A new perspective on intergroup conflict: The social psychology of politicized struggles for recognition

Abstract

The article offers a new perspective on intergroup conflict. While building on social psychological foundations laid down in self-categorization theory, it is also critically informed by and incorporates insights from the neighboring disciplines of social, political, and moral philosophy. The new perspective is organized around the principal working hypothesis that many intergroup conflicts, especially those in modern, culturally diverse societies, can be fruitfully understood as politicized struggles for recognition. In addition, four more specific corollary hypotheses are proposed concerning polarization, respected collective identity, embedded dual identity, and tolerance. The new perspective shifts researchers’ attention to the multi-level nature of intergroup conflict and to the novel concepts of recognition and identity as a different equal.

Keywords

categorization conflict equality identity recognition

The antecedents, dynamics, and consequences of intergroup conflict have traditionally been high on the research agenda of social psychologists. One highly influential social psychological approach to understanding conflicts between social groups is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), which was then further developed, both increasing its explanatory depth and broadening its scope of application, into self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Over the last four decades, these theories (and a number of derivatives thereof) have guided much, if not most, empirical research in social psychology, especially in experimental social psychology, that identified important (micro-level) psychological processes contributing to intergroup conflict.

Unfortunately, social psychology, and especially experimental social psychology, remained rather isolated from conflict theorizing in neighboring disciplines. This situation is unsatisfactory as it hampers inter- or multidisciplinary articulation, cross-fertilization, and eventual integration. In this article, I therefore offer a new perspective on intergroup conflict that, while building on social psychological foundations laid down in Turner et al.’s (1987) self-categorization theory, is also critically informed by and incorporates insights from neighboring disciplines, especially social and political philosophy.

Social psychological foundations

As a starting point, I adopt three fundamental assumptions from self-categorization theory and elaborate on the implications of each for the proposed new perspective on intergroup conflict.¹ The first of these assumptions is this: people derive collective identity from ingroup–outgroup categorizations and the associated accentuation of intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (Turner et al., 1987, pp. 44–49). Here, it is important to note that accentuation is not the same as exaggeration, overgeneralization, or some other error. In the 1990s up until John Turner’s death in 2011, there were important controversies in social psychology about the validity of accentuation and, more generally, stereotyping as psychological processes, on the one hand, and the veridicality of the content and meaning of stereotypes, on the other (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Simon, 2004). Fortunately, recent work on stereotype accuracy, especially that by Jussim (2017), seems to indicate a renewed interest in these important issues (Simon, 2018).

For our present purposes, the critical implication of the first assumption is that, by way of accentuating intragroup similarities, common group membership (i.e., shared collective identity) induces perceived “interchangeability” or “equivalence” of self and other ingroup members (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50) and, consequently, a sense of entitlement to treatment as an equal (Wenzel, 2004). In short, common group membership operates as a social psychological source of equality recognition and corresponding entitlements. This social psychological implication resonates with Hannah Arendt’s (1976) insight from the vantage point of political philosophy that “We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (p. 301). Conversely, but for the same reason, group boundaries (i.e., differentiating collective identities) are boundaries of equality recognition and corresponding entitlements or at least major obstacles to the extension thereof beyond the narrow confines of the ingroup.

The second assumption I adopt from self-categorization theory is that collective identity at a given level of ingroup–outgroup categorization is typically embedded in a higher-level, superordinate (more inclusive) collective identity (Turner et al., 1987, p. 45). Henceforth, I refer to the former as Level 1 collective identity and to the latter as Level 2 collective identity. For example, Level 1 collective identity as a resident of the city of Paris and Level 1 collective identity as a resident of the city of Marseille are both embedded in the superordinate, more inclusive Level 2 collective identity as a French citizen. Analogously, if we started with nationality or nation rather than city as the basic categorization criterion, collective identity as a French citizen or collective identity as a German citizen would figure as Level 1 collective identities and collective identity as a citizen of the European Union (E.U.) as the superordinate, more inclusive Level 2 collective identity. The critical implication for our new perspective is this: just as Level 1 collective identity (e.g., as a French citizen) grounds equality recognition and entitlement to equality recognition among members of the respective Level 1 group (e.g., among French citizens), so too, does Level 2 superordinate collective identity (e.g., as a E.U. citizen) ground equality recognition and entitlement to equality recognition among different Level 1 groups and their memberships (e.g., the French and the Germans). In short, Level 1 collective identity is a source of mutual equality recognition for members of the same group, Level 2 collective identity is a source of mutual equality recognition for members of different groups (i.e., of equality recognition across Level 1 group boundaries).

Third, and finally, I adopt the assumption that the very nature of collective identity is bound up with the concept of “value” such that what represents “us and ours” is evaluated as good and what represents “them and theirs” is evaluated as bad, or at least, less good (Turner et al., 1987, pp. 58–59). Ingroup favoritism, ingroup approval and outgroup disapproval, and other forms of evaluative differentiation between ingroup and outgroup can then be understood as a consequence or expression of the union of collective identity and (positive) value. We no longer have to postulate a psychological need for positive distinctiveness (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979), a need that would inevitably result in struggles for superiority of one’s ingroup over outgroups. In contrast, the union of collective identity and value affords a sense of collective self-worth that does not hinge on superiority over other groups. This is why, in this context, the term “worth” is actually preferable to the term “value.” “Worth” more clearly refers to the experience of intrinsic, absolute quality (positivity) that is at stake here rather than the experience of some favorable quantitative difference (for a similar distinction and a reference to John Locke, see Arendt, 1998, p. 164).

With respect to motivational assumptions, the new perspective is thus more parsimonious than the original social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). At first glance, it may seem as if this increase in parsimony comes with the price of a more loaded conception of collective identity. However, any conception of collective identity that is “cheaper” in that it excludes value or worth as a constituent of collective identity would in fact be incomplete and eventually more “expensive” (Allport, 1968; Smith & Mackie, 1995). It should also be noted that my emphasis on collective self-worth that does not hinge on superiority over other groups is not meant to deny that people engage in social or intergroup comparison. After all, perceptions of equality result from and require such comparisons no less than perceptions of superiority or inferiority do, and comparison outcomes below equality should point people to potential threats to their collective self-worth. In any case, the critical implication for our new perspective on intergroup conflict of the assumption of the union of collective identity and value is that collective identity is first and foremost a claim to collective self-worth, or worthy collective self-definition for that matter, not a claim to superiority over outgroups.

Principal working hypothesis

Equipped with these three assumptions and their implications as building blocks, I am ready to propose and flesh out the principal working hypothesis that shall guide us in taking a new perspective on intergroup conflict. The principal working hypothesis states that many intergroup conflicts, especially those in modern, culturally diverse societies comprising groups with a liberal or progressive orientation as well as groups with a traditional or religious orientation, can be fruitfully understood as politicized struggles for recognition (PSR). With this working hypothesis, I also embrace Honneth’s (1995) social philosophical theory of recognition, in which he specifies how struggles for recognition have driven and still drive the development of modern society. While recognition clearly has a symbolic component, the focus on recognition is not meant to deny the importance of material resources. Rather, it reflects the insight that redistribution of material resources usually follows, if not requires, recognition in that what people are believed to deserve in the way of material resources depends on what they are recognized to be (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). The hypothesis further emphasizes that struggles for recognition are politicized struggles, which is to say that they are fought and played out publicly in front of the larger polity or society as an audience. In particular, those who struggle for recognition address the larger polity or society in an attempt to enlist its support or at least force it to take a stand in the conflict (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

I can now propose four corollary hypotheses associated with the principal working hypothesis, which further specify the nature of politicized struggles for recognition, including the social psychological meanings and conditions that underlie their operation as well as the consequences for, and possible responses of, the larger society. For each corollary hypothesis, I will also discuss, by way of illustration, some recent empirical investigations that testify to its validity.

Politicization and polarization

Because they are power struggles in which the protagonists (i.e., those who struggle for recognition as well as their antagonists) try to enlist the members or representatives of the larger society for their agenda or at least try to force them to take sides (“You are either with us, or against us”), it can be hypothesized that politicized struggles for recognition promote polarization. More specifically, the protagonists should increasingly differentiate between potential allies and adversaries in the larger society, increasingly aligning themselves with or coopting the former and rejecting the latter.

In line with this corollary hypothesis, Zaal et al. (2017) observed that identification with feminism, which served them as a proxy for politicization, was associated with more negative reactions (e.g., greater social distance or more negative emotions) toward people less committed or even opposed to feminism. Similarly, Simon, Mommert, and Reininger (2018) found that majority politicization operationalized as demands for greater support for the interests of the majority population was associated with more negative attitudes (comprising evaluative, cognitive, and conative components) toward groups likely to be seen as responsible for, or benefitting from, grievances of the majority population (e.g., politicians or millionaires). While the evidence provided by Zaal et al. (2017) and Simon et al. (2018) was limited to cross-sectional data, Simon, Reininger, Schaefer, Zitzmann, and Krys (2019) tested the hypothesis that politicization promotes polarization using longitudinal research designs (with baseline measurements of polarization as lagged dependent variables), which allowed them to move toward causal analysis. They obtained converging evidence for the hypothesis in two studies conducted in different political and national contexts with members of very different social groups as research participants, namely, supporters of the Tea Party movement in the United States and members of the LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex) community in Germany. While both groups are involved in politicized struggles for recognition, the two groups are associated with opposite poles of the political and cultural spectrum: Supporters of the U.S. Tea Party movement with the conservative or traditional pole, members of the LGBTI community in Germany with the progressive or (post)modern pole. Accordingly, their struggles revolve around very different recognition agendas. Supporters of the U.S. Tea Party movement seek recognition (or restoration) of their traditional way of life, members of the LGBTI community in Germany seek recognition of their less common way of life. The different struggles also mobilize different constellations of allies and adversaries, such as conservatives versus liberals in the first case and feminists versus supporters of a populist right-wing political party in the second. However, despite this variation in content, Simon, Reininger, et al. (2019) observed remarkable consistency in process. In both cases, politicization operated as a temporal, and possibly also a causal, antecedent of polarization in terms of colder (or less warm) feelings toward, and less perceived commonalities with, political adversaries relative to political allies.²

Polarization prompted by politicization is not restricted to the differentiation between immediate political allies and adversaries, however. It also extends to groups that symbolize the very issues or grievances around which politicized struggles for recognition revolve and that are thus construed and targeted as “the problem.” For example, research by Krys, Simon, Reininger, Brause, and Galeão-Silva (2020) suggests that politicization in terms of a religious agenda promotes both affective and cognitive differentiation between the protagonists’ religious community and groups representing disapproved, or at least controversial, lifestyles or competing religions. Employing a longitudinal research design and members of Protestant communities in Germany as research participants, Krys et al. (2020) demonstrated that politicization negatively affected community members’ feelings toward both homosexuals and Muslims as well as their perceptions of commonalities with these target groups. They also obtained evidence for such a politicization–polarization link in a cross-sectional study with members of Protestant communities in Brazil as research participants and homosexuals and adherents of Afro-Brazilian religions as target outgroups. The socially divisive consequences of politicized struggles for recognition may thus comprise not only the rejection of immediate political adversaries, but also the singling out of disliked societal subgroups as “the other,” and possibly even their subsequent (mal)treatment as scapegoats for perceived recognition deficits.

In the investigations discussed above, the researchers’ focus was on the polarization of feelings and cognitions among the very protagonists of politicized struggles for recognition. In addition, society as a whole should become increasingly polarized to the extent that the protagonists of such struggles politicize society as a whole by drawing more and more members or subgroups of society into the power struggle. There is indeed some indication that such (macro-level) polarization is on the rise in many societies, though there are notable scientific controversies concerning the magnitude and exact nature of the phenomenon (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Valdesolo & Graham, 2016; Webster & Abramowitz, 2017).

Respect for group members’ collective identity

As a second corollary hypothesis, I propose that politicized struggles for recognition are politicized struggles for respect and ultimately for a respected collective identity. The hypothesis resonates with Honneth’s (1995) social philosophical theory of recognition, in which he identified respect as the critical form of recognition in the spheres of legal and political relations. At the same time, Honneth (1995) further specified the notion of respect and argued that, in these spheres, respect primarily reflects the recognition of people’s standing as equals rather than the recognition of their needs or achievements.

Social psychological research on the phenomenology of respect has indeed confirmed for a variety of social groups seeking a respected place in society that experiences of being respected in society primarily reflect perceptions of equality recognition as opposed to need or achievement recognition (Simon, 2017; Simon, Brause, & Galeão-Silva, 2016; Simon, Grabow, & Böhme, 2015 ). Moreover, the observation that feeling respected as an equal reduces intergroup conflict suggests it is actually such respect that group members struggle for (Eschert & Simon, 2019).

The key role of equality recognition in societal respect ties in neatly with the inference I have drawn from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) that common group membership grounds entitlement to equality recognition. Applied to politicized struggles for recognition, membership in the same society grounds the entitlement of members of different societal subgroups to equality recognition. The struggle for a respected collective identity proposed in the second corollary hypothesis is thus the struggle of members of a societal subgroup with a particular collective identity (Level 1 collective identity) for their recognition as equal members of society (Level 2 collective identity).³

Two clarifications are in order. First, unlike Taylor (1992), I do not suggest a collectivistic reading of the notion of “respected collective identity.” I do not equate respect for a particular collective identity with the recognition of the equal worth of the identity of the respective group vis-à-vis the identities of other groups (with each group being conceived of as an entity sui generis), nor do I equate it, in a weaker sense, with the presumption of its equal worth. However, my reading is not purely or overly individualistic, either. I suggest, rather, a middle ground such that members of a societal subgroup with a particular collective identity enjoy a respected collective identity to the extent that they are recognized as different equals: “different” owing to their membership in a particular ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological group, “equal” owing to their membership in the same society (Habermas, 1999; Simon, Reininger, et al., 2019).

Recognition as a different equal must not be misconstrued as bisected or otherwise diminished equality recognition. On the contrary, it adds a new sensitivity or concern to recognition as an equal member of society, which, traditionally, centers on treatment as an equal accorded to all members of society irrespective of the many ways in which they differ from each other (Dworkin, 2002). Recognition as a different equal adds the positive requirement of paying attention to and taking into consideration people’s collective identities as self-aspects that matter to them. The purpose of such additional concern is not to celebrate people’s differences and their collective identities, but to avoid offending or even repressing (without reasonable justification) what is important to them as group members (Appiah, 2007, p. 94). The recognition of members of outgroups as different equals does not require us to value what they value, but to register what they value and to show equal concern. It requires us to take into consideration what they value just as we take into consideration what we ourselves value. As for possible recognition failures, it seems to me that, while recognition as an equal member of society is typically denied through acts of commission (e.g., active exclusion or discrimination), non-recognition as a different equal more often results from acts of omission or indifference. In fact, recognition of outgroup members as different equals requires us to go the extra mile in order to find out what matters specifically to them and, if necessary and possible, to make reasonable accommodations, which may include carving out exceptions for them (e.g., exempting Sikhs from wearing helmets instead of turbans when riding a motorcycle; Appiah, 2007, p. 160).

The second clarification concerns my focus on equality recognition as the goal of politicized struggles for recognition. I certainly do not claim that there are no politicized struggles for goals other than equality recognition. In particular, there may very well be politicized struggles for superiority recognition. However, I suspect that, upon closer examination, many of the struggles that, at first glance, appear to be politicized struggles for superiority recognition will turn out to be politicized struggles for equality recognition that overshoot for fear of others’ dominance and in the hope that the best defense is a good offense (Schopler & Insko, 1992). Even some of the earliest experimental investigations into the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism point in this direction. In their report on the by now classic “minimal group” experiments, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) emphasized that fairness operationalized as equality of outcomes was consistently “powerful in guiding [research participants’] choices” (p. 173). Later, Mummendey et al. (1992) demonstrated that, when research participants made decisions that could be harmful to others, equal treatment of ingroup and outgroup members was their dominant choice, unless research participants found themselves in the vulnerable position of minority or low-status group members.

I will say more on politicized struggles for superiority recognition (or hegemony) shortly. For the time being, however, it is important to recall the insight from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) that collective identity at a given level of ingroup–outgroup categorization (Level 1) is embedded in higher-level, superordinate collective identity (Level 2), which grounds entitlement to equality recognition across lower-level (Level 1) group boundaries. Thus, membership in the same society entitles members of different societal subgroups to equality recognition. It is this entitlement afforded by shared membership in the same society that pushes the goal of equality recognition into the social psychological foreground and fuels the struggle for it. What is more, as long as this shared membership operates as the social categorical frame of reference, any struggle for recognition fought within this frame is not only politicized in that it necessarily addresses and involves society as the larger polity, it must also give priority to the demand for equality recognition because only equals can hope for recognition in other respects as well (e.g., for the recognition of their needs or achievements). While the struggle for equality recognition is thus primary, the struggle for superiority recognition is, in the final analysis, even a misguided struggle, because

even those who do win are more subtly frustrated, because they win recognition from the losers, whose acknowledgment is . . . not really valuable, since they are no longer free, self-supporting subjects on the same level with the winners. The struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals. (Taylor, 1992, p. 50)

From embedded dual identity to identity as a different equal

I have just argued that, because it grounds entitlement to equality recognition irrespective of subgroup membership, superordinate collective identity derived from membership in the larger society nurtures politicized struggles for (equality) recognition among members of societal subgroups. But because it facilitates mutual equality recognition, superordinate collective identity as a member of society also constrains these struggles. That is, by also facilitating the recognition of the members of other societal subgroups as equals, superordinate collective identity as a member of society, and thus of the polity in which struggles for recognition are played out, likely safeguards against the escalation of polarization and against extremism or radicalism (Schaefer & Simon, 2019; Simon & Ruhs, 2008).⁴

Combining the roles of superordinate collective identity as a member of society (Level 2) and of the embedded, lower-level collective identity as a member of a particular societal subgroup (Level 1), it is an embedded dual identity that operates in politicized struggles for recognition. This embedded dual identity is the combination of Level 1 collective identity, for which respect is sought (see the above section), and Level 2 collective identity, in which Level 1 collective identity is embedded and which both nurtures and constrains the struggle for a respected Level 1 collective identity. In this constellation, unlike in cases of complete recategorization at the superordinate level (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Turner et al., 1987), Level 1 collective identity is not replaced, but informed (nurtured and constrained) by Level 2 collective identity. The struggle driven by this identity constellation is shaped accordingly. With regard to (substantive) goals, it should be geared toward equality recognition as opposed to superiority recognition and, with regard to procedure or means, it should be limited to the normatively acceptable repertoire of nonviolent political action, at least in liberal democracies recognizing the rule of law (Simon, 2011).

However, the embedded dual identity is an insecure, if not torn, identity as long as the respective group members lack societal recognition as different equals. Without such recognition, it cannot develop into a secure and truly integrated identity as a different equal. I thus suggest, as a third corollary hypothesis, that embedded dual identity pushes group members toward a politicized struggle for recognition, and the prospect of a recognized identity as a different equal pulls them toward the struggle. Their embedded dual identity is an open wound and their struggle for recognition a way to show this wound to society and demand healing. In less dramatic words, their embedded dual identity is an open question, and their struggle for recognition a way to pose the question to society and demand the right answer. In this sense, struggling for societal recognition is making a claim for identity as a different equal, but it is also an offer to integrate oneself into society, which especially modern, culturally diverse societies should not refuse and very likely cannot afford to refuse.

This corollary hypothesis also contributes to the demarcation between politicized struggles for equality recognition and those for superiority recognition (or hegemony). I suggest that it is in the operation of an embedded dual identity where the critical social psychological difference lies between the two types of struggles. More specifically, superordinate collective identity is missing as a constraining or restraining force in struggles for superiority recognition. The deeper social psychological cause seems to be the restructuring of identity such that Level 1 collective identity is no longer embedded in and thus not tamed or pacified by Level 2 superordinate collective identity. Level 1 collective identity is effectively unleashed. In a sense, the roles of Level 1 and Level 2 collective identities are reversed in struggles for superiority recognition. Level 1 collective identity now aspires to conquer, to incorporate, or “devour” Level 2 superordinate collective identity. Struggles for superiority recognition thus seem to be driven by Level 1 collective identities energized by perceived entitlement “to own” Level 2 superordinate collective identity, to own the respective polity, society, or nation—to own it and not be constrained by it. Populist and nationalist political parties or movements are a case in point. As self-proclaimed advocates for the majority population, they portray the majority as the true, if not only, representative of the nation or “the people.” At the same time, they stoke the majority’s fear of being dominated by conspiring minorities and propagate that the best defense is a good offense. They thus incite the allegedly besieged majority to claim superiority over other societal subgroups and to subject “the other” (including various scapegoats) to unequal, discriminatory treatment (Simon et al., 2018; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). In such struggles for superiority recognition, equality recognition may not only be replaced as the guiding principle, the very idea of equality may actually be perverted. Especially when struggles for superiority are taken to the totalitarian extreme, the winners regularly propagate a perverted idea of equality claiming that they are “more equal than others” (Orwell, 1945) and may even put the perverted idea into practice via murderous acts of “homogenization” or “cleansing” (Arendt, 1976, 2006).

This is not to deny that politicized struggles for equality recognition driven by embedded dual identity can go awry and radicalize as well. In fact, there are at least two pathways along which such radicalization can develop. For one, superordinate collective identity as a member of the larger society, which entitles one to equality recognition irrespective of subgroup membership, functions as a promise society makes to the members of all societal subgroups. Subgroup members’ adoption of an embedded dual identity then confirms that they take society’s promise seriously. Just as the promise binds society, so too, does embedded dual identity bind subgroup members in that it limits their struggle to the pursuit of normatively acceptable goals or ends by normatively acceptable means. However, if society breaks its promise and does not respond positively to subgroup members’ expectations of or demands for equality recognition, the mutually binding promise–identity bond will be severed. The resulting sense of betrayal likely triggers a conversion from embedded dual identity to separatist identity, which unleashes Level 1 collective identity and thus facilitates radicalism (Simon, 2011).

The second radicalization pathway relates more directly to the danger of identity disintegration. To the extent that the integrity of embedded dual identity, or identity as a different equal for that matter, is undermined by perceived conflict between its components (i.e., by perceived incompatibility between Level 1 collective identity and Level 2 superordinate collective identity), the resulting identity confusion or vacuum likely precipitates a sense of anomia, which then paves the way to radicalism (Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013). It needs to be noted that, in the case of embedded dual identity, the perception of identity conflict hinges on both the definition of the superordinate collective identity as a member of society and that of the collective identity as a subgroup member. Consequently, unlike with the first radicalization pathway, which is triggered by society’s broken promise, the responsibility for radicalization along the second pathway triggered by perceived identity incompatibility lies not only with the larger society, but with both parties—with society as a whole and with the societal subgroup, or more precisely, with those who have definitional power in these social entities.

Tolerance is the right response

The final corollary hypothesis concerns society’s appropriate response to those struggling for (equality) recognition. It is hypothesized that (social and political) tolerance, understood as recognition of disliked, disapproved, or disagreeing others as different equals, is the appropriate response because it directly matches the demands of those engaged in politicized struggles for recognition. In fact, such tolerance has the same social psychological structure as politicized struggles for recognition in that it also represents a combination of Level 1 and Level 2 processes and their outcomes. Dislike for, disapproval of, or disagreement with others results from Level 1 ingroup–outgroup categorization and the corresponding differentiating identities (e.g., as members of different societal subgroups); recognition of them as equals irrespective of Level 1 differences results from Level 2 superordinate group membership and the corresponding common or shared identity (e.g., as members of the same society).

In social psychology, the tacit understanding has been for a long time that tolerance requires, if not equals, approval or even liking (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). That is, to be tolerated, other people or groups and their different ways of life (i.e., their beliefs, preferences, and practices) supposedly need to be regarded as something good or even need to be liked. However, drawing on insights from political science (Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979) as well as political philosophy (Forst, 2013; Scanlon, 2003), social psychologists now increasingly acknowledge dislike, disapproval, or disagreement as a “definitional condition” for tolerance (Gibson et al., 1992, p. 338; Simon & Schaefer, 2016; Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). It would make little sense, indeed, to say we tolerate someone or something that we already like, approve of, or agree with. Instead, tolerance requires us “to accept people and permit their practices even when we strongly disapprove of them” and is thus “intermediate between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition” (Scanlon, 2003, p. 187). It further follows that, for tolerance to become possible, there needs to be a counterweight to the disapproval of others (or the dislike for or disagreement with them) that operates as a powerful restraining force. As convincingly argued from the perspective of political philosophy (Forst, 2013) and empirically demonstrated in social psychological research (Simon, Eschert, et al., 2019; Simon & Schaefer, 2016, 2018), respect for others as equal members of society actually plays such a role. It restrains people’s disapproval of others, without removing it, and thus makes tolerance possible. With disapproval as its definitional condition, tolerance obviously does not exclude evaluative judgments on Level 1, such as differential evaluations of ingroups and outgroups, not even the attribution of differential social esteem as a function of the extent to which members of particular societal subgroups are exemplary, representative, or (proto)typical of society as a whole (Turner et al., 1987). However, as long as shared Level 2 identity as members of the same society operates as a restraining force, differential evaluations should not translate into denying others treatment as equals (e.g., denial of equal rights), although they may justify differential outcomes in the same way that different performances by different students justify different grades, without justifying that any student is denied equal concern (Dworkin, 2002).

The important point for our present discussion is that the resulting disapproval–respect model of tolerance (Simon, 2017; Simon & Schaefer, 2016) is actually a dual-level model very much in line with the proposed new perspective on intergroup conflicts as politicized struggles for recognition involving Level 1 and Level 2 processes and outcomes. Both tolerance and the demands that lie at the heart of politicized struggles for recognition are dual-level phenomena. Tolerance combines disapproval rooted in Level 1 ingroup–outgroup categorization with respect rooted in Level 2 superordinate group membership, politicized struggles for recognition combine demands for recognition of Level 1 differences with demands for recognition of Level 2 equality. If demands for recognition as different equals are the question disapproved societal subgroups pose to the larger society, tolerance as conceptualized in the disapproval–respect model is the appropriate or fitting answer of society (as well as of other societal subgroups), because it exactly meets these demands.

From the moral or a normative point of view, conservative critics (Carson, 2012) as well as progressive critics (Brown, 2006; Marcuse, 1970) have accused tolerance of being partisan, although they differ as to in whose political or ideological camp they suspect (or wish) tolerance to be. However, if conceptualized and practiced as recognition of disliked, disapproved, or disagreeing others as different equals, tolerance is not guilty of unfair partisanship. In our new perspective terminology, such tolerance is certainly not partisan on Level 1. It does not side with any particular Level 1 group or camp against another, especially not with powerful Level 1 groups, as “repressive tolerance” would do (Marcuse, 1970). If anything, tolerance is partisan only in the (paradoxical) sense that it is on the side of Level 2 equality recognition across Level 1 group boundaries (e.g., across the boundaries of societal subgroups) in support of justice (Rawls, 2005) as a matter of principle (Dworkin, 1985). Without respect for disliked, disapproved, or disagreeing others as equals, tolerance would be morally empty. Indeed, it could then easily degenerate into a merely permissive or even repressive attitude toward outgroups and serve as an ideological “mantle cast over their emancipation to contain it” (Brown, 2006, p. 71). However, because respect (i.e., equality recognition) would be a sham or at least incomplete if it did not foster the recipient’s liberty and autonomy (Dworkin, 2002; Renger, Renger, Miché, & Simon, 2017), the respect component, when taken seriously, implants into tolerance the obligation to support the emancipation of all—an obligation that (cor)responds to the target’s entitlement to emancipation. If politicized struggles for recognition are in fact struggles for equality recognition in society and thus for emancipation, as our new perspective would have it, tolerance will be a source of empowerment for those who struggle, while those who subscribe to tolerance will be their natural allies.

We can therefore conclude that tolerance is the right response from society to politicized struggles for recognition in a comprehensive sense. It not only fits from the explanatory social psychological point of view, it is also required from the moral point of view. What is more, tolerance is the right response also from a practical point of view. As the normative ought implies the practical can, it is important to reiterate that social psychological research has demonstrated that people are indeed capable of tolerating those whom they dislike, disapprove of, or disagree with (Simon, Eschert, et al., 2019; Simon & Schaefer, 2016, 2018). While it is therefore reasonable to demand tolerance as a response from society, all sides need to acknowledge that tolerance is not a one-way street. Reciprocity is crucial for the development and stability of tolerance, and of respect for that matter (Simon & Grabow, 2014; Simon & Schaefer, 2018). Those who refuse to respect others as equals not only become intolerant, they also sever the bond of mutual respect and tolerance in that they overstep the limits of what others can or ought to tolerate.⁵ Without the willingness on all sides to weave such a bond and maintain it, politicized struggles for recognition and the reactions they inevitably provoke are likely to derail and escalate into radicalism and possibly even into civil war.

Conclusion

The received wisdom in social psychology has been for a long time, and arguably still is, that conflicts between social groups are primarily struggles for superiority (i.e., superiority of one’s ingroup over outgroups). In this article, I proposed a new perspective on intergroup conflict that counters the traditional view’s overemphasis on group members’ alleged striving for ingroup superiority and its one-dimensional, single-level conceptualization of intergroup conflict in terms of simple bipolar ingroup–outgroup categorizations. I suggested that many intergroup conflicts, especially those in modern, culturally diverse societies, should be analyzed, instead, as politicized struggles for recognition. The new perspective brings into view group members’ concern for respect, or more precisely, for their recognition as different equals. In addition, it shifts researchers’ attention to the multi-level nature of intergroup conflict. Viewed as politicized struggles for recognition, intergroup conflicts still manifest themselves at the level of differentiating collective identities (Level 1), but from the new perspective we also come to appreciate that they are embedded in and played out in the context of higher-level, shared collective identities (Level 2). The latter nurture, but also constrain politicized struggles for recognition and thus facilitate polarization, but also tolerance.

Embeddedness at a higher level of social categorization is not only crucial for the taming or pacification of politicized struggles for recognition, and of intergroup conflicts for that matter. What is more, it lays the foundation for mutual recognition as different equals and thus for a satisfactory solution to politicized struggles for recognition in modern, culturally diverse societies, which is beyond both the temptation of unleashed (Level 1) subgroup identity to dominate others and the fear of “homelessness” (being without “Heimat”) possibly associated with (Level 2) superordinate identity.⁶ In a nutshell, the satisfactory solution is that the members of all societal subgroups are given access to a secure identity as a different equal.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference “Politicized Struggles for Recognition” held at Kiel University (Germany), September 13–14, 2018.

Declaration of conflicting interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article builds on research funded by German Research Foundation (DFG) Grant SI 428/20-1.

ORCID iD

Bernd Simon

Notes

Author biography

Bernd Simon is a professor of social and political psychology and director of the Tolerance Research Unit at Kiel University (Germany). He investigates inter- and intragroup processes, with particular emphasis on identity, politicization, respect, and tolerance. Recent publications include “Disapproved, but tolerated: The role of respect in outgroup tolerance” in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (with S. Eschert, C. D. Schaefer, K. M. Reininger, S. Zitzmann, & H. J. Smith).

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