. As such, individuals should join social movements when their personal values and interests coincide with those of the movement, but should leave it the moment their values and interests are no longer shared (e.g., Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Olson, 1968). Similarly, individuals may personally value the environment and on that basis decide to lower the thermostat (e.g., Schwartz, 1992). Indeed, broad theories of motivated behavior point to individualistic attitudes, values, and cost-benefit analyses (for a meta-analysis see Bamberg & Moser, 2007). These theories further suggest that there is always an individual decision to be made between values, norms, and attitudes on the one hand, and perceived costs (relative to benefits) on the other hand.

There are different shades of gray to be observed within a broad individualistic perspective that revolves around the “selfish individual.” For instance, scholars in the field of behavioral economics typically focus on individual behavior that is explained by individuals’ calculation of costs and benefits (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A common assumption here is that individuals are both willing and able to carefully calculate the correct decision because they have all relevant information available (Olson, 1968; Opp, 2009). However, psychological research has demonstrated that this assumption is flawed and thus the portrayal of individuals as rational actors is unrealistic (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981).

Although few still advocate the strong rational actor model (in which individuals are viewed as Econs; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), the emphasis has now shifted toward weaker versions of the rational actor model that allow individuals to become more human (Humans; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; see also Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Tetlock, 2002). For instance, these models no longer assume complete relevant information availability, acknowledge many heuristics in individuals’ information processing, and allow room for individuals’ values in the decision-making process (Schwartz, 1977; see also Haidt, 2001, 2007). Nevertheless, this perspective considers groups, or social relationships for that matter, as externalities that can be used in the service of individualistic self-interest.

Collectivistic assumptions

Groups are an integral part of social life. In response to individualistic perspectives on how individuals become motivated to act for groups, from the 1970s onwards the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) conceptualized how individuals can come to think, feel, and act as group members (rather than as unique individuals). In this perspective, individuals do not reflect “selfish individuals” but “psychological group members” because they have the ability to subjectively define themselves as group members and as such feel, think, and act in line with group values and interests (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Thus, the key difference between individualistic and collectivistic perspectives with respect to motivation is the question of whether individuals act out of personal self-interest or group interest.

The logic of social identity theory is that individuals can self-categorize as, and identify with, a group (independent of personality or other variables that define the unique individual). As a consequence, one can think, feel, and act on the basis of a social identity (e.g., as a man) and also view the world through that lens (e.g., feeling more similar to other men than to women). Thus, it is the group, through one’s subjective self-definition and one’s identification with it (Leach et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), that motivates one to think, feel, and act on its behalf. In this light, individuals’ participation in mass protest can be understood as action taken by a “group-selfish” individual.

Empirical research has shown consistent support for the notion of a group self with respect to the motivation to think, feel, and act as group members (Ellemers, 2012). For instance, the group self underlies individuals’ motivation to engage in different types of collective behavior (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) including participation in collective action and on behalf of social movements (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, the group self underlies the emotions that individuals experience as a group member (E. R. Smith, 1993), allowing their emotions to be shared with other group members (Peters & Kashima, 2007). Thus, the group self reflects an important psychological basis on which individuals engage in collective action.

Historically, the “group-selfish individual” serves as an antithesis to the thesis of the “selfish individual” because it reflects the origins of social identity theory as a response to individualistic approaches to group behavior (such as realistic conflict theory; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; and interdependence theory; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Social identity theory assumed that individuals have a need for a positive self-evaluation and that groups contribute to satisfying that need by endowing individuals with social identities (e.g., my social identity as a psychologist or as a man). The opposition between these perspectives has never disappeared (e.g., Turner & Onorato, 1999), which is beautifully illustrated by the typical definition of collective action in the social-identity-dominated literature (e.g., Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; Wright et al., 1990), which effectively excludes an individualistic perspective from explaining the phenomenon of collective action in the first place.

This is unnecessary for at least two reasons. First, the social identity perspective complements the individualistic perspective because it suggests that individuals can alternate between their individual and group selves, thus explaining why sometimes they act individualistically and collectivistically at other times (Turner et al., 1987). That is, the salience of the personal or group self in a given situation (Turner et al., 1987) is determined by person factors (e.g., how accessible is which self?) and situational factors (e.g., does the situation “press” one into a group or personal self?). Because of this functional separation of personal and group self in a given situation (e.g., only one of them can be salient at the same time; Turner et al., 1987), there cannot be any real conflict between them. Unfortunately, this leads to two different psychologies of two different phenomena based on two different selves, rather than to one unified perspective.

Second, this perspective effectively reduces human motivation to the need for a positive self-concept—an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption in theories of motivation (e.g., Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 2013; for an overview see Van Zomeren, 2014). This would not necessarily be problematic if the notion of a positive self-concept was a reliable human universal that would have the same structure and meaning for any individual. For instance, some have suggested that the need for positive self-regard is universal (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). However, research in populations from different cultures has not been so supportive of this notion (Adams, 2005; Adams et al., 2012; Fiske, 1992; Heine, 2005; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). In fact, cross-cultural psychologists have identified clear deviations from the tendency to construe the self as an independent, agentic, and positively evaluated unit (Adams, 2005; Fiske, 1992; Heine, 2005; Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004). For this reason, the assumption that the self represents an essential foundation of human motivation is doubtful at best (for a variety of other reasons, see Gergen, 2009; Van Zomeren, 2014).

Relational assumptions

Humans are relational beings (Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Slife, 2004; Van Zomeren, 2014). Infants begin to relate to others already when their selves, be they individual or group, are nowhere to be seen (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Infants instinctively attach to their caregiver (usually the mother) by displaying attachment behavior that results in complementary behavior in the caregiver (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969; see also Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), thus representing a social relationship that is regulated through social interaction. Intuitions about social relationships are thus formed long before any sense of self is formed (as reflected, for instance, by notions of self-awareness and theory of mind). This is how humans come prepared to the world—motivated to relate.

Furthermore, the attachment bonds that result from attachment behavior are motivationally consequential across the lifespan (for reviews see Ainsworth, 1989; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). At a general level, humans dread the termination of social relationships and are elated by the dawn of new ones (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Social exclusion—a clear rejection of a social relationship—is known to be experienced as social pain (Williams, 2007, 2009). This experience in fact appears not to be qualitatively different (as indexed by specific brain processes) than physical pain (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Loneliness is bad for one’s mental and physical health and can even be considered a “silent killer” (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). Social loss (e.g., the death of a loved one) is destructive and can lead to, among other things, severe depression (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Stroebe, Schut, & Stroebe, 2005; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987).

On the brighter side, love and friendship provide the instrumental and emotional support that can prevent feelings of loneliness (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Stroebe, Stroebe, Abakoumkin, & Schut, 1996). Being embedded in family and other social networks buffers against the effects of negative life events (Berkman & Glass, 2000; Heaney & Israel, 2008) and identification with groups can have positive effects on one’s mental and physical health (Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, & Branscombe, 2009). Finally, individuals can care about others without any hidden self-interest agenda (Batson, 1990)—a marker of the importance of social relationships that can also be found in chimpanzees and other primates (De Waal, 1996, 2008). A relational perspective thus posits a relational essence about what moves and motivates individuals, namely their instinctive need to regulate social relationships through social interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Van Zomeren, 2014).

The simple and fundamental premise that humans are essentially relational beings does not cease to be important when infants get older, become socialized, and come of age (Ainsworth, 1989; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Social relationships do not stop to define individuals when they go to college, nor when they get jobs afterwards, or when they retire and grow old (Fiske, 1992). Social relationships are arguably the clearest human universal and at the very least less variable than the ebb and flow of culturally construed selves (Van Zomeren, 2014). This implies that psychologists should try to prevent any knee-jerk response to attribute motivation to individuals’ self (Van Zomeren, 2014). Instead, psychologists should consider conceptualizing individualistic and collectivistic actions as different ways to regulate social relationships. As a case in point, the current analysis borrows extensively from Fiske’s (1992) relational models theory to apply this line of thought to environmental and collective action.

According to Fiske’s theory, humans intuitively conceive of social relationships through four different ways of relating with others. In this line of thought, humans are primarily motivated to regulate their social relationships through social interaction. Thus, it is important to understand how one implicitly understands any relationship with the other and how one regulates it through social interaction. Indeed, a shared understanding of a social relationship smoothes social interaction because it makes clear to either partner in the social relationship which values should never be violated (i.e., taboos; Fiske, 1992; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, 2002).

Indeed, a distinctive feature of this theory is that it views social relationships as encapsulating values (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Values are not simply held by individuals, but reflect the guardians of a social relationship. They serve to hold social relationships together by representing fundamental taboos that, by never being allowed to be violated, represent a strong social glue (e.g., the incest taboo). Thus, in Fiske’s framework, values serve to regulate social relationships through promoting social interaction and preventing social exclusion. Although values may be experienced by individuals as individualistic values or group values (i.e., as attached to a construed self), they in fact flow from the social relationship (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Individuals can therefore believe to be moved and motivated on the basis of their (personal or group) self, but in fact they are acting to regulate social relationships. (For a similar conceptualization of rationalization processes that follow affective intuitions about deviations from moral standards, see Haidt, 2001, 2007.)

I apply this relational perspective to the specific domains of environmental and collective action by focusing on two (out of the four) of Fiske’s relational models and their associated values. First, communal sharing is a relational model defined by solidarity and a sense of oneness and thus by a strong sense of unity and loyalty to others (Fiske, 1992). Within this type of social relationship, self-interest is taboo. Communal sharing is often found in traditional tribe-like societies, but can also easily be identified in communes, communist ideology, patriotism, and the initial parent–child bond (Fiske, 1992). It is reminiscent of strong group identification, a strong group self, and identity fusion, all of which are known to motivate individuals to act on behalf of the group (Ellemers, 2012; Swann, Jetten, Gomez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). One might refer to it as a collectivistic way of relating to others.

Second, market pricing reflects an intuitive way of relating to others in which, paradoxically, individuals view themselves as detached and uniquely different from others. Under this relational model, individuals believe that they should calculate the value of themselves and others and translate that into a single currency (e.g., being worth your paycheck). This type of relationship is defined by individual self-interest and thus by a strong sense of individuality. Here, the relevant taboo is altruism. Market pricing is often found in WEIRD cultures, but can also easily be identified in capitalist ideology, individualism, and the parent–child bond after the child has come of age (Fiske, 1992). It is reminiscent of a world full of rational actors with a strong personal self, uniquely different from others, that motivates individuals to act on behalf of themselves and themselves alone. One might refer to it as a individualistic way of relating to others.

Fiske’s theorizing has at least two important implications for analyzing human motivation. First, it is pivotal to understand in any given context which social relationship is at stake (rather than how the self is affected) and how individuals implicitly understand it (i.e., which relational model is applied and thus which values and obligations are at stake). This is not a static “given,” because individuals can understand the same situation through different relational models (which makes it theoretically possible to change how individuals understand a particular relationship). The second key insight is that the theory implies that even individualism reflects a way to relate. As such, the selfish actor becomes more social and human (and arguably even more humane) because s/he is now a relational actor (Van Zomeren, 2014). Below I apply this shift in meta-theoretical perspective, from self to social relationships, to the environmental and collective action literatures.

Application

Theory and research on environmental and collective action reflect two close-to-ideal cases to illustrate the added value of a relational perspective. This is because work on environmental action typically focuses on individual change through individualistic variables (e.g., changing individual attitudes or norms), whereas work on collective action typically focuses on social change through collectivistic variables (e.g., changing inequality through building group identities). As such, the two literatures tell a tale of two different perspectives on two seemingly different phenomena. This is unnecessary because these perspectives are not mutually exclusive and can be synthesized through adopting a relational perspective.

Environmental action

The psychological literature about environmental action emphasises individuals’ values about the environment together with their calculation of the costs and benefits of undertaking environmental action (e.g., Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Vlek & Steg, 2007). A value is defined by Schwartz (1992) as “a desirable transsituational goal varying in importance, which serves as a guiding principle in the life of a person or other social entity [emphasis added]” (p. 21). Although this definition provides scope for values to guide the lives of individuals as well as relationships, groups, and other social entities, theory and research typically operationalizes values as individual values about the environment (e.g., De Groot & Steg, 2008; Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Similarly, the notion of costs typically refers to individual costs (Diekmann & Preissendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; see also Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004). This opposition of values and costs illustrates the individualistic meta-theory assumed.

Contemporary theories of environmental action do not escape this meta-theoretical prison (for a meta-analysis see Bamberg & Moser, 2007). The theory of planned behavior, for instance (Ajzen, 1991; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), is an individualistic theory that can be applied to refer to individual attitudes, self-efficacy beliefs, and norms as predictors of environmental action. Similarly, the norm-activation model (Schwartz, 1977) focuses on how feelings of moral obligation are activated to guide environmental action (e.g., Thogersen, 1999; Wall, Devine-Wright, & Mill, 2007). The value-belief-norm-model (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999) adds the notion that personal values may underlie such feelings of moral obligation. Finally, goal framing theory (Lindenberg, 2006; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007) conceptualizes three different types of individualistic goals relevant to environmental action. Normative goal frames reflect moral incentives to act for the environment and thus are predicted to motivate environmental action, but hedonic and gain goal frames reflect emotional and instrumental incentives that hinder such enactment (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007).

Unsurprisingly, this individualistic pattern is mirrored in empirical studies of environmental action. For example, Bamberg and Schmidt (2003) found that individualistic predictors in the theory of planned behavior (e.g., attitudes, norms, efficacy beliefs) predicted environmental travel choices. Similarly, personal values about the environment (so-called biospheric values) have been found to predict various forms of environmental action (e.g., Schultz & Zelezny, 1998; Stern et al., 1999). Intriguingly, the reason given for this effect is that these values transcend individuals’ self-interest (see Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009), yet they are viewed as part of individuals rather than as encapsulated within social relationships.

Collective action

Work in the collective action literature typically focuses on members of disadvantaged groups that seek to improve their group’s position in society, including social movements (Klandermans, 1997; Runciman, 1966; H. J. Smith & Ortiz, 2002; H. J. Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012; for a meta-analysis, see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Research has focused on how women, ethnic minorities, and disadvantaged vocational groups (e.g., students, farmers, workers) become motivated to engage in collective action (e.g., signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, etc.). This literature has been a fertile ground for the social identity perspective to develop its analysis of how individuals come to act as group members (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009). Indeed, stronger identification with the disadvantaged group predicts collective action because it implies a stronger motivation to act on behalf of the group’s interests (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Recent theoretical models have been almost exclusively developed on the basis of the social identity perspective (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). For instance, Van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action, or SIMCA for short, found meta-analytic support for three related predictors of collective action, namely identification with the relevant group, perceptions of group-based unfairness and its emotional consequences (anger, resentment), and group efficacy beliefs. In SIMCA, group identification predicts collective action directly, but also indirectly through fostering group-based unfairness/anger and group efficacy beliefs. Other models agree on the importance of these predictors, but place group identification at even closer proximity to collective action (Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012) or focus on transformations of group identity to explain phenomena as empowerment and politicization (Drury & Reicher, 2009). However, there are no individualistic predictors of collective action in these models (but see Duncan, 2012; Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011).

Empirically, there seems to be fairly solid evidence for these predictors. The salience of the group self and more generally group identification predict collective action across different contexts and different disadvantaged groups (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Similarly, group-based perceptions of unfairness and group-based emotions such as anger and resentment predict collective action (e.g., Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath, 2011; D. A. Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Thomas et al., 2012; for a meta-analysis see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, Louis et al. (2004) showed that individuals who identify more strongly with a group calculate costs and benefits for the group and thus as group members rather than as unique individuals. In a similar vein, group efficacy beliefs (which reflect expectations of whether the group is able to achieve its goals) uniquely predict collective action across different contexts and disadvantaged groups (Cakal et al., 2011; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & van Zomeren, 2014; Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 2011; Mummendey et al., 1999). Thus, there is plenty of support for the importance of collectivistic predictors of collective action.

A promising and emerging domain of convergence between the environmental and collective action literatures concerns scholarly interest in values. In the collective action literature, values have recently been operationalized as individualistic moral convictions—subjective absolutist stances on moral issues (Van Zomeren et al., 2011, Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). For instance, one can have a strong attitude against gender discrimination, but a moral conviction on this issue entails also the belief that this reflects absolute truth (Skitka, 2010). Skitka’s conceptualization comes close to the values or taboos that hold social relationships together, although in Skitka’s theorizing moral convictions are based in an individualistic type of identity. Because of their subjectively absolute experience, moral convictions are easily violated, which typically results in feelings of anger and outrage that are important predictors of collective action (Thomas et al., 2012). Indeed, it is the violation of individualistic moral standards that motivates individuals to identify with the relevant group or social movement and act collectively (Mazzoni, van Zomeren, & Cicognani, 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2011, Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2012). This paradox makes clear that individualistic and collectivistic predictors of collective action are not mutually exclusive and that there is scope for a joint explanation of lowering a thermostat and participating in mass protest. In fact, on the basis of a relational perspective, both types of action should have a similar motivational profile because both reflect social interaction that regulates social relationships.

Relationship regulation

The pervasive emphasis on individualistic calculations of costs and benefits in the environmental action literature fits with a market pricing model, whereas the pervasive emphasis on social identity in the collective action literature reflects a communal sharing model. Yet under either relational model, individuals are motivated to regulate a social relationship. Indeed, engagement in environmental or collective action serves to regulate social relationships because each relational model has a specific taboo underlying it that, when violated, would mean the demise of the relationship. In this sense, the motivational profile for any social interaction that regulates relationships should be similar.

But at the same time, the type of relational model employed brings along pivotal differences in the way relationship regulation is psychologically experienced. Under a market pricing relational model, the relevant values revolve around avoiding altruism (Ratner & Miller, 2001). As such, values related to hedonism and achievement (Schwartz, 1992), reflecting the hedonic and gain goal frames in goal framing theory (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), fit with an emphasis on individual cost–benefit calculation. Similarly, the theory of planned behavior’s attitude and perceived behavioral control variables are variations on the same theme (Ajzen, 1991; for a meta-analysis see Bamberg & Moser, 2007). From such a perspective, it is no wonder that it may be hard to get individuals to lower their thermostat: there is typically little gain or pleasure to be derived from such environmental action that would justify engaging in it (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). At the same time, self-transcendent values relate to the normative goal frame in goal framing theory, the theory of planned behavior’s social norms, the notion of personal norm in the norm-activation-model, the experience of inner obligation in collective action research, and (the violation of) moral convictions in recent work in that literature.

Nevertheless, under a market pricing relationship, individuals experience those values as benefits, which stand in contrast to the personal costs associated with environmental action. Indeed, without this “illusion of exchange” (Ratner & Miller, 2001; see also D. T. Miller, 1999; D. T. Miller & Ratner, 1998), transcending the self would mean altruism and thus violate the very essence of the market pricing relationship. Put differently, under a market pricing relationship, calculations are necessary and expected in order to justify and rationalize behavior (Fiske, 1992; Haidt, 2001; Tetlock, 2002). In this sense, the rational actor acts as the “rationalizer” that needs to justify why the relational actor wants to lower the thermostat. And given that, under a market pricing relationship, the rational actor construes an individualistic sense of self, the relational actor’s motivation to act on behalf of the environment is appropriated by the individualistic self and attributed to individualistic self-interest (Van Zomeren, 2014).

By contrast, the relevant values associated with a communal sharing relational model revolve around avoiding self-interest. As such, values related to universalism and benevolence (Schwartz, 1992), reflecting much of the normative goal frame in goal framing theory (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), fit with an emphasis on self-transcendent values. Moral convictions also fit this line of thought because they are believed to be subjectively absolute and thus universal—they should apply any time, any place, without exception (Skitka, 2010). Note, however, that “self-transcendence” refers to the individualistic self. Indeed, under a communal sharing relational model, the relevant self is the group self. For this reason, what matters most is a sense of unity and identification with the group (Drury & Reicher, 2009).

A relational perspective suggests that environmental and collective action can be better understood by considering both relational models. Thus, lowering the thermostat can also be considered as a collective action under a communal sharing relational model; and engaging in a mass demonstration can also be considered as an individualistic action under a market pricing relational model. These possibilities are often forgotten or neglected in the respective literatures because of the dominant meta-theories that view individualistic and collectivistic perspectives as mutually exclusive. A relational perspective uniquely suggests that both perspectives reflect different types of relationship regulation that can be applied to environmental and collective action.

Relational models theory offers two additional relational models associated with different values (Fiske, 1992). First, authority ranking is characterized by acceptance of a power differential and thus offers precedence to the authority figure and invites respect and submissive behavior. The underlying taboo here is disrespect for authority. One way to think about the environment, for example, is to see it as an authority figure (e.g., Mother Nature), deserving of the utmost respect and protection. Second, equality matching is characterized by reciprocal behavior such as tit-for-tat-like interactions, and a focus on proportionality. Under this relational model, the underlying taboo is a lack of reciprocation. One way to think about activists, for instance, is to see them as fellow group members that expect reciprocal behavior (e.g., if one acts on behalf of the movement, the other must also act). Although for present purposes I focus on communal sharing and market pricing (which correspond with the meaning of collective and environmental action in those literatures), a relational perspective offers an even broader scope of analysis by suggesting that environmental and collective action can be motivated by regulating authority and reciprocity relationships.

Implications

The current analysis, grounded in a broader literature that rejects reductionist individualism (e.g., Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978) and embraces a relational perspective on motivation (Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Gilligan, 1982; Goffman, 1971; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Slife, 2004; Slife & Richardson, 2008), has at least two major implications for theory and research on environmental and collective action, reflecting the two aims of this article. First, scholars in either literature should learn from the insights from the other literature to generate new hypotheses. For instance, those studying environmental action should consider a view of this phenomenon as a form of collective action. This invites hypothesis generation and development with an eye to group-based predictors such as group identity, emotions, and efficacy beliefs (e.g., Thomas et al., 2012; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). It seems important to know, for example, whether individuals moralize environmental issues and whether they view them as individual or collective problems that require individual or collective action; and whether they believe such action to be effective. Specifically, the collective action literature suggests that framing environmental issues as collective issues that are enacted by a group increases the perceived efficacy of that group and thus motivates participation in environmental action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Similarly, raising identification with the relevant group and action-oriented emotion on its behalf should motivate environmental action.

Similarly, scholars of collective action should consider individualistic predictors of collective action in order to generate and develop new hypotheses. For example, the notion of moral conviction can be viewed as a bridge between individualistic values and group identity, emotions, and efficacy beliefs (Van Zomeren et al., 2011, Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2012). More generally, the notions of self-transcendent values seems important to consider in individuals’ motivation to undertake collective action. Indeed, the notion of a personal norm (Schwartz, 1977) may flow from such values and moral convictions and as such motivate collective action independently of any group-based predictors. Similarly, the element of hedonism is missing in most analyses of collective action, both in terms of values as well as in an instrumental sense. All of these suggestions point towards taking more seriously the role and conceptualization of values in theory and research about collective action.

The second implication is that merely combining predictors from both literatures is insufficient for bridging them. For proper theoretical integration to occur, scholars in either literature should consider conceptualizing environmental and collective action as different ways of relationship regulation. Values are pivotal in bridging these literatures because they are the guardians of social relationships (rather than properties of individuals or groups). A consideration of Fiske’s (1992) four relational models can generate and develop new hypotheses about the relevant values that motivate environmental and collective action on the basis of different selves. This points to the possibility that, within any given situation, different individuals may use different relational models to relate to the environment or to the group. That is, some may lower the thermostat to regulate their relationship with “Planet Earth” (communal sharing) or with “mine and others’ personal living conditions” (market pricing), and some may join a protest march to regulate their relationship with “my ‘green’ brothers and sisters” (communal sharing) or with “the movement protecting mine and others’ interests” (market pricing). Because different relational models make the salience of different selves more or less likely, knowing which relational model(s) individuals apply when thinking about undertaking environmental and collective action seems pivotal for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of each type of action. In this sense, a relational analysis adds a clear, integrative, and significant direction toward which both literatures may converge.

Such convergence is not only important for reasons of theoretical consilience and parsimony but also because both environmental and collective action can contribute to social change and thus can be practically consequential. Indeed, from a relational perspective one can derive novel practical mobilization strategies. One core recommendation would be that creating and maintaining social relationships will move and motivate individuals toward such action. Thus, rather than to focus exclusively on group identity in the collective action context or on individualistic positive benefit–cost ratios in the environmental context, mobilization campaigns should explicitly create and maintain (or affirm) social relationships. In this sense, the general messsage that can be derived from adopting a relational actor model is that human motivation is essentially not about caring for our selves, but about caring for social relationships. Indeed, no man is an island, entire of itself—but rather, a delicate and complex knot into which relationships are tied.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Linda Steg, Susanne Tauber, Greg Boese, the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on a previous draft of this article. I would also like to thank Karen Niven for her wise advice to kill my darlings, which I believe I did.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Martijn van Zomeren is an associate professor of Social Psychology at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). He has published widely on motivation and collective action in journals such as Psychological Bulletin, Personality and Social Psychology Review, and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

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