Contested industrial relations in the airline industry in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis

Comparative capitalism and the airline industry

The objective of comparative capitalism is that industrialized economies vary systemically along broadly similar patterns. A systematic approach that differentiates between two ideal types of market economies – the liberal market economies (LME, e.g. the UK) and the coordinated market economies (CMEs, e.g. Germany) (Hall and Soskice, 2001) – has been seen as a helpful heuristic to compare industrial relations (Hay, 2020; Johnstone et al., 2019). Firms in LMEs coordinate their activities internally via hierarchies and externally via competitive market arrangements. In contrast, firms in CMEs rely more on non-market or ‘coordinated’ relationships both internally and externally. This has implications for the quality of employment and industrial relations since institutions in CMEs prevent employers from focussing only on short-term benefits (‘beneficial constraints’ by Streeck, 1997) and allow employees to participate in the firm (‘voice’ instead of ‘exit’, Hirschman, 1970). Therefore, institutions in CMEs are less flexible, for example, in terms of quick layoffs. This makes it reasonable for firms in CMEs to have long-term (and trustful) employee relations, while the industrial relations in LMEs tend to be more adversarial (Schröder, 2014).

The comparative capitalism paradigm allows to contrast the institutional context of industrial relations in different countries. However, the focus on two ideal types of market economies has been criticized (Boyer 2005; Hay, 2020; Peck and Theodore, 2007). In particular, the lack of consideration for the political dimension and state action (May et al., 2023; Nölke et al., 2020; Wood et al., 2023), as well as the changing conditions due to external shocks and crises (Handley and Martin, 2023; Hay, 2020), has been criticized. Another line of critique involves the lack of consideration for supra-national coordination, which can have a profound impact on industrial relations especially in the European Union (Bechter et al., 2012; Erne, 2013; Erne et al., 2024a). These three aspects are taken up in this study, which compares the industrial relations in airlines in a coordinated national institutional setting inside the EU (Germany) and a more liberal national institutional setting outside the EU (the UK) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Civil aviation is a sector, in which national institutions are regarded specifically important for industrial relations (Bechter et al., 2012). Consequently, previous research has demonstrated that market economy types (LME and CME), as well as business model types (full-service carrier, FSC, and low-cost carrier, LCC) impact the quality of industrial relations in the airline industry (Bamber et al., 2009a; Bamber et al., 2009b; Bamber et al., 2016; Barry and Nienhueser, 2010; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2019; Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Harvey, 2009; Harvey and Turnbull, 2012; Harvey and Turnbull, 2015; Lange et al., 2015). While most FSCs (mostly former state-owned) have a long history of workplace representation, LCCs usually are less concerned with workplace representation and have even found ways to actively circumvent national laws in this regard (Bamber et al., 2009a; Geary, 2021; Golden and Erne, 2022), sometimes by exploiting the differences between their home countries and the host countries of their bases (Golden and Erne, 2022). Personnel costs are usually lower, and overall working conditions are typically worse in LCCs (Bamber et al., 2009a; Harvey and Turnbull, 2012), although some LCCs have managed to provide good working conditions and cultivate strong industrial relations (Harvey and Turnbull, 2010). Most FSCs reacted to market liberalization and the price pressure by LCCs in the industry by launching subsidiary LCCs (Barry and Nienhueser, 2010; Domanico, 2007) or adjusting their full-service model toward a low-cost model (Lange et al., 2015).

Crisis and industrial relations

Both the impact of institutional dynamics (Wright et al., 2017), and the influence of long-term sectoral trends (Bamber et al., 2016) on industrial relations are well studied. However, there is less knowledge on the impact of sudden shocks on industrial relations, although crisis can bring profound changes to industrial relations and responses to crisis are affected by the institutional context (Cullinane, 2018). The global financial crisis after 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis negatively impacted industrial relations (Cullinane, 2018; Johnstone et al., 2019), although other studies attribute less influence to the crisis (Regalia and Regini, 2018), but describe it as intensifying existing trends (Távora, 2019). Crises are characterized as threatening, uncertain and urgent situations, during which quick decisions are required and more drastic decisions can be made (Brinks and Ibert, 2020). The question arises of how the industrial relations in airlines based in different national institutional settings are challenged in this fundamental crisis. Protective mechanisms such as protection against dismissals could be particularly robust in a crisis situation, as they cushion the extent of the crisis through measures undertaken by the state and companies, as well as contributions from employees and unions through concession bargaining (May et al., 2023). Management tends to participate employees more during periods of crisis (Ramsay, 1977). However, the crisis could also be used as an opportunity for firms to erode the foundations of industrial relations. Aside from existing mechanisms, a crisis opens up opportunities for institutional change, in which actors can be more willing to act.

A framework for analysing the quality of industrial relations in airlines in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis

This study examines how the negotiations between management and unions during the COVID-19 pandemic were impacted by both institutional factors on the national and European scale, and firm-specific factors in four airlines. The focus is on the quality of industrial relations, including aspects like the perceived climate for negotiation, the manner and extent of communication, and the level of mutual trust and respect. In this sense, the quality of industrial relations describes the ability of reaching crisis solutions collectively between the employer and employee side. The atmosphere of negotiation can range between highly conflictual and threatening or constructive and cooperative and is influenced by the level of respect and trust between the negotiating partners and, in particular, their compliance to agreements. The combined spectrum of the quality of industrial relations during crisis negotiations ranges from ‘avoidance’ in the worst case, via ‘accommodation’, and up to ‘partnership’ in the best case (inspired by Bamber et al., 2009a).

In this study, two key explanatory factors for the quality of industrial relations in the airline industry during the COVID-19 crisis are considered: The national institutional setting and the airline’s firm-specific factors. The national institutional factors are determined by three aspects. First, the national institutional setting influences industrial relations through existing regulation on labour rights, workplace representation, and employee board-level representation. Second, direct interventions by governments can take the form of crisis-related policies like short-time work or loans or direct investments, which might come with conditions regarding industrial relations. Third, supra-national coordination influences industrial relations through setting the boundaries for policies and direct government interventions.

In Germany, both laws and a tradition of social partnership provide protection against job losses even in times of crisis. Further, short-time work (‘Kurzarbeit’) is an established instrument to avoid job losses in struggling firms. This enabled German airlines to quickly fall back on established programmes. In addition, the German state prominently offered support in form of credit guarantees, and even equity investments. In contrast, the UK government stated that special support measures for airlines would only be the very last resort. However, non-industry-specific support schemes were provided. For example, the Bank of England granted a loan scheme for firms and the ‘Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’ (CJRS) was introduced as a new form of short-time work in the UK.

In terms of supra-national coordination, market integration into a Single European Aviation Market (SEAM) accelerated since the 1980s (Kassim and Stevens, 2010; Erne et al., 2024b). The principal rules and regulations for European airlines of the single aviation market are regulated by EU-law. Under EU competition law, direct state aid for companies is restricted. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission temporarily relaxed its competition policy rules restricting state aid (Erne et al., 2024b). Additionally, the European Commission implemented the SURE programme (‘The European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency’) during the crisis to help member states fund temporary short-time work schemes (Erne et al., 2024b). The SEAM also opened up ways for transnational collective action (Golden and Erne, 2022). However, national industrial relations in the airline sector are still very important for collective bargaining, as national industrial relations still differ between countries in the same sector (Bechter et al., 2012).

The firm-specific factors considered here include the sector-specific business models in the airline industry (FSC or LCC), relationship between management and trade unions, and firm-specific policies. The two business models vary in terms of product offerings, pricing strategies, and target markets: FSC offer more extensive services such as different travel classes and connecting flights. In contrast, LCCs offer fewer additional services overall. They follow a multi-base/point-to-point model and operate mostly short-haul flights between multiple base airports (Bamber et al., 2009a; Harvey and Turnbull, 2012). The relationship between airline management and trade unions at the company level is an important firm-specific factor. This encompasses the history of industrial actions within the company, previous collective agreements, the overall industrial relations, and the negotiation practices employed. Finally, firm-specific policies and obligations related to employment are crucial, such as wage structures, pension schemes, and social benefits, as are general characteristics of the firm, notably its financial situation.

In conclusion, the national institutional context in which the actors are embedded, but also the previous practice of industrial relations in the airlines influences the quality of industrial relations. Aside from formal institutions like workplace representation laws, also informal institutions can be important in this context. Institutions and experiences create certain expectations as to how the crisis should be dealt with and how negotiation partners (e.g. management and unions) should behave. Further, the national institutional context also shapes expectations of government interventions to support employees and businesses during a crisis. For example, in Germany, both parties would expect short-time work compensation or government aid to companies, and unions would expect co-determination at the operational level and in supervisory boards. This contrasts with the British context, where co-determination does not exist, and particularly strong participation is not expected. This paper analyses the impact of both national institutional setting and firm-level institutional factors on the quality of industrial relations during the COVID-19 crisis, based on four cases of airlines.

Threatening with fire and rehire: British Airways

British Airways (BA) relied on CJRS to pay staff wages, and set around 30,000 employees into short-time work, and received governmental loan guarantees of approximately two billion pounds and a 300 millionpound loan from the Bank of England. BA’s management had threatened to cut 12,000 jobs at the beginning of the crisis in order to pursue a strategy of ‘fire and rehire’. It was planned to notify all 43,000 employees of their termination in mid-June 2020, and 31,000 of them to continue employment under new (worse) terms and conditions. The plan to implement ‘fire and rehire’ practices by a ‘national carrier’ was not only criticized heavily by trade unions and employees, who accused BAs’ management of exploiting the crisis, but also by politicians and the wider public in the UK. As a consequence, the cabin crew union at BA threatened of strike over job cuts and announced publicly that it no longer wished to negotiate. The relationship further deteriorated when an announcement of a takeover of the Spanish Air Europa coincided with the news of layoffs.

The conditions of the ‘fire and rehire’ plan are reminiscent of a restructuring of the cabin crew over a decade before the pandemic, where BA introduced a ‘Mixed Fleet’ by establishing a lower paid new workforce with worse terms and conditions within the existing short-haul (European) and long-haul (inter-continental) crews (Harvey and Turnbull, 2014; Taylor and Moore, 2015). Therefore, before the pandemic, the cabin crew was already divided: older staff who received higher pay, and younger staff, hired after 2010 and who were paid up to 50% less. The ‘fire and hire’ strategy during the pandemic implied a massive salary cut for the cabin crew with old wage agreements. Furthermore, employees who previously only flew short-haul were now expected to also fly long-haul routes, which is impractical for many employees due to family situations (Interviewees BA2 and BA3). According to interviewee BA2, the restructuring of the fleets led to many flight attendants leaving because ‘prior to announcing any redundancies, what they [BA] did was in essence scare crew to take voluntary redundancy’. In 2020, BA made approximately 10,000 employees redundant (Unite, 2021). Almost half of these job losses were among flight attendants. Out of approximately 16,000 flight attendants at BA, 4700 were laid off, even though salary cuts had been agreed upon (Unite, 2020a, 2021). Cutbacks were also negotiated for pilots, with the pilots’ union BALPA agreeing on a savings programme in July 2020. Instead of laying off about 30% of the pilots, as initially announced, only about 6% of the pilots were made redundant through compulsory redundancy, a substantially lower share compared with cabin crew.

The relationship between BA and BALPA was already ‘at a low point when we went into the pandemic and that I think was one of the problems’ (interviewee BA1). In 2019 both collective bargaining parties had agreed that the needed to improve their strained relationship and even intended third-party assistance for improving their relationship. However, with the outbreak of the pandemic, this was not done and the relationship deteriorated further.

The ‘fire and rehire’ threat by BA’s management lies at the core of BA’s industrial relations during the pandemic. Although the original threat was not carried out for pilots, it led to a deterioration of the relationship. Interviewee BA1 declared that ‘(…) in our opinion, that’s a very unacceptable way for any employer to behave. So, the industrial relations in British Airways went through a very, very difficult phase’.

BALPA’s primary objective was to avoid any compulsory redundancy for pilots. They also wanted to minimize any permanent changes to terms and conditions (e.g. salaries and scheduling). Whilst notably there have been no compulsory redundancies for pilots at easyJet, Ryanair, and TUI in the UK, BA made pilots redundant through compulsory redundancies, which effected mostly junior pilots. However, the pilots’ union was able to negotiate in a collective agreement that dismissed pilots have the right to return to BA once the operations recovered. According to interviewee BA1, all pilots who were laid off, were offered re-employment, and most accepted. Nevertheless, it was the first time in BA’s history that pilots faced compulsory redundancies. Although interviewee BA1 described the employer side as ‘hard-nosed’, the union was able to reduce the impact of the planned measures by accepting temporary salary cuts. In return, BA demanded that BALPA takes responsibility for training costs. The union negotiators felt compelled to accept a long-term reduction in pay, which initially started at 20% and gradually decreased over time. There was no room for negotiations, as interviewee BA1 summarizes: ‘We had a gun to our head and we had no choice but to agree to it’. Another point which the pilots’ union found incomprehensible, is that while other airlines in the UK began utilizing the furlough scheme from April 2020 at the latest, BA did not start using the furlough scheme for pilots until November 2020. The interviewee BA2 stated that BA has used the crisis to implement restructuring plans that would have been hard to implement under normal circumstances.

To sum up, although the pilots’ union was able to mitigate some consequences, the industrial relations worsened due to the unions’ perception of not having a choice than to accept the management’s offers and the threatening tactics by management. Unite representing cabin crew assesses the restructuring as an exploitation of the crisis to get rid of older, more expensive contracts.

Ambivalent negotiation strategy: easyJet

In March 2020, the management of easyJet publicly called on European governments to support the aviation industry with financial aid. While headquartered in the UK, easyJet had to restructure its operations due to Brexit, to continue flying between EU member states. Therefore, staff that would fly for easyJet Europe was already employed in EU countries. Thus, easyJet was able to use the respective national schemes. In the UK, easyJet relied heavily on the CJRS in the UK and a £600m loan from the Bank of England. The airline initially announced job cuts of 30% of its total workforce, which would have affected approximately 4500 of around 15,000 employees. Further, easyJet closed three UK bases in August 2020 (Stanstead, Southend, and Newcastle) and originally planned to dismiss around 730 pilots (about 30%) and around 1300 flight attendants in the UK through compulsory redundancies. The union Unite has criticized the UK government for not providing a bailout package for the airline industry like Germany or France (Unite, 2020b). However, the pilots’ union BALPA and easyJet reached an agreement on part-time working programmes, preventing compulsory redundancies for pilots in the UK. According to the interviewee EZY3, the management initially showed strong determination to make pilots redundant. It took significant effort to convince them that reducing such a large number of pilots would not be in the best interest of the company. The union argued although the situation was unprecedented, causing uncertainty and stress for all actors involved, there would come a time when demand for flying would rebound, and pilots would be required again. The interviewee EZY3 characterizes the industrial relationship between BALPA and easyJet as quite positive prior to the pandemic. However, the ability to prevent the original plan to lay off pilots was described by interviewee EZY3 as absolutely unique. This outcome was solely achievable due to the pilots’ solidarity by their collective decision to take part-time options as a counteroffer. Throughout the pandemic, the union and the management worked even more closely together. For example, the daily calculations of the effect of the different part-time options the pilots agreed on were made in cooperation. Despite the overall positive industrial relationship, the interviewee EZY3 emphasizes that the union had to be mindful of the possibility that the employer might take advantage of the crisis situation and might invalidate previous industrial agreements.

Interestingly, a more negative picture emerges for the easyJet base in Berlin, where substantial job losses were enforced through 720 compulsory redundancies without serious attempts to negotiate. As explained by the interviewee EZY1, although there have been very large investments in recent years (e.g. in a maintenance hangar, which opened in 2021), strategies for the base in Berlin changed completely, leading to the implementation of cost-cutting restructuring measures. Although the local trade union ver.di, representing pilots, cabin crew, and ground staff, was formally consulted, the negotiations had no significant impact on the decision-making process. Socially acceptable solutions could not be reached, as interviewee EZY1 remarked: ‘You could tell that a social coldness had set in’.

The compulsory redundancies took place in two waves (first 400 and after 6 months of short-time work additional 320). Furthermore, the interviewee EZY1 would not describe the process as a genuine ‘negotiation’, as the employer’s negotiators simply shifted the responsibility to the corporate headquarters in Luton and the ‘proposal’ was not up for discussion, but rather contained the final decisions already. Similar findings on shifting responsibility to the headquarters have been reported also from an easyJet base in Italy. The early COVID-19 outbreak in Northern Italy created a sharp contrast in how the crisis was viewed between the union and management in Italy, where it was seen as a serious threat, and the UK headquarters, where it was perceived as less severe. This led to differing opinions on how to proceed, as Italian employees were fearful of going to work (interviewee EZY2). In summary, no pilots were laid off in the UK for operational reasons and the industrial relations between the pilots’ union and management remained largely unaffected by the crisis, there. Indeed, a close collaboration in a ‘partnership’ model was reached in an agreement. In contrast, easyJet in Germany experienced a sharp break in both strategic direction and industrial relations, nearing a state of complete ‘avoidance’.

The union felt powerless and ignored by the management during the negotiation process and saw itself confronted with non-discussable finalized decisions. Therefore, at the base in Germany the quality of industrial relations eroded almost completely from a good level prior to the pandemic, resulting in the loss of trust, loss of respect and credibility in the ‘social partnership’.

Cat and mouse game around state aid: Lufthansa

Lufthansa received about four billion euros as direct support from the German state in the form of equity investments and credits. In exchange the federal government received two seats in the supervisory board. Further, Lufthansa relied heavily on short-time work in Germany. Like BA and easyJet, Lufthansa initially threatened to make large layoffs and cut 30,000 jobs throughout the group (10,000 jobs in Germany). The negotiations between management representatives and the three unions represented at Lufthansa AG started in April 2020 and job security became the top priority for the unions. The collective agreement for the cabin crew guaranteed job security until July 2024 in return for salary cuts. The cabin crew union UFO perceived the long contract duration as beneficial at that point in time due to the uncertain outlook. The two other unions followed later with similar collective agreements (VC representing pilots, ver.di representing employees on the ground). As a result of the negotiations, Lufthansa forwent compulsory redundancies for pilots and cabin crew in Germany. Instead, programmes for voluntary redundancies were implemented. Lufthansa was in the ‘focus of the press’ due to the state aid and ‘seemed to have an interest in showing the public that decisions were made together with the unions’ (interviewee LH1).

The negotiations for the cabin crew were described as unusual in the sense that constructive efforts to find a long-term solution were sought. The perception among the trade unionists was mixed, however. One interviewee (LH1) considered the quality of industrial relations as slightly improved through the crisis, while another interviewee (LH2) perceived it more negative. State aid for Lufthansa was beneficial for the employees, since it was assumed that the initially planned bankruptcy would have ultimately led to ‘the removal of all collective agreements’ (interviewee LH2). Interviewee LH2 noted that once state aid was secured, the negotiating course of the employer side shifted from ‘we stand together’ to an aggressive course. Only then, pressure was put on future collective wage agreements, as interviewee LH2 explains: ‘To set the course for the time afterwards and to massively exploit the situation to force concessions from us amounting to 30 to 40%’.

It was also noted by the interviewees, that the employer side aimed to negotiate topics not directly related to the crisis. Interviewee LH2 describes the negotiations as tougher than usual. For example, for the first time, plans were not explained during the negotiations. The management was willing to put even more pressure on the pilots than before and threatened the pilots’ union with unprecedented layoffs. The relationship between Lufthansa’s management and the pilots had been strained for decades and deteriorated further during the crisis. The employer’s level of bargaining power was perceived higher in the crisis because the option of strike disappeared due to the low demand.

Although there were no compulsory redundancies at the Lufthansa German mainline, other restructurings in the group led to discontent among employees and trade unions. The German division of the subsidiary SunExpress was shut down, and the previously scheduled shut down of the subsidiary Germanwings was accelerated, both leading to job losses. Contrarily, a new low-cost subsidiary ‘Ocean’, later renamed to ‘Discover’, was established in June 2020. All three unions represented at Lufthansa in Germany accused the management to abandon collective agreements through this new airline, which can be illustrated by the following statement by interviewee LH1: ‘That’s why they [Lufthansa] made a very conscious decision to launch something new. Yes, this is a form of abandoning collective agreements [“Tarifflucht”]. We keep calling it that’.

On the other side, a negotiator from the employer side acknowledged that the significant pressure due to the crisis has left its mark in the industrial relations in the group, although the negotiations were perceived as overall constructive to him, and the measures to be economic necessities.

To summarize, from the pilots’ union perspective, Lufthansa utilized the unions’ fear of job losses so that negotiations were tougher than usual. However, the cabin crew union perceived the negotiations as solution-oriented overall. Developments at subsidiaries in the Lufthansa Group were controversial for all unions and also had a negative effect on industrial relations in the mainline. Due to the restructuring efforts among the subsidiaries, employees were laid off and had to reapply, which was heavily criticised by unions as an attempt of avoiding collective agreements.

A growth strategy in the face of crisis: Eurowings

Eurowings is an independent business segment within the Lufthansa Group and focuses on short-haul point-to-point connections. In January 2021, Eurowings and the trade union ver.di concluded a crisis agreement for cabin staff which protects employees against dismissals until the end of 2021. In March 2021, Eurowings and the pilots trade union VC reached a collective agreement regarding working time reductions, for proportional salary waivers. Additionally, short-time work regulations were introduced early at the start of the pandemic in March 2020. One interviewee (EW1) states that the employer was unusually open about needing to reduce costs through short-time work and the need to renegotiate the collective agreement. Nevertheless, according to another interviewee of the pilot union (EW2), the employer’s side did not give up on their ‘usual gambling strategy’ (EW2) in negotiations and tried to bring structural changes into the crisis-package. Simultaneously, the employee side tried to take advantage of the situation and tried to bring in their demands, like employee financial participation and profit-sharing in the future. However, both social partners quickly realized the need to focus on addressing the immediate challenges posed by the crisis. After the collective bargaining parties switched to ‘crisis mode’, the negotiations are described as extremely efficient and cooperative by EW2: ‘You could already tell that the management was also solution-oriented. So actually, that’s the best word I can think of for it’. They aimed to position the company to be prepared for the recovery of air traffic, which involved measures like minimizing operations as little as possible and by ensuring the validity of employee’s flight licenses. According to the intervieweeEW2, these actions, along with effective communication from the employer, reassured the employees and contributed to coping with mental stress and the unpredictability of the crisis.

As explained by an interviewee (EW1), the Lufthansa group outlined a growth strategy for Eurowings despite the airline not making profits for several years. Moreover, the interviewee EW1 describes that the firm is in a challenging ‘sandwich position’ as it aims to be low-cost but the parent company Lufthansa follows a full-service approach and therefore acts differently. According to interviewees from both professional groups, these divergent business strategies often complicated issues for both the employer and the employee sides. This emerged once more at the beginning of the crisis as there were different prospects for the Lufthansa group and for Eurowings. The outlook for Lufthansa was seen less promising at the time, since it seemed unlikely that business travel would return quickly, while the prospects for Eurowings were considered better. The plan for Eurowings was to take on staff from the closed-down subsidiary Germanwings, along with employees from other airlines in the group. Therefore, the unions were puzzled as to why they needed to negotiate a corporate crisis contribution for Eurowings’ employees when their jobs were not immediately at risk, except in the case of the entire group facing bankruptcy, which seemed unlikely after the state aid. However, the parent company expected lower costs through collective negotiations across all segments. In parallel negotiations on short-time work in the beginning of the crisis, the employer side and the trade union were able to find solutions in a constructive and timely manner. Still, it appeared that Eurowings’ management was under pressure from the parent company to make a cost-saving contribution. The different perspectives in the group complicated and prolonged the negotiations at Eurowings over months, according to interviewee EW1. The negotiations for cabin crew staff were temporarily deadlocked and that the management threatened to stop negotiating with the respective union, which in turn, threatened with strikes.

Furthermore, there were threats to establish a new airline under the Eurowings label without transferring existing staff. This would mean new jobs under worse conditions for the employees. However, as stated by the interviewees, these threats were not a crisis-specific response but rather common. The interviewee EW1 recounts that the negotiating partners were, at one point, in a threatening competition against each other. This made it difficult to switch back to a more cooperative negotiating approach and the negotiations only took a turn after a clarifying conversation. Finally, the negotiations concluded with the collective agreement mentioned above, in which the union contributed to groupwide cost-saving measures as a sign of solidarity, while reaching job protection at a reasonable cost. Nevertheless, interviewee EW1 describes the situation that followed after the agreement as bizarre. Employees, who had been laid off elsewhere in the group, were recruited immediately after the collective agreement was made.

In summary, the negotiations with the pilot union were relatively solution-oriented after some early tactical manoeuvring, while the cabin–crew union stressed the initial conflicts during the negotiations far more. Overall, there were no compulsory redundancies and relatively low salary cuts at Eurowings. In comparison to Lufthansa mainline and other subsidiaries in the group, the situation for the (low-cost) subsidiary Eurowings was more favourable due to the growth strategy. After initial difficulties, negotiations were solution-oriented. Nevertheless, there was a slight deterioration in industrial relations due to management’s threats to stop negotiating or through downsizing by establishing a new airline.