Italian parliamentary debates on energy sustainability: How argumentative ‘short-circuits’ affect public engagement

Abstract

Public engagement is considered a crucial process in the transition towards sustainable energy systems. However, less space has been devoted to understand how policy makers and stakeholders view citizens and their relationship with energy issues. Nonetheless, together with technological advancements, policies and political debates on energy affect public engagement as well as individual practices. This article aims at tackling this issue by exploring how policy makers and stakeholders have socially constructed sustainable energy in Italian parliamentary debates and consultations during recent years (2009–2012). Results show that societal discourses on sustainable energy are oriented in a manner that precludes public engagement. The political debate is characterised by argumentative ‘short-circuits’ that constrain individual and community actions to the acceptance or the refusal of top-down decisions and that leave little room for community empowerment and bottom-up innovation.

Keywords

deficit-expertise themata energy policy hierarchic-egalitarian themata models of public public engagement renewable energy technologies

1. Introduction

Energy transitions – such as the current one towards low-carbon, distributed and smart systems – require that technological and industrial developments co-evolve with deep institutional and cultural changes (Fouquet and Pearson, 2012). The success of European, national and local energy plans cannot be expected only on the basis of techno-scientific innovations; it must rather be accompanied by careful strategies of public engagement that require strong regulatory governance and substance (Sovacool, 2014). Public engagement finds its roots in the principles of citizenship: it ‘creates the space for ethical value-laden issues to be explored, while bringing inclusiveness, transparency, diversity and creativity into the research and innovation process’.¹ In the field of energy sustainability, an ideal example of public engagement is shown in sustainable energy communities: ‘local communities in which politicians, planners, project developers, market actors and citizens actively co-operate to develop high degrees of intelligent energy supply, favouring RES, together with a conscientious application of energy efficiency measures’ (Intelligent Energy Executive Agency (IEEA), 2006: 4).

Although there is overall agreement as far as the underlying democratic aims and the necessity of a ‘participatory turn’ (Owens and Driffill, 2008; Saurugger, 2010), public engagement continues to be subject to criticism regarding its effectiveness, and several challenges still need to be addressed (cf. Bauer, 2014).

On the one hand, empirical evidence in energy studies has shown that participative approaches to public engagement help minimise social conflicts; enhance public understanding, knowledge and awareness; restore trust; and encourage public support (Devine-Wright, 2007b, 2011).

On the other hand, public engagement does not guarantee acceptance (Devine-Wright, 2007b). The legitimacy of power groups, the exclusion of opponents, knowledge gap biases, the search for consensus and asymmetry are among the limits attributed to participatory processes (Irwin, 2014; Wynne, 2014). Therefore, after over two decades of research in this field, the shift ‘from understanding to engagement’ and ‘from deficit to dialogue’ still seems far from being achieved (Stilgoe et al., 2014).

Critical analyses of both the process of ‘engagement’ and the notion of ‘public’ have recently been performed, with the intent of overcoming this dilemma (Barnett et al., 2012; Jasanoff, 2014).

In particular, concerning the ‘public’, many scholars have critiqued the idea of laypeople as a homogeneous ‘black box’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996) in favour of plural views of citizens (cf. Maranta et al., 2003). This implies an examination of what constitutes the public in the eyes of policy makers and stakeholders (Bauer, 2014). This is a crucial issue: it has been suggested that implicit and explicit models of ‘public’ have an effect on the mechanisms of engagement approved by authorities, the interaction between laypeople and experts, and the motivation and ability of citizens to get involved (Barnett et al., 2012; Batel and Devine-Wright, 2014; Burningham et al., 2007; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012).

In this article, we will therefore focus on the way Italian policy makers and stakeholders view the public, with regard to sustainable energy. We aim to understand how the public has been socially constructed in parliamentary debate in recent years, and whether and how it has been connected to representations of energy and energy governance. Our overall purpose is to examine how Italy is dealing with the current energy transition (Brondi et al., 2014; Sarrica et al., 2014). Before presenting the study, we will briefly summarise the main models of the public and the key features of the energy situation in Italy.

Models of the public

The main models of the public recognised so far can be reduced to a few themata, that is, fundamental oppositional categories that generate new situated interpretations as well as norms of individual choices and interactions among actors (Marková, 2000). Probably the two most influential themata are the deficit-expertise and the hierarchic-egalitarian dichotomies.

The deficit-expertise thema refers to the issue of voice in public decisions (Huijts et al., 2012). It reveals itself in the opposition between different models of understanding and communicating science- and technology-related topics (cf. Lewenstein, 2003), as well as in the corresponding views of the public. At one pole, consistent with the deficit model, the public is a passive consumer or customer that lacks the time, interest or ability to act (Barnett et al., 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012). Therefore, either the public is naturally excluded from participatory processes, or it must be carefully guided in order to avoid unexpected problems. At the opposite pole, there is the expertise model, which stresses the importance of recognising lay knowledge and values or, at a minimum, the interest and ability of the public to actively participate in decision-making processes and mechanisms of engagement.

The hierarchic-egalitarian thema refers to the right to manage environmental resources and public assets (Gray and Putnam, 2003). It manifests in the opposition between technicians and laypeople (cf. Bucchi, 1996). At one pole, there is the minimalist version of participation, where experts have the task of informing laypeople and the right to lead communication and decision processes. At the opposite pole, there is the maximalist version of participation, where experts and laypeople are involved in dialogical encounter, each bringing his or her own knowledge and needs, both with the right to participate and decide (Batel and Castro, 2009). The two themata are implicitly or explicitly linked to different environmental policies and planning strategies.

The ‘Decide-Announce-Defend’ (DAD) planning strategy (Wolsink, 1996) and explanations like ‘Not-In-My-BackYard’ (NIMBY syndrome) (Burningham, 2000) can be brought back to the deficit and hierarchic poles. According to these approaches, the public is passive and ignorant. Therefore, it should not be involved in decision-making processes, and when it participates, it is motivated by selfishness and irrational beliefs (McClymont and O’Hare, 2008; Roccato et al., 2008).

On the contrary, expertise and egalitarian poles are declared with more and more emphasis on European statements and plans, which aim to develop a veritable energy citizenship: ‘a view of the public that emphasizes awareness of responsibility for climate change […] and the potential for (collective) energy actions, including acts of consumptions and the setting up of community renewable energy projects’ (Devine-Wright, 2007a: 72).

Background scenario on energy sustainability in Italy

Italy is one of the European Union (EU, 2014) Member States with the highest percentages of energy imports (80.8% in 2012, that is, 133.81 Mtoe), with a strong dependence on fossil fuels (particularly petroleum and its by-products decreasing and gases increasing). However, over the past two decades, Italy has increased production from renewable energy sources (RES) considerably (particularly hydropower and solar/photovoltaic), and these now represent almost half (18.06 Mtoe) of the nation’s total energy production (31.95 Mtoe).

This technological change stems from three levels of governance: first, the EU level, detailed in Directives and Communications; second, the national level, detailed in National Action Plans (PAN - Piano d’Azione Nazionale) and National Energy Strategies (SEN - Strategia Energetica Nazionale); third, the local level, detailed in Regional Energy and Environment Plans (PEAR - Piano Energetico e Ambientale Regionale).

The main EU strategy is ascribable to the ‘Climate and Energy Package’, which, in 2009, set targets to be reached by Member States in order to reduce gas emissions and to reduce the EU’s dependence on imported energy (53.4% in 2012).

These 20-20-20 targets provided the framework for energy policies in Italy at the national and local levels. The national level defines the paths that have to be followed in order to reach the Italian targets, whereas the local level contributes to reaching the national targets by allocating quotas among the 20 Italian regions.

In particular, at national level, the success of the incentive policies for RES makes it realistic for Italy to achieve the EU target in all the sectors involved (electric, thermal and transport).

Specifically, until 2011, the attention of incentive policies has mainly been paid to solar/photovoltaic or wind technologies, although this strategy has been criticised since their production pathway is mainly based on the importation of their components. In parallel, geothermal and hydropower showed positive advances too. Bio-energy (biomass, biogas and bio-fuels) has received incentives more recently for its potential crucial role in the thermal sector (heating/cooling), still behind the goals. The energy policy programmes of both the centre-right political coalition, in office from 2008 to 2011, and the opposing centre-left coalition confirm a general support for RES. In fact, although neither programme discussed the details in depth, both parties had many ideas about renewable energy policy in common: they promoted energy saving, RES and cogeneration, and focused on energy security and supply by means of regasification plants. Nuclear power was the only controversial issue. Rejected in 1987 with a national referendum, this technology was promoted by the centre-right coalition and was only partially supported by the principal centre-left party, which favoured investments in fourth-generation research. Nuclear energy was strongly rejected by the left wing of the centre-left coalition, which pushed another national referendum forward that led to the rejection of nuclear power in 2011.

The considerable increase in energy production from RES in recent years has also played a significant role in the reduction in gas emissions. In 2012, Italy – although this was also because of the economic crisis – was considerably closer to the average emissions target for the first commitment period set by the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012) and went further by subscribing to the Doha Amendment, a second commitment period with even more ambitious goals.

Moreover, Italian administrations have arranged a series of actions to promote energy efficiency and to lower consumption. Italian citizens receive incentives for energy-saving activities (e.g. renovating buildings) and products (e.g. energy-saving bulbs, energy performance certificates) and a tax deduction of 55% for home installation of RES.

The scenario illustrated shows that the 20-20-20 targets and the ‘Climate and Energy Package’ can already be put back into discussion in order to orient policies towards more ambitious aims. At the EU level, targets have been updated in 2011 both in the Communication of the European Commission entitled ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ and in the Energy Roadmap 2050 (COM 2011 885/2).

Nevertheless, within the Italian energy system, there are still numerous technical and policy factors that hinder a complete transition towards energy sustainability: the absence of a medium-/long-term strategy that would give certainty to investments in all the sectors involved (electric, thermal, transport, energy saving and efficiency), the failure of investments in smart grids, the incomplete liberalisation that does not facilitate the exchange on-site of every typology of power plant and the lack of the possibility of direct selling of energy and of creating private networks. All these components are the object of intense public and scientific debate.² Furthermore, the involvement of citizens in the energy decision-making processes that lead to elaborate national and local energy programming paths (PAN, SEN, PEAR) is lacking. Strategic impact assessment procedures (VAS - Valutazione Ambientale Strategica), as well as environmental impact assessment procedures (VIA - Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale), which are implemented in the energy sector and involve public participation, require long authorisation processes and are applied only to large-scale RES plants (>1 MW). On the contrary, small-scale plants (<1 MW) are subject to simplified authorisation procedures (PAS - Procedura Abilitativa Semplificata) that do not require citizens involvement. Over the last few years, as a consequence of these different procedures, nearly all the new solar/photovoltaic systems, and over half of all other RES plants, were slightly below the threshold of 1 MW (Gestore Servizi Energetici (GSE), 2012). A positive element – although it is not mandatory – is the frequent consultation with stakeholders during the elaboration of planning documents. However, this involvement has not been always translated into a process of public debate that engages citizens and local communities.

Moreover, the progressive mandate to local authorities has led to a considerable fragmentation of the regulatory framework. The two tools available to local authorities in order to involve citizens in the development of energy scenarios are the Local Agenda 21 and the Covenant of Mayors. While the former, although starting from excellent premises, has been much criticised in the last decade, the second is an example of a success in achieving the 20-20-20 targets locally. At present, it represents a valuable tool in the hands of local governments. This is particularly true for Italy, the country with the highest number of signatories.

2. Aims

This article aims to explore how Italian policy makers and stakeholders have socially constructed the public and its relationship with sustainable energy policies in recent years.

In particular, we look at three elements of sustainable energy: representations of energy, energy governance and the energy public. These three elements (cf. Stern and Aronson, 1984) can be defined separately; however, they cannot be understood independently from each other. Mutual relations among these three elements were thus examined in order to explore whether and how they were oriented by expertise and egalitarian views or by deficit and hierarchic views, which foster or hinder the development of a proper energy citizenship, respectively.

Changes and stabilities in the representations were also explored across time (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, 2008), as well as differences and similarities among the contents shared by different social actors.

3. Method

The study envisaged the use of archival materials extracted from Italian parliamentary debates. Materials were searched by means of the public online archive of the Chamber of Deputies (http://www.camera.it/), where verbatim reports of the sittings and official documents are available. Texts of the parliamentary debates were collected by selecting as search criteria the Italian keywords energ* and sostenibil* [sustainab*]³ across the period between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012. The year 2009 was chosen as the starting point because of the EU ‘Climate and Energy Package’, with its 20-20-20 targets, and especially the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC, signed by the European Parliament and the Council, which defined the Italian framework with regard to energy policies. The year 2012 was a crucial year for the Kyoto Protocol, and, for this reason, it represents an important moment of analysis and evaluation for Italy and for the entire world.⁴ Specifically, the study focused on the scrutiny function (i.e. policy setting, scrutiny of the government’s activities and fact-finding investigation) whereby discussions and negotiations take place; the legislative function, that is the formal construction of laws, was excluded. Then, the research team manually screened texts, selecting all the texts deemed relevant for the topic under study. Specifically, texts in which the use of energ* and sustainab* was not related to energy sustainability (i.e. texts with sentences such as ‘we will put all our energy into this initiative’ or ‘we have to think about the economic sustainability of this intervention’) were excluded from subsequent analysis. The definitive corpus includes n = 90 discussions among policy makers (i.e. policy setting and scrutiny reports) and n = 53 consultations with stakeholders (i.e. fact-finding investigation reports) (e.g. private companies – energy producers, electric utility companies, electricity transmission system operators – trade and industry associations, regulatory authorities, environmental groups, members of government consulted as key informants⁵).

Data were investigated adopting both qualitative and quantitative content analyses – with the aid of the software NVivo (cf. http://www.qsrinternational.com/) – and argumentation analysis.

The sentence was chosen as a unit of analysis. Two independent judges carried out the coding procedure, and its reliability and heuristic capacity were enhanced discussing all the categories with the research team until reaching consensus.

The coding process was mainly guided by the contribution of Devine-Wright (2007a) on studying energy issues (cf. also Stern and Aronson, 1984). Codes derived from the literature were as follows: energy as commodity (i.e. an asset subjected to the laws of market, supply and demand), ecological resource (i.e. a natural resource extracted, used and/or to be saved), social necessity (i.e. a response to universal needs in terms of justice, equity, availability and rights) or strategic material (i.e. a tool for economic stability and the geopolitical security of a nation); centralised (i.e. a top-down and hierarchical management of energy systems) or decentralised governance (i.e. a bottom-up and collaborative management of energy systems); and public as consumer (i.e. passive and only interested in the fulfilment of its own consumption needs), having or not having access to energy (i.e. described in terms of the ability to gain or not gain access to the energy market and/or to energy supply), environmentally concerned (i.e. concerned about environmental impact and exploitation of resources, yet passive) or energy citizen (i.e. socially aware and committed, engaged in the process of decision-making and active in the everyday practice of energy production, saving or efficiency) (see Brondi et al., 2014; Sarrica et al., 2014 for a detailed description of codes).

Finally, an argumentation analysis (cf. Liakopoulos, 2000) was conducted to identify – by describing the relationships between codes emerging from content analysis – similarities and differences among the argumentative patterns of the debates. According to Liakopoulos (2000), argumentation analysis can

be conceptualized as a form of content analysis. Both analyses try to reduce large amounts of material by capturing certain important aspects of the texts […] [Argumentation analysis] is a realistic depiction of an argumentation structure deriving from a large amount of text. Such depiction allows for the description of category relations. (pp. 167–168)

Mutual relationships among the representations of energy, governance and public were examined for each text individually, and the prevailing relationships were examined qualitatively. Consistent or inconsistent relationships among representations, the evolution of argumentations during the debates, their sequence and their stability and change were thus examined.

Similarities and differences among the argumentative patterns proposed by the actors involved in the parliamentary debates were also explored. The political orientations of policy makers, as well as stakeholders’ specificities, were taken into account, in order to identify shared patterns based on internal memberships and belongings. Surprisingly, these factors had only a weak effect on the debates. Concerning policy makers, the centre-right (in office until November 2011) and the centre-left (the opposition) political coalitions actually share the same patterns. Some differences emerged when considering the specific parties, and these will be discussed in the ‘Results’ section. Concerning stakeholders, differences were noted between environmental groups and other stakeholders (private companies, trade and industry associations, regulatory authorities). For this reason, these two groups will be presented separately in the ‘Results’ section.

4. Results

Sustainable energy: Representations of energy, governance and public

In Italian parliamentary debates on energy sustainability, energy is mostly represented as a strategic material for national growth in times of global crisis and for independence from geopolitical turbulence, or – secondarily – as an economic commodity (Table 1). Both of these principal representations remain almost stable over time, with a slight inversion during 2010. Although less frequently, a focus on depletion of energy-related ecological resources is also present, whereas very little attention is devoted to energy as a social necessity.

Table 1.

Representations of energy, governance and public by social actors (number and percentage of coding references).

		Policy makers	Stakeholders – other	Stakeholders – environmental groups	Total
Energy	Commodity	317 (24.4%)	330 (49.2%)	10 (14.5%)	657 (32.2%)
	Ecological resource	333 (25.6%)	73 (10.9%)	30 (43.5%)	436 (21.4%)
	Social necessity	117 (9.0%)	53 (7.9%)	9 (13.0%)	179 (8.8%)
	Strategic material	533 (41.0%)	215 (32.0%)	20 (29.0%)	768 (37.6%)
Governance	Centralised	556 (68.6%)	201 (52.9%)	98 (81.7%)	855 (65.3%)
	Decentralised	254 (31.4%)	179 (47.1%)	22 (18.3%)	455 (34.7%)
Public	Consumer	76 (13.9%)	162 (42.9%)	10 (27.0%)	248 (25.8%)
	Access	292 (53.6%)	166 (43.9%)	7 (18.9%)	465 (48.4%)
	Energy citizen	164 (30.1%)	41 (10.8%)	17 (46.0%)	222 (23.1%)
	Environmentally concerned	13 (2.4%)	9 (2.4%)	3 (8.1%)	25 (2.6%)

Both centralised and decentralised governances are present; however, the former is cited almost twice as often as the latter (Table 1). Centralised governance is always prevalent in the years analysed, although a significant increase in interest towards decentralised governance is observed in 2012.

The public is mainly viewed in relation to access issues, or – secondarily – as passive consumers (Table 1). The view of the public as energy citizens is also present, although with lower frequencies, whereas the acknowledgement of an environmentally concerned public is almost absent. The trend of these views of the public changes over time: if in 2009, 2010 and 2012 the prevalent view is strongly associated with access issues, in 2011 – concurrently with the national referendum against nuclear power – the focus temporarily moves towards a more active and engaged idea of the public.

Figure 1 summarises the three main representations of energy, governance and public, and shows the emerging differences among various social actors.

Figure 1.

Representations of energy, governance and public by social actors.

Considering discussions among policy makers, the speeches on sustainable energy are polarised: results show that politicians mainly represent energy as a strategic material, cite a centralised governance and view the public in relation to access issues. In particular – with the exception of the non-political members of the Monti caretaker government, who mainly represent energy as a commodity – all parties propose a representation of energy as a strategic material. Similarly, the Members of Parliament (MPs) of all political orientations favour centralised governance. Moreover, only the members of the party that promoted the national referendum rejecting nuclear power differ from the prevalent view of the public, favouring contents on energy citizenship. Looking at the stakeholders, this general idea of sustainable energy is even more unbalanced towards a representation of energy as a commodity and a view of the public as related to access issues, but with a lower attention to a centralised governance. Nevertheless, significant differences among various stakeholders should be noted: environmental groups widely favour argumentations about centralised governance, but they oppose to this scenario a representation of energy as an ecological resource, and a view of the public as energy citizens.

Sustainable energy: Argumentative ‘short-circuits’

The results emerging from argumentation analysis show some recurring patterns in the analysed texts. The argumentations do not develop along linear sequences; on the contrary, these patterns are built around a circular structure, in which the use of some argumentations acts as a pretext – sometimes even inconsistently – to justify the return of some key issues in the debate. In this regard, we have chosen to define these circular relationships as ‘circuits’ or – when they show inconsistent mutual relationships – ‘short-circuits’.

Stakeholders share two similar, consistent and traditional patterns of argumentation on sustainable energy and its management (Figure 2, top). Specifically, the first pattern includes a public viewed in relation to access issues, associated with a representation of energy as a commodity – and secondarily as a strategic material – and with a centralised governance. The second pattern differs to the first one only in the view of the public, described here as passive consumers. The differing view of the public in these two patterns could be interpreted by considering the spread of the economic crisis in recent years: from mere consumers, the public becomes more and more an issue to be dealt with as the economic crisis worsens.

Figure 2.

Argumentative patterns (circuits and short-circuits) according to different social actors.

Argumentations proposed by stakeholders are thus based on the idea that energy is a matter of economic interest. They use a largely techno-scientific language, but seem to interact with policy makers by means of frequent references to energy represented in terms of national and strategic interests.

Moreover, they find a meeting point with the politicians by proposing a strongly centralised modality of energy governance as well as a view of the public as lacking knowledge, capacities or interest in such difficult issues. They refer particularly to second-generation technologies, above all solar/photovoltaic:

We must establish all the decrees in good time to ensure continuity and certain rules for the achievement of the PAN objectives with incentives that will ensure the development of the sector, but that are also economically viable for the bill of the Italians […] The EU objectives will eventually have a cost for those who consume electricity, and so for customers […] I believe that the work you are doing right now goes in this direction, that is to make sure that this cost is as low as possible, but we can’t imagine that these objectives can be achieved without impacting on Italians’ pockets. (Enel Spa)

From a strictly economic point of view, the financing of renewable energy sources is done by citizens, but produces a net revenue for the State: the costs are charged to the energy bill, while the benefits, which are of a fiscal nature, are on the State budget. (Federutility)

The draft of the legislative decree in question in its present formulation introduces exciting progress towards the realization in Italy of energy, natural gas and electricity markets which are even more competitive, more open to the benefit of consumers, more transparent and non-discriminatory in their criteria – such as access to networks and transaction information – and more integrated into the European market framework, while respecting the needs of supply security, operation of energy systems and protection of the users of such systems, customers and, in particular, the so-called vulnerable consumers. (Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas – Authority for Electricity and Gas)

These patterns are coherent with hierarchic views, in which authorities should regulate the exploitation of resources and experts should control energy production. Both argumentative patterns could also be ascribable to the approach of hard energy paths (Lovins, 1977), characterised by centralised, top-down governance and by the presence of large-scale production sites distant from the places of energy consumption. Into this classical approach stakeholders insert renewable sources in the place of fossil fuels, implicitly showing a ‘technological substitution’ and not a radical ‘reconfiguration’ of the system (Geels and Schot, 2007).

Members of environmental groups share a different, but coherent argumentative pattern (Figure 2, middle). They view the public as energy citizens, associated with energy as an ecological resource – and secondarily as a strategic material – and in contrast with centralised governance.

Argumentations proposed by environmental groups are thus based on the representation of energy as a precious resource that, on the one hand, should be saved and preserved for the future of the planet and, on the other hand, should be produced through renewables in order to contribute to the reduction of CO₂ emissions and climate change. In this argumentation, the acknowledgement of the strategic functions provided by sustainable energy is a rhetoric introduced in order to dialogue with policy makers.

Wind and also solar/photovoltaic and biomass technologies fuel the most controversial discussions: the first one for the impact of the turbines on landscapes and the last two for their competition with agriculture:

We are against the vast ‘football fields’ of accumulator batteries, which would be used to store solar energy and then return it at night […] With regard to wind power, Italy is a country that has magnificent landscapes and I can’t figure out which tourist country would accept those turbines that disfigure the territory. (Fare Ambiente – Making Environment)

Their argumentations show a strong opposition to a centralised modality of energy governance. Moreover, they give value to lay knowledge and propose a view of the public as active, fostering the development of a proper energy citizenship:

I think that the cost-benefit analysis is also a participatory and democratic view, which obviates the need to find an accumulation of rules and constraints on our territory, on our landscape […] in the cost-benefit analysis it is necessary to recognize what the preferences of the citizens in economic terms on environmental protection are. (Amici della Terra – Friends of the Earth)

This argumentative pattern is coherent with egalitarian views, in which laypeople and experts are equally responsible for the fragile equilibrium between human beings and nature and are asked to act personally in order to avoid the depletion of resources. This pattern could also be ascribable to soft energy paths (Lovins, 1977), which are characterised by efficient energy consumption, large use of renewables and a more gentle impact on the environment and communities. However, the pattern proposed by environmental groups diverges from this classical approach in its numerous references to centralised governance instead of small-scale production sites close to users and decentralised, bottom-up governance. It seems as if the soft path was defined in negative, in opposition to the current reality, as a quest for a radical ‘re-alignment’ of the system (Geels and Schot, 2007).

Finally, the discussions among policy makers present more varied and fragmented structures. However, it is possible to identify two main argumentative patters, both inconsistent (Figure 2, bottom). The first pattern defines energy as a strategic material – and secondarily as an ecological resource – coupled with decentralised governance, but the public is viewed in terms of (lack of) capability of gaining access to the energy market or energy supply. The second pattern also shares the idea that energy is a strategic material – and secondarily an ecological resource; however, this view is coupled with centralised governance and with views of the public as energy citizens. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this view of the public frequently has a – more or less explicitly – negative connotation. Politicians describe energy citizenship more as an obstacle to top-down policy-making processes on energy policies than as a fruitful opportunity.

According to policy makers, energy is thus above all a matter of national interest; however, their argumentations are also grounded in rhetoric about energy as an ecological resource that should be preserved, especially when they frame their discussions within the broader European context.

Different modalities of governance assume a central role in constructing the view of the public, which remains, however, always deficient (in agency or in consciousness).

In the first pattern, the public lacks agency when – even if it is aware and sensitive – it cannot gain complete access to energy supply (because of prices being too high) or to the energy market (because of constraints due to the inefficiency of the bureaucratic machine). It is especially the case with second-generation technologies – above all solar/photovoltaic:

The continuing absence of decrees is penalizing all the small-size renewable energy plants […] As a result of this delay many small producers are not able to initiate new investment programs that would develop the market and technological potential of these sources, with negative consequences in industrial and employment terms. (Interrogation Libé)

We thank the government because it has also agreed to provide incentives for farmers who decide to use the energy produced from biomass for their own consumption […] Moreover, the savings on energy bills for imports of natural gas could amount to about 1.5-2 billion euro per year in current prices; by doing so, we could maintain the levels of domestic supply of natural gas even in the presence of the decline in the production of our deposits. (Servodio et al. Motions)

In the second pattern, the public lacks consciousness in the negative representation of the energy citizen, that is, when individuals enact oppositional behaviours against centralised decisions despite not being sufficiently informed. In this case, the attention to the technologies does not focus exclusively on (controversial) nuclear power, but also on all the renewable sources, both new and traditional:

The mere announcement by the government has caused fear and anxiety in the population […] We believe that this dialogue is fundamental to preparing the country for – and to sharing with it – the new energy challenges […] The information – and a shared decision-making process – will broadly contribute to creating a climate of collaboration, so that energy policies can be implemented in territories and communities. The condition of energy dependence of our country is so strong as to prevent any further hesitation and requires beginning in a shared manner, because it can’t happen that – while experts say that we are ready – instead the country is not. (Mosella Interpellation)

Both these argumentative patterns try to reconcile the two alternative energy paths proposed by Lovins (1977) and end up as unstable transformations of the representation of the system. These argumentative inconsistencies, which we have called ‘short-circuits’, serve, in any case, to re-affirm the centring of policy makers in an up-to-date version of the hard path. Policy makers have competence and agency and are thus entitled to ensure the provision of strategic resources to Italy and to preserve the ecological balance despite the lack of capability and consciousness of the citizens faced, respectively, with opportunities for decentralisation or with centralised decisions.

5. Conclusion

This article has examined the views of the public in relation to energy sustainability issues proposed by Italian policy makers and stakeholders during parliamentary debates in recent years (2009–2012).

The public’s views affect regulatory governance (Sovacool, 2014) and are implemented in the models of engagement proposed by authorities and stakeholders (Bauer, 2014). Furthermore, people can internalise such views, which can then become veritable self-representations that guide the way citizens perceive themselves and their role in decision-making processes (Barnett et al., 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012). For these reasons, a deficient view of the public – along with a centralised modality of governance based on questionable technological choices – could represent a significant obstacle affecting the construction of a proper energy citizenship.

Results show that policy makers and stakeholders have socially constructed the issue of sustainable energy trying to accommodate sustainability and the use of RES to the traditional approach to energy management ascribable to the hard paths (Lovins, 1977). This is characterised by a centralised, top-down governance regulated by authorities and by the presence of few, large-scale production sites, distant from the sites of energy consumption, controlled by experts. Energy is thus represented in terms of national and economic interests and the public is viewed as lacking awareness or capabilities for dealing with – and interesting themselves in – such difficult issues.

The public is thus viewed as lacking consciousness and/or agency, yielding four main models (Figure 3): first, as a consumer and/or customer who is neither sufficiently informed and concerned about energy sustainability nor involved in the first person in such issues; second, as a person who – even if aware of energy sustainability – cannot gain access to the energy market and/or energy supply; third, as an environmentally concerned person who does not, however, put such values into practice; and fourth, as a person who – even if poorly or ‘wrongly’ informed and concerned about energy sustainability – acts by hindering and/or slowing down the successful implementation of centralised energy policies.

Figure 3.

Deficient views of the public in Italian parliamentary debates.

The results are in line with the scientific literature on the deficit model. However, different kinds of deficient views were identified, which can also be interpreted by considering other models of understanding and communicating science- and technology-related topics (cf. Lewenstein, 2003), thus introducing some glimmers of hope. Further studies are therefore needed to better understand whether these various deficient views lead to different policies.

Indeed, a form of understanding seems to be acknowledged in the representation of the energy public, which is viewed as having awareness and sensitivity, but lacking agency (i.e. access views). This view of the public focuses on structural constraints (e.g. bureaucracy and costs) and on the quality of the information provided to citizens. This approach is coherent with the contextual model, which ‘recognises the presence of social forces’ together with ‘the ability of social systems and media representations to either dampen or amplify public concern about specific issues’ (Brossard and Lewenstein, 2010: 14). Nevertheless, this is an individualistic approach that thrives on delivering information more than it does on actual public engagement. In this regard, Barnett et al. (2012) stated that a public that is socially constructed in relation to matters of concern – and thus limited in its actions – rather than as poor in knowledge ‘invites interactions framed in terms of expert reassurance rather than mutual exchange and engagement […]’ (p. 47). Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the acquisition of agency may also lead to a change in representation towards an anti-scientific and obstructionist idea of the public (Owens, 2000), which moves towards what we call a negative view of the energy citizen.

It is also worth noting that all the social actors involved in the parliamentary debates share this prevailing representation of sustainable energy with only minimal differences among them.

Two notable exceptions emerge from our data. Environmental groups, which strongly contest this model, and discussions held in 2011, at the same time as the national referendum rejecting nuclear power, move the focus towards public participation/engagement models (cf. Lewenstein, 2003). These exceptions signal the political efficacy of models that thrive at actively engaging citizens (Brossard and Lewenstein, 2010); however, these models still challenge the deficit and hierarchical views, which prevail in the political discourse in Italy.

In the attempt to force energy sustainability into the space defined by deficit and hierarchical poles of the two themata considered, the representations of energy, governance and public proposed by policy makers are often in inconsistent mutual relationships. Policy makers introduce veritable ‘short-circuits’ in their argumentations that preclude public engagement and hinder the development of a proper energy citizenship. ‘Short-circuits’ constrain individual and community actions to accept or refuse top-down decisions and leave little room for community empowerment and bottom-up innovation. The argumentative ‘short-circuits’ seem to be aimed at preserving policy makers’ power and control as against more distributed and collaborative models of management of energy issues. On the one hand, they might be interpreted as an attempt to integrate conflicting models of sustainable energy in a new emerging one. On the other hand, inconsistent relationships among vertices might be considered a form of resistance to the on-going changes required by other levels of governance (i.e. European and local levels). In both cases, the views of the public proposed by Italian policy makers are far from the ideal concept of energy citizenship and map to the deficit and hierarchic poles of the two fundamental themata considered.

The results also highlight the prevalence of a techno-centric perspective with regard to the perceived relationships between governance and the public. On the one hand, when a decentralised modality of governance prevails in speeches, second-generation technologies – especially solar/photovoltaic panels – are accused of being difficult to access because they are overly expensive or because of the constraints due to the inefficiency of the bureaucratic machine in providing the economic incentives. On the other hand, when a centralised modality of governance prevails, renewable technologies (both first- and second-generation), as well as nuclear power, are expected to elicit oppositional behaviours by citizens.

To conclude, the picture drawn by this study shows a national context taking its first steps along the pathway towards ‘full’ energy sustainability. We cannot exclude that transformations might be observed in the future (Mulkay, 1994) but, at present, the study suggests the necessity of fostering a change in the political debate in order to construct policies that are substantially more inclusive and participatory. In this regard, it should be noted that we focused on official transcripts and documents concerning the scrutiny function: we cannot exclude that this focus favoured hierarchic rhetoric based on ‘facts’, ‘science’ and ‘rationality’, whereas more informal and local contexts may favour the emergence of participatory rhetoric and values.

In conclusion, our results suggest some preliminary recommendations that will allow Italian sustainable energy pathways to fully engage in participatory processes. Local initiatives such as the Covenant of Mayors, which currently bypass the national level in order to access the European one, could be brought to the centre of the national debate. These initiatives acknowledge lay expertise, and the public, although often involved through invited engagement processes, is committed to developing community empowerment and energy citizenship. These initiatives are based on democratic and participatory views of public, energy and energy systems, and their inclusion in the national debate could foster effectiveness and efficiency in energy strategies and action plans.

At the same time, in order to overcome the deficit model, engagement education for younger generations becomes crucial. Projects and initiatives in schools have been proposed recently (e.g. the Italian Ministry for the Environment has drafted guidelines that would make environmental education a compulsory school subject as soon as the 2015–2016 school year). We support this choice; however, our data suggest that the mere raising of awareness could lead – again – to the construction of conscious citizens that lack agency. On the contrary, thinking about young citizens should encourage both traditional and innovative forms of (invited and uninvited) engagement (Wynne, 2007) and promote future positive views of public.

In order to provide transnational recommendations, further investigation is necessary to better understand whether this general tendency of representing the public as deficient assumes specific characteristics in Italy or can be reasonably extended to other European and non-European countries with comparable features. Some examples could be countries that are implementing similar energy pathways (e.g. other leaders in RES production such as Germany, Sweden and Spain), countries that have similar energy profiles (e.g. a similar energy palette, a similar fossil fuel dependency or a similar quota of energy imports, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta) or countries that are geographically and culturally near (e.g. countries in the Mediterranean region that share similar ‘histories of scientific culture’ with Italy; cf. Greco (2004) for a preliminary proposal of a Mediterranean model of science communication).

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

With regard to Alessandro Caramis, the contribution expresses solely the point of view of the author and does not reflect the official position of his institution (ISTAT).

Funding

This research was supported by the Basic Research Investment Fund 2010 of the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research (Programma Futuro in Ricerca 2010) – project ACCESI (RBFR10886R).

Notes

Author biographies

Sonia Brondi, PhD in Social Sciences (University of Padua), is Postdoc and Researcher within the ACCESI project. Her main interests include environmental changes from a socio-constructivist perspective, with a focus on identity processes and social participation.

Mauro Sarrica, PhD, is Adjunct Professor of Social Psychology and Communication Psychology. He is principal investigator of the ACCESI project. His main interests are in the social construction of knowledge, the stability and change of social beliefs, and peace psychology.

Alessandro Caramis is an Environmental and land use Sociologist. He carried out research on environmental conflicts and environmental communication at Sapienza University of Rome, and since 2013, he is a Researcher for the National Institute of Statistics.

Chiara Piccolo, graduated in Psychology, is PhD student in Social Sciences: Interactions, Communication, and Cultural Constructions. Her research interests include social representations, welfare, social policy and social changes.

Bruno M. Mazzara is full Professor of Social Psychology and Consumer Psychology. His main interests are in cultural psychology, social representations and mass media, environmental psychology and consumer behaviour.

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